

Toxic Chemical Pollutants in the U.S. States

Shigemi Kagawa (✉ kagawa@econ.kyushu-u.ac.jp)

Kyushu University <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3936-4103>

Shohei Tokito

Yamagata University

Hidemichi Fujii

Kyushu University <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3043-1122>

Manfred Lenzen

The University of Sydney <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0828-5288>

Futu Faturay

Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5636-1794>

Shunsuke Okamoto

Onomichi City University <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3949-1567>

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1 **Toxic Chemical Pollutants in the U.S. States**

2

3 **Abstract**

4 Footprint indicators are used to evaluate chemical substance management. However,
5 determining the impact of chemical restrictions on manufacturing processes and supply chains
6 without a footprint analysis of the entire lifecycle is difficult. Here, we propose a new
7 framework for estimating chemical toxicity footprints utilizing the risk-screening
8 environmental indicators (RSEIs) published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. We
9 conducted an empirical analysis using multi-states input-output data from the U.S. in 2017 to
10 demonstrate the usefulness of the framework, and made policy recommendations based on the
11 obtained results. According to the production-based RSEI scores, Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois,
12 and Louisiana accounted for 43% of the total human health risk in the U.S. By contrast,
13 California and New York ranked first and second in consumption-based RSEI score (i.e., health
14 risk footprint), respectively; however, the District of Columbia and Alabama ranked first and
15 second in per capita footprint. Three significant risk transfers, accounting for 6% of the total in
16 the U.S. economy, were found: from California to Texas, from New York to Texas, and from
17 Florida to Texas. In conclusion, specific states such as Texas and Louisiana were at considerable
18 risk from major chemical substance emissions triggered by final demands in mega cities such
19 as New York and California. Thus, the federal and state governments should select high priority
20 sectors and states according to the production-based RSEI scores. Relevant taxes can be
21 collected from states based on the consumer's responsibility. Footprint-based inter-state
22 financial cooperation is crucial in mitigating chemical pollutions in the U.S.

23 **Data availability statement:** The environmentally-extended MRIO data of the U.S. states is
24 available upon request.

25 **Competing Interest Statement:** The authors declare no competing interest.

26 **Keywords:** Chemical toxicity footprint; multi-regional input–output dataset; RSEI

27

28

29 **1. Introduction**

30

31 Toxic chemical management is being promoted worldwide to realize a healthy and prosperous
32 society (1). The use of chemicals dramatically increases our convenience (2); however, toxic
33 chemicals generated during manufacturing, utilization, and disposal of products have adverse
34 effects on human health and ecosystems (3). To address these challenges, target 12.4 from the
35 Sustainable Development Goals states the following: "By 2020, achieve the environmentally
36 sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with
37 agreed international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in
38 order to minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the environment." However, this
39 target is difficult to achieve, and a global action plan (i.e. post strategic approach to international
40 chemicals management) has been proposed for implementation even after 2020 (4).

41

42 In response to this situation, efforts to manage toxic chemicals are increasing mainly in
43 developed countries. In 2016, the toxic substances control act (TSCA), the basic federal law for
44 handling general industrial chemicals in the U.S., was amended for the first time in 40 years to
45 establish priorities for risk assessment of chemicals, and to establish proposed rules regarding
46 risk reduction of individual substances (5). Moreover, to protect workers who handle
47 hazardous chemicals, a hazard communication standard was established under the
48 Occupational Safety and Health act in 2012, which imposes obligations such as communication
49 of chemical hazard information and employee training (6). These chemical toxicity assessment

50 and on-site information communication efforts are expected to promote appropriate chemical
51 management and mitigate toxic effects on human health and ecosystems (7).

52

53 In Europe, the “chemicals strategy for sustainability” was announced in October 2020, and
54 efforts are underway to achieve zero pollution for a toxic-free environment (8). In this context,
55 the revision of the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals
56 (REACH) regulation, which guides the management of toxic chemicals, is also under
57 consideration (9). It should be noted that the EU is considering to expand the information
58 requirements of REACH to include information on the overall environmental footprint of
59 chemicals (8).

60

61 Footprint indicators can evaluate not only the direct toxicity impact of chemical substances but
62 also the indirect toxicity impact through intermediate goods inputs, allowing the evaluation of
63 chemical substance management throughout their entire life cycle (10). Since the transition of
64 the economic system to a circular economy is underway, especially in the EU, the method
65 whereby the toxic effects of chemical substances are assessed over their entire life cycle plays
66 an important role in building the circular chemistry system (11).

67

68 Various studies have been conducted on the management of toxic chemicals using data from
69 pollutant release and transfer register (PRTR) systems [e.g., U.S. (12-14)]. Many of these studies
70 have focused on the effects of toxic chemical exposure on human health and appropriate

71 chemical management methods at business sites. However, there have been limited studies on
72 footprint coverage of the entire supply chain (10, 15–17).

73

74 One of the reasons for the lack of progress in footprint research on chemical substances is their
75 characteristics; unlike, for example, CO₂ emissions, which are the subject of much footprint
76 research (18), chemical substances have diverse characteristics (7). Specifically, toxic effects on
77 human health and ecosystems vary widely among chemicals, and an analytical framework that
78 explicitly takes these differences into account is needed (19). Since the EU has proposed a
79 management method that uses integrated chemical substance risk as an indicator, there is a
80 growing social demand for using footprint information in integrated risk minimization (11).

81

82 Footprint indicators can be used to monitor the effects of chemical substance regulations.
83 Chemical restrictions can lead to shifts in manufacturing processes and supply chains; however,
84 these impacts are difficult to determine without an analysis of the entire lifecycle. In addition,
85 the EU aims to “develop a framework of indicators to monitor the causes and effects of chemical
86 pollution and to assess the effectiveness of chemical legislation,” and footprint analysis with
87 integrated risk indicators for chemical substances is consistent with these objectives (8).

88

89 The objective of this study was to propose a new framework for estimating chemical toxicity
90 footprints utilizing the risk-screening environmental indicators (RSEIs) published by the U.S.
91 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In addition, to demonstrate the usefulness of the
92 estimation framework, we conducted an empirical analysis using U.S. multi-regional input–

93 output data from 2017 and made policy recommendations based on the footprint estimation
94 results.

95

96 RSEI uses three indicators to assess toxic chemical emissions (19). The first is the simple sum
97 of chemical emissions, expressed in pounds. The second one is “hazard,” which is the toxicity-
98 weighted emissions and is measured in toxicity-weighted pounds. The third one is the “score,”
99 which is an indicator that reflects the size of the chemical release as well as the size of the
100 exposed population and ecosystem and indicates the potential risk due to toxicity effects. The
101 relationship between these three indicators is summarized in Figure 1. The RSEI scores are
102 designed to be comparable to each other (19), with a 10-fold higher number indicating a 10-
103 fold higher likelihood of risk. Even relatively small/large releases of chemicals tend to have
104 higher/lower RSEI scores when the toxicity weight is high/low or when the modeled exposed
105 population is large/small.

106

107 A high RSEI score identifies areas that require further investigation, but does not indicate the
108 health risk itself (19). Therefore, while the analysis results from the RSEI score are useful for
109 gaining new insights through relative comparisons of potential risk across regions and
110 industries, it is difficult to identify causal factors affecting human health based on these results
111 alone. In other words, the RSEI score reflects the relative degree of risk and can be used as
112 useful information when considering priorities for pollution control measures.

113

114 In this study, we used the U.S. multi-regional input–output table fed by the RSEI data to identify
115 the production-based and consumption-based toxicity footprints for each state and sector,

116 while considering the limitations in data availability. Then, we used the results of the RSEI
117 model to develop a policy recommendation framework.

118

119 [Insert Figure 1 here]

120

121 **2. Methodology**

122

123 **2.1 MRIO model**

124 We formulated the U.S. production-based and consumption-based toxicity emissions and risk
125 indicators using an MRIO analysis. The production- and consumption-based environmental
126 accounting method using the MRIO framework has been widely adopted (20, 21).

127

128 An intermediate input from industry i in state r to industry j in state s is defined as
129 Z_{ij}^{rs} ($i, j = 1, 2, \dots, M; r, s = 1, 2, \dots, N$). The final demand from industry i in state r to final
130 consumers in state s is defined as F_i^{rs} ($i = 1, 2, \dots, M; r, s = 1, 2, \dots, N$). As a result, the total
131 output of industry i in state r is defined as $x_i^r = \sum_{s=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^M Z_{ij}^{rs} + \sum_{s=1}^N F_i^{rs}$. If the intermediate
132 input coefficient $a_{ij}^{rs} = Z_{ij}^{rs}/x_j^s$ is defined, the total output can be formulated as $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{Ax} + \mathbf{f}$ in
133 matrix notation, where $\mathbf{x} = (x_i^r)$, $\mathbf{A} = (a_{ij}^{rs})$, and $\mathbf{f} = (\sum_{s=1}^N F_i^{rs})$. The MRIO model, $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{I} -$
134 $\mathbf{A})^{-1}\mathbf{f} = \mathbf{Lf}$, can show the extension of the final demand that directly and indirectly generates
135 the industrial output. Here, \mathbf{I} is the identity matrix; $\mathbf{L} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1} = (l_{ij}^{rs})$ is the Leontief
136 inverse, which is a direct and indirect requirement matrix that represents how many units of a
137 product of industry i in state r are needed to produce one unit of a product of industry j in state
138 s . In addition, we defined the row vector \mathbf{e}^r , whose element of industry i is 1 in state r and 0 in

139 others, and the final demand column vector \mathbf{f}^s for the state s , which is the s^{th} column vector of
140 the final demand matrix; then, the production of industry i in state r directly- and indirectly-
141 induced by final demand in state s can be represented with $\mathbf{e}^r \mathbf{L} \mathbf{f}^s$.

142

143 ***2.2 Production- and consumption-based accounting***

144

145 Production-based accounting for a state represents the pollution by industry in the state.
146 Production-based RSEI hazard and RSEI score of state r is the local pollution by industry in state
147 r and the local exposure dose, respectively. Production-based RSEI hazard PH^r and RSEI score
148 PS^r of state r can be obtained as

149

$$150 \quad PH^r = \mathbf{h}^r \mathbf{L} \mathbf{f} \quad (1)$$

151

$$152 \quad PS^r = \mathbf{s}^r \mathbf{L} \mathbf{f} \quad (2)$$

153

154 where \mathbf{h}^r and \mathbf{s}^r are the row vectors whose elements of industry i in state r are the RSEI hazard
155 and RSEI score per unit of output of industry i in state r , respectively, and 0 in the others.

156

157 Consumption-based accounting for a state represents the total pollution induced by final
158 consumption in the state. Consumption-based RSEI hazard and RSEI score are the total
159 pollution exposure dose in U.S. allocated to the states in the U.S. finally consumed through the
160 import of industries, government, and residents. The consumption-based RSEI hazard CH^r and
161 RSEI score CS^r of state r can be obtained as:

162

163
$$CH^r = \mathbf{hLf}^r \quad (3)$$

164

165
$$CS^r = \mathbf{sLf}^r \quad (4)$$

166

167 where \mathbf{h} and \mathbf{s} are the RSEI coefficient row vectors whose elements are the RSEI hazard and
 168 RSEI score per unit of industrial outputs, respectively. The superscript T indicates the
 169 transposition.

170

171 As above, total pollution can be allocated to each state based on where the state produced or
 172 finally consumed. This accounting can be decomposed as follows:

173

174
$$\mathbf{hLf} = \sum_{r=1}^N PH^r = \sum_{s=1}^N CH^s$$

175
$$= \sum_{r=1}^N \sum_{s=1}^N \mathbf{h}^r \mathbf{Lf}^s = \sum_{r=1}^N \sum_{s=1}^N TH^{rs}$$

176 (5)

177

178 Here, $TH^{rs} = \mathbf{h}^r \mathbf{Lf}^s$ is called the gross emission transfer from state s to state r , that is, pollution
 179 emitted in state r induced by final consumption in state s (22). The same applies to that of the
 180 RSEI score ($TS^{rs} = \mathbf{s}^r \mathbf{Lf}^s$). In addition, the balance of pollution across state transfer [“net”
 181 emission transfer NH^{rs} and NS^{rs}] can be obtained as follows (23, 24):

182

183
$$NH^{rs} = TH^{rs} - TH^{sr} \quad (6)$$

184

185
$$NS^{rs} = TS^{rs} - TS^{sr} \quad (7)$$

186

187

188 **3. Data sources**

189

190 We used the U.S. multi-regional input–output (U.S.-MRIO) table for 2017 constructed using the
191 US Industrial Ecology Laboratory by Faturay *et al.* (25), which includes data on 20 industries
192 (Table S1) and 52 regions (50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; Table S2).

193

194 For analysis of industrial toxicity emission, we used the RSEI, which is publicly available at the
195 Toxic Release Inventory database in the EPA website (<https://www.epa.gov/rsei>). The RSEI is
196 constructed from the amount of toxic chemicals released, the chemical’s fate and transport
197 through the environment, each chemical’s relative toxicity, and potential human exposure. This
198 allows RSEI scores for different substances to be added together. In this study, we used the RSEI
199 score and RSEI hazard among the RSEI parameters.

200

201 The RSEI hazard considers the size of the release and the chemical’s toxicity. The RSEI hazard
202 does not consider environmental fate and transport modeling or adjustments for population
203 exposure. Therefore, the potential risk of exposure to humans may not be high even if the RSEI
204 hazard is high. The RSEI score is a unitless value because it considers the size and location of
205 the exposed population, and is only meaningful in comparison with other sectors and states.
206 Even if the chemical release is relatively small, the RSEI score will be high if the toxicity weight
207 is particularly high or if the exposed population is large. The relationship between the three
208 indicators is illustrated in Figure 1.

209

210 We particularly focused on five chemical substances, chromium, ethylene oxide, cobalt, nickel,
211 and asbestos, which are the top five chemical substances for the RSEI score. Note that the
212 compounds are integrated for chemical substance category.

213

214 **4. Results**

215

216 ***4.1 Production-based RSEI hazard and score of the U.S.***

217 Based on the Toxic Release Inventory program provided by the EPA, the total amount of the
218 RSEI hazard in the U.S. was 9.5 trillion toxicity-weighted pounds in 2017. Toxicity-weighted
219 pounds reflect the size of the release and the chemical's toxicity from industrial production.
220 Importantly, there existed a large difference in the production-based RSEI hazard among the
221 various states in the U.S. Figure 2 depicts the spatial distributions of the RSEI hazard in the U.S.
222 It shows that Texas and Louisiana had the highest shares among the states, occupying 20% and
223 16% of the total U.S. RSEI hazard, respectively.

224

225 We next examined the reason for the significant contribution of Texas and Louisiana to the RSEI
226 hazard. We found that not only the ethylene oxide hazard was spatially concentrated in Texas
227 and Louisiana (Figure 3) but also that ethylene oxide was a major chemical substance greatly
228 contributing to the higher RSEI hazard in Texas and Louisiana, accounting for 48% and 35% of
229 the total hazard in each state, respectively. Ethylene oxide is a human-made chemical
230 intermediate used mainly in the manufacture of ethylene glycol, textiles, detergents,

231 polyurethane foam, and other products (26, 27); however, chemical manufacturing was a major
232 source of ethylene oxide emissions in Texas and Louisiana (Tables S3 and S4).

233

234 In Pennsylvania, which was the third largest emitter, cobalt emitted from primary metal
235 manufacturing was a major chemical substance (Figure 3 and Table S5). Cobalt is used to
236 produce alloys used in the manufacture of aircraft engines (28). Alabama was ranked fourth in
237 the production-based RSEI hazard (Figure 3), with more than 80% of the asbestos hazard being
238 caused by industrial activities (Figure 2). The detailed RSEI database of 2017 (29) shows that
239 U.S. military facilities in Alabama remarkably contributed to a considerable asbestos hazard of
240 178 toxicity-weighted billion pounds, accounting for 100% of the total asbestos hazard in the
241 U.S.

242

243 It is important to note that the RSEI hazard does not describe potential human health risks that
244 are comparable between the states of the U.S. The RSEI “score” estimated using the RSEI
245 “hazard” (i.e., toxicity-weighted pound), exposed population, and estimated dose (29) describes
246 a potential human health risk indicator. For example, a larger exposed population leads to a
247 higher RSEI score.

248

249 [Insert Figure 2 here]

250

251 [Insert Figure 3 here]

252

253 Figure 4 depicts the spatial distributions of the RSEI score in the U.S. Texas was the largest
254 emitter (Figure 2), accounting for 20% of the total RSEI hazard, and ranked first in the RSEI

255 score. Louisiana was the second largest emitter and ranked fourth in the RSEI score.
256 Pennsylvania and Illinois ranked second and third in the RSEI score, respectively (Figure 4).
257 The sub-total of the RSEI scores in the four states of Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Louisiana
258 accounted for 43% of the total human health risk in the U.S. Thus, the U.S. economy imposed
259 considerable health risks on people in these four states in 2017.

260

261 Figure 5 shows the major chemical substances involved in the production-based RSEI scores
262 (i.e., production-based health risk) in the U.S. Texas and Pennsylvania had higher potential
263 health risks due to the emission of different major chemical substances of ethylene oxide and
264 chromium, which together accounted for 71% and 85% of the RSEI score in Texas and
265 Pennsylvania, respectively (Figure 5). Therefore, the state governments should identify the
266 higher priority sectors listed in Table S2 and major chemical substances listed in Figure 5, and
267 aid the important stakeholders under limited resource constraint.

268

269 [Insert Figure 4 here]

270

271 [Insert Figure 5 here]

272

273 ***4.2 Consumption-based RSEI hazard and score of the U.S.***

274

275 To aid relevant stakeholders through inter-state cooperation, we further need to evaluate the
276 consumption-based RSEI scores (i.e., health risk footprint) of a particular state (10). The

277 footprint indicator of a state can help policy makers understand how the final demand of goods
278 and services in that state can have potential health risks in other U.S. through supply chains.

279

280 We found that there was a large gap between the production- and consumption-based RSEI
281 scores in the U.S. (Figures 4 and 6). Among the considered regions (the 50 states, the District of
282 Columbia, and Puerto Rico), Texas and Pennsylvania ranked first and second in the rankings of
283 production-based RSEI score, respectively (Figure 4). By contrast, California and New York
284 ranked first and second in the rankings of consumption-based RSEI score (Figure 6). California
285 and New York accounted for 9% and 7% of the total consumption-based RSEI in the U.S. (Figure
286 6), implying that consumers in California and New York had a significant responsibility on
287 health risks in other states of the U.S.

288

289 When noting that mass consumption in an urban area with high population density induces a
290 large health risk footprint, it is important to observe the per capita footprint of that specific
291 state. Figure 7 illustrates the health risk footprint in the bar plot and the per capita health risk
292 footprint is indicated by the x mark. The District of Columbia (Washington, D. C.) and Alabama
293 had low health risk footprints; however, they were ranked first and second in the rankings of
294 per capita footprint, respectively (Figure 7). In other words, final consumers in the District of

295 Columbia (Washington, D. C.) and Alabama had a high “personal” responsibility for the potential
296 health risks in their own state as well as those in other states.

297

298 [Insert Figure 6 here]

299

300 [Insert Figure 7 here]

301

302 ***4.3 Health risk transfer in the U.S.***

303 Consumptions in California induced a considerable potential health risk in Texas in 2017 and
304 vice versa (Figure 6). Therefore, the net health risk transfers (i.e., difference between the
305 consumption-based RSEI scores of the states) can quantify the environmental responsibility of
306 a particular state through supply chains. Thicker flows in Figure 8 show higher net health risk
307 transfers between the U.S. We found three significant risk transfers: from California to Texas,
308 from New York to Texas, and from Florida to Texas (Figure 8). Specifically, Texas was the
309 epicenter for chemical pollution in the U.S. supply chains in 2017. Importantly, the total of those
310 three significant risk transfers accounted for 6% of the total in the U.S. economy. Figure 8 can
311 help policy makers quickly identify higher priority states that indirectly contributed to regional
312 human health risks.

313

314 Figure 9 depicts a net transfer coefficient matrix whose elements are percentages of the net
315 health risk transfers from a particular demand state (a row sector in the matrix) to a particular
316 emission state (a column sector in the matrix) to the total of whole net health risk transfers in
317 the U.S. economy. In Figure 9, the net transfer coefficients are calculated by dividing the net
318 transfers between states by the total of the net transfers. The sum of all the matrix elements in

319 Figure 9 coincides with unity (i.e., 100%). The column sum shows the net potential health risk
320 in a particular state induced by the final demand of the U.S., while the row sum shows the net
321 potential health risk in the U.S. induced by the final demand of goods and services in a particular
322 state. In other words, a state with a higher row sum should have a greater responsibility for
323 toxic chemical-induced health risk in the other states. In the following section, we show how to
324 use the information in Figure 9 in policy strengthening.

325

326 [Insert Figure 8 here]

327

328 [Insert Figure 9 here]

329

330

331 **5. Policy implications**

332

333 The TSCA, administered by the U.S., authorizes the EPA to provide grants to states for the
334 establishment and operation of programs aimed at preventing or eliminating unreasonable
335 risks to health or the environment associated with chemical substances or mixtures (see p. 4 of
336 (30)). This is a general grant guidance for many toxic chemical substances identified by the EPA;
337 however, the government can provide a special grant guidance with a focus on the five major
338 chemical substances that caused the highest potential health risk—chromium, ethylene oxide,
339 cobalt, nickel, and asbestos.

340

341 In doing so, the above-mentioned four states of Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Louisiana
342 showed higher potential health risks resulting from the five chemical substances that exceeded

343 the average production-based RSEI scores of the U.S. Therefore, the federal and state
344 governments should focus on preventing or eliminating the five major chemicals in the four
345 states identified in this study. It will be important to determine who will pay the total
346 prevention program costs in the specific exposed state.

347

348 In covering the total program costs, we suggest that the federal government should collect
349 relevant taxes from states based on the previous year's net risk transfers of the potential health
350 risk (i.e., RSEI scores) formulated in this study. When the federal government focuses on the
351 above-mentioned four states with the highest potential health risks in 2017 (Texas,
352 Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Louisiana), Figure 8 can help plan the collection of taxes from states
353 based on the consumers' responsibility.

354

355 For example, Figure 9 shows that 2.8% and 3.2% of the potential health risk in Texas was
356 attributable to consumptions in New York and California, respectively. Therefore, the
357 prevention program costs in Texas should be covered by tax collections based on the respective
358 responsibility shares of 2.8% by New York and 3.2% by California. Thus, we propose a policy
359 framework for sharing total program costs to prevent or eliminate health risks associated with
360 toxic chemical substances.

361

362 Subsequently, the state governments with higher potential health risks can receive reasonable
363 grants from the federal government and then allocate the grants to green companies with
364 higher production-based RSEI scores. The grantee should not only set reduction targets on
365 major toxic chemical substances, but also publish regular reports on how to reduce and/or
366 eliminate the toxic chemical substances, and submit them to the federal and state governments.

367 Finally, this combined policy framework based on production- and consumption-based
368 accounting approaches is summarized in Figure 10.

369

370 [Insert Figure 10 here]

371

372 **6. Conclusion**

373 This study contributes to the existing chemical footprint research. A previous study developed
374 environmentally extended input–output tables with a focus on toxic chemical substances in the
375 U.S. economy (10); however, an environmentally extended multi-regional input–output dataset
376 with a focus on the toxic chemical substances in the U.S. was missing. To the best of our
377 knowledge, this is the first study attempting to develop such a multi-regional input–output
378 (MRIO) dataset of the U.S. in 2017.

379

380 We found that specific states such as Texas and Louisiana were at considerable risk from major
381 chemical substance emissions triggered by final demands of goods and services in mega cities
382 such as New York and California. Figure 8 can help policy makers or stakeholders easily
383 understand how consumption activities in a particular state were linked with potential health
384 risks resulting from chemical substance emissions by industrial activities in a particular state
385 through supply chains.

386

387 Stakeholders in states need financial support to prevent or eliminate toxic substances.
388 Nevertheless, we did not find any concrete policy frameworks for targeted states with higher
389 potential health risks. We suggest that the TSCA should be prioritized following the production-
390 based RSEI scores of sectors in the U.S., followed by the selection of high priority sectors and

391 states. Once the high priority states are selected by policy makers (i.e., federal government), the
392 Figure 9 obtained in this chemical footprint approach provides a guidance on how much a
393 specific state (e.g., New York) needs to share the prevention costs incurred to prevent or
394 eliminate toxic chemical substances from industrial activities in the high priority states (e.g.,
395 Texas). Footprint-based inter-state financial cooperation is crucial in mitigating chemical
396 pollutions in the U.S.

397

398

399

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
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488 **Figures**


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491 **Figure 1.** Relationship between the three risk-screening environmental indicators (RSEIs).

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
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496 **Figure 2.** Spatial distribution of the production-based risk-screening environmental indicator

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(RSEI) hazards in 2017 in the U.S.

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
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501 **Figure 3.** Major chemical substances for the production-based risk-screening environmental

502 indicator (RSEI) hazards in 2017 in the high priority U.S.

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
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506 **Figure 4.** Spatial distribution of the production-based risk-screening environmental indicator

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
(RSEI) scores (i.e., production-based health risk) in 2017 in the U.S.



508

509 **Figure 5.** Major chemical substances for the production-based risk-screening environmental

510 indicator (RSEI) scores (i.e., production-based health risk) in 2017 in the U.S.



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
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513 **Figure 6.** Spatial distribution of the consumption-based risk-screening environmental

514 indicator (RSEI) scores (i.e., health risk footprint) in 2017 in the U.S.

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
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Figure 7. Consumption-based risk-screening environmental indicator (RSEI) scores (i.e., health risk footprint) in 2017 in the U.S.

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


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Figure 8. Net health risk transfers between the states of the U.S.in 2017.


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525 **Figure 9.** Net transfer coefficient matrix whose elements are percentages of the net health
 526 risk transfers from a particular demand state (a row sector in the matrix) to a particular
 527 emission state (a column sector in the matrix) to the total of whole net health risk transfers in
 528 the U.S. economy.

529



530

531 **Figure 10.** A combined policy framework for the mitigation of chemical pollutions based on
 532 production- and consumption-based accounting approaches.

533

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