CSO and Media Contributions to the Fight Against Corruption in Ghana's Extractive Sector: A Political Economy Analysis

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Abstract

Estimates show that Ghana losses approximately 30 percent of domestic revenue to corruption. Although losses due to corruption in Ghana's extractive sector have not yet been quantified, the sector is plagued with incidents of corruption despite the country's commitment to international conventions, transparency mechanisms and best practices. A concerted efforts by state and non-actors is key to ease this canker. Understanding the role of CSOs and media in exposing corruption, promoting oversight and identifying the enablers and obstacles to their work is key to informing practise in the development space. This study examines the role of CSOs and media in the fight against extractive sector corruption. It identifies political economy factors that enable or hinder them in exposing corruption. Lastly, it identifies practical suggestions for surmounting the identified adverse political and economic factors. The research examines two cases of corruption, based on a desktop review and a survey of 11 state and non-state actors. A direct association between the role of CSOs and media and the level of corruption were established. Coalition building, using legal suits, sustaining advocacy, collaborations between media and CSOs are some enabling political economy factors identified. Inadequate resources to sustain advocacy, excessive duplicity of roles amongst oversight institutions, vested interests in extractive sector, inadequate prosecution of offenders by the legal system, inadequate evidence-based policy solutions by government, inadequate political will, limited access to information; little or no funding for legal action, increasing CSO and media employee turnover rates, are identified as some key political economy factors militating against efforts towards stemming corruption in Ghana's extractive sector. These findings provide reliable information for CSOs and media in development practice, informs advocacy design, evaluates and improves media and CSO effectiveness in ridding the extractive sector of corruption.

1. Introduction And Background

Corruption is defined as the exploitation of bequeathed power for private gain. This phenomenon impairs good governance, social inclusion, economic development, trust and aggravates poverty, inequity, and environmental problems. It can involve anyone, occur in secret places with the help of professionals and shadowy shell companies. Corruption is dynamic to evolving context, environment and circumstances and in every sector of an economy including the extractives [2]. In the extractive sector especially, it can be complex and multifaceted with an array of causes and effects [3].

Globally, estimates suggested that USD 1.5 - 2 trillion is lost annually through bribes. This translates to about 3 - 4 percent of global GDP. The OECD posits that 20 percent of foreign bribery cases are related to the extractive industry. This makes the extractive sector the main concern for transparency[4]. In Ghana, estimates show that the country losses USD 3 billion annually to corruption, an amount equivalent to 4 percent of the country's GDP for 2019 and 30 percent of the country's domestic revenue[5] [6].

Although the country has committed to international transparency mechanisms, conventions, and movements such as Open Governance Partnership, EITI, corruption in the extractive sector is still prevalent and as such will need concerted efforts by state and non-actors to ease this canker. The role of

non-state actors like CSOs and media cannot be understated. Understanding the role of CSOs and media in exposing corruption, promoting oversight and identifying the enablers and obstacles to their work is key to informing practise in the development space.

1.1 Country context

In 2018, the oil, gas, mining and quarrying sector contributed 17.4% to GDP. Oil contributed 3.8% while mining and quarrying contributed 13.6% [7]. The highest GDP growth rate recorded before the discovery of oil was in 2008 (9.15%) it peaked in 2011 (14.05%) and plummeted in 2012 (9.29%). Since then, growth after oil production has never recovered past 9.15% recorded in 2018. This may be attributed to a structural shock. ie. Oil revenue injection providing a new base for GDP growth rate analysis. Between 1990 and 2019, the country's GDP growth recorded its lowest in 2015 (2.18%). By December 2020, the country's gross debt was 77% of GDP [8]. Between the years 2000 and 2019, Ghana's human development index increased from 0.49 to 0.61, indicating a 24.49 percentage improvement in access to knowledge, life expectancy, health and standard of living. This score places the country 138 out of 189 countries [9]. Regarding wages, the daily minimum wage is GH₵11.82 (USD 2.16) [10]. Mineral royalties and oil revenues contribute 2% and 7% respectively on average to domestic revenue [11].

1.2 Emergence of CSOs and media

The need for democracy, independent press and liberation from authoritarianism triggered the formation of CSO groups and media. In 1822 Sir Charles McCarthy's Royal Gold Coast Gazette was launched to provide news on British colonies and to share business information [12]. On the CSO front, the advent of the Gold Coast Aborigines' Rights Protection Society in 1897 served as a scholarly and activist group to serve as the mouthpiece for colonist Africa [13]. After that, the Fante confederacy traced its roots from the late 17th century and later reformed in 1968 by bourgeois elites aimed at promoting education, road construction and commerce. They contributed to deepening democracy and development.

Mr. George Grant, a member of the middle class and a timber merchant convened a meeting that began the formation of the UGCC in 1947 [14]. Over time, economic and policy threats like the Institute of Economic Affairs was formed in 1989 and subsequently, the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) on 11th August 1990. The MFJ together with the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), Christian Council, Catholic Bishops Conference and the Ghana Bar Association contributed to mounting pressure on the PNDC to return the country to civilian democratic rule in 1992. They also contributed to the termination of censorship and media dominance by the state broadcaster [15]. Up until today, CSOs and the media have played oversight roles of state programmes, shaped policy, influenced change, demanded accountability, promoted peace, democratic citizenship, civic participation, created platforms for engagement and served as an intermediary between government and citizens on issues [16].

Given the historic and current role of CSOs and the media coupled with the current political and socio-economic environment, it is important to understand what has contributed to the resilience and success of the CSOs and media so far and identify the obstacles that confront them in fighting corruption in Ghana's

extractive sector. The value of this paper will be to empirically document the enabling political economy factors and challenges that need to be addressed to inform advocacy design, evaluate and improve media and CSO effectiveness in ridding the extractive sector of corruption. The rest of the paper is presented as follows; approach, political economy analysis of case studies, nexus between CSO and media efforts and corruption, a summary of political economy factors and conclusion.

[2] Transparency International, “What Is Corruption? - Transparency.Org,” accessed February 2, 2021, <https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption>.

[3] Roberto Laver, “Defining Corruption,” *Deliver Us from Evil*, 2021, 7–12, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1ddcr0n.5>.

[4]

[5] Conversion was done using an official exchange rate (LCU per USD, period average) of GH₵5.22 to 1 USD as reported by the Worldbank and the 2019 provisional estimate for domestic revenue from the Ghana’s Ministry of Finance.

[6] ZDRAVKO Ljubal, “Ghana Loses US\$3 Billion to Corruption a Year,” 2019, <https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/10498-ghana-loses-us-3-billion-to-corruption-a-year>.

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[10] Bloomberg, “Ghana to Raise Daily Minimum Wage for 2020,” September 2019, <https://news.bloombergtax.com/payroll/ghana-to-raise-daily-minimum-wage-for-2020>.

[11] PIAC, “Public Interest and Accountability Committee,” 2019; Ghana Chamber of Mines, “The Ghana Chamber of Mines Performance of the Mining Industry in 2017,” *Performance Of The Mining Industry In 2017*, 2018; Ministry of Finance, “2019 Fiscal Data,” 2019.

[12] Paul Anyidoho, “Ethnography of Print and Broadcast Media in Ghana,” *Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research* 2, no. 7 (2016): 2454–1362, <http://www.onlinejournal.in>.

[13] “Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society (Western Colonialism),” accessed February 2, 2021, <http://what-when-how.com/western-colonialism/aborigines-rights-protection-society-western-colonialism/>.

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[16] Thomas Prehi Botchway, “Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic,” *Cogent Social Sciences* 4, no. 1 (2018): 1–17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2018.1452840>.

2. Approach

The study examines two cases of extractives sector corruption by applying a macro-level political economy analysis (PEA) framework as used by the Worldbank and the Australia Department of Foreign Affairs[17]. Three key questions are asked (figure 1);

- a. What has been the contribution of CSOs and media in fighting extractive sector corruption in Ghana?
- b. What are the political and economic factors enabling or hindering CSOs and media efforts against extractive sector corruption?
- c. What practicable options can be identified to fight extractive sector corruption in Ghana?

This approach is triangulated with responses from an online survey to identify how these political economy factors have positively or adversely shaped CSO and media efforts against extractive sector corruption. The study relies on several secondary information sources to provide answers to the questions. These sources are media reports on extractive sector corruption, World bank reports, and the literature.

The bus-branding saga is used as a case for identifying key political and economic factors enabling CSO and media efforts against extractive sector corruption while the fight against galamsey[18] is used as a case in identifying the key political and economic factors hindering CSO and media efforts against extractive sector corruption. Data from the World Governance Indicators are used as a proxy to illustrate the contribution of CSOs and media against extractive sector corruption in Ghana. Lastly, practicable options for fighting extractive sector corruption are elicited through the survey.

2.1 Sampling

A mix of sampling methods is used; purposive, convenient, and disproportional non-random sampling are used to administer the questionnaire for this survey. Respondents are recruited by relying on a publicly available CSO and media email list which is often used in correspondence on sector events. The email list has 80 emails comprising internal stakeholders (CSO, Media), external stakeholders (Civil Servants, International NGOs, Government Officials, Company officials, Political Actors, Former CSO and Media Actors who now work in government or the industry). An online questionnaire was sent to the pool of respondents on 1st February 2021 but only eleven responses were received. There were several bounced emails. The survey was administered from 1st February 2021 to 7 February 2021.

[17] DFAT, "Political Economy Analysis," vol. 34, 2016; Verena Fritz, Kai Kaiser, and Brian Levy, "Governance and Political Risk" 7, no. September (2009): 441-60, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3767\(06\)07018-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3767(06)07018-X); Louise Van Schaik, Xander van Tilburg, and Ivan Briscoe, "Political Economy of Green Growth and Energy Security A Framework for Country-Level Analysis," Clingendael, 2016.

[18] Schaik, Tilburg, and Briscoe, "Political Economy of Green Growth and Energy Security A Framework for Country-Level Analysis."

3. Results

Eleven respondents participated in the survey; they comprised 10 males and a female. Three were from the media, three from CSOs,2 civil servants, one person from industry, an INGO and a former CSO or media actor.

Table 1: Political economy factors from analysis of survey results

No.	Obstructing Factors-Galamsey	Other General Obstruction Factors	Enabling factors- Bus branding Saga	Enabling Factors-Galamsey
1.	Excessive red tapes amongst oversight institutions	Limited access to information	Effective advocacy strategy	Coalition building
2.	Lack of evidence-based policy solutions by government	Little or no funding for legal action	Public support	Leveraging traditional and new media platforms in advocacy
3.	Inadequate political will	Disunited front in advocacy	Leveraging traditional and new media platforms in advocacy	
4.	Vested interests in the extractive sector	Biased advocacy and media coverage	Political will by government	
5.	Lack of prosecution by the courts	Inadequate operationalisation of RTI	Legal action	
6.	Inadequate resources to sustain advocacy	Extractives considered technical	Sustained advocacy and demand for accountability	
7.	Clientelism	Weak accountability and transparency	Complementary efforts between Media and CSOs	
8.	Weak regulatory oversight	Cultural acceptability of certain corrupt practices	Democratic dispensation	
9.	Inadequate funding for research and investigation	Inadequate remuneration for media practitioners	Vibrant and Incorruptible CSO and media leaders	
10.	Weak oversight role of anti-corruption agencies	Inadequate capacity building of media		

11.	Absolving political appointees of Government	Media intimidation
12.		Political capture of media

3.1 Political economy analysis of case studies

3.1.1 The Bus branding saga

On 16th December 2015, the 2015 annual report on petroleum funds was being discussed in parliament when the then minority questioned the move by the government to spend an amount of GH¢31,000 for branding each of 116 Huanghai buses at a total cost of GH¢ 3.59 million. The Chief of Staff directed the Attorney General to investigate the matter and report back by 22nd December 2015. The Attorney General indicated after the investigation that the total amount to be repaid was GH¢1.9 million. This amount was later reviewed to GH¢1,548 million. The revised amount was premised on a modified Value Added Tax and Withholding Tax position on the original amount. The expenditure was a portion of the annual budget funding amount allocation to roads and infrastructure. The PIAC chair revealed that an amount of GH¢3.65 million was refunded by March 2016. The then sector Minister resigned within a month after the issue broke [20]. The following enabling factors emerge from the analysis of the case. Public support and sustained demand for accountability; legal action; prevailing economic challenge; an effective advocacy strategy; a vibrant and incorruptible CSO and media actors; leveraging traditional and new media platforms in advocacy; complementary efforts between media and CSOs; political will by the government to ensure that the case was investigated and monies recovered and the prevailing democratic dispensation.

3.1.2 Public Support and Sustained demand for accountability

The demand for accountability by the citizenry was unflinching. This support was borne out of their understanding of the issue at hand when the media and civil society discussed and sustained the issue in the media landscape for a long time. For instance, two pressure groups; the Citizen Ghana Movements and Occupy Ghana played a key role in the advocacy process. This assertion is reflected in a response by respondents when asked to list briefly what in their view was the enabling/success factor(s) by the media and CSO in the fight against fighting corruption during the bus branding scandal.

“Mobilising public opinion and support for the cause through public campaigns and sensitisation” (CSO Male 1)

“Support from the general public” (Civil Servant 1)

“Perseverance and sustained follow-ups on the story” (Former CSO or media actor Male 1)

“The media published the stories and the CSOs demanded accountability” (Media Male 1)

3.1.3 Legal Action

Second, the legal suits filed by Road Safety Advocates Ghana and Occupy Ghana contributed to complying with a repayment plan as proposed by the contractor. Road Safety Advocates Ghana filed a case against the contractor and Ministry for violating windscreen visibility provisions in the country's Road Traffic Regulations, 2012 (L.I. 2180). Occupy Ghana demanded the documents regarding the transaction. This point is echoed in a response by respondents when asked to list briefly what in their view was the enabling/success factor(s) by the media and CSO in the fight against fighting corruption during the bus-branding scandal.

“The court case requesting information” (CSO Male 2)

3.1.4 Prevailing economic challenge

From a desktop review, the demand for accountability was aggravated by the existing economic challenge at the time. In 2015 and 2016, among other dire economic outturns, the country experienced power crises, oil prices collapsed, dropping from USD 98.97 per barrel in 2014 to USD 43.64 per barrel in 2015. The cedi depreciated by 18.75 percent, and Accra experienced devastating floods in Accra,. GDP per capita and GDP growth dipped in 2015. The lowest growth rate ever recorded (2.18%) between 2000 and 2019. GDP per capita, PPP also plummeted from USD 5454.14 to USD 5117.34 [21].

3.1.5 Other Political Economy Factors

From the survey, the following political economy factors contributed to the successes chalked during the bus branding saga. An effective advocacy strategy; a vibrant and incorruptible CSO and media actors; leveraging traditional and new media platforms in advocacy; complementary efforts between media and CSOs; political will by the government to ensure that the case was investigated, and monies recovered; the prevailing democratic dispensation as manifested in an enabling environment especially the freedom to information, and media freedom, access to information, and freedom of speech. Below are some unedited responses from respondents

An effective advocacy strategy

“Effective advocacy strategy”(Female CSO 3)

A vibrant and incorruptible CSO and media actors

“Vibrant and bold civil society and media leadership” (Male INGO 1)

“Availability of hardworking and high integrity Journalist and CSOS” (Male Civil Servant 2)

Leveraging traditional and new media platforms

"Use of social and traditional media" (Female CSO 3)

"Vibrant social media participation in governance issues" (Male INGO 1)

"Social media" (Male Civil Servant 2)

Complementary efforts between media and CSOS

"Partnerships" (Female CSO 3)

"The media uncovered them and kept talking about them until it courts public attention" (Male Media 2)

Political will by the government

"Committed Government in power" (Male Industry 1)

"Relatively receptive government" (Male INGO 1)

Democratic dispensation

"Access to information" (Male Civil Servant 1 and Male Media 2)

"Independence of the media" (Male Civil Servant 1)

"Enabling legal environment especially FOI and Media Freedom in Ghana" (Male CSO 1)

"Democratic space" (Female CSO 3)

"Freedom of speech" (Male Civil Servant 2)

"Easy Access to information and data" (Male Civil Servant 2)

3.2 Galamsey

In the late 1980s, there were widespread cases of illegal small-scale mining (also known as Galamsey) immediately after the promulgation of the Small-Scale Mining Law, 1989 (PNDCL 218) which sought to give directives regarding licensing, ownership and operation of small-scale gold mining in Ghana [22]. In the last decade, the concern for illegal small-scale mining got revived in February 2017 when the Director of Natural Resources at Ghana's EPA cautioned that the country risks importing water if Galamsey is unchecked. Before this caution, some water treatment plants had shut down. This triggered the **#StopGalamseyNow** campaign by Citi FM and the subsequent launch of the Media Coalition Against Galamsey (MCAG) in April 2017. The **#StopGalamseyNow** campaign by CitiFm had five pressing objectives: first, a halt in galamsey for six months. Second, a cessation in new mining licence issuance for a year. Third, it demanded a re-categorization of small-scale mining activities to reflect the current use of heavy-duty equipment. Fourth, allow the regeneration of polluted water bodies. Fifth, reclamation of

lands destroyed by illegal mining. Similarly, MCAG's objective was to embark on public education on the adverse impact of unsustainable mining practices and an end to Galamsey[23].

3.2.1 Successes chalked during Galamsey fight

The following were some feats chalked after reinvigorating the fight against Galamsey in the ASM subsector. First, a ban was placed on small scale mining in April 2017. Afterward, Operation Vanguard was launched on 31st July 2017 [24]. The security task force arrested more than 1000 illegal miners and had their equipment seized. Second, three of the five objectives of Citi FM's **#StopGalamseyNow** campaign was achieved, except for land reclamation and ASM sub-sector recategorisation. That same month, the Judicial service announced the constitution of 14 specialised courts comprising seven high courts and seven circuit courts to deal with mining offences speedily. In 2018, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Illegal Mining (IMCIM) was formed. IMCIM trained and vetted over 1000 miners to go back to work and launched a road map for lifting the ban. To support the fight, Parliament reviewed the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 to prescribe harsher punishment for offenders.

3.2.1.1. Enabling political economy factors during the Galamsey fight

3.2.1.2 Coalition building

From the analysis of the case study, the media formed a potent coalition called the Media Coalition Against Galamsey.

3.2.1.3 Leveraging traditional and new media platforms in advocacy

Citi FM leveraged its authoritative executive breakfast show as a platform for evidence-based advocacy. Besides, the media deployed the use of investigative journalism, enhanced coverage, and advocacy through their respective platforms to throw sunshine on sector issues and increase the number of stories.

3.2.2 Impeding political economy factors against Galamsey fight

Despite some successes chalked, several factors contributed to a botched galamsey fight. Below are some factors.

3.2.2. Excessive role duplicity amongst oversight institutions

First, IMCIM virtually took over the regulatory and monitoring role of the Minerals Commission, second, another layer of bureaucracy and role facsimile was witnessed when the GalamSTOP taskforce was formed in September 2019 to supplement the role of Operation Vanguard and IMCIM. This is aptly stated by a respondent that

"Bureaucracies at responsible ministries factors inhibited the media and CSO efforts in the fight against extractive sector corruption" (Civil Servant Male 2)

3.2.2 Vested Interest in the extractive sector

Next, there were news reports of corruption by the lead state actors. For instance, there was a bribery allegation against the then Secretary for IMCIM. He was subsequently cleared by the Criminal Investigations Department but the Official of the Special Prosecutor to an exception to his exoneration [25]. Relatedly, it was announced that a good number out of some 500 seized excavators were missing. Linked to this incident was the arrest by the then New Patriotic Party central regional vice-chairman and five others in connection with missing excavators. An audio recording of the then IMCIM Chair and Minister for MESTI seeking to profit from the seizure of excavators and related allegations of conflict of interest went viral. [26]. Respondents stated the underlisted as factors inhibiting the media and CSO efforts in the fight against extractive sector corruption

“Government unwillingness to punish their own” (CSO Male 2)

“Clientelism across the political divide” (INGO Male 1)

3.2.4 Inadequate political will

Regarding the issue of corruption, a significant proportion of miners trained and issued licenses after being vetted were alleged to be party members of the ruling government. Again, there was a lack of support by key ministries and departments like the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, Ministry of Information, Ministry for Water and Sanitation and IMCIM during CSO and Media led events [27]. The Multi-Sectoral Mining Integrated Project (MMIP) was watered down into a roadmap [28] Respondent captured this as

“Inadequate political will” (INGO Male 1)

“Lack of political will on the part of political actors to act on corruption cases”(civil servant1)

“No Political Will, appointees who should fight corruption are those who are corrupt, Government shielding their appointees, family members in govt: (Industry Male 1)

3.2.5 Little or no prosecution by the courts

Strikingly, non-deterrent punishment was issued to offenders. Albeit this was later remedied by a revision of the punishment regime by parliament. Despite the revision, there was no compliance with the revised punishment regime [29]. This claim is corroborated by a responded who noted the

“Lack of prosecution by the courts” (CSO Male 1)

3.2.6 Inadequate resources to sustain advocacy

It is sad to say that the media lost momentum and the fight was left for IMCIM, Operation Vanguard, Galamstop and political actors. For instance, Citi FM gradually switched to cover other equally important

national issues. The MCAG activities were stalled after about 18 months donor-supported project ended. To add to this, the media and CSO did not follow up on the activities of the 14 court adequately. A respondent captures this as

Limited resources (financial, logistical) (Civil servant male1)

3.2.7 Inadequate evidence-based policy solutions by government.

Alternative livelihoods provided are usually not research-based. They are largely agrarian, short-term, and usually do not factor in the role of women and children. Another policy failure is the use of security forces as a major intervention to fighting galamsey. This approach is unsustainable [30]. This is stated by a respondent as

"Reality of the issue of lack of alternative livelihoods" Female CSO 1

3.2.9 Other Political Economy Factors that Obstructed Efforts at Curbing the Menace

The results from the survey identify several impeding factors. These are limited access to information; little or no funding for legal action; disunited front in advocacy; biased advocacy and media coverage; the lack of operationalisation of RTI; extractives considered technical; weak state anti-corruption actors; cultural acceptability of certain corrupt practices; media intimidation; political capture of media and inadequate remuneration for media practitioners. This is captured in the responses below.

Limited access to information

"Little access to information, as a result, the lack of operationalisation of the law" Male CSO 2

Little or no funding for legal action

"Lack of resources to take legal action key issues" Male CSO 2

Disunited front in advocacy.

"Little togetherness and fighting a common and united cause as a common front" Former CSO or media actor1

Extractives considered technical

"Sector is very complex with too much technical jargon that can cloud the issues" Male CSO 1

Weak state anti-corruption actors

"Weak Anti-corruption agencies" Male CSO 2

Cultural acceptability of certain corrupt practices

Cultural acceptability of certain corrupt practices" Male INGO

Media intimidation

Government has curtailed media freedom. " Media Male 1

"Insecurity in the face of associated risks and exposure" Male CSO 1

Political capture of media

"Political capture of media entities" Media Male 1

Inadequate remuneration for media practitioners

*"Inadequate remuneration for media practitioners resulting in most media persons being compromised"
Male INGO 1*

3.3 Nexus between media and CSO efforts and Corruption

Interestingly there is a strong positive relationship between (Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (r) = 0.54) between the control of corruption and voice and accountability(Figure 1). In this study, the variable "voice and accountability" is used as a proxy for CSOs and media efforts. Voice and accountability as used in the chart measure the perceived level of citizen's inclusion in elections, freedom of expression, association and free media. The control of corruption as used in the figure measures the perceived level of abuse of delegated power for private gain, as well as state capture by elites and private interests. The estimate indicators for both variables range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).

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4. Summary Of Political Economy Factors

This study suggests a myriad of political economy factors which either constrain or enable CSOs and the media to be efficient in the fight against corruption in the extractive sector.

First, crafting an effective advocacy strategy that uses traditional and new media platforms in advocacy, seeks collaborations between media and CSOs and can court the support of the public is an effective strategy that can be deployed by CSOs and media in fighting corruption in the extractive sector.

Second, the availability of logistical, human and financial resources contribute to sustaining evidence-based advocacy efforts. The use of legal action by CSOs as a complementary strategy is potent in advancing the demand for transparency, accountability and social justice. The lack of this encourages corrupt acts. Also, having vibrant and incorruptible CSO and media leaders is premised on an enhanced remuneration and conditions of work. For instance, an ardent advocate may join a state institution or resign to an organisation that will guarantee better conditions of work. When there are high employee turnover rates, CSO and media organisations direct efforts towards recruiting, training, and onboarding instead of fighting corruption. [31]. Additionally, inadequate resources may terminate sustained advocacy, stifle evidence-based advocacy and investigations and in some cases contribute to weak oversight role of anti-corruption agencies.

The study identifies coalition building as a potent tool for synthesising resources, gaining attention, and influencing change that may have been difficult to achieve as separate organisations. A united media or CSO front is an effective way of preventing intimidation and increasing governments political will to fight corruption. In Ghana, the Right to Information Coalition championed the passage of the RTI bill to law, the Media Coalition Against Galamsey and the Alliance of CSOs working on Extractives, Anti-Corruption and Good Governance have played a key role in educating the public and halting the Agyapa Gold royalties deal [32]. This finding confirmed by Ako and Ekhaton [33] who identify that by forming coalitions and seeking legal action CSOs influence and make a government more responsive to their request.

Fourth, the extractive sector is considered technical by a section of the media and public. This stems from inadequate capacity building of media on the extractive sector. They are unable to ask the right questions and do in-depth stories. When the media understands the issue they can break down complex issues into digestible forms for the consumption of the public hence contribute to increasing citizen interest in extractive sector governance. A previous study supports the finding that, the tendency for CSO and the media to be biased in their work based is on political affiliation, funding sources and organisational ownership. Some media organisations in Ghana are an appendage of political groups [34].

Lastly, inadequate operationalisation of Right to Information has contributed to limited access to information, weakened transparency and accountability. The necessary internal systems by the state including having a decentralised record management system, budget support, capacity building programmes and adherence to the law is lacking hence the populace, media and CSO are unable to request information to advance the fight against corruption in the extractive sector. Similarly, the literature on Nigeria and Uganda supports this claim by the study. For instance Nigeria media's inadequacy in performing their watch dog role is due to a media ownership by politicians, the commercial challenges they face and the under exploration of the freedom of information Act [35].

The study identifies that, times of economic difficulties may aggravate public demand for accountability. The summary of political economy factors presented in this section is supported by the literature which finds that, there are many political, technical, financial and bureaucratic constraints hindering CSOs in their work [36].

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5. Conclusion

The study set out to first assess the contributions of CSOs and media against corruption in Ghana's extractive sector. This was achieved by a correlation analysis between the control of corruption and the level of voice and accountability (representing CSO and media). Second, the paper argued that although CSOs and media play a key role in fighting extractive sector corruption, they are confronted with several political economy factors.

The study identifies that, the level of CSO and media activism impacts the level of corruption in general. Also, factors like an effective advocacy strategy, the availability of logistical, human and financial resources, use of legal action, coalition building, improving access to information are key enabling political economy factors whereas inadequate resources to sustain advocacy, excessive red tapes amongst oversight institution, vested interests in the extractive sector, inadequate prosecution of offenders by legal system, inadequate evidence-based policy solutions by government, inadequate political will, limited access to information; little or no funding for legal action, increasing high CSO and

media employee turnover rates, are crucial political economy factors hindering CSOs and media in their anti-corruption work in Ghana's extractive sector. The study proposes the following practicable recommendations to fighting corruption in Ghana's extractive sector.

The media must specialise reporting on extractives and anti-corruption, increase research capacity, be independent, sustain advocacy journalism, break down complex industry terms to the comprehension of citizens, form coalitions when necessary and address the issue of poor conditions of services including remuneration.

CSOs are to take the legal route when necessary, present a unified front via coalitions, sustain evidence-based advocacy, be apolitical, collaborate with true independent media organisations in the fight against corruption, seek ways to improve the condition of service for their staff, sustain advocacy for the full operationalisation of the RTI Law to improve access.

This study contributes to practise by proffering useful political economy factors which confront the work of CSOs and media in the fight against corruption in the extractive sector. Future studies may investigate the political economy factors that constrain the responsiveness of state accountability institutions to citizens' accountability demands.

Declarations

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Abbreviations

ASM	-	Artisanal and Small-scale mining
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organisation
EPA	-	Environmental Protection Agency
EITI	-	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
IFRS	-	International Financial Reporting Standards
IMCIM-		Inter-Ministerial Committee on Illegal Mining

LCU	-	Local Currency Unit
MCAG	-	Media Coalition Against Galamsey
MMIP	-	Multi-Sectoral Mining Integrated Project
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD	-	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PNDC	-	Provisional National Defence Council
PPP	-	Purchasing Power Parity
RTI	-	Right to Information
USD	-	United States Dollars
UGCC	-	United Gold Coast Convention

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Appendices - Questionnaire

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Figures

Figure 1

Problem-driven PEA model used for the study

Figure 2

Nexus between the control of corruption and voice and accountability

Figure 1 indicates a decline in the perceived level of voice and accountability between 2010 and 2015. Although the level of accountability and corruption improves it marginally dips in 2018 and 2019. Similarly, the perceived level of corruption control in Ghana sees a decreasing trend from 2011 to 2018.