Sub-Saharan Africa lags the rest of the world in access to electricity, and progress towards developing renewable energy resources has been underwhelming relative to potential and expectations. Existing explanations for this failure fall into two camps. The first focuses on technical solutions to policy frameworks designed to attract private capital investment to power sectors. Such explanations make an unjustified ex ante assumption that private investment is either necessary or sufficient to solve the region's energy problems, and the policy deficiencies they identify are symptomatic of political economic conditions this literature pays little attention to. The second camp focuses on a narrow definition of institutional quality that lacks theoretical depth. This work responds to this gap in the literature by focusing on how variation in the organization of policy regimes, or the sets of institutions responsible for power sector governance, contributes to electricity access and renewable energy development. Through a longitudinal comparative case study of Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, this work finds that coherent policy regimes (where institutional interests and incentives are aligned, and policy instruments produce synergistic benefits) with limited distributions of implementation responsibilities are most effective at delivering electricity access and renewable energy development to their publics. The conclusions of the case studies are tested through a set of panel regressions on a broad sample of Sub-Saharan African countries, combining new and existing data on regulatory interventions. The panel regression results support the conclusions of the case studies.