

Mobility network reveals the impact of spatial vaccination heterogeneity on COVID-19

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12 ABSTRACT

Massive vaccination is one of the most effective epidemic control measures. Because one's vaccination decision is shaped by social processes (e.g., socioeconomic sorting and social contagion), the pattern of vaccine uptake tends to show strong social and spatial heterogeneity, such as urban-rural divide and clustering. Examining through network perspectives, here we quantify the impact of spatial vaccination heterogeneity on COVID outbreaks and offer policy recommendations on location-based vaccination campaigns. Leveraging fine-grained mobility data and computational models, we investigate two network effects—the “hub effect” (hubs in the mobility network usually have higher vaccination rates) and the “homophily effect” (neighboring places tend to have similar vaccination rates). Applying Bayesian deep learning and fine-grained epidemic simulations, we show a negative effect of homophily and a positive effect of highly vaccinated hubs on reducing COVID-19 case counts; these two effects are estimated to jointly increase the total cases by approximately 10% in the U.S. Moreover, inspired by these results, we propose a vaccination campaign strategy that targets a small number of regions with the largest gain in protective power. Our simulation shows that we can reduce the number of cases by 20% by only vaccinating an additional 1% of the population. Our study suggests that we must examine the interplay between vaccination patterns and mobility networks beyond the overall vaccination rate, and that accurate location-based targeting can be equally if not more important than improving the overall vaccination rate.

14 Introduction

15 COVID-19 pandemic is not only a public health challenge but also an immense societal challenge because social
16 processes, such as political polarization and social contagion, significantly impact the course of epidemics^{1–10}.

17 Although the availability of effective vaccines presents a clear solution—reaching the herd immunity¹¹, it is still
18 challenging to predict the course of the pandemic as numerous social factors come into play^{12–15}. These factors
19 include highly unequal vaccine allocation across locations¹⁶, heterogeneous vaccine hesitancy across social groups¹⁴,
20 and their mixing patterns^{17,18} in social and mobility networks. Such heterogeneity raises important questions: What
21 are the implications of heterogeneous vaccine uptake across the society? How can we understand and predict the
22 course of the pandemic given the observed patterns of vaccine uptake?

23 Our study addresses these questions by employing an empirical mobility network dataset and large-scale
24 epidemic simulations with hypothetical vaccination distributions. Departing from typical simplistic models to
25 understand vaccine performance^{19–21}, we employ a data-driven approach to discuss the impact of spatial vaccination
26 heterogeneity in the real world by leveraging the availability of fine-grained human mobility data, vaccination
27 data, and census data in the U.S. These rich datasets, along with fine-grained data-driven models^{22–24}, enable us
28 to estimate the outcome of hypothetical vaccination distributions and vaccination campaigns with unprecedented
29 precision^{14,18,25–27}.

30 The goal of our study is twofold—to examine the impact of spatial vaccination heterogeneity on COVID-19
31 and to provide policy recommendations for location-based vaccination campaigns through the lens of networks.
32 We begin by investigating the impact of spatial vaccination heterogeneity on COVID-19 by focusing on two major
33 network effects. The first network effect is *homophily*, which describes the phenomenon where similar people tend
34 to cluster, either due to sorting, social contagion, or local regulations^{3,17,28}. In our context, homophily captures the
35 fact that vaccination rates are similar among geographically close or socially connected locations^{9,28,29}. A high
36 level of homophily in vaccination leads to clusters of the unvaccinated, which can trigger localized outbreaks and
37 produce more cases than expected by the overall vaccination rate. The second network effect is the *hub effect*: the
38 vaccination rate of central and highly mobile places can have a disproportionate impact on the case count^{30,31}. Given
39 that mobility networks exhibit a high level of degree heterogeneity³², and that the urban population is more likely
40 to be vaccinated in the U.S. due to the current political landscape, the vaccination heterogeneity in the U.S. may
41 potentially reduce the severity of outbreaks. In many parts of the world, hubs may have a higher vaccination rate for
42 various reasons^{33–35}. We visualize these two effects on the county level in Figure 1 for illustration.^a

43 To quantify the impacts of these two effects on case counts, we examine both synthetic and real-world fine-
44 grained mobility networks. We design synthetic networks that exhibit either hub effect or homophily effect to study
45 how these two effects operate in isolation. We compare the original vaccination distribution with hypothetical
46 vaccination distributions where we remove or flip the direction of homophily or hub effects (otherwise the same),

^aWe use the 2019 mobility data to reflect the scenario when all businesses were to fully reopen and vaccination rates are recorded on July 1st, 2021. Counties in Hawaii are omitted because of the unavailability of vaccination data. Note that this is only for the illustrative purpose and all our later results are based on CBG-level analyses.

47 finding that the homophily effect exacerbates the size of an outbreak, while the hub effect attenuates it. Next, we
48 repeat the same procedure on the empirical mobility networks and vaccination distribution in the U.S. Because
49 vaccination data is only available at the county level, we leverage additional fine-grained census features and
50 Bayesian deep learning^{36,37} to infer vaccination rates at the level of the census block groups (CBGs).^b We show
51 that the observed homophily accounts for at least 17% increase in new COVID-19 infections within 30 days in
52 comparison with hypothetical scenarios without homophily, while the hub effect caused by urban-rural divide
53 reduces the cases compared with the corresponding hypothetical vaccination distribution.^c

54 In the second part of our study, we provide a potentially highly effective location-based vaccination campaign
55 strategy, which can substantially reduce case counts. Inspired by the conclusions about the two network effects,
56 we develop an efficient algorithm to explore the optimal vaccination campaign strategy that focuses on certain
57 locations to further reduce hesitancy and encourage additional vaccinations (given no shortage of vaccines). While
58 it is computationally challenging to run transmission simulations for 200,000 CBGs, our algorithm solves these
59 challenges by using gradient-based optimization on a differentiable surrogate objective. We predict that our proposed
60 campaign strategy can reduce the number of cases by almost 20% with only a 1% increase in overall vaccination rate,
61 as opposed to a 5% reduction with homogeneously distributed vaccination uptake. Our strategy also outperforms the
62 baseline strategy that targets only locations with the lowest vaccination rates³⁹ by two times. These results show that
63 accurate location-based targeting can be equally if not more important than improving the overall vaccination rate.

64 Results

65 Simulation results from two synthetic networks

66 We begin by employing synthetic mobility networks to study the impact of hubs and homophily on case counts.
67 The goal of this first set of simulations is to isolate the impact of each effect by selectively controlling specific
68 features of synthetic networks. To study the impact of homophily, we construct a *clustered network* of census block
69 groups (CBGs), where closely connected CBGs have a similar level of vaccination rates and the network is polarized
70 into high and low vaccination regions. Separately, to show the impact of the hub effect, we construct a *centralized*
71 *network* with a positive correlation between the network degree of a CBG and its vaccination rate. We then mix
72 these two networks to observe how these two effects jointly affect the outcome. See *Materials and Methods* for the
73 detailed explanation of how these synthetic networks are constructed.

74 To measure the impact of homophily or hubs on the severity of outbreaks, we redistribute vaccination over
75 CBGs in the network that *removes* or *flips* the homophily or hub effect, but otherwise is identical to the original
76 vaccination distribution including the overall vaccination rate. We can then compare the outcome under a hypothetical

^bDeep learning has been shown powerful in predicting fine-grained level statistics, such as poverty³⁸.

^cSince our simulations assume the full-reopening scenario, we use pre-pandemic mobility data in 2019.




Figure 1. Illustration of the average vaccination rate in each county and the county-level mobility network backbone (a) among all U.S. counties, (b) for Hennepin county in MN and its adjacent counties, and (c) for Dallas county in TX and its adjacent counties (see *Materials and Methods* for details). Nodes correspond to counties and are colored according to their vaccination rate, ranging from red (low) to blue (high), and are positioned according to the Fruchterman-Reingold layout⁴⁰. The node size reflects its connectivity to other nodes. Panel (a) illustrates strong homophily, shown as localized clusters of the blue and red. For example, we see “blue clusters” for counties close to New York county in NY and Middlesex county in MA, while we observe “red clusters” for counties close to Dallas county in TX and Fayette county in KY. Panels (b) and (c) are the local networks for Hennepin county in MN and Dallas county in TX, respectively, where we observe that these hub counties that are connected to many other counties tend to have a higher vaccination rate than their neighboring counties.

77 vaccination distribution and the original vaccination distributions. Differences in the COVID-19 cases would then
 78 inform the impact of homophily or hub effects. Throughout the article, we consider four hypothetical vaccination
 79 distributions: “reverse”, “exchange”, “shuffle”, and “order.” Their impacts on homophily and the hub effect are
 80 illustrated in Table 1 and details are described in *Materials and Methods*.




Figure 2. Simulation results for synthetic networks. (Left) For a network with strong homophily, both “exchange” and “shuffle” remove the homophily, leading to fewer cases. “Reverse” does not affect the homophily, as well as the outcome. “Order” slows down the spread by introducing the the optimal hub effect. (Middle) For a network with strong hub effect, both “reverse” and “shuffle” remove the hub effect, leading to more cases. “Exchange” does not significantly affect the hub effect, nor the number of cases. (Right) A mixture of two networks (clustered and centralized networks) with a tuning parameter λ illustrates how the two effects can be mixed in a single network. Error bars are standard deviations from different runs of simulations.

Hypothetical vaccination distribution	Homophily	Hub Effect
Reverse	=	-
Exchange	-	\approx
Shuffle	-	-
Order	-	+

Table 1. Impacts of four hypothetical vaccination distributions on homophily and the hub effect compared to the original distribution. Homophily in the networks is largely reduced or removed with “exchange” and “shuffle”, but mostly unchanged by “reverse” and “order”; the hub effect is flipped by “reverse” (i.e., high vaccination CBGs become low vaccination in the hypothetical vaccination distribution and vice versa) and removed by “shuffle”, improved by “order”, and mostly unchanged by “exchange”. In all four hypothetical scenarios, we keep the average vaccination rate (population-weighted over CBGs) the same as “original” to prevent any effect from higher or lower overall vaccination rate.

81 Figure 2 shows the simulated case counts under these hypothetical vaccination distributions, using a pre-assigned
82 proportion of initially infected people (see *Materials and Methods* for details). The left panel shows any hypothetical
83 vaccination distribution that removes the homophily effect (“exchange” or “shuffle”) reduces cases; this confirms
84 our conjecture that stronger homophily increases the number of cases. Since there is no hub effect in this network,
85 “reverse” has the same result as “original”, and introducing the hub effect (“order”) would greatly reduce the cases.
86 The middle panel presents the simulated case counts on the centralized network which has a strong hub effect but no
87 homophily. The main observation is that “shuffle” and “reverse” increase cases because they either eliminate or
88 reverse the direction of the hub effect. Furthermore, since the network already has a perfectly strong hub effect,
89 the “order” does not further improve the outcome. This confirms our assumption that the hub effect attenuates the
90 severity of outbreaks. Since this network does not exhibit homophily, “exchange” does not have any impact.

91 The right panel shows how new infections change under the hypothetical vaccination distributions for different
92 mixtures of the two synthetic networks. The network includes λ fraction of the edges from the centralized network
93 and $1 - \lambda$ fraction of the edges from the clustered network (see *Materials and Methods* for details). Here the
94 vaccination rate is the weighted average (where the weights are λ and $1 - \lambda$) in the two networks. As λ increases, the
95 case count under the “reverse” hypothetical vaccination distribution increases due to a stronger hub effect. Similarly,
96 when λ decreases, the case count under “exchange” decreases due to weaker homophily. These results further verify
97 that homophilous networks with vaccination clustering would have more cases whereas the highly vaccinated hubs
98 decrease them.

99 **Simulation results on the U.S. mobility network**

100 Having illustrated the potential impacts of homophily and hubs, we then examine these effects on the observed U.S.
101 mobility network and vaccination rates. The nationwide mobility network is constructed based on mobile phone
102 users’ home census block group (CBG) and the points of interest (POIs) they visit on an hourly basis (see *Materials*
103 *and Methods* for details). We examine the impact of current vaccination patterns when human mobility were to be
104 recovered to pre-pandemic, and thus we use the mobility data from 2019.

105 Since the vaccination rates are only available at the county level, we extrapolate them to the CBG level using
106 additional CBG-level census demographic and spatial features. We use a graphical model⁴¹ and Bayesian neural
107 networks³⁶ to capture the joint distribution between the observed variables (CBG-level census features and county-
108 level vaccination rates) and the hidden variables (CBG-level vaccination rates). We use variational inference^{37,42}
109 to infer the hidden CBG-level vaccination rates (see *Materials and Methods* for the description of the algorithm).
110 Similar to the simulations on the synthetic network, we examine the impact of homophily and hub effects on case
111 count using “reverse”, “exchange”, “shuffle”, and “order” hypothetical distributions described above. Note that here
112 we apply “reverse” hypothetical distribution to each state separately (see *Materials and Methods* for the rationale).




Figure 3. The number of simulated cases based on the U.S mobility network under various hypothetical scenarios. Error bars are standard deviations of simulations. These results support our hypothesis that the homophily effect harms the outcome while the within-state hub effect improves it. Specifically, by removing homophily, “exchange” reduces the cases. By flipping the hub effect, “reverse” increases the cases. The “order” hypothetical distribution strengthens the hub effect, and greatly reduces the number of cases; “shuffle” eliminates all network effects and leads to a decrease in cases.

113 Figure 3 shows the simulated case counts over 30 days for the original and hypothetical scenarios (see *SI* for
 114 details of the simulation). Compared to the actual vaccine distribution, the “exchange” distribution reduces the
 115 cases by 17.1%. This result agrees with our conclusion from synthetic networks that homophily in vaccination rate
 116 adversely affects the number of new infections. It is also consistent with the high correlation we observe between
 117 the vaccination rate of a CBG and that of its neighbors (see *SI*). The “reverse” distribution increases the cases by
 118 22.0%, pointing to the positive impact of high vaccination rates in hubs. Under the “shuffle” distribution, which
 119 simultaneously eliminates the hub effect and homophily, the number of cases decreases by 11.4%. This result
 120 indicates that the homophily effect appears to be the dominant factor. The “order” distribution demonstrates the huge
 121 potential of further exploiting the hub effect, since assigning the highest vaccination rates to central nodes reduces
 122 the case count by 74.5% compared to “original.” In *SI*, we run separate simulations for each state to investigate how
 123 the homophily and hub effect affect the spread within each state, which offers insights into how our results might
 124 generalize to other regions or smaller countries.

125 Informing effective vaccination campaigns

126 An effective strategy to increase the vaccination rate is by vaccination campaigns that encourage hesitant individuals
 127 to receive vaccination with financial incentives or advertising. Motivated by the strong network effect, we study
 128 a hypothetical vaccination campaign strategy that focuses on a small number of CBGs, given aiming for further

129 promoting a fixed number of hesitant individuals to get vaccinated.^d This is a significant computational challenge
130 because we are testing numerous combinations of thousands of CBGs out of over 200,000 CBGs in total. Therefore,
131 we design an algorithm that addresses the computational challenge by using the projected gradient descent^{43,44}
132 to optimize a computationally feasible surrogate objective. Our proposed approach might be practically feasible
133 to some extent as it could be implemented by concentrating promotions and vaccine availability in the targeted
134 communities. The details of our algorithm and the validation steps are presented in *Materials and Methods*.

135 Our objective function implies the uses of both the hub effect and the homophily effect (see *Materials and*
136 *Methods* for explanations). To show the effectiveness of the proposed vaccination campaign, we compare it against
137 four baseline policies: untargeted, random targeting, targeting least vaccinated CBGs, and targeting the most central
138 CBGs (see *Materials and Methods* for details). To guarantee fair comparisons, all policies promote the same number
139 of people (an additional 1% of the U.S. population) to receive the vaccine.

140 The simulation results are presented in the left panel of Figure 4. First, we find a network externality (or
141 spillover) effect: although all policies are designed to increase the country-wide vaccination by only 1%^e, their
142 actual effect is much larger (i.e., at least 4.9%), because vaccines protect not only the vaccinated people, but also the
143 unvaccinated people who may contact the vaccinated. Second, the non-targeting or the random vaccine campaign
144 show the poorest performance among all strategies. Targeting the least vaccinated CBGs achieves slightly better
145 performance, with a 7.5% reduction in the cases. Most importantly, our proposed policy reduces 19.7% of cases,
146 which is three times more than the non-targeting or random targeting strategy. Our proposed campaign also has a
147 significantly better outcome than targeting the most central CBGs, which reduces cases by 16.6%.

148 An important question regarding the proposed vaccination campaign is whether it takes advantage of the hub
149 effect (by increasing vaccination rate in central CBGs) or the homophily (by breaking the similarity in clusters of
150 low vaccination). The right panel of Figure 4 presents the map of the targeted CBGs. We observe that our policy
151 primarily targets hub cities and the south (which includes several clusters with low vaccination). 74.9% of the
152 targeted CBGs by the proposed policy overlap with those targeted by the most-central policy. This suggests that an
153 ideal strategy mainly leverages the impact of the hub effect to improve the outcome of the vaccination campaign,
154 echoing the “order” distribution result. The proposed strategy also appears to take advantage of the homophily effect,
155 since it reduces the correlation between a CBG’s vaccination rate and its neighborhood average from 0.756 to 0.733
156 with the 1% increase in the overall vaccination rate. This might explain our further improvement compared with the
157 “most central” targeting strategy.

^dHere we assume vaccination is available to all individuals; the strategy is to encourage hesitant individuals in certain CBGs rather than allocating limited number of doses of vaccines.

^eIn our data, about half of the population are unvaccinated, so a 1% increase in vaccination rate protects approximately 2% of unvaccinated people.




Figure 4. (Left) The performance of the four targeting strategies. The y-axis is the reduction compared to the current vaccination distribution (“original”) in the first 30 days. Error bars are standard deviations from different runs of simulations. (Right) The most strongly targeted CBGs whose vaccination rate increases more than 5% under a scenario with our proposed strategy. Each blue dot represents a targeted CBG.

158 Discussion

159 While massive vaccination is crucial to the control of COVID-19, our results show that the spatial heterogeneity of
 160 vaccination has a strong impact on the course of the epidemic. Specifically, we show by both synthetically generated
 161 networks and real-world mobility networks that homophily can increase case counts whereas hub effects reduce
 162 them. We also propose a promising vaccination campaign strategy that would substantially reduce case counts by
 163 marginally increasing the vaccination rates in a small number of regions.

164 Our study may have policy implications beyond the U.S. In addition to the synthetic networks and the U.S.
 165 mobility network, we conduct the transmission simulation on the mobility network of each U.S. state, assuming no
 166 cross-state mobility, and observe largely similar results. Our conclusions could be generalized to other countries,
 167 future mobility trends, or other pandemics such as measles⁴⁵.

168 Our results suggest the existence of a huge spatial heterogeneity in the impact of each additional vaccination. By
 169 reducing hesitancy and consequently increasing vaccination rates, a small set of locations would have disproportionate
 170 impacts on the nationwide outcomes. Thus, the spatial distribution of vaccination may be more informative than
 171 the overall vaccination rate in predicting the course of the pandemic. We show that there may be a large, untapped
 172 potential to utilize the homophily and the hub effect to improve the effectiveness of the vaccination campaign. Even
 173 though it is sometimes suggested that one should focus on the least vaccinated places (in fact, current campaigns are
 174 already using this strategy³⁹), our results indicate that this may not be the best strategy for reducing total case counts.

175 However, our conclusions should be interpreted cautiously. First, our mobility networks are constructed from
176 data provided by SafeGraph, which collects human mobility data from mobile applications. The data may have
177 biases such as over-representing certain demographic groups who use mobile phones more frequently. Moreover,
178 the quality of vaccination data and the predictability of simulation models may also affect the estimated daily case
179 counts. Therefore, we recommend using our results to qualitatively inform policy making, rather than using our
180 exact estimates. If policymakers make decisions based on our approach, the effectiveness of their decision would
181 be further improved if they have higher quality data. Furthermore, any real-world applications based on our study
182 must examine the social implications and ethical concerns. For instance, our proposed campaign strategy may
183 preferentially target certain socio-demographic groups. Note that we focus on campaigns that reduce hesitancy
184 and incentivize vaccination rather than allocating limited extra doses, hence the ethical issues might be less severe
185 than spatial allocation (i.e. providing vaccination only to targeted locations). Nevertheless, we urge that our results
186 should be carefully interpreted and applied by considering diverse social contexts and social inequality. Finally,
187 when performing our proposed vaccination campaign, we should inspect political, legal, and economical feasibility.
188 Those feasibility and ethical issues have to be resolved by the government or specialists.

189 **Materials and Methods**

190 **Data collection**

191 The network is constructed using the U.S. mobility from SafeGraph, a company that provides aggregated data
192 collected from mobile applications. All data is anonymized and aggregated by the company so that individual
193 information is not re-identifiable. This dataset has been widely adopted to study human mobility patterns, particularly
194 during the COVID pandemic, such as^{1,3,24,46-49}. Most notably, an epidemic model built on this data—which we
195 adopt in this paper—has shown to be highly predictive of the size of local outbreaks as well as other stylized facts²⁴.
196 SafeGraph receives the location data from “third-party data partners such as mobile application developers, through
197 APIs and other delivery methods and aggregates them.” This data reflects the frequency of mobility between all
198 points of interest (POIs) and the census block groups (CBGs) in the United States. Specifically, the data contains
199 information on the number of people at a CBG who visit a POI on a certain day or in a certain hour. The data also
200 contains the information for each CBG’s area, median dwell times, as well as geo-locations of all CBGs and POIs.
201 In total, there are 214,697 CBGs and 4,310,261 POIs in the U.S. Since this paper aims to measure the counterfactual
202 impact of vaccine distribution if all businesses were to fully reopen, we use the mobility data from U.S. in 2019
203 prior to the pandemic for our simulation.

204 We also collected the latest U.S. census data from the SafeGraph database (the complete US Census and
205 American Community Survey data from 2016 to 2019). The data contains the demographic features of each CBG,
206 such as the fractions of each sex, age group, racial and ethnic group, education level, and income level. The Centers

207 for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)^f provides daily vaccination records on all states except Texas and Hawaii.
208 The Texas Department of State Health Services provides its own data on daily vaccinations^g. We joined these data
209 sources and generated the vaccination rate of all U.S. counties (except those in Hawaii) on July 1st, 2021.^h

210 **Constructing mobility network of counties or CBGs**

211 We first construct a *mobility bipartite network* for a given region (country or state), consistent with ref. 24. The
212 edges in the bipartite network are between POIs (denoted by the set \mathcal{P}) and CBGs (denoted by the set \mathcal{C}). The
213 edge weight between a POI $p \in \mathcal{P}$ and a CBG $c \in \mathcal{C}$ corresponds to the number of people who live in CBG c and
214 visit POI p . The bipartite network can vary over time according to the SafeGraph mobility data. However, since our
215 study aims to illustrate the two network effects rather than to provide exact predictions in growth of COVID-19
216 cases, we aggregate the hourly number of visits in 2019 and construct the bipartite network for each hour given the
217 annual average weights (persons per hour).

The undirected *mobility network among CBGs* is derived by projecting the aforementioned bipartite graph, considering the areas and dwell times of each POI. In this network, the edges between two CBGs c and c' is

$$w_{c,c'} = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \frac{d_p V(c,p) V(c',p)}{a_p}. \quad (1)$$

218 Here p corresponds to a POI, $V(c,p)$ is the hourly average number of visitors from CBG c at POI p , a_p is the
219 area of POI p . d_p is the probability of two people visiting the POI p at the same time, derived from the median
220 dwell time at the POI as described in ref. 24. This edge weight is consistent with the simulation process proposed by
221 ref. 24, as illustrated later in Eq. (2). The edge weight is proportional to the number of people in CBG c who get
222 infected from CBG c' assuming equal infection rate across all CBGs. The network in Figure 1 is constructed using
223 the same method, but it is at the level of counties instead of CBGs for illustrative purposes. We only retain the top
224 five neighbors of each county with the highest weights (thus making it as a directed graph); and then we convert the
225 directed graph to an undirected one for Fig. 1. We use the full CBG-level network in our simulations.

226 **The synthetic networks**

227 In this section, we explain the construction of the synthetic networks in detail. The construction of networks is
228 consistent with the input in the model of ref. 24, where the basic element is a CBG and individuals are homogeneous
229 among each CBG. For the clustered network, we assume there are 10,000 CBGs each with 10,000 residents. These
230 CBGs are equally divided into 100 clusters, each of which can be considered as a “city.” Similarly, we create 10,000

^f<https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker>

^g<https://github.com/shiruken/covid-texas-data/>

^hThe vaccination data from Hawaii is not available and Hawaii is not included in our analysis. Given that their population makes up a tiny fraction and that Hawaii is an island state, we believe that its impact on the country-level outcomes could be marginal or negligible.

231 POIs, which are equally spread out in the 100 clusters. All POIs have identical areas and dwell times. People
232 living in one CBG visit the 100 POIs within the same cluster with a high probability (for each POI with an hourly
233 probability of 40%), but visit the other 9,900 POIs with a small probability (for each POI with an hourly probability
234 of 0.05%). We draw from the Bernoulli distribution to determine whether there exists at least one person from the
235 CBG who visits the POI. To create some heterogeneity in the number of visits, the number of additional visitors
236 follows the Poisson distribution $\text{Pois}(1)$. To create the homophily effect, we randomly assign vaccination rates
237 (either 80% or 20%) to clusters. That is, all CBGs in the same cluster have the same vaccination rate, which is either
238 80% and 20%, which creates a strong contrast of vaccination rates among different groups.

239 For the centralized network, we also assume there are 10,000 CBGs and 10,000 POIs, with a population of
240 10,000 in each CBG. However, instead of organizing into clusters of similar vaccination, the CBGs exhibit a high
241 level of variation in their degree centrality. We first generate the random variable D_c for each CBG c , which follows
242 a power distribution (with density function $f(D_c) = 0.25D_c^{-0.75}$ and $0 < D_c < 1$). The CBG is then connected to
243 $100 \times D_c$ (rounded to an integer) randomly selected POIs. In this way, the degree distribution will be skewed with
244 considerable degree heterogeneity among CBGs—a few CBGs will connect to many POIs, thus becoming central,
245 while the majority will connect to only a few POIs. Similar to the clustered network, the number of people who visit
246 each POI from CBG c follows the Poisson distribution $\text{Pois}(1)$, which generates a certain level of heterogeneity in
247 the edge weights. To create a positive hub effect, we impose a positive correlation between the degree of the CBG
248 and its vaccination rate. In particular, the vaccination rate of a CBG c is set to be $0.4 + 0.5D_c$, thus ensuring that
249 more central CBGs (with higher degree) have higher vaccination rates. Finally, since the degree of each CBG and in
250 particular the set of POIs it is connected to is independent of other CBGs, the network will not exhibit homophily in
251 vaccination.

252 Finally, hybrid networks (with varying λ) are constructed by mixing the clustered and centralized networks with
253 a parameter λ that controls the composition of the mixture. We first randomly map each CBG in the instance of the
254 clustered network to a CBG in the instance of the centralized network.ⁱ For a given value of λ , an edge between a
255 CBG and a POI in the clustered network is kept with a probability of λ independent of other edges, and similarly an
256 edge from the centralized network is kept with probability of $1 - \lambda$. Thus, a higher value of λ implies a stronger hub
257 effect and a weaker homophily. The vaccination rate of a CBG is the weighted average of the vaccination rates in the
258 centralized network and the clustered network, with weights of λ and $1 - \lambda$ respectively.

259 **Inferring CBG-level vaccination rate**

260 County-level vaccination rates are provided by the CDC on a daily basis, while fine-grained CBG-level vaccination
261 rates are unavailable. Because counties cover relatively large, heterogeneous areas and because the epidemic model

ⁱIn practice, each CBG has an index from 1 to 10,000 which is independent of its own attributes, and we match on the index.

262 we use is formulated at the level of CBGs, which offers a much higher resolution than county-level models and
 263 predicts the epidemic growth with high accuracy, we estimate the CBG-level vaccination rates from county-level
 264 vaccination rates.




Figure 5. A Bayesian latent variable model to impute the CBG-level vaccination rate from the county-level vaccination rate. For each county (indexed by i) we observe the county-level average vaccination rate; for each CBG we observe demographic and geographic features (proportions of different sex, age, racial or ethnic, income, and education groups as well as the geo-locations). The latent variables (which we need to impute) are the vaccination rate for each CBG. We model the mapping from each CBG’s feature to vaccination rate as a Bayesian neural network with unknown parameters Θ . Given the observed variables (blue boxes) we infer the posterior distribution on the latent variables (yellow boxes).

265 This problem is called “small area estimation”⁵⁰, where the goal is to use aggregated statistics (such as county-
 266 level vaccination rate) and socio-demographic characteristics to infer corresponding statistics at a more fine-grained
 267 resolution (such as CBG-level vaccination rate). To enable more accurate inferences, we use demographic and
 268 geographic features such as sex, age, race and ethnicity, income level, education level, and geographical coordinates,
 269 which are available for all the CBGs. Our assumption is that CBGs with similar features should have similar
 270 vaccination rates. This is a missing data imputation problem as illustrated in Fig. 5, where the observed variables are
 271 county-level vaccination rates and CBG-level features, while the missing variables are the CBG-level vaccination
 272 rates.

273 We design a Bayesian model shown in Fig. 5 to impute the missing variables (i.e., the CBG-level vaccination
 274 rates). The benefit of the Bayesian approach is that once we define the data generation process, we can compute the
 275 Bayesian posterior over the missing variables given the observed variables with standard inference methods³⁷. We
 276 define the following data generation process: for each CBG we observe the demographic and geographic features;

277 the features are inputs to a Bayesian neural network³⁶ with unknown parameter Θ , which outputs the vaccination rate
278 of the CBG. Finally, we average the vaccination rates of all CBGs in a county to obtain the overall vaccination rate
279 of that county. Since the posterior inference is approximate, the weighted average of CBG-level vaccination rates
280 in a county does not exactly match the ground truth vaccination rate for that county. Thus, we rescale the inferred
281 vaccination rates to match the ground truth county level vaccination rate. In *SI*, we present examples of our inferred
282 results. We use the interpolated CBG-level vaccination rates as the input for the downstream simulation tasks.

283 A major challenge is performance evaluation because no CBG-level ground truth data is available. We thus
284 resort to using county-level ground truth data. We remove 10% of county-level vaccination rate data (i.e., we treat
285 them as unobserved variables in addition to the CBG-level vaccination rates), and infer the posterior vaccination
286 rates for these removed counties. We then compute the mean absolute error (MAE) between the inferred vaccination
287 rate and the ground truth vaccination rate for these counties. For our model, we observe an MAE of 5.23%, while
288 the small area estimation method based on logistic regression (details in *SI*) has an MAE of 5.82%. This shows that
289 deep neural networks can more accurately capture the non-linear relationships between demographic and geographic
290 features versus the vaccination rates.

291 **Hypothetical vaccination distributions**

292 Here we describe the construction of the hypothetical vaccine distributions in detail:

- 293 • *Original*: We use the originally assigned vaccination rates from the inference process discussed above.
- 294 • *Reverse*: We “reverse” the vaccination rates. That is, if the original vaccination rate of a CBG c is v_c , we assign
295 it to $1 - v_c$ instead. Thus if hubs have high vaccination rates in the original scenario, they will end up with low
296 rates in this hypothetical distribution. The homophily effect is preserved because by reversing all vaccination
297 rates, the network assortativity⁵¹ remains the same. For U.S. simulations, we apply the reverse distribution to
298 each state separately, which prevents conflating variation in the mobility centrality of different states and helps
299 retain the urban-rural divide in vaccination within states. Also note that due to large differences in vaccination
300 rates across states, conducting the reverse distribution across the country may simply capture the effect of
301 heterogeneity in vaccine acceptance among the states with high and low rates, which is not the main point of
302 this paper.
- 303 • *Exchange*: We “exchange” the vaccination rates of CBGs with similar mobility centrality scores. Specifically,
304 we first rank all CBGs by their mobility centrality scores (see *SI* for the definition). We conduct pairwise
305 matching – for each CBG, we find the other with the closest mobility centrality score; and then we exchange the
306 vaccination rates of these two CBGs. In this way, we maintain the correlation between the mobility centrality
307 score and the vaccination rate, while shuffling the vaccination rate distribution such that the homophily effect
308 is reduced. Since the mobility centrality score follows the long tailed distribution, we do not exchange the

309 CBGs with the top 1% mobility centrality scores, which prevents significant impacts from changing the
 310 vaccination rates of CBGs with the top 1% mobility centrality.

- 311 • *Shuffle*: We also randomly “shuffle” the vaccination rates among CBGs. Therefore, we maintain the average
 312 and variance of the vaccination rates while simultaneously eliminating the homophily and hub effect.
- 313 • *Order*: We re-“order” the vaccination rates. That is, we first rank the CBGs by mobility centrality score; then
 314 for a CBG with a higher mobility centrality score (see *SI* for the definition), we assign a higher vaccination
 315 rate in the original distribution. In this way, we impose the maximum level of the hub effect.

316 For all distributions, we adjust all the vaccination rates such that the CBG-population-weighted vaccination rate
 317 average is the same with the original distribution (by adding and subtracting the differences). We clip vaccination
 318 rates in all distributions to range in $[0, 1]$.

319 **Simulating COVID-19 spreading**

320 We extend the model in ref. 24 to simulate the spreading of COVID-19. The model is essentially an SEIR model⁵²,
 321 but it is based on the full human mobility data at the level of CBGs and the key parameters in the SEIR model are
 322 estimated from the mobility network using machine learning tools. Susceptible individuals (S) first get exposed (E)
 323 to the disease with a certain probability after contacting infected people; then exposed people develop symptoms (I,
 324 infected) after a period of time; finally, the infected people get recovered or removed (R) after a period of time.

The key difference in our approach is that we also incorporate the vaccination status of individuals in the model using the CBG-level vaccination rate. For example, if a CBG c has a vaccination rate v_c , we assume that a fraction v_c of individuals in the CBG are “recovered” at time 0. This implies that the efficacy of the vaccination is “perfect” or 100%. Essentially, the number of people in CBG c who newly get exposed (and then infected) at time t from POI p follows a Poisson distribution as shown below:

$$\text{Pois} \left(\phi \sum_{c' \in \mathcal{C}} \frac{d_p S_c^{(t)} I_{c'}^{(t)}}{a_p N_c N_{c'}} V(c, p) V(c', p) \right). \quad (2)$$

325 Here we follow the convention, using $S_c^{(t)}$, $E_c^{(t)}$, $I_c^{(t)}$, $R_c^{(t)}$ to denote the number of people in CBG c who are susceptible,
 326 exposed, infectious, and removed at the time stamp (i.e., hour) t , respectively. Other variables were defined along
 327 with Eq. (1). All exposed people will eventually become infectious, and all infectious will eventually become
 328 removed.

329 Equation 2 also motivates our construction of edge weights for the network. The number of people in CBG i
 330 who get infected because of their contact with people from CBG j is proportional to the edge weight we define in
 331 Equation 1. This also helps us define the mobility centrality of a CBG (see *SI*).

332 Designing the vaccination campaign

333 Here we explain the selection procedure of targeted CBGs in our proposed vaccination campaign strategy. Let u
334 be the vector of the initial fraction of unvaccinated for each CBG (i.e., one minus the vaccination rate), and v be
335 the increase in the vaccination rate under the campaign. Thus, $u - v$ is the unvaccinated fraction vector after the
336 campaign. Our goal is to find the optimal v^* that decreases the case count as much as possible.

337 The quantity $(u - v)^T W(u - v)$ is our objective function, which captures the growth rate of the cases. The
338 intuition is as follows. First, from Eq. (2) we know that the number of people in CBG c who get infected from
339 people in CBG c' is proportional to $\frac{S_c^{(t)} I_{c'}^{(t)}}{N_c N_{c'}} w_{c,c'}$. Under the “perfect” vaccination (i.e., vaccinated people do not get
340 infected), we assume $\frac{I_{c'}^{(t)}}{N_{c'}}$ is highly correlated with (or approximately proportional to) the fraction of unvaccinated in
341 c' , which is $(u_{c'} - v_{c'})$; and $\frac{S_c^{(t)}}{N_c}$ is highly correlated with (approximately proportional to) the unvaccination rate of c ,
342 which is $(u_c - v_c)$. Therefore, the value $(u_c - v_c) w_{c,c'} (u_{c'} - v_{c'})$ reflects the transmission from CBG c to c' . Using
343 the matrix notation, $(u - v)^T W(u - v)$ is approximately proportional to the total transmission for all possible c, c'
344 pairs, or the number of new cases.

345 Intuitively, this objective function incorporates both the hub effect and homophily. For the hub effect, the
346 increase in the vaccination rate of a CBG (by v_c) reduces the objective function by v_c times the mobility centrality
347 score of the CBG (see SI). Therefore, the optimization tends to reduce the vaccination rates of more central CBGs.
348 For the homophily effect, a decrease in a CBG c 's vaccination rate results in the decrease of the objective function
349 that is proportional to $w_{c,c'} (u_{c'} - v_{c'})$ for all other c' that are connected to c . Therefore, reducing the vaccination rate
350 of one CBG spills over to the adjacent CBGs. The spillover effect is larger if the targeted CBG c is in a cluster of
351 CBGs with similarly low vaccination rates. Thus, the optimization can exploit the homophily in the network by
352 targeting clusters of low vaccination and further reducing the objective function by the spillover effect.

353 In addition, we impose several feasibility constraints. Specifically, we assume that $u - v \succcurlyeq 0$, which means
354 that no CBG's unvaccination rate is negative. Also, $v \succcurlyeq 0$, which indicates that vaccination campaign only reduces
355 unvaccination rate and never increases it. We also impose constraints that make the practical implementation of the
356 vaccination campaign possible: specifically, it is difficult to decrease the unvaccination rate of a CBG by a large
357 amount; a 10% increase in the vaccination rate of two CBGs might be much easier than a 20% increase in one CBG.
358 Therefore, we require $v \preccurlyeq 0.1$, i.e., we reduce unvaccination rate of each CBG only up to 10%. Finally, to model
359 finite resources, we limit the total number of vaccine doses to administer by θ , that is $\langle v, m \rangle \leq \theta$ where m is the
360 population vector of CBGs. For our results, we set θ to 1% of the total population of the country, in other words, the
361 proposed strategy increases the country-wide vaccination rate by at most 1%. Accordingly, the proposed strategy is
362 the solution of the following optimization problem:

$$\min_v \quad (u - v)^T W (u - v) \quad (3)$$

$$s.t. \quad \langle v, m \rangle \leq \theta \quad (4)$$

$$u - v \succeq 0, 0 \preceq v \preceq 0.1 \quad (5)$$

363 More technical details of the optimization approach are included in *SI*.

364 Finally, we compare the eventual case counts under the following five campaign policies by running the
365 simulations under the same setting on the U.S. mobility data:

- 366 • *Proposed*. It uses the increase in vaccination rate of targeted CBGs proposed by our algorithm. The total
367 number of targeted people is capped at 1%.
- 368 • *Untargeted*. It increases the vaccination rates of all CBGs by 1%.
- 369 • *Random*. It increases the vaccination rate of randomly chosen CBGs by 10%. This process continues until an
370 additional 1% of the whole population has been vaccinated.
- 371 • *Least vaccinated*. It increases the vaccination rate of CBGs with the lowest vaccination rate by 10%. The
372 process of choosing the least vaccinated CBGs continues until an additional 1% of the whole population is
373 targeted.
- 374 • *Most central*. It increases the vaccination rate of CBGs with the highest mobility centrality by 10%. The
375 process of choosing the most central CBGs continues until an additional 1% of the whole population is
376 targeted.

377 Acknowledgements

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472 **Supplementary Information**

473 **Illustrations for synthetic networks**

474 We first provide a simple illustration for our synthetic networks. By “simple”, we mean that we visualize networks
475 of 50 nodes only, although our simulation utilizes 10,000 nodes. The left panel of Fig. S1 presents a centralized
476 network where well-connected hubs tend to have higher vaccination rates. The middle panel illustrates a network of
477 two clusters – one with high and another with low vaccination rates. The right panel presents a network with a mix
478 of edges from both the centralized and the clustered networks. This network has two clusters with different overall
479 vaccination rates. At the same time, it also exhibits centralization with higher vaccination at hubs of each cluster
480 than other non-central nodes of the same cluster.




Figure S1. Simple illustrations of the synthetic centralized network, clustered network, and the mixed network (with $\lambda = 0.5$). Blue and red indicate high and or low vaccination rates, respectively. Larger nodes have higher mobility centrality in the network. Nodes are positioned according to the Fruchterman-Reingold layout⁴⁰.

481 **Details for the parameters in the simulations**

482 Our simulations are based on ref. 24 with modifications to adapt to the goals of our study. For the synthetic networks,
483 we run the simulations over 30 days by setting the initial infection rate to 0.01% and the transmission rate to 0.1.
484 These parameters have no specific meanings and their choice would not change our main conclusions other than the
485 growth rates in Fig. 2. The simulations on the synthetic networks enforce a within-CBG transmission rate of 0 since
486 our focus is on how cross-CBG transmissions affect the eventual case number.

487 For the U.S. country-level simulation, we set the initial infection rate to 0.1%, the country-wide cross-CBG
488 transiting to $\phi = 1500$ (multiplied by a POI's factor) and within-CBG transmission to 0.005 (these numbers affect
489 the transmission rates). The choice of these values is informed by their estimates in the ten major metro areas studied
490 in ref 24. Marginal changes to these values would not alter our main conclusions significantly.

491 Ref. 24 employs inferred hourly mobility patterns to conduct simulations which aim to most accurately predict
 492 the growth of COVID-19 transmission. By contrast, our study aims to examine how the homophily and hub effects
 493 of heterogeneity in vaccination affect the frequency of infections when human mobility returns to the pre-pandemic
 494 levels. Thus, the input to our simulations is the hourly average number of visits in 2019 rather than their inferred
 495 values above. All our results, including figure 3, are based on the simulations over a period of 30 days.

496 **Mobility centrality**

In network science, there are multiple measures for node centrality⁵³. They describe the degree to which each node is central in the network under different contexts. In our study, we employ the weighted degree centrality. Specifically, we use W to denote the weighted adjacency matrix ($|\mathcal{C}| \times |\mathcal{C}|$). Then, mobility centrality (MC) is defined as

$$MC(c) = \sum_{c'} w_{c,c'} = \sum_{c'} \sum_p \frac{d_p V(c,p) V(c',p)}{a_p}. \quad (6)$$

497 Intuitively, a more mobile and populous CBG, or a CBG connected to many other CBGs (through mutually visited
 498 POIs), should have a higher mobility centrality score. There are different ways of defining the edge weights. We
 499 choose this edge weight because it directly reflects the extent of transmission between two CBGs, as it corresponds
 500 to Eq. (2). Thus, a more mobile CBG is considered more central as it is more vulnerable to contracting the disease.
 501 Similarly, there are other valid choices for the centrality score⁵³. However, since our study examines a mobility
 502 network of more than 200,000 CBGs, calculating other centrality measures (such as eigenvector centrality or
 503 betweenness centrality) becomes computationally expensive. Nevertheless, as previous work has shown, degree
 504 centrality is highly correlated with other centrality measures, specifically eigenvector centrality⁵⁴. Thus we do not
 505 expect the choice of centrality measure to significantly change our conclusions.

506 Figure S2 presents the mobility centrality maps of California and Texas, the two most populous states in the
 507 U.S. As shown in the figure, CBGs that are closer to the large cities (such as Los Angeles and San Francisco in
 508 California and Dallas and Houston in Texas) have larger centrality scores. Moreover, CBGs in Texas have larger
 509 average mobility scores than those in California, indicating that residents in Texas are on average more mobile than
 510 in California.

511 **Measuring homophily in U.S. data**

512 Here, we analyze the correlation between a CBG's vaccination rate and the weighted average among its neighboring
 513 CBGs in the U.S. This analysis is complementary to the simulations discussed in the main text and provides direct
 514 evidence on the existence of homophily in the US, yet it does not capture the impact of homophily on the number
 515 of infections. Fig. S3 provides an intuitive visualization of the strength of the homophily effect. As shown in the
 516 Figure, there is a strong positive correlation between a CBG's vaccination rate and its neighbors' weighted average
 517 ($\rho = 0.756$). This strong positive correlation suggests a high level of clustering by vaccination, dense clusters of




Figure S2. The mobility centrality maps for the two most populous states in the U.S. The centrality is presented and color coded in log-scale.




Figure S3. Left: The vaccination rate of a CBG versus the average among its neighbors in the network weighted by their mobility centrality under the “original” distribution. **Right:** The same plot as the one on the left, but under the “exchange” distribution.

518 high and low vaccination CBGs with many connections within and few connections between, which may lead to
 519 more infections compared to a uniform vaccine distribution without the homophily effect. Figure S3 also shows
 520 this correlation under the “exchange” distribution. The correlation is largely reduced, thus confirming the rationale
 521 behind the “exchange” procedure which largely reduces the homophily effect.

522 Measuring hub effect in U.S. data

523 Similar to the previous section, here we present results of a complementary analysis to the simulations which verify
 524 the existence of the hub effect. We first divide all CBGs by their mobility centrality⁵³ into deciles, and then plot the

525 average vaccination rate in each decile. Furthermore, to understand the within-state relationship between mobility
526 centrality and the vaccine rate, we plot the vaccination of CBGs versus their within-state centrality z -scores. The
527 country-level and within-state binned scatter plots are presented in Fig. S4.

528 In the left panel, we see that as centrality in the country network increases by one decile, the average vaccination
529 rate increases by 0.5%. This result suggests a weak but positive correlation between centrality and vaccination. In the
530 right panel, we observe that as within-state centrality increases by one decile, the average vaccination rate increases
531 by 1%. This result suggests that the within-state hub effect is stronger and more significant than the country-level.
532 Thus reversing vaccination rates within states, rather than the whole country, would help us better understand the
533 impact of the hub effect. Moreover, such a “reverse” distribution also reflects the urban-rural divide in vaccination
534 that is common in many states.




Figure S4. The average vaccination rates in each decile of the country-wide mobility centrality (left) or the normalized centrality z -score within states (right). Error bars are standard errors of the averages.

535 Within-state hypothetical vaccination distributions and simulations

536 The hypothetical simulation analysis in this section is similar to the one presented in the main text, with the exception
537 that the hypothetical distribution generating procedure is conducted within each state separately, while removing
538 any cross-state mobility from the network. Thus we perform the simulation separately in each of the fifty state
539 and district networks (except Hawaii for which we don't have vaccination data). The state networks exhibit large
540 variations in their structural properties, which may imply the generality of our results to other regions, especially
541 less populous countries. The results in this section can thus provide extra insights on how spatial heterogeneity in
542 vaccination, especially the homophily and hub effects, affects the overall transmission in different regions.

543 As shown in the upper left panel of Fig. S5, we find that many states exhibit a significant increase in the case
544 count by reversing the vaccination rates, with Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma being the top three states. As for the

545 homophily effect, we find different patterns than the simulation result for the whole country. That is, for many states,
546 the “exchange” distribution does not significantly reduce the cases. The state with the most noticeable homophily
547 effect is Virginia, where the “exchange” distribution on average reduces the number of new cases by 16.1% and a
548 large discrepancy in vaccination rate is observed between Northeast and Southwest and of Virginia but much less
549 mobility is observed between these two regions.

550 However, in most other states, the “exchange” distribution does not always reduce the case number. We
551 conjecture that this may be due to the following reasons. First, the “exchange” procedure may only succeed in
552 removing the homophily effect in a large region (e.g. the entire U.S.). If we exchange the vaccination rates of
553 CBGs with similar centrality scores in a small region, we may not sufficiently shuffle the vaccination rate such
554 that homophily is largely removed. As shown in the left panel of Fig. S6, there is a very weak correlation between
555 the vaccination rate and the value it is exchanged with for the country-level hypothetical distribution analysis.
556 However, the exchange distribution within each state, even in the ten most populous U.S. states, shows a strong
557 correlation between the vaccination rate of a CBG and the value it is exchanged with (right panel). These results
558 imply the limitations of our exchange approach as it potentially retains the homophily effect if applied to small
559 regions. Second, as shown in the right panel, most states show a strong correlation between CBG vaccination rates
560 and their within-state mobility centrality scores, but on the country level such correlation is much weaker. This
561 echoes our results in the synthetic networks: if the hub effect dominates, the exchange distribution may not clearly
562 show the homophily effect.

563 Combining with “shuffle”, we also obtain insights into the effects of the homophily effect. For each state and
564 each hypothetical distribution, we run 25 rounds of simulations and obtain the case numbers. We then generate
565 the “reverse:original” ratio, “exchange:original” ratio, and “shuffle:original” ratio. We treat “shuffle:original” ratio
566 as the dependent variable and “reverse:original” ratio and “exchange:original” as independent variables. With an
567 ordinary least squares model, we find the regression coefficient for the “reverse:original” is 0.328 ($p < 0.001$) and the
568 regression coefficient for the “exchange:original” is 0.377 ($p < 0.001$). This result indicates that both the hub effect
569 (“reverse”) and the homophily effect (“exchange”) contribute to the shuffled result. Since “reverse:original” ratios
570 are generally larger than the “exchange:original” ratios, the “shuffle” result (for example the ranks) is consistent
571 with the “reverse” result in the main text.

572 From the lower right panel, we see that although the current hub effects are shown to be strong from the “reverse”
573 effect, we can still leverage and increase the hub effect to further reduce the case number. For example, we find
574 that by improving the hub effects in states such as New York, Nevada, and Georgia we would observe very large
575 reductions in the case numbers.




Figure S5. The box plots of the ratio of (**upper left**) “reverse” to “original” (**upper right**) the ratio of “exchange” to “original”, (**lower left**) the ratio of “shuffle” to “original”, and (**lower right**) the ratio of “order” to “original” distributions within each state. States are ranked by the ratio averages.

576 **Details of inferred CBG-level vaccination rates**

577 Here we discuss more details about our Bayesian neural network. We use a three-layer network with ReLU activation.
 578 We then assume a Gaussian prior on the parameters of the neural network Θ^{36} . Exact inference over the posterior of
 579 a Bayesian neural network is intractable, so we use an approximate inference technique based on dropout³⁷.




Figure S6. (Left) The correlation between the vaccination rate of a CBG and the vaccination rate it is exchanged with in the country-level (all) and state-level (the ten most populous states are presented) simulations. We use linear models to fit the correlations and present the 95% CIs. **(Right)** The correlation between the vaccination rate of a CBG and the vaccination rate it is exchanged with in the country-level (all) and state-level simulations (the ten most populous states are presented). We use linear models to fit the correlations and present the 95% CIs.

580 Fig. S7 presents our inferred results of the two most populous states: California and Texas. The left panels of
 581 each row present the inferred CBG level vaccination rate. To illustrate how the inferred vaccination rate reflects
 582 demographic features, we plot the estimated average age and education level (percentage with Bachelor's or higher
 583 degree) for each CBG as examples. As shown in Figure, the CBGs with higher vaccination rates in general have
 584 either a higher average education level or higher average age.

585 Details of the proposed vaccination strategy

We solve the optimization problem by projected gradient descent^{43,44}. At each step, we take a gradient step to minimize $(u - v)^T W(u - v)$. The resulting v might be infeasible, i.e. fail to satisfy the constraints in Eq.(4,5), so we project v back to the feasible set. In particular, to satisfy Eq.(4) we can compute the projection by

$$v' = \begin{cases} v & \text{if } m^T v \leq \theta \\ v - \frac{m^T v - \theta}{\|m\|_2^2} m & \text{if } m^T v > \theta \end{cases}$$

To satisfy Eq. (5) we can compute the projection by

$$v'' := \min(\min(\max(v', 0), 0.1), u).$$

586 Intuitively, we lower bound v_c by 0 and upper bound it by the smaller of 0.1 and u_c .

587 The algorithm must converge with a small enough learning rate based on standard results in optimization
 588 theory^{43,44} (i.e. because each step in the algorithm does not increase the L2 distance to the optimal solution). Upon
 589 convergence, the resulting v_T is approximately the optimal solution (v^*) to the optimization problem in Eq. (3).




Figure S7. Inferred vaccination rates on the two most populous states. Blue indicates higher vaccination rate (or higher average age or education level) and red indicates low vaccination rate (or higher average age or education level). For comparison, we also plot the average age and education (percentage with college degree). In general, CBGs with either a higher average age or a higher education level have higher vaccination rates. This is consistent with the observation that in general older people have higher vaccination rate (because of earlier access) and better educated people have higher vaccination rate (because of lower hesitancy).

590 Formally, the algorithm is as follows:

591 1. Initialize $v^0, \lambda^0 = 0, \gamma^0 = 0$;

592 2. For $t = 0, \dots, T$:

593 (a) $v^{t+1} := v^t + \eta(2W(u - v^{(t)}))$;

594 (b) Set $v^{t+1} := \min(\min(\max(v^{t+1}, 0), 0.1), u)$;

595 (c) Set $v^{t+1} := v^{t+1} - \frac{m^T v^{t+1} - \theta}{\|m\|_2^2} m$, if $m^T v^{t+1} > \theta$.

Finally, we plot the histogram of the vaccination rate increases for all the CBGs in Fig. S8.




Figure S8. Histogram of the vaccination rate increases for all the CBGs (0 if untargeted). The histogram is a bi-modal distribution: for the majority of CBGs the vaccination rate increase is 0% (i.e. these CBGs are not included in the vaccination campaign), while for a small proportion of CBGs the vaccination rate increase is 10% (which is the maximum vaccination rate increase that we assume is feasible). Much fewer CBGs are targeted but have an increase smaller than 10%.

Supplementary Files

This is a list of supplementary files associated with this preprint. Click to download.

- [211117157nrreportingsummary.pdf](#)