Betting on Forests and Soils to Reach Net Zero

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-1846581/v1

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Betting on Forests and Soils to Reach Net Zero

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-1846581/v1

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published 07 Dec, 2022

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The deployment of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) is essential to reach global and national net-zero emissions targets, but little attention has been paid to their practical deployment by countries. Here we conducted a systematic analysis of CDR in 41 national climate strategies submitted to the UNFCCC. We show that enhancing forest and soil carbon sinks are most advocated (40/41) within strategies but only quantified in 12. Residual emissions in 2050 are only quantified in 19/41 strategies and most of these use forests to reach national net-zero targets. Strategies that quantify residual emissions and assess CDR identify national constraints (e.g., wildfire risks for forests and geology for CO2 storage) and highlight the need for international collaboration. Our analysis also identifies that net-zero targets are often poorly described and, in some cases, misleading. Together these findings underline the need for the UNFCCC to urgently strengthen national reporting requirements for 2050.

Carbon dioxide removal

Climate policy

Negative emissions

Long-term Low Emissions Development Strategies

Nationally Determined Contributions

As net-zero becomes the organising principle of climate policy, countries are considering the practical and policy dimensions of using Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and the implications for achieving national climate targets^1–4. Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 124 countries have agreed to a net-zero emissions target, defined as a balance of emission sources and anthropogenic removals^5,6. We present a systematic analysis of CDR in 41 (of 51) national climate strategies submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by the end of 2021. These cover 58% of global 2019 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions⁷ and around 74% of global GDP⁸.

CDR has largely been analysed globally, yet CDR will be delivered by individual countries through national climate policies. National analysis is therefore required to understand the practical questions of deployment, policy and governance^9,10. CDR methods are characterised by different potentials and limitations, including cost, readiness, energy requirements, permanence, and social and political acceptability^11–13. These may be implicit, or arise from their national or local configuration and policy design^14,15. Domestic policies to incentivise CDR deployment should be designed within these considerations, requiring different types of policy depending on the CDR method, moving from research and development towards full integration within existing or new policy mechanisms^10,16. Incentivisation combines with an urgent need to scale-up CDR methods to meet the projected demand within integrated assessment modelling¹⁷. These dynamics suggest a decisive role for national governments in realising CDR, yet there are few comparative studies into CDR in national climate planning¹.

CDR has a role in achieving global (or national) net-zero by counterbalancing residual emissions from difficult to decarbonise sectors in the mid-century^4,10. National net-zero targets, however, reach beyond borders. CDR interacts across scales and a country’s strategy may create risks towards the collective achievement of the Paris temperature targets, and the need for a more balanced portfolio of removals^3,18. The trading of removals between countries may also be required for certain states to reach their net-zero targets, owing to the level and make-up of residual emissions from economic sectors and country-level biophysical, social or political limits^4,19. There is a need, therefore, to consider countries adopting net-negative targets as well as policy mechanisms to facilitate such transfers^19–21. CDR presents a major challenge, both at national and international scales, and stretches the current conventions of climate policy²², it is therefore necessary to understand both national CDR strategies and their collective international implications.

We analyse national strategies and long-term targets and their relevance towards CDR, alongside the types and quantities of CDR methods. We identify two emerging challenges for the deployment of CDR and conclude by advocating the requirements of national climate strategies to be strengthened.

The Paris Agreement has two relevant reporting obligations towards national planning: Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (Article 4.2) and Long-term Low Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS) (Article 4.19). NDCs are required under the Paris Agreement and represent short-term commitments by countries up to 2030. Some NDCs include increased forest and soil carbon as near-term mitigation options^3,23, whilst the consideration of engineered CDR is limited². The shorter-term mechanism of NDCs are ill-suited to consider CDR which is primarily used to counterbalance residual emissions from difficult to decarbonise sectors in the mid to late century¹⁰.

LT-LEDS have a longer-term focus (e.g., up to 2050) allowing more detailed consideration of CDR methods, governance and feasibility^2,3,24. They are one of the few policy contexts where CDR is actively considered^2,10,13,24. LT-LEDS are optional, they have no formal reporting requirements in the Paris Agreement but the accompanying decision (Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 35) notes that LT-LEDS should consider up to the mid-century and are encouraged to be submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 2020²⁵.

Considerable discretion is given to national governments about the design of LT-LEDS in comparison to NDCs. In practice LT-LEDS are highly heterogenous in their depth and breadth of analysis. NDCs and LT-LEDS can be considered interrelated as the long-term planning detailed in LT-LEDS may inform the design of NDCs, identifying barriers to climate action in the near-term²⁶. LT-LEDS may prove to be a crucial corrective mechanism for reconciling the long-term needs of net-zero with shorter-term NDCs and policy cycles²⁷. Given the general absence of CDR within current policy processes⁹, and the functional need for CDR in the latter stages of decarbonisation to reach net-zero targets, mechanisms that bring long-term needs into the near-term purview of national climate policy has particular relevance to CDR. An analysis of recently submitted strategies is needed to better understand CDR in national planning and the challenges posed to global climate policy.

We analysed all LT-LEDS published in English by the UNFCCC Secretariat before 31^st December 2021 (plus one EU long-term strategy, for Estonia). Most were published in 2020 and 2021 (23/41) by countries in the Global North (Figure 1). The prominence of European countries is expected because the EU require member states to develop national long-term strategies^26,28. The lack of strategies from countries in Africa and Latin America (4/41) is only partially explained by selection bias for English language (6 excluded) (Figure 1).

Inexact Long-term Targets

Several strategies have long-term targets that are inexact, expressing or implying an approach that conflicts with modelling or analysis later detailed. Increasingly, targets are subject to calls for greater clarity, specifically regarding the extent of overall CDR, sectoral contributions and the role of the land-use sector^15,23,29. Within these strategies, targets serve a crucial guiding function. We report the headline target presented and then deduce from supporting information within the strategy the coverage of the target, comparing both in Table 1. Several LT-LEDS (Japan, South Africa France, Portugal, Cambodia, Fiji, Andorra) detail targets described in terms of ‘carbon neutrality’ but do not apply specifically to CO₂, but a range of GHGs. ‘Climate neutrality’ is the stated long-term target of five countries, yet the treatment of this target elsewhere within the strategies implies this is analogous to net-zero for all main GHGs, as climate neutrality would seek to account for the bio-geophysical impacts of human activities, such as surface albedo³⁰. Some countries fail to specify the exact sectoral coverage of their long-term target, or exclude specific sectors, e.g., Germany which exclude land use and forestry from their climate target assessments. Nine countries note the prospective or intended use of international offsets, or otherwise transferred mitigation outcomes, further complicating the extent of domestic emission reductions.

Ambiguity in targets is a common problem^30,31, but in mobilising CDR, ambiguity has notable implications, as the target definition determines the extent of CDR required⁴. Reaching net-zero for CO₂ alone requires less CDR than reaching net-zero for all greenhouse gases, due to CH₄ and N₂O emissions from hard-to-abate sectors such as agriculture. This affects planning and policy decisions in the near-term, as the envisaged CDR demand could be met via a smaller portfolio of methods, ‘locking-out’ others³². A similar dynamic is foreseeable with sectoral differences, such as international aviation and shipping emissions. Retaining the potential use of emissions reductions from abroad to fulfil net-zero targets, leaves the level of future domestic emissions unclear¹⁹. A target of climate neutrality also implies counteracting the local or regional effects of CDR. Ambiguity in emission and sectoral coverage can obscure CDR demand, despite several countries actively quantifying negative emissions within their strategies.

Most (9/11) strategies that set emission reduction targets relative to a specific base year rather than a net-zero target do not quantify CDR. This could be because the emission reductions can be achieved through mitigation alone. Or it supports the idea that setting a net-zero target itself forces national governments to consider CDR. Examining the distinction between the headline target and the modelling details within the strategy highlights a tension between determining the properties of the target and the criteria for modelling (e.g., use of international offsets). Devising a common standard of net-zero, then communicating long-term targets relative to this standard, would largely alleviate these issues³.

CDR Method, Magnitude and Reliance

Enhancing forest and soil carbon sinks are the most common CDR methods in the strategies (Table 2). This aligns with previous analysis of smaller samples of strategies^2,24. Enhancing forest carbon is the most quantified (12 strategies) and advocated (40) CDR method. Soil carbon enhancement is quantified in four (Australia, Indonesia, France, and Portugal) but advocated in 31 (Table 2). The dominance of forests and soils is to be anticipated given the legacy of forest and land management, the co-benefits for food security and biodiversity^33,34, and their integration into prior policy mechanisms³⁵. Coastal blue carbon (seagrasses, mangroves, wetlands, and salt marshes) has limited policy legacy but comparatively broad support, advocated in 15 (yet only quantified by Fiji). Engineered CDR methods feature in fewer strategies and their inclusion is notably more speculative, with countries highlighting limitations amongst a desire to explore their future potential. Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) is promoted in 16 strategies and quantified in five whilst Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS) is promoted in seven and quantified in only two strategies (UK and Switzerland). Carbon Capture Utilisation and/or Storage (CCUS) is quantified in five strategies and promoted in 26.

In 11 strategies (Indonesia, Thailand, France, Cambodia, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Slovakia, Costa Rica, Hungary, Sweden) increased forest carbon or nature-based CDR is primarily or solely relied upon to compensate for residual emissions, achieving long-term targets (Figure 2). Other strategies also rely on forest carbon, but demonstrate a sizeable projected sink, such as Nepal and Fiji (Figure 2). Not all strategies follow this pattern, the UK is notably dependent on BECCS, whilst Switzerland is balanced across BECCS and DACCS, fully compensating for residual emissions. The ‘sink status’ column (Table 2) reports the net balance of the land-use carbon sink historically and in future projections. For many this does not appear to have a discernible bearing on CDR method choice or quantification, while emphasising the challenge posed by some strategies. For example, Cambodia relies on forests to compensate for residual emissions, where this has historically been a net-source of emissions, implying stopping and then reversing deforestation.

Critically, most strategies do not quantify residual emissions from decarbonisation which limits evaluation. The lack of quantification and limited breadth of CDR suggests countries are struggling to integrate CDR into their projections, many of which use national GHG inventories as a foundation, and current inventory guidelines are not specifically designed to cover CDR³.

Our analysis reveals two major challenges within the strategies towards feasibility of CDR: the limitations of forests to act as substantial or long-term stable carbon sinks, and the limited geological storage capacity for engineered CDR. Understanding these feasibility challenges highlights what barriers to deployment countries envisage.

CDR limited by geology and land use

Many national strategies ‘bet’ on the increase of carbon sinks in forests and soils as a means of achieving long-term targets. Such reliance on forests and soils creates risks for long-term international temperature targets, as these methods of CDR are reversible^36,37, prone to disturbances³⁸, and limited in the long-term owing to saturation^37,39. Historically, country estimates of carbon sinks in forests and soils have been limited by data availability and estimation methodologies, leading to large uncertainties^23,40. These characteristics are acknowledged by countries in our sample. Several strategies emphasise the limited potential of carbon sinks in forests, with the increasing age of forest stands gradually tapering the amount of removals possible until effective equilibrium (e.g., France). South Korea, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, and Finland anticipate a limited contribution from forests carbon sinks towards long-term targets, owing to the age of existing stands or limited additional area for new forests. Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia note the vulnerability of forests to natural hazards, such as wildfires and increased natural mortality from disease or pests. These risks can impact the carbon stored within forests and may require continuous active management³⁸.

The reliance on nature-based CDR in national climate strategies can be problematic for the viability of net-zero beyond the mid-century. For some countries enhancing carbon sinks in forests and soils may be sufficient to achieve long-term targets. However, by focusing solely on achieving a specific target, the longer-term ability of that country to achieve a specific balance of sources and sinks may become limited or compromised⁴. It is important to treat net-zero as a state to be attained and continued rather than achieved in a single year⁶. France outlines this possibility and considers BECCS because it has the potential to ‘generate negative emissions in the very long term’. Net-zero targets in 2050 function as a milestone to longer-term net-negative emissions (i.e., 2050-2100). Engineered CDR, such as BECCS and DACCS, can deliver larger continual negative emissions although they are limited by rates of infrastructure construction¹⁷, availability of low-carbon energy and ultimately economic and accessible geologic storage¹¹. There are many reasons to pursue nature-based CDR beyond carbon, such as co-benefits for biodiversity and other ecosystem services^34,41. Nature-based CDR can play a role in reaching long-term targets (along with other co-benefits), but this role is ultimately a sequential role towards CDR methods able to deliver continual negative emissions⁴². National climate strategies should reflect this understanding.

Some countries assess the feasibility of CDR methods in relation to national geological storage capacity. Austria and Switzerland note a limited geological storage capacity, whilst Singapore has no geological formations suitable for CO₂ storage. Cambodia identifies issues with location, seeing a need to identify land isolated from urban or industrial areas. France, comparatively, presents an initial assessment of up to 1.5 GtCO₂ in geological storage capacity, with suitable co-location of emissions sources and geological storage sites, although social acceptability may mean offshore sites are prioritised. Country geology will provide a comparative advantage for those able to pursue it for engineered CDR.

Cooperation between countries is needed for CDR and Net-Zero

Several strategies emphasise a need for cooperation in deploying CDR and achieving long-term targets. These have physical, biophysical, or economic rationales. For example, the Netherlands calls for EU countries to shape CDR around their respective physical circumstances and common interests, noting the limited additional space it has for afforestation but the potential for bilateral partnerships for CO₂ storage under the North Sea. Switzerland has limited geological CO₂ storage and propose implementing DACCS abroad to minimise storage and transport costs (e.g., the North Sea) with domestic storage reserved for CCS on industrial sources. Understanding CDR resources and potentials within a country can facilitate the joint coordination of strategies. Coordination within the EU is more likely given the overarching EU objective of climate neutrality and existing EU policies that assign emission reduction targets by country and sector. Partnerships towards CDR may be the next necessary extension of EU climate policy⁴³.

Australia calls for international cooperation to create international carbon markets, such as a proposed ‘high integrity carbon offset scheme in the Indo-Pacific’. Enhancing soil carbon in Australia is presented as a means of generating these offsets, although the strategy maintains flexibility towards whether these are internationally traded or supplied to a domestic market. Australia’s strategy also envisages the ability to reach its long-term target via international offsets in addition, or as a substitute, to removals via soil carbon. Australia may therefore seek to mobilise on both the supply and purchase of offsets, presenting CDR as an extension of existing offsetting regimes.

Countries foresee partnerships for CO₂ storage or deployment of CDR beyond national borders, with removals transferred. Such partnerships and transfers would require strong institutions, policy, and governance, with precise rules and accounting frameworks to avoid double-counting. A mechanism is foreseeable under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which allows ‘internationally transferred mitigation outcomes’, but these transfers would also stretch the meaning of a domestic net-zero target when it’s achievement is contingent on actions in other countries^19,44. Net-zero targets may grow increasingly interconnected as CDR becomes a more prominent feature of climate policy.

National climate strategies provide a vital policy context for countries to assess CDR. Our analysis identifies the limits of current approaches, including the dependence of CDR upon governance decisions, such as the precise definition of long-term targets, and the reliance on enhancing carbon in forests to counteract residual emissions, limited by national constraints. Some strategies acknowledge challenges of limited land availability for afforestation, maturity of existing forests, or increasing climate risks from fires, pests, and disease. We argue that the long-term viability of net-zero as a domestic target relies on acknowledging net-zero as a state to be attained and continued, not a target of a single year. Doing so refocuses attention on decarbonisation, and the unique role of BECCS and DACCS to provide continual negative emissions. There are many co-benefits to nature-based CDR methods, including biodiversity, food security, adaptation^34,41, but an overreliance on these methods in the near term may prove risky.

We identify drivers for cooperation between countries which stretch the meaning of a ‘domestic’ net-zero target. CDR is characterised by complex governance challenges with high variability between strategies in the quantification and qualitative inclusion of different CDR methods. National climate strategies must be strengthened in respect to their assessment and degree of integration towards CDR. LT-LEDS should be a compulsory obligation and require detailed guidance on timeframe, greenhouse gas and sectoral coverage, treatment of international aviation and shipping, and the intended use of international offsets, against a common standard for long-term targets. LT-LEDS should be reflexive and function to set a long-term target within which NDCs operate. Targets should be supported by the modelling of policy pathways that explicitly detail the CDR necessary to compensate for residual emissions, alongside the CDR methods used, considering their different characteristics with respect to national circumstances. This enables countries to consider the necessary steps in the near term to achieve long-term targets. The UNFCCC should consider these changes, alongside the unique role LT-LEDS hold in enabling the assessment of CDR, to deepen discussions of CDR in climate policy.

We group CDR into two categories, ‘nature-based CDR’, i.e. sequestration of carbon in forests, soils, or coastal blue carbon, and ‘engineered CDR’, i.e. biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS)^11,34. Separately, we analyse carbon, capture and storage (CCS) and carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) and use the term CCUS to cover both. CCUS is seen as a potential means of scaling CDR, either as a physical steppingstone using shared or repurposed infrastructure, or by means of finance, by crowding in investments^45,46. The role of CCUS in decarbonisation is contested^47,48 but we argue CCUS is an adjacent consideration to CDR for national governments.

We developed analytical categories based upon inductive coding of the strategies and deductive coding from previous literature on CDR and net-zero. Such flexibility is necessary owing to the wide differences in terminology, structure and depth of analysis presented. Once collated a second stage in our analysis systematised these categories into practical insights on CDR planning and governance. We code for the main long-term target of the strategy and then assess its treatment within the strategy itself from statements made or from the modelling data presented in text or graphical format. We analyse the quantification of negative emissions, the sectoral coverage, the coverage of greenhouse gases, the prospective use of international offsets or otherwise traded outcomes, and the inclusion of ‘memo’ items, such as international aviation and shipping. We also code for a range of additional governance considerations than inform CDR within the strategies, such as calls for international cooperation, and national considerations of feasibility, based on their inclusion in prior analyses ^2,24.

To allow comparison between countries, we also code for any quantification of negative emissions, based upon or inferred from scenario modelling or policy assessment. Where quantification is contingent upon choice of scenario, the quantification supporting the scenario that reflects the position of the national strategy was chosen. This could be the scenario that is modelled to achieve the long-term target of the strategy, or the scenario that is expressed as the national government’s policy position. We also capture, where possible, the extent of residual emissions. To compliment this analysis, we also code for any qualitative consideration of a specific CDR method, such as the mention of policies to incentivise negative emissions for a specific method or discussions of national circumstances. Further detail can be found in the Supplementary Materials and Supplementary Data.

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Tables 1 and 2 are available in the Supplementary Files section.

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Betting on Forests and Soils to Reach Net Zero

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