

# Did More Generous Health Insurance Improve Health Outcomes of The Elderly? Evidence From China

**Jusheng Shieh**

Nanjing University

**Xinpeng Xu** (✉ [xuxinpeng@njmu.edu.cn](mailto:xuxinpeng@njmu.edu.cn))

Nanjing Medical University

**Hua You**

Nanjing Medical University

**Qifeng Wu**

Nanjing Medical University

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## Research Article

**Keywords:** Catastrophic Medical Insurance, health outcomes, elderly, China

**Posted Date:** November 19th, 2021

**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-1091084/v1>

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1 **Did more generous health insurance improve health outcomes of the elderly?**  
2 **evidence from China.**

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4 Jusheng Shieh<sup>1,\*</sup>, Xinpeng Xu<sup>2,\*,#</sup>, Hua You<sup>2,3,#</sup>, Qifeng Wu<sup>2</sup>

5 <sup>1</sup> Center for Health Policy and Management studies, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China

6 <sup>2</sup> School of Public Health, Nanjing Medical University, Nanjing, China

7 <sup>3</sup> Institute of Healthy Jiangsu Development, Nanjing Medical University, Nanjing, China

8

9 **# Corresponding Author:** Xinpeng Xu, Hua You.

10 **Address:** School of Public Health, Nanjing Medical University, Nanjing, 211166, China

11 **Email:** [xuxinpeng@njmu.edu.cn](mailto:xuxinpeng@njmu.edu.cn); [youhua98@163.com](mailto:youhua98@163.com)

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13 **\* Shieh, Jusheng and Xinpeng Xu contributed to this study equally.**

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1 **Did more generous health insurance improve health outcomes of the elderly?**  
2 **evidence from China.**

3 **Abstract**

4 **Background:** Catastrophic Medical Insurance (CMI) has been piloted in China Since 2012 and  
5 gradually implemented in various regions. Most studies focus on its impact on medical economic  
6 risks, and few studies discussed the impact of CMI on health of the elderly.

7 **Methods:** This study used Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS) data to  
8 explore the impact of CMI on health of the elderly. Difference-in-differences (DID) and Propensity  
9 score matching-DID were employed to study the health impact of CMI. Heckman selection model  
10 was used to study the potential mechanisms.

11 **Results:** We found that the implementation of CMI improved the mental health of the elderly, and  
12 the effect was limited. Moreover, the positive effect of CMI on the health of the elderly was mainly  
13 in the high-income group, and CMI had no significant effect on any health indicators of the low-  
14 income group population. The potential channel of CMI health improvement was its ability to  
15 increase hospitalization rate in the elderly.

16 **Conclusions:** Therefore, the health promotion and equity of CMI deserve more attention, and the  
17 compensation level of CMI needs to be improved under the premise of sustainable and effective  
18 supervision of the fund.

19 **Key words:** Catastrophic Medical Insurance; health outcomes; elderly; China

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## 1 **Background**

2       The challenge of aging has prompted countries around the world to pay attention to aging  
3 health. According to China's seventh population census in 2020, people aged 60 and above  
4 accounted for 18.7% of the national population, an increase of 5.44% compared with the sixth  
5 population census[1]. For the elderly, the degeneration of physical function will increase the health  
6 vulnerability of this group because of the changes in physical and psychological aspects caused by  
7 the aging stage. According to the Healthy China Action (2019-2030), 75% of the elderly in China  
8 suffered from one or more chronic diseases, and about 40 million of them are completely or partially  
9 disabled[2]. According to the survey data of China Scientific Research Center on Aging, more than  
10 half of Chinese elderly at different age stages have obvious loneliness[3], which indicates that the  
11 overall health status of Chinese elderly is not optimistic. The low health level of the elderly would  
12 not only reduce the quality of life of individuals and families, but also bring heavy economic burden  
13 to the society[4].

14       Improving health is one of the important policy objectives of health insurance, especially social  
15 health insurance. A large number of studies have evaluated the health effects of health insurance  
16 carried out in different countries. However, existing studies have not reached a unanimous  
17 conclusion. Some studies believe that the expansion of health insurance coverage can significantly  
18 improve the health of participants and reduce the risk of death. Card et al. (2009) found that after  
19 joining Medicare, the mortality rate of the insured elderly would decrease significantly[5]. Chou et  
20 al. (2014) studied the impact of National Health Insurance (NHI) on infant mortality and found that  
21 the infant mortality rate in rural areas decreased by 8-16% after the implementation of NHI[6].  
22 Kwack et al. (2013) also studied the impact of NHI on mortality, self-rated health and physical

1 function limitations of the elderly, and found that NHI only reduced the risk of death of the elderly  
2 group, and the most unhealthy group benefited the most[7]. Tian et al., (2012) found that people  
3 without health insurance were more likely to suffer from severe depression risk[8]. Yu et al. (2019)  
4 found that participating in any kind of health insurance would significantly improve the health of  
5 the elderly, possibly due to the improvement of medical consumption level and the change of health  
6 behavior[9]. But other studies have shown that medical insurance has little or no significant effect  
7 on health. The famous RAND Medicare experiment found no significant difference in health  
8 outcomes for individuals with different levels of reimbursement [10]. A study of low-income group  
9 population in India found no significant improvement in health outcomes despite increased  
10 healthcare utilization by insured people for the poor [11].

11 Since 1998, China has gradually established social medical insurance programs for different  
12 groups, including Urban Employee's Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) for urban employees, New  
13 Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) for rural residents and Urban Resident Basic Medical  
14 Insurance (URBMI) for urban residents. Studies have evaluated the health effects of them  
15 respectively. Studies found that UEBMI could improve short-term and long-term health of  
16 participants to a certain extent[12], and it can significantly improve the health level of the elderly  
17 floating population[13]. The implementation of NCMS improved activities of daily living (ADL)  
18 and cognitive function, but did not significantly improve self-rated health[14]. Studies about the  
19 URBMI found URBMI enrollees had better health outcomes and the effect was stronger for those  
20 with lower education levels and lower income[15], and URBMI has a direct health improvement  
21 effect on the labor force[16]. However, other studies found that UEBMI has little effect on self-  
22 rated health of participants[17]. Some studies shown that NCMS had no significant effect on

1 maternal and child mortality[18], and it did not significantly improve the self-rated health and illness  
2 or injury in the past four weeks for the enrollees[19, 20].

3 By comparing the health improvement effect of different types of basic medical insurance,  
4 studies found that the health effect of different medical insurance on the insured has obvious  
5 differences[13, 21]. UEBMI enrollees had better self-rated health, physical functioning and mental  
6 health than URBMI and NCMS participants[22]. UEBMI can promote the health of migrant workers,  
7 but URBMI and NCMS did not significantly improve their health effects[23]. In addition, Huang &  
8 Wu (2020) also found that the integration of URBMI and NCMS had limited impact on the health  
9 of middle-aged and elderly rural residents[24].

10 In order to further reduce the economic burden of disease of patients with serious diseases,  
11 China has implemented Catastrophic Medical Insurance (CMI) since 2012. Residents who  
12 participate in URBMI and NCMS automatically participate in CMI without additional payment.  
13 After the reimbursement of basic medical insurance, CMI would provide extra compensation for  
14 those who still need to pay high medical expenses by themselves. Studies on CMI mainly focused  
15 on whether it could reduce economic risks and found CMI reduced the incidence of CHE[25-27].  
16 Some studies have found that CMI has a limited role in reducing CHE[28], and it may even increase  
17 CHE intensity[29]. Currently, there is little literature exploring the health effects of CMI, Zhao et  
18 al. (2020) found that the implementation of CMI could significantly improve the health status of  
19 rural residents[30]. Huang & Fu (2021) studied the impact of CMI implementation on mortality in  
20 the elderly[31]. Some studies discussed the impact of medical insurance integration model on the  
21 health of patients with serious diseases[32, 33].

22 Compared with previous studies, this study mainly aims to answer the following three

1 questions :(1) what is the impact of CMI on the health status of the elderly? (2) Whether there is  
2 heterogeneity in the health effects of CMI, whether there are differences in the effects of CMI for  
3 the elderly with different residence and income levels. (3) What are the potential mechanisms behind  
4 the effects of CMI on health?

5

## 6 **Methods**

### 7 *Data and study sample*

8 The data used in the study are from Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS),  
9 which is combined conducted by Peking University and China Scientific Research Center on Aging.  
10 This survey takes the elderly aged 65 and above as the object, aiming to explore the determinants  
11 of health and longevity of the elderly population in China. The design of the survey is scientific and  
12 representative[34, 35]. The CLHLS baseline survey was conducted in 1998, followed up in 2000,  
13 2002, 2005, 2008/2009, 2011/2012, 2014, and 2018. The baseline and follow-up surveys covered  
14 23 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in China. Considering the purpose of the study,  
15 the data of 2011/2012 and 2014 were selected as study samples, and data of other years were not  
16 selected, mainly for the following reasons.

17 China has reconstructed its medical insurance system covering different people since 1998,  
18 including UEBMI implemented in 1998, NCMS piloted in 2003, and URBMI piloted in 2007 and  
19 fully implemented in 2009. It can be seen that before 2009, Medical insurance system is to improve  
20 the coverage. In 2012, in order to further ease the medical economic burden of residents, the Chinese  
21 government implemented CMI with additional reimbursement for residents participating in NCMS  
22 and URBMI. The implementation time of CMI is not consistent in different regions, which enables

1 us to use the framework of quasi-natural experiment to analyze the effect of CMI. To be specific,  
2 some provinces began to implement CMI in 2013, and most provinces began to implement CMI in  
3 2014 and later. Therefore, the former can be used as the treatment group and the latter as the control  
4 group to analyze the effect of CMI. The reason why 2018 wave were not used is that in 2016, China  
5 started the integration of URBMI and NCMS to promote the equitable enjoyment of medical  
6 security treatment for urban and rural residents. Therefore, the survey data of 2018 were not  
7 included in this study to avoid potential bias. The CMI is mainly for residents in URBMI and NCMS,  
8 and hence we screened out the original data of people who had participated in these two types of  
9 insurance. After sorting out and removing the samples with missing key variables, the final samples  
10 used in this study were 4727, including 551 and 4176 samples in the treatment group and control  
11 group, respectively.

## 12 *Measurements*

### 13 *Health outcome variables*

14 Multiple health indicators were used to measure health outcomes among the elderly, including  
15 self-rated health, Activities of Daily Living (ADL), Instrumental Activity of Daily Living (IADL),  
16 Mini-mental State Examination (MMSE), Index of Positive Well-Being and Index of Negative  
17 Well-Being.

18 Self-rated health, the most common health measure in household survey data, has been widely  
19 used in the existing studies[23, 36]. This study also adopted self-rated health as one of the health  
20 measures, which was based on a 5-level Likert Scale: How do you rate your health at present? The  
21 responses include 1=very good, 2= good, 3= so so, 4=bad, 5=very bad.

22 ADL were reflected in 6 aspects in CLHLS questionnaire, namely eating, taking a bath, dressing,



1 going to the toilet, controlling urine and defecation, indoor transfer. The respondents would be asked  
2 whether they needed help in each aspect, and there were three options for each aspect, including  
3 being able to do it on your own without help, with partial help, with complete help. We construct 6  
4 binary indicator for 6 aspects above, recoded as 0= can do it without help and 1= can't do it without  
5 help, and the ADL variables used in this study was number of ADL limitations obtained by summing  
6 up the six binary variables[37].

7 Similarly, IADL was measured by 8 questions in the CLHLS questionnaire, including visiting  
8 the neighbor's house alone, going out shopping alone, cooking alone, washing clothes alone,  
9 walking for 2 miles continuously, lifting 5kg weight, squatting and standing up for 3 times  
10 continuously, and taking transportation alone. There are three options for each aspect, including yes  
11 and independently, yes but need some help, no and can't. By constructing 8 dummy variables, assign  
12 the values of the last two options to 1, and assign the values of the first option to 0. Then we summed  
13 up the 8 binary variables to obtain number of IADL limitations used in this study.

14 Referring to existing studies[14], we used MMSE to measure individual cognitive function.  
15 MMSE includes 13 questions of 4 aspects, i.e., orientation, registration, attention and calculation,  
16 recall and language. Each question has three options, namely correct, wrong and not able to answer.  
17 We recoded the answer "not able to answer" as wrong based on existing research[38, 39]. Finally,  
18 a continuous variable MMSE with a value range of 0-30 points was obtained by summing up all the  
19 related variables. Individuals with higher MMSE scores had better cognitive function.


20 In addition, in terms of mental health, this study referred to the existing references and selected  
21 index of positive and negative well-being to measure the mental health status of the elderly[40].  
22 There were three related questions about positive mental health, including how do you rate your life

1 at present, with 1=very bad, 2=bad, 3=so so, 4=good, 5=very good; Do you always look on the  
2 bright side of things, with 1=always, 2=often, 3=sometimes, 4=seldom, 5=never; Are you as happy  
3 as when you were younger, with 1= always, 2=often, 3=sometimes, 4=seldom, 5=never. The  
4 answers to these three questions were added together to obtain the index of positive well-being  
5 ranging from 3 to 15, which is the positive health variable used in our study. Individuals with higher  
6 index had better mental health. Negative mental health involves three related questions, including  
7 Do you often feel fearful or anxious? Do you often feel lonely and isolated? Do you feel the older  
8 you get, the more useless you are, and have trouble doing anything? Each of the above three  
9 questions has five options: 1 = always, 2=often, 3=sometimes, 4=seldom, 5 = never. The negative  
10 score ranging from 3-15 were obtained by summing up the three variables. Individuals with lower  
11 index of negative well-being had better mental health.

## 12 ***CMI***

13 The key explanatory variable in this study was CMI, which is whether an area has implemented  
14 CMI in the past year. To construct this variable, we collected the policy documents issued by  
15 provinces and cities to implement CMI, and matched them with CLHLS data sets at the individual  
16 level to explore the impact of CMI on health among elderly. The policy documents of different  
17 regions from the official websites of each regional government or the medical insurance  
18 administration. Our judgment is based on the year in which each province started to fully implement  
19 CMI. The time distribution of each province implementing CMI was shown in figure1. Finally, we  
20 selected five provinces as the treatment group, namely Liaoning, Jilin, Fujian, Hubei and Chongqing,  
21 and took the other provinces as the control group.

22



1

2 **Figure1. The implementation time of CMI among the 23 provinces (municipalities,**  
 3 **autonomous regions) in CLHLS.**

4 ***Covariates***

5 In this study, we controlled for variables that might confuse the relationship between health  
 6 outcomes and CMI, with variable selection based primarily on existing studies[14, 22] and data  
 7 availability. Covariates included the following categories: sociodemographic characteristics,  
 8 socioeconomic status, and health-related behaviors. Sociodemographic characteristics included age,  
 9 gender, marital status and number of children, and whether the elderly live alone. Marital status is  
 10 divided into two categories, with 0 indicating the respondent was divorced, widowed or never  
 11 married, 1 indicating the elderly was married. Whether the elderly live alone or not is a dummy  
 12 variable, 0 represents the respondent live with his/her family. 1 indicated the elderly lived alone.  
 13 Socioeconomic status variables included years of education, type of job held before age 60,  
 14 household income per capita(logarithmic), and place of residence, where the job type before the age

1 of 60 is a dummy variable (1 = had a white-collar job, 0=others). There are two categories of  
 2 residence, where 0 means an individual lives in a rural area and 1 means an individual lives in an  
 3 urban area. Regarding the health-related behaviors, we controlled 3 variables: Smoking (1=smoke  
 4 at the present) and Drinking (1= drink alcohol at the present). Considering that chronic diseases is  
 5 degenerative diseases, the number of chronic diseases suffered by the elderly is also included in our  
 6 study as a control variable.

## 7 *Statistical Methods*

### 8 *Difference-in-Differences model*

9 As mentioned before, the implementation time of CMI in different provinces (municipalities  
 10 directly under the Central Government and autonomous regions) is inconsistent, so we adopted  
 11 difference-in-differences model to study the impact of CMI on health outcomes of the elderly, and  
 12 take it as the benchmark. The specific model is set as follows.

$$13 \quad y_{ipt} = \alpha + \beta_0 \cdot time_t + \beta_1 \cdot treat_p + \delta \cdot (treat_p \times time_t) + \mathbf{Z}'_{ipt}\boldsymbol{\eta} + \sigma_p + \varepsilon_{ipt}. \quad (1)$$

14 Where  $y_{ipt}$  represented the health status of individual  $i$  of province  $p$  in period  $t$ .  $time_t$  is  
 15 a binary variable, with 0 indicated that the period belongs to 2011/2012, 1 indicated that the  
 16 observations belongs to 2014.  $treat_p$  is also a dichotomized variable, with 1=the individual  
 17 belongs to the provinces where CMI is implemented, including Liaoning, Jilin, Fujian, Hubei and  
 18 Chongqing, 0 indicated that the individual belongs to the provinces where CMI is implemented in  
 19 2014 or later. The coefficient of the interaction term of  $treat_p$  and  $time_t$  is the effect we are  
 20 concerned with, namely, the effect of CMI on the health of the elderly.  $\mathbf{Z}'_{ipt}$  represented other  
 21 covariates that may affect individual health;  $\sigma_p$  is the provincial fixed effect used to control for  
 22 confounding factors at the provincial level;  $\varepsilon_{ipt}$  is the error term of the model.

1 In addition, in order to answer our second question, we added interaction items of  $treat_p$ 、  
 2  $time_t$  and residence, income variable in the model (1) to verify the CMI effect differences to the  
 3 health of urban and rural residents and different income group population (model (2)).

$$4 \quad y_{ipt} = \alpha + \beta_0 \cdot time_t + \beta_1 \cdot treat_p + \delta \cdot DID_{ipt} + \delta_1(DID_{ipt} \cdot Rural_{ipt}) + \delta_1(DID_{ipt} \cdot$$

$$5 \quad \quad \quad Middle\_income_{ipt}) + \delta_1(DID_{ipt} \cdot High\_income_{ipt}) + \mathbf{Z}'_{ipt}\boldsymbol{\eta} + \sigma_p + \varepsilon_{ipt}$$

6 (2)

7 Where  $DID_{ipt}$  is the  $treat_p \times time_t$  in model (1).  $Urban_{ipt}$  is a dummy variable, where 1  
 8 means that individuals live in cities and towns, and 0 means that individuals live in rural areas.  
 9 Therefore, coefficient  $\delta_1$  reflected the difference of health impact of CMI on urban and rural  
 10 residents. In order to further study the influence of CMI on the health of individuals in different  
 11 income group population, we divided the sample into three categories according to the income  
 12 quantile of the sample, and generated three corresponding binary variables. Considering that there  
 13 would be complete collinearity if all of them were added into the model, we took the low-income  
 14 group as the reference group and added the interaction terms of  $DID_{ipt}$  and  $Middle\_income_{ipt}$ ,  
 15  $DID_{ipt}$  and  $High\_income_{ipt}$ , respectively to observe the impact of CMI on the health of the elderly  
 16 with different income levels.

17 ***PSM-DID***

18 To make individuals more comparable between treatment and control groups, we used  
 19 propensity score matching-difference-in-differences (PSM-DID) method based on the  
 20 benchmark[14] and take it as the robustness test. To be specific, we first screened the sample and  
 21 set it as balanced panel data, that is, every individual in the sample was interviewed in both two  
 22 waves. Then, the sample of the former wave (2011/12) and the covariate mentioned above were

1 used to establish logit model to obtain propensity score ( $P(treat = 1|Z_i)$ ), and the matching of  
 2 individuals between the treatment and control group in the common support was carried out by the  
 3 kernel matching strategy. Then the matched data and DID model were employed to estimate the  
 4 impact of CMI on the health of the elderly. Finally, the average treatment effects on the treated was  
 5 as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
 6 \quad ATT &= E(Y_{i,2014}^{treat} - Y_{i,2011/12}^{treat} | P(treat = 1|Z_i), treat = 1) - E(Y_{i,2014}^{control} - \\
 7 \quad &Y_{i,2011/12}^{control} | P(treat = 1|Z_i), treat = 0) \quad (3)
 \end{aligned}$$

### 8 ***Heckman sample selection model***

9 To estimate the potential mechanisms of the impact of CMI on individual health, we used the  
 10 Heckman selection model to analyze the impact of CMI on healthcare costs over the past year[41].  
 11 The model consists of two stages. The first stage is the selection stage. The selection equation,  
 12 namely a probit model, was used to predict the probability of individual seeking medical treatment,  
 13 and the inverse Mills ratio of each observation was calculated, which reflected the instantaneous  
 14 probability of selecting each observation into the sample. Two variables were included in our study,  
 15 whether the respondents had seen a doctor in the past year, and whether the respondents were  
 16 hospitalized in the past year. the second stage is the outcome stage, and a linear regression was  
 17 employed at this stage to predict the total medical expenses (including the out-of-pocket and  
 18 reimbursement payment) and the hospitalization expenses (including the out-of-pocket and  
 19 reimbursement payment) in the past year. The dependent variables were the natural logarithm of  
 20 them, and the inverse mills ratio was added to the second-stage regression to control for selection  
 21 bias (there are systematic differences between those individuals who choose to see a doctor or be  
 22 hospitalized and those who do not). When there is a significant correlation between the error terms

1 of the selection equation and the result equation, the estimation results of only linear regression  
2 results would have a bias, indicating that it must be corrected[41].

### 3 **Results**

#### 4 *Characteristics of the study population*

5 Table 1 compared the characteristics of individuals in CMI implementation and non-  
6 implementation groups. There were 551 and 4176 elderly people in the treatment and control group,  
7 respectively. From the perspective of health outcomes, most of the elderly in the whole sample  
8 reported general health status (39%), followed by those who believed good (35%). In terms of  
9 activities of daily living (ADL) and Instrumental Activity of Daily Living (IADL), both types of  
10 limitations were worse in the control group. In addition, there was a significant difference in IADL  
11 between the two groups ( $P<0.01$ ). MMSE score, which reflected individual cognitive function,  
12 showed that the cognitive function of the elderly in the treatment group was slightly worse than that  
13 in the control group (25.66 vs. 26.09), and the difference was significant at the level of 10% ( $P<0.1$ ).  
14 From the results of the indices of positive and negative well-being, there was significant difference  
15 in index of positive well-being between the two groups ( $P<0.05$ ), but there was no significant  
16 difference in index of negative well-being between them ( $P>0.1$ ). The average age of the elderly in  
17 the whole sample was  $82.13\pm 9.61$  years old, and years of education of the elderly in the treatment  
18 group was significantly higher than that in the control group (2.41 vs. 2.08). Also, individuals in the  
19 treatment group had more chronic diseases than those in control group (1.83 vs. 1.58). In addition,  
20 there were significant differences between the treatment group and the control group in medical  
21 insurance type, residence and smoking ( $P<0.05$ ).

22 **Table1 Characteristics of respondents**

---

Control group	Treatment group	Total
---------------	-----------------	-------

Variables	(N = 4176) (%/mean(sd))	(N = 551)	(N = 4727)
Self-rated Health (%) <sup>a</sup>			
Very good	11%	10%*	11%
Good	35%	33%	35%
So so	38%	44%	39%
Bad	14%	11%	14%
Very bad	1%	1%	1%
Number of ADL limitations	0.25 (0.82)	0.21 (0.74)	0.25 (0.81)
Number of IADL limitations	2.11 (2.62)	1.77 (2.53)***	2.07 (2.61)
MMSE score	26.09 (4.90)	25.66 (5.52)*	26.04 (4.98)
Index of Positive Well-Being	11.20 (2.09)	11.13 (1.98) **	11.20 (2.08)
Index of Negative Well-Being	6.68 (2.23)	6.60 (2.26)	6.67 (2.24)
Age (years old)	82.23 (9.67)	81.32 (9.14)	82.13 (9.61)
Years of Schooling	2.03 (2.95)	2.41 (3.12) ***	2.08 (2.97)
Number of Children	3.94 (1.77)	4.05 (1.76)	3.95 (1.77)
Household Income Per Capita (logarithm)	8.43 (1.42)	8.45 (1.55)	8.43 (1.44)
Number of Chronic Disease	1.58 (1.49)	1.83 (1.58) ***	1.61 (1.51)
Female (%)	55%	54%	54%
Had a White-collar Job before 60 (%)	3%	3%	3%
Rural China (%)	54%	46%***	53%
Married (%)	46%	49%	46%
Live Alone	19%	17%	19%
NCMS (%)	90%	82%***	89%
Smoking (%)	21%	25%**	21%
Drinking (%)	19%	19%	19%

1 <sup>a</sup> For continuous variables, T test was used to see whether the differences of variables were significant between the treatment and control group; for categorical  
2 variables, Chi-square test was used to see whether the differences of variables were significant between the two groups.

3 \*  $P < 0.1$  \*\*  $P < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $P < 0.01$

#### 4 ***The impact of CMI on health of the elderly and its Heterogeneity***

5 Table 2 showed the main DID regression results of the impact of CMI on health among the  
6 Chinese elderly. It can be seen from the model that, after controlling information at the provincial  
7 level and other covariates of individuals, the implementation of CMI can improve the self-rated  
8 health of the elderly by 0.065 units, reduce the limited number of IADL by 0.132, increase the  
9 limited number of ADL by 0.012, and decrease the MMSE score by 0.494 points. However, these  
10 effects are not statistically significant ( $P > 0.1$ ). It can be seen that, CMI could increase the index of  
11 positive well-being by 0.391 units and decrease the index of negative well-being by 0.370 units,



1 which were both significant at the level of 5% ( $P < 0.05$ ).

2 **Table 2 Main results: the impact of CMI on health of the elderly in China**

Variables	Self-rated Health	Number of ADL limitations	Number of IADL limitations	MMSE score	Index of Positive Well-Being	Index of Negative Well-Being
$treat_p$	0.438*** (0.137)	-0.251 (0.156)	-0.723* (0.396)	-0.826 (0.791)	-1.489*** (0.316)	0.926*** (0.330)
$time_t$	-0.019 (0.026)	0.012 (0.023)	0.046 (0.062)	0.365*** (0.131)	-0.099 (0.064)	0.131** (0.065)
$DID_{ipt}$	-0.065 (0.072)	0.012 (0.062)	-0.132 (0.165)	-0.494 (0.370)	0.391** (0.173)	-0.370** (0.177)
Province	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,727	4,727	4,727	4,727	4,727	4,727
Adjusted $R^2$	0.130	0.102	0.367	0.219	0.075	0.080

3 \*  $P < 0.1$  \*\*  $P < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $P < 0.01$

4 In order to further examine the impact of CMI on different subgroups, we added the interaction  
5 item of  $DID_{ipt}$  and residence  $Rural_{ipt}$ , and interaction items of  $DID_{ipt}$  and the binary variables  
6  $Middle\_income_{ipt}$ ,  $High\_income_{ipt}$ . It can be seen that the impact of CMI on self-rated health,  
7 IADL and MMSE Score were still insignificant ( $P > 0.1$ ). But CMI could significantly reduce the  
8 number of ADL limitations of the elderly living in rural areas and middle- and high-income  
9 groups ( $P < 0.1$ ). In addition, CMI could significantly increase the index of positive well-being and  
10 reduce the index of negative well-being of high-income group population ( $P < 0.1$ ).

11 **Table 3 Heterogeneity analysis**

Variables	Self-rated Health	Number of ADL limitations	Number of IADL limitations	MMSE score	Index of Positive Well- Being	Index of Negative Well- Being
$treat_p$	0.431*** (0.137)	-0.263* (0.157)	-0.751* (0.396)	-0.833 (0.792)	-1.486*** (0.316)	0.928*** (0.330)
$time_t$	-0.019 (0.026)	0.011 (0.023)	0.045 (0.062)	0.364*** (0.131)	-0.096 (0.064)	0.128** (0.065)
$DID_{ipt}$	0.036 (0.126)	0.342* (0.176)	0.189 (0.332)	-0.247 (0.730)	-0.032 (0.298)	0.017 (0.296)
$DID_{ipt} \cdot Rural_{ipt}$	-0.111 (0.105)	-0.227** (0.111)	-0.394 (0.267)	-0.144 (0.610)	0.207 (0.251)	-0.129 (0.282)
$DID_{ipt} \cdot Middle\_income_{ipt}$	0.017 (0.125)	-0.348** (0.146)	-0.271 (0.328)	-0.346 (0.853)	0.044 (0.309)	-0.179 (0.330)

$DID_{ipt} \cdot High\_income_{ipt}$	-0.128 (0.123)	-0.279* (0.156)	-0.149 (0.325)	-0.178 (0.702)	0.708** (0.295)	-0.611* (0.320)
Province	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,727	4,727	4,727	4,727	4,727	4,727
Adjusted $R^2$	0.130	0.104	0.367	0.219	0.076	0.080

\*  $P < 0.1$  \*\*  $P < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $P < 0.01$

## Robustness test

Although the DID model controlled as many factors as possible, due to the limitations of two periods of data, we could not verify whether the assumptions of DID method, namely common trend was met. Therefore, we referred to the practices of existing studies.[14] The results of PSM-DID model were used as the robustness test of our benchmark results. Firstly, the samples were screened into panel data, and then the samples were matched according to the characteristics of the baseline survey (2011/12 wave). Then the effect of CMI on health of the elderly was studied using the DID method. Table A1 and Figure A1 list the balance test results and the kernel density curve of propensity score before and after matching. It can be seen from Panel A in Table A1 that after matching, all observable characteristics between the treatment and control group were well balanced. Variables with significant differences between the two groups became statistically insignificant ( $P > 0.05$ ) after matching.

**Table 4 Robust test**

Variables	Self-rated Health	Number of ADL limitations	Number of IADL limitations	MMSE score	Index of Positive Well-Being	Index of Negative Well-Being
$DID_{ipt}$	-0.117** (0.059)	-0.050 (0.077)	-0.080 (0.175)	0.253 (0.394)	0.094 (0.142)	-0.375** (0.151)
Province	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,928	4,078	4,210	3,250	3,460	3,646
Adjusted $R^2$	0.045	0.084	0.146	0.013	0.008	0.011

\*  $P < 0.1$  \*\*  $P < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $P < 0.01$

Meanwhile, Panel B in table A1 showed the overall balancing properties of kernel matching.

1 the Pseudo R square of probability model, the joint significance of covariates, the mean and median  
2 of the standardized deviation were all significantly lower after matching. As can be seen from the  
3 probability distribution density function in Figure A1, the probability distribution density curves of  
4 the two groups were close to coincidence after matching, indicating that the samples of the treatment  
5 and control group were more balanced after matching.

6 Table 4 reported the PSM-DID estimation results. It can be seen that CMI could significantly  
7 improve self-rated health and index of negative well-being among the elderly. Specifically, the self-  
8 rated health of the elderly in treatment group was improved by 0.117 units, and the index of negative  
9 well-being decreased by 0.375 units in the treatment group, and the above effects were significant  
10 at the level of 5% ( $P<0.05$ ). Moreover, the estimation results showed that CMI could reduce the  
11 number of ADL and IADL limitations, and increase MMSE score and index of positive well-being  
12 by 0.253 and 0.094 points, respectively. However, these effects were not statistically significant  
13 ( $P>0.1$ ).

#### 14 ***Potential Mechanisms analysis***

15 In order to verify the potential mechanisms of CMI influencing the health of the elderly, we  
16 used the Heckman Selection model to estimate the impact of CMI on the total healthcare utilization  
17 and inpatient healthcare utilization of the elderly. The results are shown in Table 5. for the total  
18 healthcare utilization, the inverse Mills ratio was significant at the level of 1%, indicating that there  
19 was an obvious selection effect in patients' decision making. But there was no significant selection  
20 effect on hospitalization. After controlling for provincial information and related covariates, we  
21 found that CMI mainly increased the hospitalization rate of the elderly ( $P<0.01$ ), but did not  
22 significantly affect their total hospitalization expenditure, probability of visit, and total medical

1 expenditure ( $P>0.1$ ).

## 2 **Discussion**

3 In order to reduce the risk of catastrophic health expenditure for urban and rural residents,  
4 China has issued a document to establish and promote the implementation of the catastrophic  
5 medical insurance since 2012. The gradual implementation of CMI in different regions provides a  
6 good basis for studying the effect of the implementation of it. Existing studies discussed the effect  
7 of CMI in lowering medical economic risks, ignoring its influence on health outcomes. The study  
8 based on a natural experiment framework, using the CLHLS data and a number of health indicators,  
9 evaluated the effect of CMI on health outcomes among the elderly and its heterogeneity. Also, its  
10 potential mechanism was studied. The conclusion can provide useful references for improving the  
11 medical insurance system design in China and other developing countries.

12 Our study found that the implementation of CMI can improve the mental health status of the  
13 elderly to some extent, which is consistent with the conclusions of previous studies[31]. From the  
14 perspective of system design, CMI mainly compensates for the compliance medical expenses that  
15 still need to be paid by individuals after being reimbursed by the basic medical insurance. Studies  
16 have pointed out that CMI can reimburse an additional 10% of the expenses on the basis of the basic  
17 medical insurance[42]. This medical cost sharing mechanism of CMI can further improve the  
18 accessibility of hospitalization services and hence increase the probability of hospitalization. One  
19 study found that CMI increased the frequency and length of hospital stays, promoted the utilization  
20 of medical services for inpatients[26]. In addition, CMI could promote the subjective healthcare  
21 accessibility of the elderly, increases the probability of timely treatment when the elderly was ill[31],  
22 the promotion in healthcare utilization accessibility could improve the health outcomes of the

1 elderly, especially in the aspect of mental health.

2 Our study also demonstrated that CMI had a limited effect on the health improvement of the  
3 elderly. CMI had no significant impact on the physical health of the elderly, including ADL, IADL  
4 and cognitive function. Existing studies on the effect of URBMI and NCMS found individuals  
5 would be excluded from the scope of compensation due to high deductibles, Low reimbursement  
6 rate and limited coverage[20]. Therefore basic medical insurance contribute only modestly to health  
7 improvements[23]. CMI provides extra compensation for URBMI and NCMS patients with high  
8 medical costs. Although the level of security is improved to a certain extent, the protection effect is  
9 limited[43], which may also be the reason for the limited health improvement effect. Moreover,  
10 since health is a stock, the impacts of the cost-sharing mechanism of CMI on health outcomes of  
11 the elderly deserve further study[17].

12 Finally, our study showed that there was heterogeneity in the health improvement effect of  
13 CMI among different groups. The positive effect of CMI on health was mainly concentrated in the  
14 elderly with higher income level, and there is no significant improvement effect on the middle- and  
15 low-income group, especially for the low-income group population. The coverage of CMI and its  
16 segmented compensation design suggested that people who pay more out-of-pocket medical  
17 expenses get more subsidies from it. As studies have shown, out-of-pocket health expenditures  
18 increase as affordability increases[44]. For individuals, in order to get additional compensation from  
19 CMI, they have to reach the high deductible. For the low-income group population, to achieve the  
20 threshold means that they need to undertake a certain proportion of out-of-pocket medical expenses.  
21 And those constrained by their income could not enjoy CMI benefits because it was hard to pay the  
22 threshold for them. A study about the NCMS also found that participants with low- and middle-

1 income were more likely to avoid using medical services[20]. Therefore, higher income group will  
2 benefit more from CMI[26]. In contrast, the benefits of the CMI are not fully available to low-  
3 income group population, so there is no significant improvement in health outcomes. The income  
4 heterogeneity of the health effect of critical illness insurance is consistent with previous studies on  
5 the general population[30].

6 Our study had several policy implications. First of all, CMI should focus on its health  
7 improvement effect in the future since the ultimate goal of health insurance is to improve the health  
8 outcomes of participants. For patients with serious diseases, the government should focus on their  
9 health demand and give personalized medical insurance reimbursement plan; Second, CMI should  
10 take fairness into consideration during the process of practice, focusing on welfare improvement for  
11 low-income group population. Although CMI has provided some priorities in view of the extreme  
12 poverty population in the process of implementation, such as to reduce the deductible, cancel the  
13 cap line, increase reimbursement ratio by 5-10% and so on. However, some people with lower  
14 income level are still excluded from the scope of policy security due to budget constraints. In view  
15 of this problem, it is suggested to design the compensation policy of CMI according to the gradient  
16 of residents' disposable income, so as to make the policy security more accurate. Finally, although  
17 most areas are introduced CMI mainly for hospitalized patients with serious illness, but for some  
18 patients with specific diseases, the outpatient medical expenses are also burdensome. These people  
19 remain at high risk of falling into catastrophic health spending. Therefore, it can be considered to  
20 broaden CMI coverage, but need to pay attention to individual excessive demand and induced  
21 demand from staff in health facilities.

22 Our study had some limitations. Firstly, considering the implementation of CMI to the

1 improvement of individual health needs some time, but data used in this study cannot capture the  
2 health effect of CMI for a long time, so this is one of the limitations of this study, and it is also a  
3 research direction in the future. Secondly, the influence of CMI on health of other group population  
4 is also a research direction we will pay attention to in the future.

## 5 **Conclusions**

6 This study analyzed the impact of CMI on the health among Chinese elderly. The results showed  
7 that CMI could improve the mental health of the elderly to a certain extent, but the effect is limited.  
8 CMI mainly improves the health of middle- and high-income groups, especially high-income group  
9 population, and did not significantly affect any health outcomes of low-income elderly. The possible  
10 mechanism for the impact of CMI on health is that it can promote access to healthcare utilization  
11 for older people through price subsidy mechanisms, especially increase the probability of  
12 hospitalization. Our research conclusions have important policy implications. The government  
13 should pay more attention to health improvement effect and its fairness in the future implementation  
14 process of CMI. In the premise to ensure the sustainable and effective regulation of the CMI fund,  
15 the reimbursement coverage can be expanded and the reimbursement rate of CMI can be increased  
16 appropriately, making CMI more accessible to those need it most.

## 17 **List of abbreviations**

18 CMI: Catastrophic medical insurance  
19 CLHLS: Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey  
20 DID: Difference-in-differences  
21 PSM: Propensity score matching  
22 UEBMI: Urban Employee's Basic Medical Insurance

1 URBMI: Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance

2 NCMS: New Cooperative Medical Scheme

3 NHI: National Health Insurance

4 ADL: Activities of Daily Living

5 IADL: Instrumental Activity of Daily Living

6 MMSE: Mini-mental State Examination

7 **Acknowledgments**

8 We thank the Center for Healthy Ageing and Development Studies, Peking University, very much  
9 for providing the data of CLHLS.

10 **Availability of data and materials**

11 [https://sites.duke.edu/centerforaging/programs/chinese-longitudinal-healthy-longevity-survey-](https://sites.duke.edu/centerforaging/programs/chinese-longitudinal-healthy-longevity-survey-clhls/)  
12 [clhls/](https://sites.duke.edu/centerforaging/programs/chinese-longitudinal-healthy-longevity-survey-clhls/)

13 **Authors' Contributions**

14 XX and HY designed the study. JS and XX led the data analysis and wrote the manuscript. HY, JS, XX  
15 and QW participated in the revision of the manuscript and approved the final version for publication.

16 **Ethics approval and consent to participate**

17 Ethical approval for the study was not required since it was based exclusively on the publicly available  
18 data, CLHLS. Hence the study subjects were not directly approached.

19 **Consent for Publication**

20 No applicable.

21 **Competing interest**

22 The authors report no conflicts of interest in this work.



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
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- 22

1 **Appendix**

2

**Table A1 The balancing tests of covariates from kernel matching**

Panel A Test the balancing property for each observed covariate											
Variables	Prematching					Postmatching					% reduction  bias
	Treated	Control	t	p>t	% bias	Treated	Control	t	p>t	% bias	
Age	80.428	81.285	-1.67	0.095	-9.3	80.477	80.492	-0.02	0.980	-0.2	98.2
Female	0.540	0.553	-0.51	0.612	-2.8	0.535	0.541	-0.16	0.869	-1.1	59.1
Years of Schooling	1.737	1.940	-1.30	0.193	-7.2	1.754	1.759	-0.03	0.975	-0.2	97.1
Rural China	0.512	0.446	2.41	0.016	13.1	0.507	0.509	-0.04	0.966	-0.3	97.7
Had a White- collar Job before 60	0.019	0.025	-0.81	0.418	-4.6	0.019	0.019	-0.03	0.977	-0.2	96.0
Married	0.486	0.468	0.66	0.511	3.6	0.488	0.489	-0.03	0.976	-0.2	94.2
Number of Children	3.802	3.930	-1.29	0.199	-7.1	3.803	3.821	-0.15	0.882	-1.0	85.9
Live Alone	0.195	0.161	1.7	0.089	9.1	0.190	0.204	-0.50	0.618	-3.6	60.9
NCMS	0.077	0.070	0.46	0.643	2.5	0.077	0.082	-0.25	0.804	-1.8	29.4
Household income per capita (logarithm)	8.532	8.062	5.77	0.000	31.2	8.51	8.436	0.75	0.451	4.9	84.3
Number of Chronic Diseases	1.630	1.208	5.40	0.000	27.7	1.592	1.597	-0.04	0.965	-0.3	98.8
Smoking	0.242	0.222	0.85	0.394	4.6	0.244	0.240	0.13	0.900	0.9	81.0
Drinking	0.233	0.192	1.87	0.062	10.0	0.232	0.227	0.19	0.851	1.3	86.7
Panel B Test the overall balance											
sample	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		LR $\chi^2$		p> $\chi^2$		Mean bias		Median bias		
Unmatched	0.040		81.92		0.000		10.2		7.2		
Matched	0.001		1.10		1.000		1.2		0.9		



1

2 **Figure A1. The distribution of density of propensity score before and after matching**