

# Factors that affect social health insurance enrollment and retention of the informal sector in the Philippines: a qualitative study

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## Research article

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2 **sector in the Philippines: a qualitative study**

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24 **Abstract**

25 Background. The primary goal of providing social protection to informal sector workers is to  
26 guarantee a minimum level of income and dignity that allows for better protection against  
27 income shocks and other vulnerabilities. With the passage of the Universal Health Care Act in  
28 the Philippines, the determination of factors affecting enrollment and retention into social  
29 health insurance among informal sector workers in the Philippines is crucial to design  
30 appropriate policies and programs fit to their needs.

31 Methods. This study aimed to identify factors that affect social health insurance enrollment  
32 and retention of the informal sector in the Philippines through qualitative research methods of  
33 face-to-face, semi-structured focus group discussion and key informant interviews.

34 Results. The analysis identified five broad themes that affect informal sector enrollment and  
35 retention in social health insurance: 1) overlaps in categorization, 2) insufficient or  
36 inappropriate social health insurance initiatives for the informal sector, 3) awareness and  
37 understanding of social health insurance, 4) supply side factors, and 5) convenience and  
38 amount of premium payment.

39 Conclusion. Informal workers are individuals who are not covered by protective labor laws  
40 and tend to not belong or contribute to a national health insurance scheme. In the case of the  
41 Philippines, the diversity of informal work and dynamic nature of the sector works against an  
42 ideal one-size-fits-all solution to increasing informal sector enrollment and retention to social  
43 health insurance.

44 **Keywords:** informal sector, health insurance, universal health care, health finance,  
45 Philippines, developing country

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49 **Background**

50 Since its establishment in 1995 through the National Health Insurance Act, the Philippine  
51 Health Insurance Corporation has developed various strategies in ensuring universal health  
52 care (UHC). This is complemented by national health policies which guarantee Filipinos  
53 equitable access to quality and affordable health goods and services. The recently signed  
54 UHC Law “*guarantees all Filipinos equitable access to quality and affordable health goods  
55 and services and protected against financial risk protection*”. With its implementation, Filipino  
56 citizens will either be indirect contributors (sponsored, subsidized by the government) or direct  
57 contributors. Efforts of developing countries like the Philippines to expand health coverage are  
58 characterized by a common enrollment and financing pattern: commencing with formal sector  
59 workers followed with government-subsidized enrollment of the poor (2). The informal sector  
60 group is typically left behind which then makes them vulnerable to health catastrophes.

61 The International Labor Organization describes the work undertaken by informal laborers as  
62 any economic activity undertaken by workers and profitable units that are not legally or  
63 sufficiently recognized by formal arrangement (3). The Philippine Department of Labor and  
64 Employment estimates that in 2017, 22.71 million individuals or 56% of the total employed  
65 population were in the informal sector (4). The sector is identified as the “*missing middle*”  
66 whose membership and retention to a national health insurance program is crucial to attain  
67 UHC. They are some of the most mobile and volatile members of the Philippine social health  
68 insurance (SHI), influenced by a multitude of factors that affect voluntary payment options. To  
69 date, just over 27% (6.3 million) of informal sector members in the Philippines are registered  
70 to SHI and only 1% (2.4 million) are actively paying members. This translates into a \$959  
71 million annual premium loss for the country (5).

72 The primary goal of providing social protection to informal sector workers is to guarantee a  
73 minimum level of income and dignity that allows for better protection against income shocks  
74 and other vulnerabilities (1). With the passage of the UHC Act, determination of factors

75 affecting enrollment and retention into SHI of the informal sector in the Philippines is crucial to  
76 design appropriate policies and programs fit to their needs.

## 77 **Methods**

78 This study aimed to identify factors that affect SHI enrollment and retention of the informal  
79 sector in the Philippines through face-to-face, semi-structured focus group discussion and key  
80 informant interviews.

### 81 Sampling and participants

82 This study used convenience, purposive, and snowball sampling to select study participants.  
83 For key informant interviews, participants from government and non-government agencies  
84 were targeted through an online search of department heads and key leaders. Critical  
85 employees within the agencies were chosen based on their roles and its relevance to the  
86 informal sector. Recommendations by other targeted participants as well as authors of  
87 published literature on informal sector in the Philippines were also invited to participate in the  
88 study. Informal sector participants for the focus group discussion were recruited through  
89 unions.

90 The targeted participants were contacted via letter of invitation, e-mail, text messages, and  
91 phone calls. Out of the 35 potential participants, 16 participated in key informant interviews  
92 and six informal sector workers joined the focus group discussion. No response was received  
93 from three potential key informants while one was not able to participate due to scheduling  
94 conflicts. Due to the precarious nature of their work, four informal sector representatives were  
95 unable to join the focus group discussion.

### 96 Setting and data collection

97 A topic guide was developed by the researchers in preparation for the interviews and focus  
98 group discussion. The topic guide was based on important points to cover during the interview

99 or discussion based on literature review. The topic guide was not pilot tested but was refined  
100 after each interview and discussion.

101 A total of 16 key informant interviews and one focus group discussion were conducted in  
102 meeting rooms or offices. Before beginning each interview and focus group discussion, the  
103 researchers introduced themselves and the participants were oriented on the research  
104 purpose, objectives, its funder, the purpose of the interview or discussion, participation risks,  
105 right to refuse or end participation, right to retract statement, and confidentiality of their identity  
106 and responses. The participants were then asked to sign a written informed consent form.

107 The interviews and focus group discussion were held between August to September 2019 in  
108 Manila, Philippines. Interviews lasted between one to three hours while the focus group  
109 discussion ran for four hours. No more than three researchers were present per interview and  
110 discussion. All researchers present during the interview or discussion hold post-graduate  
111 degrees and have previous experience and training in conducting qualitative research  
112 methods. Besides the researchers and participants, no other individuals were present.  
113 Interviews and discussions were held in the local language and/or English, depending on the  
114 preference of the participants. The interviews and discussion were audio recorded with the  
115 consent of the participants. Notes were also taken during the interview by one of the  
116 researchers to aid in data collection and analysis. Renumeration was only provided to informal  
117 sector workers to replace income lost by attending the discussion. No repeat interviews were  
118 carried out.

### 119 Analysis

120 Iterative, inductive thematic and content analysis was used to synthesize findings. These types  
121 of analysis were chosen due to the wide variety of research questions and topics that can be  
122 addressed through these methods (6).

123 The transcription of audio recordings was ongoing during the study and were completed  
124 between one to four weeks after each interview or discussion. Transcription was done by a

125 researcher who was present during the interview or discussion. This was done to achieve  
126 familiarity and entirety of the data and allow understanding of phrasing or the meaning of a  
127 term within the context of the interview or discussion.

128 The transcribed text was disassembled for thematic analysis using Google Sheets by one  
129 researcher. The topic guide was used for initial *a priori* coding. A second researcher then  
130 repeatedly analyzed the transcripts and *a priori* coded data for grounded coding. Emerging  
131 themes and codes were sharpened and refined throughout this period and was done  
132 repeatedly until new data did not alter the definition of the themes and codes. Data saturation  
133 was declared once no new patterns and themes emerged from the data.

134 The data were grouped and regrouped continuously to show patterns that may indicate an  
135 explanation for factors that affect national health insurance enrolment and retention of the  
136 informal sector. Interpretation and conclusion were conducted by one researcher.  
137 Interpretation and conclusion were based both in and outside the context of the data.  
138 Relationships between the themes was also considered in interpreting the data and drawing  
139 conclusions.

## 140 **Results**

141 The analysis identified five broad themes that affect informal sector enrollment and retention  
142 in SHI (Table 1). The findings are discussed in more detail below with examples selected from  
143 the dataset indicated between quotation marks.

144 ***Table 1. Factors that affect SHI enrollment and retention of the informal sector in the***  
145 ***Philippines***

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Overlaps in categorization</li><li>▪ Insufficient or inappropriate SHI initiatives for the informal sector</li><li>▪ Awareness and understanding of SHI</li><li>▪ Supply side factors: quality of services and current benefits</li><li>▪ Convenience and amount of payment</li></ul> |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

146

147 Overlaps in categorization

148 Informal workers should be categorized as individually paying SHI members. However,  
149 overlaps do occur in the system.

150 Due to the variability of work and income in the informal sector, there are near-poor informal  
151 workers that can overlap with indigents. Local governments estimate that 90-95% of their  
152 sponsored members are actually informal workers. While local governments may view this as  
153 UHC, one informant claimed that this is only universal coverage.

154 There have been recommendations to remove local government sponsorship due to its  
155 politicization and free riding (those with capacity to pay apply to be sponsored). Stringent  
156 screening is necessary to identify qualified members, but this is difficult due to lack of social  
157 workers in health facilities and shared data between agencies to determine trueness of  
158 applicant declaration. An informal worker participant said:

159 *“Not being politically connected to local leaders puts you in a disadvantage when it*  
160 *comes to accessing benefits in general. Money that is supposedly allotted for health is*  
161 *being corrupted.”*

162 Another informant said:

163 *“There is currently no data sharing amongst government agencies. Enrollees are not*  
164 *required to declare their profession and sources of income and no cross-checking is*  
165 *done on their declaration.”*

166 Adverse selection through point-of-service membership also occurs. This was originally  
167 intended as a stopgap measure and safety net. However, members now pay at the point-of-  
168 service once they need to avail benefits. This defeats the purpose of an insurance scheme,  
169 where funding should be prepaid for planning and investment. A key informant explains this:

170 *“The point-of-service should only be a stop-gap measure and a social safety net. But*  
171 *from a financing perspective, payments should be prepaid so one can plan and invest*

172 *the money. With this, it's spending the money right on the spot without letting it grow*  
173 *and without sharing it within the pool for other people to use."*

174 Insufficient or inappropriate SHI initiatives for the informal sector

175 There were varied responses regarding current SHI policies and programs in place for the  
176 informal sector. Some informants revealed that there is no specific strategy or program for the  
177 informal sector. Because the sector does not comprise the bulk of SHI contributions, there are  
178 limited to no marketing plans and funds for the sector. This represents a missed opportunity  
179 in engaging informal sector, considering that they are the majority of the working population.  
180 One informant said:

181 *"There is no active promotion or advertising for the informal sector. This depends on*  
182 *the region. Radio and television ads are preferred but are very expensive."*

183 While there have been initiatives in some regions for group membership, informants did not  
184 find this suitable for the sector due to 1) their unorganized nature, 2) the issue of security once  
185 contributions grow, 3) the need to access payment site to pay the contribution. A key informant  
186 said:

187 *"Group membership only covers a very small percentage of the informal sector.*  
188 *They're not organized so this is unsuitable for them. Even if pilot tests of group*  
189 *membership were successful, this is difficult to scale up."*

190 When asked why previous initiatives failed, informants cited the lack of 1) official receipts of  
191 some proposed mechanisms, 2) infrastructure at the time, and 3) political buy-in and  
192 leadership. For digital platforms, the changing technical requirements which payment  
193 channels are unable to comply with and information technology human resource capacity from  
194 SHI are a barrier to implementation. An informant shared:

195           *“Group memberships only issue one receipt for the entire group. If one member gets*  
196           *sick, no receipt can be shown as proof of payment. Mobile payments only provide*  
197           *acknowledgement of payment with no official receipt.”*

198 Another informant said:

199           *“To reach the informal sector, community leadership is key. This should be someone*  
200           *they can trust and serve as the link to government but also understands the process.”*

201 Informants recommend that SHI explore marketing strategies in the areas of willingness to  
202 invest of informal sector, repackaging the program per segment of the sector, and exploring  
203 how private health insurance companies sell their products. Another recommendation is to  
204 utilize social media as the primary marketing tool if there are limited marketing funds for the  
205 informal sector. Finally, it is recommended to relax the requirements to be a collecting agent  
206 and address the issue of interrupted contribution periods, a common phenomenon for  
207 seasonal workers.

#### 208 Awareness and understanding of SHI

209 Results from interviews and focus group discussions show that enrollment is primarily affected  
210 by how members of the informal sector understand SHI. In particular, the concept of SHI in  
211 relation to other social insurance schemes is important. Unlike other social insurance schemes  
212 wherein return on investment is tangible, SHI is seen as a riskier investment that, if left unused,  
213 translates into wasted money. An informant explained:

214           *“People are more interested in an insurance if they know their money will grow. The*  
215           *concept of health insurance is still not clear to many. The concept that people have of*  
216           *SHI is that it is only used in health emergencies. If the member does not use health*  
217           *services in an emergency, this is interpreted as a wasted investment.”*

218 Another informant said:

219 *“Not everyone sees the value of SHI. It is very hard to see the value of prevention.*  
220 *Other social insurance schemes have a tangible return of investment.”*

221 An informal worker shared:

222 *“I prioritize payment of other social insurance schemes over health insurance since it*  
223 *offers more benefits with tangible returns.”*

224 Reasons for enrollment and retention include availment of benefits or discounts and practicing  
225 their rights as workers. Conversely, lack of knowledge on how to enroll, where to pay, and  
226 benefits prevent are barriers to enrollment and retention. An informal worker participant said:

227 *“There is appreciation and acceptance of SHI but there is limited knowledge on the*  
228 *amount of payment, where to pay, and the benefits.”*

229 Supply-side factors: quality of services and current benefits

230 Quality of services also affects retention, with informants less inclined to retain membership if  
231 the quality of service they receive both in SHI and health facilities is poor. One informant  
232 explained:

233 *“When the experience in availing services in the health facility is not good, individuals*  
234 *second guess paying for membership. This contributes to the feeling that they are*  
235 *discriminated against, particularly if they are near-poor.”*

236 The lack of coverage for outpatient and primary care services, which are the most common  
237 services used by informants, discourages them from premium payment. While some  
238 medicines are covered by SHI, these are often out-of-stock in public health facilities, thus  
239 rendering the membership useless. In addition, when informants apply for SHI reimbursement,  
240 the tediously slow process is a deterrent to claim the benefit. An informal worker shared:

241 *“They should provide medications. Currently, medicines purchased outside the health*  
242 *facility are not covered. But health facilities are always out-of-stock.”*

243 Convenience and amount of payment

244 Informants find the payment of premium to be an inconvenience, citing that payment sites are  
245 inaccessible and requires that they take a day off from work. The combined cost of income  
246 lost, transportation, and the premium discourages informal workers to pay their contributions  
247 on schedule. An informant shared:

248 *“Payment mechanisms need to be accessible. There is indirect cost when there is a*  
249 *need to go to the payment site. Access is an issue especially for geographically*  
250 *isolated and disadvantaged areas.”*

251 Despite high willingness to pay, unaffordability of the premium is also a deterrent to continuous  
252 payment, especially when coupled with factors such as seasonality of income and other  
253 financial priorities. In particular, informal workers prioritize other social insurance schemes.  
254 Interestingly, the high premium for other schemes is the reason cited for not missing a  
255 payment schedule. Because of high premiums in other social insurance schemes, carrying  
256 over a missed payment to the next cycle is financially damaging to informal workers as this  
257 can amount up to almost Php 5,000. This is contrary to the Php 200 monthly premium for SHI,  
258 which informants said they can afford to be carried over in the next cycle if missed. An  
259 informant said:

260 *“The informal sector is willing to pay but not at the current rate. Formal sector workers*  
261 *only contribute half and share the burden with their employers. Informal workers*  
262 *shoulder 100% of the burden of the premium.”*

263 Interrupted or lapsed contribution occurs if the workers are put in floating status by their  
264 employer, a state wherein they are unemployed but are retained by their employer with  
265 benefits uncovered. Instances of unknown lapsed contribution occurs when employers inform  
266 their workers that their share of the contribution is paid but do not actually pay the premium  
267 continuously. An informal worker shared:

268 *“The continuity of payment depends on the [manpower] agency or employer. I thought*  
269 *my employer was continuously paying but I could not avail the benefits when I needed*  
270 *as my employer did not pay their share of the premium.”*

271 Informants recommend a tiered payment scheme for the informal workers wherein the  
272 government shares the burden of premium costs, similar to how formally employed workers  
273 share costs with their employer. Another proposal is a progressive scheme wherein informal  
274 workers with higher income pay a higher premium. They also prefer a quarterly schedule to  
275 reduce indirect costs of premium payment. Informants also suggest a text message scheme  
276 wherein a reminder is sent prior to the deadline of the current payment cycle to encourage  
277 continuous contribution. An informal worker stated:

278 *“A customizable package for informal sector workers is preferred and should be*  
279 *custom fit to our capacity to pay. There should be a tiered payment strategy: the higher*  
280 *the income, the higher the premium paid.”*

## 281 **Discussion**

282 Attainment of UHC has been a key priority both in the Philippines and the global agenda of  
283 social protection. Governments usually rely on three strategies to increase health coverage:  
284 1) a centrally managed and tax-financed national health care system, 2) development of social  
285 health insurance schemes, and 3) promotion of private health insurance (7). These strategies  
286 mostly target the sector of the population in the civil service or formal economy (8). In low- and  
287 middle-income countries (LMIC), attaining UHC is complicated by the large and continuously  
288 rising share of the population employed in the informal sector (2).

289 There is a gap in identifying or validating whether or not sponsored members are part of the  
290 informal economy or not. In theory, they are members who don't have the capacity to pay their  
291 premiums. However, there is still a question on whether or not they do not have the capacity  
292 to pay as the process of identifying such members may be affected by politics. This can result  
293 in underestimation of the informal economy workers. The informal sector is highly diverse and

294 ranges from professionals to below-minimum wage workers (5). Knowing the size and scope  
295 of the informal sector is then crucial for policymakers to design appropriate policies and  
296 programs for their assistance and social protection (2).

297 Our results also show that a lack of awareness about SHI is a barrier to both enrollment and  
298 retention. In a 2013 South Africa study, 24% of participants identified lack of awareness as  
299 the most important barrier to enrollment (9). In a 2017 Nigeria study, education was a  
300 consideration for varied awareness levels of a SHI (10). A systematic review published in 2012  
301 that included 19 LMIC studies found that education increases a person's likelihood of  
302 enrollment (11). It is then likely that a person with higher educational attainment may better  
303 understand and comprehend the benefits of participating in a SHI (10). The better an individual  
304 understands the benefits of health insurance, the more likely they are to participate in the  
305 scheme (12).

306 This study found that unaffordability of the premium is a deterrent to enrollment and retention.  
307 Two studies in Kenya found that the premium amount was thought of by the informal sector  
308 as unaffordable and posits that, while some entities are able to afford the premium, substantial  
309 sections of the informal sector were unable to cope with this and would continue to require  
310 government subsidies to be included in the health insurance scheme (13, 14). In financing  
311 UHC, policy-makers should take into account whether the informal sector has the financial  
312 capability to participate in a prepayment scheme for health care (14). Wealthier individuals are  
313 more likely to participate in a SHI, so it is unsurprising that amount of premium payment is a  
314 determinant of enrollment and retention (12). The policy direction of expanding contribution  
315 collection to the informal economy is led by the assumption that the sector is the "*missing*  
316 *middle*" or that they have substantial financial resources that can be tapped to finance UHC  
317 (14). In an environment characterized by seasonal employment and high variations in income,  
318 informal workers are unable and even unwilling to pay premiums for SHI (12, 15).

319 Interviews and focus group discussions reveal that informal workers find premium payments  
320 inconvenient, inaccessible, and result in income loss due to the indirect costs of payment.  
321 Frequent lapsed contributions also occur due to the seasonal and unprotected nature of  
322 informal work. Collecting premium contributions from the informal sector continues to be a  
323 challenge for many LMICs (16). More flexible terms of premium collection that adapts to local  
324 realities are considered the most appropriate approach compared to the one-size-fits-all model  
325 currently used by the Philippines (12, 17). The various preferences in payment schedule,  
326 mode, and location emphasizes the diverse priorities and needs within the sector. Purchasers  
327 in the Philippines must then determine the extent to which they can accept and accommodate  
328 irregularity of premium payment from the sector (12).

329 Another crucial set of factors identified in this study are on supply-side issues which includes  
330 the (perceived) quality of health care services and the benefit package offered by a SHI. In  
331 supply-side issues, many other factors may come into play: the state and proximity of a  
332 healthcare facility, availability of medical staff, waiting times, and availability of medicines,  
333 among others. A similar phenomenon was observed in Tanzania, where dropout was primarily  
334 related to the lack of quality care services and failure of SHI to meet the needs of the  
335 beneficiaries. In this case, respondents resorted to more convenient alternatives such as  
336 traditional medicines, private health facilities, and pharmacies (12). In Kenya, participants  
337 found benefit packages attractive and comprehensive on paper, but benefits received in  
338 practice was limited. This, coupled with poor bedside manners of health staff, ultimately led to  
339 attrition (13).

## 340 **Conclusion**

341 Informal workers are individuals who are not covered by protective labor laws and tend to not  
342 belong or contribute to a national health insurance scheme. In the case of the Philippines, the  
343 diversity of informal work and dynamic nature of the sector works against an ideal one-size-  
344 fits-all solution to increasing informal sector enrollment and retention to SHI.

345 Due to the significant size and unorganized nature of the sector, it remains a significant  
346 challenge to capture each individual segment that comprises its entirety. It may be more  
347 significant to target individuals within the informal sector who have the ability to contribute and  
348 pay premiums. Specifically targeting these individuals will enable the Philippines SHI to  
349 allocate resources towards strategies that can create sustainability of the financial pool.

### 350 **Study limitations**

351 This study is limited by the underrepresentation of informal sector members from semi-rural  
352 and rural areas. Only informal sector members connected to labor groups in Manila were  
353 reached to take part in the study. The viewpoints of semi-rural and rural workers were then  
354 not captured in the study.

355 The study also did not include informal sector workers in the high-income quintile. They may  
356 have provided insights that differed from those found in this study.

357 The study was unable to gather insights from representatives of other Philippine social  
358 insurance agencies who may have been able to share their knowledge on informal sector  
359 enrollment retention for non-health social insurance schemes.

### 360 **List of abbreviations**

361 UHC – universal health care

362 LMIC – low- and middle- income country

363 SHI – social health insurance

### 364 **Ethical considerations**

365 This study received ethics approval from Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Regional  
366 Hospital on 18 July 2019 with protocol number CLMMRH-RERC 2019-18.

### 367 **Availability of data and materials**

368 The datasets used and/or analyzed during the study are available from the corresponding  
369 author on reasonable request.

### 370 **Competing interests**

371 This study was commissioned by the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation.

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374 Health Research and Development.

### 375 **Author's contributions**

376 DS Jr and TT participated in the research conception and design. RKS managed research  
377 implementation. DS Jr, TT, GKR, and RKS participated in data collection. TT, GKR, and RKS  
378 developed the topic guide. GKR and RKS conducted the analysis. RKS conducted the  
379 interpretation of results. GKR and RKS drafted the results. RKS wrote the manuscript. All  
380 authors reviewed the manuscript.

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