Facilitating the development of green agriculture is an effective way to reduce carbon emissions and achieve carbon neutrality. However, researches on the development of green agriculture are still on the way. Despite the fact that many researchers have explored and analyzed this issue, there is still a gap between stakeholders of green agricultural development combined with low-carbon policies and green preferences that has been overlooked, resulting in theory and practice being imperfect. To bridge this gap, a three-party evolutionary game model based on the government’s low-carbon policies and stakeholders’ green preferences is developed. Numerical simulations are applied to verify real-world tripartite participation. The six key parameters that influence strategic behaviour are thoroughly discussed. The findings show that: (1) appropriate subsidies policy and relatively high carbon prices are conducive to promoting the development of green agriculture; (2) The improvement of three parties’ green preference enhances people’s low-carbon awareness in the market; (3) Different levels of green preference lead to government’s uneven strategies, which depend on the relative level of its green preference and regulate cost. Finally, this study addresses how to promote green agricultural development and offers several management recommendations.