Countering infodemics with targeted, factual information is crucial for ending the COVID-19 pandemic.4, 7 Understanding what factors have played a role in people’s adherence to COVID-19 misinformation is critical to enabling policymakers to craft strategic communications to manage the COVID-19 infodemic and may provide insights on how to tackle the future infodemics related to novel infectious disease threats. Our study attempted to identify the factors associated with adherence to certain types of COVID-19 misinformation among US adults in April 2020 and showed that misinformation started affecting the general public from the early phase of the pandemic. We performed our analysis on four types of misinformation: general, anti-vaccine, bioterrorism, and transmission modes. Our use of LASSO regressions allowed us to identify and select significant predictors from a broad pool of potential factors while simultaneously reducing selection bias, a marked improvement on the traditional approach of using predetermined small subset of predictors. Using bootstrapping, we further refined predictor selection and quantified our estimates’ standard error, which increased our confidence in our results.
First, we found that more than 30% of our sample of US adults on social media reported adhering to at least one type of COVID-19-related misinformation in early 2020. Compared to later estimates,43, 44 our findings suggest that the prevalence of misinformation grew in tandem with the infodemic, as has been noted by health authorities and researchers.7, 8 This suggests that it is important to promptly address the spread of misinformation, lest an infodemic grow out of control. Second, we found that particular demographic and socioeconomic factors predicted respondents’ susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. Of the 66 variables included in our analysis, 58 were significantly associated with increased or decreased odds of adhering to specific types of misinformation about COVID-19. Many of these variables were characteristics that are readily available and routinely collected as part of other national surveys, which suggests that policymakers could develop and leverage cost-effective predictive models using existing datasets to identify specific communities and individuals more likely to adhere to misinformation.
Third, we found that different audiences were susceptible to different types of misinformation. Prior research on COVID-19 misinformation tended to aggregate all types of misinformation into a unified index despite the weak correlation between the types of misinformation.30 This method overlooked key differences and made it difficult to identify differences between sociodemographic groups’ adherence to misinformation, which in turn led to policymakers treating everyone who adheres to any COVID-19 misinformation as one target group for interventions. As previously noted, anti-misinformation communication strategies need to be targeted to specific subgroups to be effective.15, 45 Our findings confirmed that there are clear differences in subgroups’ adherence to misinformation, and should be used to inform strategies that effectively engage those groups by understanding their existing beliefs and motivations, and that address the structural and economic factors that facilitate or promote adherence to misinformation.15
Our study had several limitations. First, we used nonprobability convenience sampling via social media platforms affiliated with Facebook to collect our survey data. Because of this approach, our sample may not be representative of the US adult population, despite our sample’s large sample size.33 While our sample is balanced across geography, age groups, and other sociodemographic characteristics, we acknowledge the under-representation of certain subpopulations that might be particularly vulnerable to misinformation. For example, our choice of sampling platform systemically excluded people without access to the internet or social media platforms. Given time constraints and the impracticality of face-to-face recruitment due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we chose the social media platforms affiliated with Facebook as a recruitment and dissemination platform to maximize our reach to the general US population; 70% of the US population are estimated to have Facebook accounts, and among those with accounts, 75% use Facebook daily.46 Foreign-born adults with limited English-speaking skills, comprising over 40 million adults,47 would additionally have been excluded from our sample. As a result, the participants in our study were overwhelmingly non-Latinx white despite our concerted effort to oversample potentially under-represented sociodemographic groups.33 Thus, given these sampling limitations, the findings from our study cannot be generalized to the US population. In particular, those under-represented subpopulations may likely provide further insights into different subgroups who adhere to misinformation. Several studies have highlighted immigrants’ elevated risk of exposure to misinformation and difficulty in accessing needed information and resources during the COVID-19 pandemic.48–50 Further research focusing on this under-represented community is therefore warranted.
Second, our regression analysis was conducted on a subset of the sample that only contains complete responses with no missing data. Since most missing data were MCAR, we did not perform any imputations. Differential missingness of certain responses which were MAR and whose missingness is associated with the outcome variables,36, 51 however, might have caused some bias. Despite this limitation, we believe our findings still provide novel and significant insights on specific groups. Further, we believe that the benefits of our methodological approach—namely the LASSO regressions, which require complete data—outweigh the costs of subsetting our dataset.
Third, we note that our misinformation categories, which were formulated in the nascent stages of the pandemic, were not necessarily the categories of misinformation that ultimately played the most significant role in individuals’ adherence to—or rejection of—public health guidelines. For instance, “bioterrorism” ultimately had less bearing on the public than other strains of misinformation, and anti-vaccine information proliferated and became more nuanced after the first vaccines were released. Future research should seek to investigate specific strains of misinformation, such as “vaccine chip” misinformation versus “vaccine poison” misinformation. Finally, we note that the number of respondents who adhered to transmission mode information was very small (N = 56), and that particularly in the US context, an underlying cultural lack of conformity with government mandates may have also contributed to individuals responding that they would not comply with government mandated social distancing. The transmission mode misinformation results should therefore be interpreted with some skepticism.