Towards Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis CCDA Methodology A multidisciplinary approach to Social Science

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-1540970/v2

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Towards Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis CCDA Methodology A multidisciplinary approach to Social Science

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-1540970/v2

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This paper introduces a comprehensive CCDA methodology that bridges CL and CDA. CCDA depends on two main approaches studied extensively in Linguistics Approach in the last decades; the first is Cognitive Linguistics (CL) (which contains theories on Mental Frames (MF) and Conceptual Metaphors Theory (CM). The second is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which includes the analysis of the linguistic production (the discourse) and the social and political context of that production (political agenda, injustice, social stereotypes, and equality). This paper aims to join all the previous attempts to join CL into CDA in one comprehensive methodology for social science researchers with essential linguistic backgrounds. Contrary to the already existing CL theories, which consider MF as the output of CM analysis, CCDA argues that the analysis of the non-metaphorical linguistic choices is another essential tool to identify dominant framings of the social phenomena and the linguistic structures related to them. In CCDA, MF and CM analysis are separated but correlated analysis fields in CL. CCDA goes beyond the linguistic structures to reveal the dominant framing that control people’s minds on social phenomena.

Cognitive linguistics CL

Conceptual Metaphor CMT

Mental Frames MF

Intercultural Communication

Critical Discourse Analysis CDA

Signs

Symbols

Dominant discourse

Cultural Diversity

Social Inequality

Research methodology

Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis CCDA

Social Studied

Cultural embodiment

Embodied experience

Social science studies mainly depend on conducting interviews and analyzing texts to obtain their results. Such methodologies involve discourse analysis and require linguistic competencies that sociologists may not have a profound experience at. Languages are not merely instruments of communication. Any language is a revealing tool for the individual and collective understandings of the physical world and its speakers’ social phenomenon (Rubén, 2013; Guerrero-González & Haska, 2017). If the sociologist unconsciously overlooked some features of the linguistic dimension in data analysis, s/he would inevitably miss significant findings in the social dimension.

This paper introduces a multidisciplinary linguistic approach to social science research. It aims to provide social science researchers with a multidisciplinary (sociolinguistic) methodology that is easy to understand and apply in social research, even for those who may not have a deep knowledge of linguistics. I do not claim that I am creating a totally new theory in sociolinguistic analysis. I only try to put together existing cognitive linguistics theories in one comprehensive methodology for social science research. I would neither provide an in-depth bibliographical review on all the involved disciplines for two reasons: 1) the limitation of the paper, 2) it would be a complex content for social studies researchers. This paper will provide an overview of the novel approaches to linguistic studies and how they can be implemented in social research.

This paper joins two paramount approaches in Linguistics studies: 1) Cognitive Linguistics (CL) which studies how language controls, and sometimes limits, our cognition (Langacker, 1990; Gibbs, 2005; Kristiansen & Dirven, 2008; Hollmann, 2013). CL consists of the Mental Frames theory (MF) (Kovecses, 2006, 2005; Semino, 2008; Brugge, 2011; Zeim, 2014; Dancygier, 2017; Hart, 2017) and Conceptual Metaphors theory (CM) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Barcelona, 2003; Kovecses, 2006, 2017, 2020). Both explain how the received language (the linguistic input) and the bodily experience (emotional outcome) correlate in the meaning-making process. 2) Critical Discourse Analysis methodology (CDA) (Van Dijk, 2001, 2013; Achugar, 2017; Mullet, 2018), which focuses on social inequalities in the political and public discourse. In the end, I will introduce the Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis (CCDA) as a comprehensive methodology that combines all these theories altogether. In framing this methodology, I depend on all previously cited work as much as on Christopher Hart’s various works (2010, 2011a, 2001b, 2014, 2017, 2018). I also referred to my published empirical study in which I put into practice the CCDA methodology[1].

[1] Due to the anonymous peer review protocol, I will add this reference when the peer review is done.

“Cognition” refers to all conscious or unconscious mental activities such as thinking, remembering, reflecting, and learning (Gibbs, 2005; Fauconnier, 2006). Cognitive and social psychologists define “cognition” as the mechanism “through which people attribute events to causes to make sense of experiences and to construct mental models of the environment” (Sperber, 1995:1). Diederik Aerts, in “Quantum Structures in Cognitive and Social Science,” clarifies that the general aim of implementing the Cognitive Approach in any scope of research is to study the mechanisms that control how the brain processes the information of this field, how it transforms this information into memories, how the brain recalls this information and uses it in interaction (Aerts et al., 2016: 5-7).

Cognitive Linguistics[1] (CL) aims to go beyond the visible structure of language to explain, or discover, the cognitive mechanisms through which the language operates in (inter)(re)action (Fauconnier, 2006; Moreno-Fernández, 2016). That is to say, CL studies how the received linguistic structures (the input) are processed in mind and rearticulated (the output). CL considers that the “context” is an unavoidable element in such analysis. The binary language-context focus paved the way for the Cognitive Sociolinguistics (CSl) approach (Kristiansen & Dirven, 2008; Hollmann, 2013; Moreno-Fernandez, 2016; Guerrero-Gonzales & Haska, 2017)[2]. CSl analyses the lexical choices of communities, their meaning variations, and the cognitive structures behind these choices (Kristiansen and Dirven, 2008). However, CSl does not limit the analysis to the input and output as CL does. CSl enriches its findings by considering cultural variation as an essential trigger for language variation. CSl studies how processing the language, the input, and the (re)articulation of these linguistic structures, the output, shapes social values and promotes (or demotes) social equalities and diversity, the outcome[3]. However, CSl is a recent discipline and scholars are still working to put this approach together (Kristiansen, Dirven, & Peirsman, 2010; Geeraerts et al., 2010; Pütz et al., 2014; Moreno-Fernández, 2016; Guerrero González & Haska, 2017, Condamines, 2018; Zandi et al, 2020).

Towards a Comprehensive Imagination theory

Noam Chomsky’s theories on mind, body, and thoughts opened a new path for linguists. He combined Cartesian Philosophy with formalist philosophy to create a new philosophical view on language, separating the mind and the body. He asserted the capacity of the mind to work independently from bodily control. He hypothesized that thoughts are metaphorically understood as language. Accordingly, he argued that as rationality is universal, we share a universal grammar in our cognitive system (Chomsky, 2007; Borradori, 2008). In the second half of the 20^th century, linguists shifted their focus from grammatical to cognitive structures[4]. However, not all scholars agreed on Chomsky’s separation between the mind and the body or Chomsky’s denial of culture’s important role in human language acquisition and production (Marcondes, 2020). The second generation of CL elaborated the term “Embodiment,” which goes beyond the body’s physical sense, to involve every experience, meaning, thought, and language (Lawrence-Barsalou et al., 2003; Turner, 2018). “Embodiment” determines what we think about and how we think; how we involve our multi-experiences (physical, emotional, psychological experiences) in the process of thinking and interaction (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Winkielman et al., 2015; Turner, 2018; Hart, 2017)[5]. Lakoff and Johnson (1999), the first to coin the term in 1980, argue that “Embodiment” is not limited to personal experiences. The term includes social and cultural experiences stored in our cognition. The speaker’s embodied experience influences, or even controls, their language production in social interaction (Rohere, 2007). Accordingly, the linguistic output is based on personal assumptions and self-interpretation of the situation based on previously received discourse or social experiences (Langacker, 1990; Gibbs, 2005)[6].

Mark Johnson, in his book The Body in the Mind: the Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (1987), uses the term “embodiment” to refer to the significant role of imagination in the meaning-making process, e.g., understanding abstract concepts such as time, love, and success. He argues that humans use imagination to create mental structures through which they understand such abstract, intangible concepts[7]. These mental structures are not arbitrary. On the contrary, they are based on emotional, historical, social, and linguistic experiences stored in our mind and body, the “Embodiment.” As our reasoning is part of our cultural and linguistic experiences, the imagination structures are these shared embodied (spatial, temporal, cultural) understandings that make our communication mutually understood. This process is a collective meaning-making process in which we do not understand things individually. We instead understand things collectively as members of a (linguistic) community (Edward, 2009; Bucholtz & Hall, 2016). Accordingly, Jonson asserts that the study of the meaning-making process requires a comprehensive theory on imagination which needs to cover the following cognitive processes (1987: ch1)[8]:

Categorization: the process in which we break up our experiences into simpler patterns to order them and quickly come back to them when needed. It is an unconscious and continuous process in which new categories are created constantly (e.g., what is appropriate, or not appropriate to do in a five-star restaurant; how to order in a fast-food restaurant and how to order in a daily menu restaurant; etc.)
Image Schemata: (or mental frames) it is the storage, the mental structures, where the categories are stored. Unsimilar to the categories, they are hardly modified or created (e.g., the Restaurant Frame that includes all categories of restaurants, fast food, Pizza, Five Stars Restaurant, Menu restaurant, etc.).
Metaphorical projection: the tool by which we conceptually put in order and elaborate our mental frames and categories (e.g., social standards usually consider a five-star restaurant is UP and a fast-food restaurant is DOWN on the scale of class stratification).
Metonymy: another tool to project and develop meanings (e.g., the use of “McDonald’s” to refer to an entire categorization of fast-food restaurant prototypes).
Narrative structure: the complex unity between the linguistic and the cognitive levels (e.g., how we frame all the previously mentioned mental processes into words in our daily interaction).

Imagination works on all these levels to enable us to order experiences and control our reasoning about them. Each level is a wide field of research and an essential pillar in CCDA (we will go through some of them below).

A Semiotic Approach to Meaning-making Process:

Ferdinand De Saussure, the founder of the Linguistics approach, argued that social signs consist of a signifier and a signified^{^[9]}. As a linguist, he considered written words or acoustic sounds as signs. The signifier refers to the word’s letters, as C A T in the word cat, or it can be the sound of the word cat /kæt/[10]. The signified is the concept of the four-legged animal with fur. He explains that these signs allow us to communicate and covey meanings in our daily interaction easily; it is to say, there is no need to look for a cat and show it up to convey the meaning of the animal. De Saussure’s argument focused on language, arguing that there is no inherited relationship between the signifier and the signified. There is no inherited meaning between the “cat” word or sound and the animal.

In an attempt to incorporate De Saussure’s theory into social studies, Charles Pierce (1960) suggested more than one way to determine the relationship between the signifier and the signified. He argues that signs can be an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is anything with a physical resemblance to the evoked idea (a photograph of a cat evokes the concept of a cat); an index is linked to the evoked concept by a direct relation as smoke comes from fire. A symbol has no relation between the signifier and the signified. The relationship comes from our decision as a society that the link should be that way. Language is a perfect example of symbols. Traffic lights are another example of a symbol. There is no inherited meaning between the red light and the fact that cars have to stop and the green light and the fact that cars can shove off. These lights references are established by society and globally adopted.

Depending on Pierce’s argument, various scholars draw a difference between the use of the term sign and the term symbol (Hausman 1989, Kaldis 2013, and Forte 2014). Kaldis (2013) assumes that signs have an inherited meaning, an inseparable part. While symbols stand for another meaning that they do not usually refer to.

In the meaning-making process, all the linguistic approaches (pragmatics, semiotics, and cognitive linguistics) consider “mutual knowledge” a prime key to successful socio-linguistic interaction. Johnson’s Imagination Theory asserts the importance of the shared mutual knowledge of social signs at all levels: (Categorization, Image schemata, Metaphor and Metonymy structures, and narrative structure). But does mutual knowledge necessarily mean comprehension?

Sperber and Wilson (1980) argued that mutual knowledge in communication does not necessarily indicate comprehension. We will miss the point if we share mutual knowledge on a cultural sign or symbol, but we process it from our own cultural frame of reference. For example, the zebra way is a symbol that indicates the place through which pedestrians can cross the road. In the Spanish context, the zebra way gives the right to pedestrians to cross the road; cars must stop to let them cross. Spanish pedestrians would not pay much attention to all the directions because they know that the driver will pay attention to them if a car is approaching.

On the contrary, in the United Kingdom, zebra way gives the driver the priority to drive through the road; British Pedestrians need to make sure that no car is around. Or they estimate if they can reach the other side safe and sound when cars are approaching. Drivers do not have an obligation to pay a lot of attention to whether someone on the footway desires to cross the road or not. Both British and Spanish drivers share mutual knowledge of the zebra way symbolism, from where pedestrians cross the road. But what would be the result if a British driver drove through Spanish roads without prior knowledge of how Spanish pedestrians process the zebra way symbolism? The disastrous result is an outcome of processing the mutual knowledge from the British cultural frame of reference instead of reaching the Spanish frame of reference on the same symbol. In (inter)cultural communication, it is essential to activate our conscious thoughts to distinguish between the minority’s values on their cultural signs or symbols and our understanding of their signs and symbols from our own values’ frame of reference.

Mutual knowledge and how we, as communities, process this knowledge are pivotal aspects of CCDA methodology, as we will see below. The analysis need not be limited to the cognitive levels of the “Imagination Theory.” CCDA involves the social, cultural, political, and religious values that unconsciously dominate the meaning-making processes of social phenomena.

Conceptual Metaphors Theory CMT in Meaning-making process:

Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Metaphors We Live By ignited interests in metaphorical studies. The book argued that our conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. It is to say, what we think and what we experience every day are just matters of metaphors[11]. They explained that Conceptual Metaphors (CM) allow us to understand and experience “one kind of thing in terms of another” (e.g., LOVE IS JOURNEY) (1980: 5). Antonio Barcelona (2003) defines CM through the mapping between two conceptual domains: the source domain (tangible concept, JOURNEY) and the target domain (conceptual and nontangible concept, LOVE). Barcelona uses the term “Conceptual Metaphor” to refer to “the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain is partially “mapped,” i.e., projected, onto a different experiential domain, so that the second domain is partially understood in terms of the first one” (2003: 3). A straightforward definition is introduced by Zoltan Kovecses, who states that metaphors are cross-domain mappings that represent the relationship between two frames with the notion of A (abstract concept, the target, LOVE) is B (more physical, the source, JOURNEY)[12] (2006:116). Kovecses’ definition is grounded on the mental categorization and metaphorical projections in Johnson’s “Imagination Theory” (mentioned above). He asserts that these cognitive structures are “essential for survival” and the “backbone” of language and thoughts (2006: 17)[13].

In more recent studies on CM, Christopher Hart (2017) defines CM as a cognitive projection “reflected in and effected through metaphorical expressions in discourse” (2017:6). Like Kovecses, Hart asserts our need for conceptual metaphors to mentally process unfamiliar or abstract concepts. Hart highlights that conceptual metaphors are not a personal device; it is a collective device in which mutual knowledge is an essential element that gives meaning to social values, events, and situations. Accordingly, CM is part of the cognitive processes involved in collective meaning-making, as in individual decisions, reactions, and emotional responses (Hart 2011a, 2014; Kovecses, 2020; Taylor, 2021). Hart (2017) explains that CM can highlight certain aspects of any situation as important and marginalize other aspects. In doing so, “they problematize situations in specific ways, promote particular solutions to those ‘problems’ and pave the way for actions which accord with the metaphor” (Hart, 2017: 11). Several scholars in social science approaches are currently more interested in CM analysis due to its ability to offer up interpretations of social phenomena and its techniques to highlight similarities and differences and prioritize situations.

As I mentioned before, having a basic knowledge of CM is essential to fully comprehend CCDA methodology. To do so, I summarize below some relevant components, 5 out of 12, listed by Kovecses (2006: ch8)[14]. Firstly, metaphors consist of two main domains: the source domain (more physical, represented by the letter B) and the target domain (more abstract, represented by the letter A). The relationship between both is represented as A is B. In other technical words, target is source “AFFECTION IS WARMTH” and “LOVE IS JOURNEY.” The target domain can be attached to several sources “LOVE IS WAR,” “LOVE IS JOURNEY,” which is called the range of target.

Secondly, each metaphor acquires an experiential basis, our embodied experience, which remains unconscious most of the time. It helps any language users to understand the metaphors’ meanings easier. For example, we accept substantial metaphors such as “AFFECTION IS WARMTH” without difficulty because the feeling of affection correlates with the bodily experience of warmth[15]. Thirdly, there are comprehensive mappings between the source and the target domains. For example, in the metaphor “LOVE IS JOURNEY,” mappings are as follows: lovers are travelers, love relationship is a vehicle, progress made in a relationship is distance covered, and so on.

Fourthly, there is a connection between the linguistic metaphor (rhetoric) and the conceptual metaphor (cognitive). Conceptual metaphors manifest through linguistic expressions[16]. Finally, conceptual metaphors produce cultural models (or mental frames, defined below) which operate in thoughts. These models are “culturally specific mental representations of aspects of the world” (2006: 126). These cultural models stand for mutual knowledge between the community’s members toward any abstract concept, such as LOVE, which is processed identically among the members of that culture. The LOVE range of target I have mentioned above is a good example. The different understandings of the target domain, LOVE, depend on the particular meaning in focus. Each source, WAR and JOURNEY, imposes an entirely different understanding of the target LOVE because each depends on the cultural, individual, bodily, and emotional experiences of being in love. Even when two cultures mutually understand the LOVE concept through the JOURNEY metaphor, each culture processes and maps this metaphor differently according to the corresponding values system (to be cited later).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) listed three kinds of conceptual metaphors. Firstly, “orientational metaphors” are metaphorical structures built on organizing concepts concerning spatial orientations such as up-down and front-back. For example, the expression “I feel up today” comes from the fact that HAPPY is oriented UP in the “HAPPINESS IS UP” metaphor. Such metaphorical orientations are not randomly assigned. They are grounded on the speaker’s physical and cultural experience and might vary from one culture to another.

Secondly, “ontological metaphors” refer to understanding experiences in terms of objects and substances. These metaphors allow the speaker to treat parts of their experience as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. The structure of ontological metaphors depends on projecting our experience into the physical objects around us, e.g., MIND IS AN ENTITY is elaborated to be THE MIND IS A MACHINE, e.g., he broke down. The range of such metaphors is immense. Besides, they could vary within the cultural context. Some of the most used ontological metaphors are the following: containers metaphors (IN/OUT), entity metaphors (MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT, e.g., he cracked up), and personification (INFLATION IS A PERSON, e.g., inflation has attacked the foundation of our economy, the dollar has been destroyed by inflammation, inflammation has given birth to a money-minded generation).

Thirdly, “structural metaphors” provide the most abundant source of metaphorical elaboration. They allow the speaker to project their experiences on specific concepts. Such kinds of metaphors are more flexible than the previous ones. Structural metaphors provide a deeper understanding of abstract concepts such as communication, argument, equality, and integration. Additionally, they are grounded on the systematic correlations with the speaker’s experiences, e.g., IDEAS ARE BUILDING, ARGUMENT IS WAR, and LIFE IS JOURNEY[17].

These three metaphorical categories depend on primary experiences, but they are not necessarily universal metaphors[18]. Primary experiences (similar to mutual knowledge) might lead to a diversity of metaphors because cultural experiences are inevitably involved in categorizing, understanding, and framing these experiences (Kovecses, 2005:4; Bucholtz and Hall, 2016:186)[19].

Metaphor variation occurs within and across cultures. The different embodied experiences of a shared conceptual metaphor (mutual knowledge) create diverse mental framing of the same sign, ritual, or (political/social) practice. The core meaning focus of conceptual metaphors is significant due to their cultural sensitivity. In other words, the meaning-focus of metaphors provides us with comprehensible answers on how social differences emerge and control the community members (inter)(re)action, such as the example I made above; two social diversities map the metaphor LOVE IS JOURNEY differently according to each culture’s values. The meaning-focus analysis also reveals the different framings of the same target across social dimensions within the same society, such as the class, the ethnic, gender, and religious dimensions (Kovecses, 2015).

Mental Frames and Conceptual Metaphors

In the Imagination Theory, Johnson emphasizes categorization as the first mental process in human cognition. Categorization is a continuous unconscious process of analyzing situations around us and finding a proper reaction. Everything we look at or think about is an “input” organized in an already established category. When our mind does not find a perfect match, a new category is created (Johnson, 1987). These mental categories are stored in the “Image schemata” (see Johnson’s “Imagination Theory” above). Scholars have given image schemata different names: scenario, scene, cultural models, cognitive models, or mental frames. All these terms stand for coherent, categorized structures of human experiences (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Kovecses, 2006, 2005; Zeim, 2014, Dancygier, 2017). In my research, I use Kovecses’ term “mental frames” because I agree with him that the term “mental frames” provides the “structured” mental representation that other definitions might miss (Kovecses 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006).

Mental frames are the cognitive structures where we store the categorizations of our experiences of all types (bodily, emotional, social, religious, cultural, etc.) (Kovecses, 2005, 2006, 2017, 2020; Dancygier, 2017). They provide us with patterns of reasoning based on what is “normalized” or “accepted” (re)action (Turner, 2001). They are stored in the scaffolds of our minds, not fixed nor stable, yet they are hardly changed (to be cited later). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that we cannot make a radical and massive change in our mental system through a conscious act of recategorization even though we are regularly exposed to new “input.” Our mental frames are deep and rooted in our cognition, so it takes too much time, effort, and consciousness to change them. Kay Brugge (2011) draws the attention that humans cannot think beyond these mental frames’ scaffolds. We cannot go beyond these mental frames and think in an abstract uncategorized manner. Besides, human cognition cannot think through a mental frame that it has never experienced, heard, or read about.

Brugge (2011) extends that conceptual metaphors expand and empower our mental scaffolds (frames), on which our thoughts can rest, because they explain our lives’ abstract aspects. He notes that our thoughts can only go as high as the scaffold permits. We live within the lines of our mental frames’ borders, which become our life stage. These lines, or boxes, can be self-imposed (e.g., inner forces of underestimating or self-estimating the self) or imposed by others (e.g., the social norms imposed on individuals). Elena Semino (2008) and Cristopher Hart (2017) agree that conceptual metaphors are not reflections of the mental frames in our cognitions. They are powerful tools that can modify and create new mental frames or expand existing ones. When new metaphors emerge from new social situations, a new mental frame might gradually emerge too.

Hart (2017) asserts that conceptual metaphors are a robust framing tool due to their ability to interpret how social situations, events, and values are understood, reasoned about, and responded to emotionally and physically. As he argues that mental frames are open-ended conceptual structures of different levels of generality and specificity, he explains that one frame can be seen as a “more specific instantiation of another frame” depending on the relationship between metaphors (2017: 6). Semino (2008) states that using a particular metaphor rather than another is not a random decision. It is tied to what this metaphor highlights as foreground and background, the provided interferences, the kind of emotions and triggers associated with this metaphor, etc. In this process, the discourse producers pragmatize social problems according to the metaphor meaning-focus, promote particular solutions, and pave the way for action that goes in accord with the metaphor. Jonathan Charteris-Black (2011:32) asserted that in political discourse, metaphors are used to frame how we view or understand political issues by dismissing alternative points of view[20]. As conceptual metaphors are expressed linguistically, mental frames are not separable from the language we receive and produce. The received language contributes to building our mental frames, and we reveal our mental frames through the language we speak (Boroditsky, 2011).

Mental frames and categories construction is not limited to the use of conceptual metaphors. CL and cognitive psychology argue that our vocabulary choices on social experiences or signs evoke already-established mental frames that attribute meaning to them (Kovecses, 2006; Tompkins, 2011; Boroditsky, 2011, 2018). These choices might not include a rhetoric or conceptual metaphor. Still, their semantic field can reveal the mental structures behind the linguistic output (Way, 1991). The discourse circulated in the community is the tool that gives meaning to our social experiences and constructs our mental frames on social life (Kramsch, 1991). When I say “discourse,” I do not limit the reference to everyday languages, as in Kovecses and Lakoff’s CMT studies. I refer to all discourses we are exposed to (everyday language, public discourse, political discourse, Media discourse, etc.).

In the last decade, multiple studies emerged to incorporate the analysis of conceptual metaphors in discourse analysis (Charteris-Black, 2011; Salahshour, 2016; Hart, 2017, 2021; Taylor, 2021). Taylor (2021) argues that applying CM analysis in discourse analysis provides researchers with insights into the receptor’s perspectives. However, all these studies incorporated the analysis of MF as the output of CM analysis. In this paper, I argue that applying Cognitive Linguistics analysis consists of two separated but correlated approaches: CM and MF. I argue that the analysis of MF includes CM but is not limited to it. The analysis of the non-rhetoric vocabulary-choices on a social phenomenon is significant in detecting the mental frames that control the participants’ minds. This separation makes CCDA more inclusive than the multiple attempts to include Cognitive Linguistics in CDA.

[1] Cognitive Linguistics appeared around the 1970s by scholars, such as George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, and Leonard Talmy, who were more interested in meanings, individual bodily experiences, and cognitive processes than grammar and language structures. Lakoff’s Women, Fire and Dangerous Things (1987) and Langacker’s Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (1987) marked the emergence of the Cognitive Linguistic approach.

[2] Hollmann argues that there is a difference between the Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Social Cognitive Linguistics. See the full argument in (Hollmann, 2013:2-4)

[3] (Reference added after the peer review, 2021)

[4] This does not mean ignoring grammar studies. It is the focus of the study which was shifted. Grammar was studied as a cognitive process in human mind instead of being analyzed as theoretical abstract rules.

[5] Winkielman et al. (2015: 151) argue that the idea of embodiment theory is that higher-level processing is grounded in the organism’s sensory and motor experiences. Accordingly, all the received information (e.g., tools, melodies, flavors, abstract social and emotional experiences) depends on perceptual, somatosensory, and motor resources.

[6] Raymond Gibbs (2005:37) notifies that “Embodiment” theory is not capable to provide a unified grounding for all thoughts and language theories despite of the new development in cognitive psychology. But he indicates that it is a significant element in the perceptual and cognitive processes by which we make sense of our experiences in the world. As for social and culture studies, Gibbs affirms that “embodiment” focus evolves around “the ways that attending the body brings different cultural processes into focus.”

[7] Zoltan Kovecses (2003, 2005, 2006) used the term “mental frame” to refer to these mental structures. We will discuss these terms below.

[8] Multiple works were published in the 70s and 80s on the imagination theory such as Sarbin and Juhasz (1970), Berthoff (1972), McCreary (1973), Streminger (1980), Klein and Damm (1983), who were philosophers and psychologists. I chose Johnson’s because his theory is closer to linguistics than the others. However, Kathleen Stock (2011) doubts that the “Imagination Theory” is a scientific one. He criticized that “Imagination Theory” is recently discussed as if it inherits relevance of science prestige, unlike traditional philosophy even though it not a subject of empirical analysis. To read the entire argument, read Stock (2011: 270-272). For recent publication on the “Imagination Theory” and cognitive linguistics, read Dancygier (2017) and Bloomsbury (2018).

[9] De Saussure (1857-1913) is a professor of Indo-European languages, around the beginning of the XX century. His book “Course in General Linguistics” introduced revolutionary insights on language in contexts. The three most significant concepts of his legacy are the Langue/Parole, Signifier /Signified, and Synchronically/Diachronically.

[10] Pronunciation adopted form Macmillan Dictionary, link: https://www.macmillandictionary.com/pronunciation/british/cat

[11] Cornell Way (1991) refused Lakoff and Johnson’s stress on the conceptual over the literal. She argued that we cannot consider that all our language is conceptual. In every language, there is fixed meaning words that have literal reference and used every day for granted. Way also argues that the “literal” language is important to set the contrast to the “non-literal” one. Her criticism refers to the ability to non-metaphorical vocabularies to reveal the cognitive structure. Such perspective is explained in the following section on mental frames.

[12] Following the study of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), The capitalized words stand for the conceptual range of understandings of the source and the target domains of metaphors, no the literal meaning of the vocabulary.

[13] Metonymy and polysomy are another important tool in meaning-making. They can be part of the CCDA methodology. However, due to the limitation of the paper, I can not include them.

[14] NOTE FOR THE REVIEWER: I am not sure if it is fine to explain briefly the metaphor component. Shall I skip this part and only make a reference to Kovecses’ book in which he explains these component?

[15] CMT argues that we can only understand abstract ideas, such as love and life, by projecting them into a physical world which we are familiar with. Accordingly, conceptual metaphors become the outcome of the interaction between cognitive structures and our bodily experience of the world.

[16] However, Kovecses indicates that identifying what counts as metaphorical expressions and what counts as rhetoric is “an extremely difficult task”, but it does not indicate that it is impossible (2006: 122).

[17] These three metaphors are not restrictive. Kovecses in his recent work (2020) questions different types of metaphors, conceptual and nonconceptual. I chose this categorization because it serves the purpose of the paper as it is a clear one for non-linguist researchers. See Also Salahshour (2016) on liquid metaphors.

[18] Primary experiences are the unconscious universal bodily experiences as the warmth at being in love. It is believed to be responsible for producing universal metaphors. Primary experiences coincide with the mutual knowledge perspective.

[19] Naomi Quinn disapproves of the need for primary conceptual metaphors in our everyday interactions. She argues that metaphors simply reflect mental frames, and no metaphor is needed to understand abstract concepts such as love and marriage. The understanding of these concepts emerges from basic experiences that structure them. For more information about her argument read: Quinn N (1997) A cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

[20] Charteris-Black is keen to bridge CMT in social studies.

CDA is prominent due to its focus on social inequalities, hegemonic discourse, and ideologies. Teun Van Dijk (2001) asserts that CDA is a tool to challenge the power relations of dominance in societies. CDA is a transdisciplinary “multifarious” approach because it depends on different theoretical backgrounds, data, and methodologies (Weiss & Wodak, 2003:12). Norman Fairclough (2013) asserts that the dialogue between these different theories and frameworks is essential for each’s development. He also notes that transdisciplinary CDA should have a transdisciplinary “methodology” rather than a pre-established “method.” He suggests that a cognitive approach to CDA can better explain social life areas, including social wrongs, and ways to righten them. It analyzes how the “wrongs” might be “rights” and how social and political values control all social phenomena. He asserts that the cognitive approach to CDA would provide insights into how possible changes might occur.

Christopher Hart and Dominik Lukeš (2009) work on a Cognitive Linguistics in Critical Discourse Studies theory CL-CDS. Hart (2011b: 270) indicates that CL is not featured in Van Dijk’s approach to CDA; he argues that CL is a specific tool associated with Lakoff (1987, 2014), Langacker (1990, 2002), and Taylor (2008, 2018, 2021) among others. He explains that CL affords CDA with comprehensive links between discursive and social practices. At the same time, CDA allows CL to extend its analysis beyond linguistic and conceptual structures to include societal and contextual structures. He indicates that incorporating the CL approach to CDA can analyze ideology patterns in text (linguistic structure) and conceptualizations (cognitive structures). Hart’s association between CL and CDA is based on the incorporation of CMT in CDA studies, assuming that the analysis of MF is part of CMT. His interest in CMT is based on Lakoff and Johnson’s statement: “metaphors create realities for us, especially social realities” (1980: 156). Although I totally agree with Hart on the impeccable outcome of joining CMT with CDA, I do not agree with reducing the CL dimension in CDA to CM analysis. I argue that MF analysis can be carried out on linguistic structures that may not contain any metaphor.

3.1. CDA and (Hegemonic) Ideologies

Ideology is the system of ideas (social, political, or religious) produced by the dominant group, reflecting its interests (Van Dijk, 1995). They define what is good and what is bad; it draws the borders on what is accepted and where to mark the redline (Eagleton, 2014). From a cognitive perspective, Hart (2015) argues that ideologies behind social actions are based on a shared system of mental frames (mutual knowledge) and is identically processed by the group members. Such ideologies affect the linguistic choices as much as the conceptual metaphors used to convey the values of that ideology.

Van Dijk (1998) asserts that every ideology involves the “us/them” polarization, which entails positive beliefs about us and negative beliefs about them. He set out that any dominant discourse follows the four rules of “the ideological square”: 1) Emphasize positive things about us, 2) Emphasize negative things about them, 3) De-emphasize negative things about us, 4) De-Emphasize positive things about them. Any ideological-group member follows fixed patterns of basic categories in constructing the ideological mental frame, such as:

Membership criteria: Who does (not) belong?
Typical activities: what do we do?
Overall aims: What do we want? Why do we do it?
Norms and values: What is good or bad for us?
Position: What are the relationships with others?
Resources: Who has access to our group resources?

Answering these questions is crucial in CDA because they summarize the collective beliefs and, hence, group members’ identification criteria (Van Dijk, 2009; Hart & Cap, 2014).

From another perspective, David Francis and Stephan Hester (2004) argue that discourse (semiotic) hegemony is practiced by the mainstream or those in power; hegemonic powers control and shape the public sphere. They decide what people listen to, speak about, and how to react (against or for). The discourse hegemony controls the meanings attached to social experiences, values, and signs, especially those related to minorities; it is called a dominant discourse (to be cited later). Cultural authority legitimates such hegemony. Public figures (such as journalists, politicians, activists, and historians) consider themselves part of an authoritative community that enjoys the privilege of molding the events into preferred forms. The social authority assigned to them makes their re-articulation of the reality (the re-told story) a reliable version (Van Dijk, 1979, 2001). However, their re-articulation of reality constructs a similar but not identical version in which secrets are concealed, details are skipped, and critical information is ignored. Receivers (the public) of the hegemonic and authoritative discourse do not show tendencies to challenge the re-told story as long as it somehow coincides with their already established collective mental frames. Accordingly, those who control the discourse can control, or gradually change, the public mind (Toolan, 1991; Van Dijk, 1998; Lakoff, 2014; Salahshour, 2016).

3.2. Discourse(s) on social experiences and Signs

Previously, I explained the difference established between the terms “sign” and “symbols” in semiotics. I followed Kaldis’ suggestion that signs have an inherited meaning while symbols are used to convey a meaning other than what they usually refer to. In Sociolinguistics, language is the system of representations through which all social phenomena are realized (Stockwell, 2002; Holmes, 2013; Ruben, 2013). Accordingly, sociolinguists hypothesize that language can shape the meanings of social experiences and signs as much as the meanings of social experiences and signs control the linguistic choices in our discourse (Kramsch, 2004; Holmes, 2013; Gal & Irvine, 2019).

The question is: Is our discourse on social experiences and signs neutral? It is not. All CDA studies mentioned in this paper argue that discourses, in general, are not neutral; discourse production depends on the speaker’s framing of the social phenomenon in accord with their shared cultural values. Hart (2017:271) highlights that the same social phenomenon is understood and interpreted differently by the communities within the same social context. In a reciprocal relation, linguistic choices used by each community to debate social phenomena deepen these different framing. Hart argues that each discourse reflects the speaker’s perception of reality, and this perception is inevitably based on an ideology.

Several scholars agree that the perceptions and re-articulations of social signs and symbols are controlled by the public discourse (Kristiansen & Dirven, 2008; Langacker, 2002; Musolff, 2003; O’Halloran, 2003). It is to say, when the social sign (or experience) belongs to our community, its meaning flows from its shared social value into the linguistic representation. But when the social sign (or experience) belongs to other communities that we do not feel identified with, e.g., minorities, the meaning is imposed on the signs and symbols by the dominant discourse’s linguistic choices. As a result, social signs and experiences that belong to less-powerful communities are framed according to the dominant group’s understanding, far from their original system of values in that minority.

To be aware of such twisted representation of less-powerful social diversities and their related values towards their signs/symbols/experiences is not relatively easy. It requires an active “conscious thought” that stimulates critical thinking about what we listen to and read about (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010). An active conscious thought has to identify if the discourse (the used vocabularies and metaphors) frames the sign (or symbols or experiences) according to the dominant discourse’s understanding of that sign (or symbols or experiences), i.e., depending on their dominant system of value, or if the discourse frames it according to the system of value that the sign (or symbols or experiences) holds in that minority (To be cited later).

Conscious thoughts involve the awareness of separate episodes that occur in different times and places at the moment of dealing with public discourse on social signs (or symbols or experiences): 1) the past (conscious remembering of the historical background), 2) the future (conscious planning of the consequences), 3) counterfactual (conscious reasoning: why it is framed that way), 4) imagined situation (conscious design: the outcome of such discourse) and 5) desired situations (daydreaming: the mental comfort zone that we prefer not to challenge) (Tomasello, 2010). The lack of conscious thought by the receptors (society members) ends up by manipulated and controlled mental frames (Steen, 2009).

How can we activate conscious thought? Through challenging the dominant (restrictive) discourse and creating alternative ones (Van Dijk, 2001; Kulyk, 2006; Lakoff, 2014). When receptors have no choice but to listen to and read a dominant discourse, their mental frame on that social phenomenon is restricted to the frames mentioned in the dominant discourse. Suppose that there is no alternative version or resources to evaluate the dominant discourse; receptors will lack the opportunity as much as the freedom to think about that social phenomenon from different perspectives. Creating an alternative public discourse that challenges the (stereotypical) dominant framings offers receptors by a variety of framings on the same social phenomenon. It will expand their perception of the diverse framings of the same social phenomenon. They will enjoy the mental freedom to think critically about the social phenomenon, and each of them will choose the mental framing They are convinced with (To be cited later).

4.1. Recapitulation

This paper briefly introduced the basics of multiple approaches involved in CCDA: Semiotics, CL (CMT and MF), and CDA. The above-mentioned theoretical frame knocks on the door of each discipline, not dare to open it because each statement stands for a broad area for research. As this paper aims to introduce a cognitive-socio-linguistic analysis methodology, CCDA, to non-linguist researchers, I consider this basic knowledge at each discipline’s doorstep as a comprehensive ground to build up CCDA methodology.

As I referred to above, there were multiple research on the importance of joining CL into CDA, CL-CDS, (Van Dijk, 1993; Chilton, 1996; Stockwell, 1999; Koller, 2004; Musolff, 2004, 2006; Dirven et al., 2003, 2007; Semino, 2008; Hart,2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2014, 2015, 2018; Charteris-Black, 2011, 2004, 2019; Taylor 2021, 2020; Taylor and Kidgell 2021; SalahShour, 2016). However, these attempts limited their analysis focus to conceptual metaphors. They considered the linguistic metaphorical structures the main tool to identify the mental frames in the scaffold of speakers’ minds.

This paper aims to put together all these previous attempts in a solo comprehensive multidisciplinary methodology for social science researchers; secondly, it will include the analysis of non-rhetoric vocabulary choices and their semantic field in the meaning-making process. This semantic analysis is an essential tool in CL analysis. These vocabularies might not reflect any conceptual metaphor, but they form part of the cognitive structures of which metaphors are only a part (Stubbs, 2001; Kovecses, 2006; Tompkins, 2011; Boroditsky, 2011, 2018). Public discourse might choose semantic strategies to empower some (dominant) framings over others (less powerful, minorities) without using any conceptual metaphors (Hart & Lukes, 2009). CDA analyzes the semantic dimension of the used vocabularies without going through their cognitive dimension. The current CL approach to CDA ignores non-rhetoric vocabularies; it focuses on conceptual metaphors analysis. Charteris-Black (2011), Hart (2014), and Salahshour (2016) argue that incorporating CMT will enrich CDA with the cognitive structures that control the public discourse. Would you think how deep our findings will be if we incorporate the cognitive-semantic analysis as an effective additional tool in revealing the mental frames in that discourse?

4.2. Sewing threads together:

Hart (2014:47), in his efforts to join CMT and CDA, was skeptical of the problematic relationship between both of them. His doubts were based on their different focuses. Until the first decade of this century, CMT was limited only to daily apolitical discourse, while CDA focused on political and social public discourse. Another problematic relation between CMT and CDA is the “unconsciousness” dimension. Kovecses, Lakoff, and Johnson agree that the experimental linkage between the two domains of primary metaphors (the abstract and the physical) is part of the cognitive unconsciousness. While in CDA, Charteris-Black (2004:247) states that metaphors are chosen to achieve a specific communication purpose (to control how we frame certain political issues by eliminating alternative frames) in a particular context; they are not merely predetermined bodily experience.

Both perspectives are valid and compatible. If we think of knowledge and discourse as construal, we might overcome these problematic contradictions in the consciousness dimension (Hart, 2014). It is to say, in any social group, knowledge and beliefs are firstly presumed, mainly by dominant groups, for a particular purpose or need. Then, an appropriate and convincing discourse is imposed on this presumed knowledge and beliefs; the dominant discourse is imposed on the rest of the community (input). After that, the community mentally processes the discourse and builds their experiences and mental frames accordingly (output). Finally, the constructed and activated mental frames become part of the community’s embodied experience of this knowledge and beliefs (outcome). Accordingly, even if conceptual metaphors in public discourse, as Charteris-Black argues, are chosen, they eventually construct the public’s unconscious memory of the topic.

In other words, the hegemonic-dominant discourse producers control and selectively choose their vocabularies and conceptual metaphors in the public discourse. Yet, when the public receives the discourse, these vocabularies and conceptual metaphors are transformed into the receivers’ unconscious collective memory. Passive receivers of that discourse, who do not enjoy conscious thoughts and do not critically think about its liability or credibility, will reproduce these linguistic structures sonorously and unconsciously.

Despite the debate on CMT and CDA relationship, several CDA studies applied CMT by the mid of the second decade; these studies are of different focuses, such as migration (Salahshour, 2016; Taylor, 2020, 2021), Brexit Campaign (Charteris-Black, 2019), Miner’s Strike (Hart, 2017), The pandemic (Taylor and Kidgell, 2021). Again, all these studies included MF as part of the CMT analysis; on the contrary, I argue that CMT and the semantic analysis of the non-rhetoric vocabularies are part of MF analysis.

Based on multiple works on CL-CDS Charteris-Black (2004), Stubbs (2011), Hart (2011, 2014), Salahshour (2016), and Taylor (2021), I reaffirm that CCDA is not an entire invented new methodology. I recognize all the previous attempts to join CL into CDA. I use the term “new methodology” only to distinguish between CCDA and the previous scattered attempts to join CL into CDA. The term CCDA stands for a comprehensive multidisciplinary framework that includes the needed tool to analyze social research data in a solo methodology. In addition, CCDA is selected based on my argument that CL includes both CMT and MF as separated but correlated fields of analysis

CCDA bridges the gap between the discourse analysis (CDA) and the cognitive processes behind that discourse (CL, MF, CMT). What differentiates CCDA from CL-CDA is that CCDA observes the intentions behind the rhetoric and non-rhetoric linguistic choices by the discourse producers as much as their impact on receivers’ minds. As CDA studies what is said and why it is said that way, CCDA studies how what is said the way it is said shapes the public mental frames towards that topic; what are the activated, re-activated, and de-activated mental frames on what is said in the way it is said (the conscious use of rhetoric and non-rhetoric choices); how the receptors process and rearticulate what is said the way it is said (the collective unconscious memory).

4.3. How to Apply CCDA?

I agree with Fairclough (2013) that multidisciplinary analysis needs a flexible multidisciplinary methodology. CCDA is a flexible methodology that adapts to each research focus. Each study would opt for the features of CCDA according to its focus. Scholars have to reflect on including these multi-dimensions of CCDA in their study focus. CCDA consists of three dimensions: 1) the linguistic-semantic dimension, 2) the cognitive dimension, and 3) the “sociopolitical and cultural” dimension. I put the term “sociopolitical and cultural” into brackets because it can be any other discipline in Humanities such as political, religious, gender, and feminist studies or psychological focus. It is essential to be conscious of the profile of the analyzed discourse producers.

The semantic dimension refers to the rhetoric and non-rhetoric linguistic choices in the analyzed discourse. We have to keep in mind the profile of the analyzed discourse producers. As mentioned above, the dominant discourse producers DDP consciously select their linguistic choices to impose the meaning on the social context (e.g., political discourse and press discourse). In contrast, the linguistic choices of the dominant discourse receivers DDR are primarily based on personal assumptions and self-interpretations of the situation based on the previously received dominant discourse or personal experience (e.g., interviews, discussions, and blogs). DDRs’ linguistic choices are a reflection of their embodied collective social experience.

After identifying the discourse producers, the study focus is refined, and key concepts are derived. For example, a study on the increased visibility of X minority in the suburb of London interviews the mainstreamers living in that neighborhood. The profile of those participants is DDR. The study would have the following key concepts: public sphere, cultural diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance, differences, us/them polarization, concerns, neighborhood identity, gender, ethnicity, religion, migration, etc. The semantic analysis starts by looking for the vocabularies used to speak about the key concepts. The detected vocabularies are classified into two main categories of CL: 1) Metaphorical linguistic structures (e.g., invading, thread, defend, enriching, protect, in/out, sharing the public sphere), 2) Non-metaphorical linguistic structures (ignorant, extremists, homeless, their children break the internal school rules, their women are oppressed, etc.). Findings in each category are grouped according to the corresponding key concept within each list, e.g., metaphors used to convey the public sphere understanding (see figure 1) and the non-metaphorical linguistic choices used to describe the X minority (see figure 2). In figure 1, the “public sphere” category includes all the metaphorical structures used to convey the speakers’ understanding of the PUBLIC SPHERE. In figure 2, the “description of X minority” category includes all the non-metaphorical choices used to speak about it.

As we have the categories and sub-groups classified, the cognitive dimension starts. At this stage, the researcher must reflect on the linguistic findings to detect the cognitive structures behind them. In the example mentioned above (Figure 1), “invade, thread, and defend” stands for CULTURAL INTEGRATION IS WAR metaphor in which PUBLIC SPHERE is understood as AN OWNED TERRITORY, and the mainstreamers want to protect from the X minority invasion. Similarly, stigmatizing the X minority as “ignorant” and highlighting that their children “break the internal school rules” reveal the mainstream’s framing of this X minority members through the IGNORANCE mental frame and their children through an INDISCIPLINE mental frame.

The social/political/cultural dimension is essential to understanding and interpreting linguistic and cognitive findings. This dimension studies the triggers of these linguistic and cognitive structures on X minority. Are they considered a “thread” because of (historical or current) political conflict? Does (post)(neo) colonialism has anything to do with these cognitive structures shared by this mainstream community? Why is the X minority framed as ignorant? Is the trigger their religious affiliates? Is it their vestment choices? Are these framings applied equally to men and women in the X minority, or do some gender variations exist? What are the rules broken at school? Is there a constitutional law that guarantees those kids’ freedom to celebrate their diversity at public school? Answering these questions through unbiased and empirical research would reveal that the IGNORANCE framing of the X minority is based on the concealment or direct stigmatization of the X minority members in the dominant discourse. Accordingly, the mainstreamers lack the cultural intelligence to understand and respect the X minority’s cultural variation. They establish their cultural values are the norm or the correct form of living. The social dimension analysis would also reveal if those students are practicing their constitutional rights to freedom of thought and diversity. The conflict occurs because these rights are not recognized in the internal school rules.

Following these three dimensions in CCDA allow us to step back away from the fragmented linguistic analysis to observe how the linguistic choices of each participant’s profile reveal their embodiment of the studied social phenomenon. In the example mentioned above on X minority, participants were dominant discourse receivers. Their linguistic choices are the (unconscious) output of the received and processed dominant discourse. The outcome is the detected social inequality, e.g., the stigmatization and exclusion of the X minority and their children in that neighborhood. Suppose the same study includes the analysis of press discourse or political discourse on this X minority. In that case, the analysis focus will include the conscious and authoritative discursive strategies used to frame the X minority in the public mind. It would detect how Van Dijk’s “the ideological square” (mentioned above) manifests in the dominant discourse through the rhetoric and non-rhetoric linguistic choices. What are the ignored attributions of this minority? What are the attributes attached to this minority? Is X Minority’s sign interpretation based on the X minority values system, or is it grounded on the authoritative discourse’s frame of reference? What is the (political) (national) (social) agenda behind such discourse? Such comprehensive analysis allows us to observe how the dominant discourse frames the public mind toward social phenomena.

To sum up, CCDA involves the meaning-making process in the collective social mind. The analysis of the rhetoric and non-rhetoric linguistic choices detects the similarities and differences in how and why the same social phenomenon is framed differently. The metaphor mappings and meaning-focus provide comprehensible answers on how social differences emerge and control the community members (inter)(re)action. The non-rhetoric linguistic choices are a powerful tool that shapes our perceptions of the social phenomenon (through cognitive categorization and framing). The analysis of signs and symbols is a significant field of analysis in CCDA because it shows how the mutual understanding of signs and symbols does not necessarily mean comprehension. The CCDA reveals how meanings are consciously attached to signs and symbols of minority and majority by DDP (to be cited later).

CCDA inevitably involves a diachronic theoretical analysis and a synchronic one (if the study focuses on current discourse). It reveals how the conflict of interests and power manipulate the linguistic and the cognitive structures in the public (hegemonic) discourse and DDR’s mind. CCDA extends to reveal the dominant discourse outcome on the social collective behavior and values. A good CCDA would be able to expect how the DDP would frame an X social phenomenon and how DDR would react to it! Implementing CCDA in the research has to develop a guideline on creating an alternative discourse in which conscious thought is activated. Such guideline provides instructions on the stereotypical manipulated mental frames and the linguistic structures that (re)activate them, possible linguistic structure to de-activate them, and possible linguistic structures to replace them. The guideline includes cognitive and social explanations of these guidelines to break down the reciprocal chain of manipulated discourse and achieve an effective change on both the linguistic and cognitive levels in the DDR’s minds.

4.4. CCDA in Dominant Discourse Analysis:

Metaphorical and non-metaphorical linguistic choices interact with the cognitive structure (mental frames) through three main processes: 1) re-activating, 2) de-activating, and 3) activating mental frames. “Re-activating” refers to the act of recycling a historical discourse on the X minority. It means to re-use a historical framing on this minority and re-attach it to the current one. “Re-activating” mental frames is typically found in stereotypical discourse, and it overthinks that these frames are no longer applicable to X minority due to social evolution. For example, the public discourse stigmatizes the fifth generation of the X minority as “migrants” due to their religious visibility, or it stigmatizes an X minority as invaders because five centuries ago, the minority’s original nation invaded the host country. Re-activating mental frames is mainly tied to political agenda and national identity construction.

“De-activating” mental frames occurs in several ways according to the ideological square that controls the discourse production. The DDP might practice “de-activating” mental framing to de-activate a positive frame on the X minority when it becomes widespread in people’s minds. DDP can emphasize the negative things and de-emphasize the positive things about the X minority; they can also assert the We/Other categorization, etc. On the contrary, suppose X minority members produce an alternative discourse to challenge the dominant one; they challenge the stereotypical frames activated by DDP on their signs, values, visibility, etc. The alternative discourse de-activates the stereotypical framing and, sometimes, activates alternative ones that reflect their value system. However, the dominant hegemonic groups usually restrict such alternative discourse and deprive them of accessing public discourse (El-Madkouri, 2009; to be cited later). Consequently, alternative discourse is limited to X minority’s blogs, websites, or intercultural non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

I use the “activating” mental frames term to refer to the newly created mental frames about the X minority by DDP or by the X minority members. It refers to new linguistic choices and the cognitive structures related to these choices. As mentioned above, dominant discourse tends to use conscious linguistic choices to frame the social phenomena according to their interests or ideologies. In the following, I will suggest some steps to follow in the analysis of national press discourse on X minority:

Visibility and Quantity: Observe the visibility and the contribution quantity of the X minority members in the debate. Are they reasonably involved in the debate? Did they have enough time to express their perspectives? Compare it to the counterparts’.
Participants’ framing: Detecting the discursive strategies used to introduce the participants in the debate. Are minority participants presented as authoritative spokespersons on behalf of their minority? Is their academic background, civic roles, or activism acknowledged in their presentation? Are they given the legitimate and the credibility to opine in the debate? Compare your results on how the counterparts’ presentations and given credibility.
Non-rhetoric linguistic choices: Identifying the vocabularies used to refer to the members of X minority and detect the (re) (de) activated mental frames by these choices. This stage might include references to the X minority’s signs, symbols, and social values (output).
Rhetoric linguistic choices: detect the conceptual metaphors used in the debate on the visibility, signs, diversity, or social status of X minority. Study the main meaning focus of these metaphors because it represents the collective embodied experience toward the X minority (output).
Detect the triggers: analyze these linguistic findings within the social, political, and historical context. It allows us to understand the historical-contemporary framework of the analyzed discourse[1]. Without having this twofold knowledge about the studied target, we will not be able to understand, study and analyze our findings comprehensively.
Unfold the layers: CCDA reveals the inner connection between the social inequalities and public discourse (outcome). Define the triggers, the ideology that controls these (conscious) linguistic choices, and the expected cognitive impact on the DDR’s minds. Suggest a guideline on how to break this dominant reciprocal chain in the public discourse.

These discursive strategies bring the DDR closer or farther from the story’s core idea, make them empathize with the participants, and highlight their discourse as authoritative and trusted. Some of these above-listed steps are part of the CDA; CCDA joins CDA into the cognitive approach, including MF and CMT analysis. All the analysis methods provided in CDA can be incorporated in CCDA. The researcher is responsible for adding the cognitive dimension to the analysis to research the comprehensive outcome of CCDA. In a sequel article, I will provide a detailed case study on implementing CDA analysis techniques into CCDA.

[1] I mentioned above that public discourse analysis needs to cover multi-temporal dimensions: the past (conscious remembering of the historical background), the future (conscious planning of the consequences), and counterfactual (conscious reasoning: why it is framed that way) imagined situation (conscious design: the outcome of such discourse) and desired situations (daydreaming: the mental comfort zone that we prefer not to challenge).

This article aims to develop a comprehensive CCDA methodology. This methodology is not totally new; there have been multiple attempts to bridge CL and CDA. Yet, all these attempts were addressed to linguists with deep technical words. These attempts are also limited to CM analysis, considering MF as part of the CMT. CCDA argues that the analysis of the non-metaphorical linguistic choices is another essential tool to identify dominant framings of the social phenomena and the linguistic structures related to them.

This paper joined all previous attempts in a solo comprehensive multidisciplinary methodology for social science researchers who has no linguistics background. It introduces a straightforward and simple-to-use methodology in social science research. CCDA methodology consists of three significant dimensions: 1) the linguistic-semantic dimension, 2) the cognitive dimension, and 3) the social and historical dimension. Incorporating these three dimensions in social science research allows us to identify the (re) (de) activated frames that dominate the public discourse and control people’s minds.

Applying CCDA will able us to identify the cognitive structures behind social inequalities and injustice, deeply analyze them, and create an alternative discourse that challenges them. CCDA bridges the gap between the linguistic analysis and the cognitive structures that operate in the receptors’ minds. It aims to stud how the collective memory is built, controlled, changed, or maintained by the DDP. It also reveals the embodiment of social values in the collective memory, identifies the embodied meaning of diverse sign systems visibility, and uncovers the cognitive structures behind identity construction and belonging. The expected outcome of CCDA is a guideline with clear recommendations on how to break down the reciprocal linguistic-cognitive dominant discourse and how to achieve alternative discourses to provide DDR with the mental freedom to activate conscious thoughts.

Funding

No funding was received for conducting this study.

Declarations Conflict of interest

The author has no conflicts of interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.

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Towards Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis CCDA Methodology A multidisciplinary approach to Social Science

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Abstract

Figures

1. Introduction

2. Cognitive Linguistics: (Mf) And (Cmt)

Towards a Comprehensive Imagination theory

A Semiotic Approach to Meaning-making Process:

Conceptual Metaphors Theory CMT in Meaning-making process:

Mental Frames and Conceptual Metaphors

3. Critical Discourse Analysis CDA

3.1. CDA and (Hegemonic) Ideologies

3.2. Discourse(s) on social experiences and Signs

4. Towards a Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis CCDA

4.1. Recapitulation

4.2. Sewing threads together:

4.3. How to Apply CCDA?

4.4. CCDA in Dominant Discourse Analysis:

5. Conclusion

Declarations

References

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