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Land misallocation and urban air quality in China

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Abstract: In China, local government's "land for development" strategy has led to a large number of urban construction land allocated to the industrial field, which has promoted the rapid development of industry and economy in the short term, but also brought serious environmental quality losses. This paper systematically sets out how land misallocation works on urban air quality and employs the spatial Durbin model (SDM) to conduct an empirical analysis on the panel data of 283 China's cities at or above the prefecture level. The result shows that, stimulated by financial maximization and political promotion, in order to obtain more fiscal revenue and growth performance, local governments prefer to allocate a large number of urban construction land to industry and related fields, which leads to the underestimation of industrial land price and the misallocation of land resources. Land misallocation has exerted significant inhibiting effects on the air quality of local and their surrounding cities through inhibiting the upgrading of industrial structure. Further analysis reveals that the bigger the city, the less the inhibition effects of land misallocation on upgrading of industrial structure and urban air quality, and vice versa. The conclusions of this paper can provide useful reference for local governments to optimize land allocation, promote economic restructuring and environmental quality upgrading.

Keywords: land misallocation; upgrading of industrial structure; urban air quality; spatial Durbin model

JEL Classification: R52; E62; P28

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25 **Highlights**

26

- 27 ● We explore the effects of land misallocation on urban air quality.
- 28 ● We estimate spatial spillover effect by spatial Durbin model using the
29 panel data of 283 cities.
- 30 ● We investigate heterogeneous spatial effects from cities of different
31 grades.
- 32 ● Land misallocation can reduce the urban air quality of local and
33 surrounding cities.
- 34 ● Land misallocation lowers urban air quality by inhibiting the upgrading of
35 industrial structure.

36

37

38 **1. Introduction**

39 Environmental pollution is an important problem that plagues most developing countries, including
40 China. China's economic and social development have the dual tasks of "stabilizing growth" and
41 "promoting emission reduction." Over the past three decades, China's economy and urbanization have
42 been growing rapidly at an annual rate of 9.4% and 1.02%, respectively. Additionally, however, the
43 extensive development mode characterized by "high pollution, high energy consumption and high
44 emissions" has taken a heavy toll on China's environmental quality. According to the 2019 Report on the
45 State of the Environment in China published by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's
46 Republic of China, among the 337 cities at and above prefecture-levels, 180 cities had ambient air
47 quality worse than the pollution standard, accounting for 53.4%. To control environmental pollution and
48 improve environmental quality, the Chinese government put forward the concept of green development
49 at the 5th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. All the 2017
50 - 2019 Report on the Work of the Government established the target of reducing sulfur dioxide and
51 nitrogen oxide emissions by 3% and substantially lowering concentration of PM 2.5 in key areas. The
52 reports of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China also stipulate that, in addition to
53 creating more material and cultural wealth to fulfill individuals' ever-increasing desire to improve their
54 lives, China must also provide more quality ecological goods to fulfill individuals' ever-growing
55 demands for a pristine environment. All these demonstrate that the Chinese government's firm will to
56 reduce air environmental pollution and realize the coordinated development of economic construction
57 and ecological civilization construction.

58 Regarding this question, researchers have used various perspectives to investigate the impetus for
59 environmental topics and paths to improve air quality. Among these researchers, some have discussed
60 the relationship between economic growth stages and environmental quality by testing the
61 Environmental Kuznets Curve by Grossman and Krueger (1991, 1995) (Jebli and Youssef, 2015; Tiba
62 and Omri, 2017; Dong et al., 2018), and others have probed into the relationship between foreign trade,
63 foreign direct investment (FDI), and air environmental pollution (He, 2006; Cole et al., 2011; Ren et al.,
64 2014; liu et al., 2018). Additionally, still another group of researchers has discussed the path to improve
65 air quality from the perspective of industrial restructuring (Mi et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2018; Chen and

66 Zhao, 2019), and others have demonstrated how spatial agglomeration of economic activities affects air
67 quality (Cheng, 2016; Han et al., 2018a; Fremstad et al., 2018).

68 In China, economic factors such as international trade, FDI, industrial restructuring, and industrial
69 agglomeration cannot function without relying on a institutional system, especially the land
70 misallocation strategies in association with investment introduction, urbanization, and rapid economic
71 growth (Li et al., 2013; Jiang, 2014; Fan, 2015). The binary land structure in China featured by
72 urban–rural segmentation has given local governments the special triple identity of owner, supplier, and
73 monopolist of state land (Shao et al., 2016), resulting in the land transfer behavior of local governments.
74 Under the system of political centralization and economic decentralization, for the purpose of political
75 promotion and private economic profits, local government officials use the land disposal right to
76 strategically set prices and the size of land leased in the monopolized land market, and tend to allocate
77 construction land to productive infrastructure and capital-intensive industries. The biased allocation of
78 construction land resources distorts the land market and reduces the efficiency of land use. The process
79 of allocation and reallocation of land, as a basic production factor and the most important economic
80 resource, is the process of realizing and deepening capitalization and the process of economic and social
81 structure adjustment and evolvement. Undoubtedly, this essential factor affects environmental issues in
82 the process of economic development. Cai et al. (2008) posited that current environmental issues in
83 China mainly stem from the existing extensive economic development pattern, which is closely related
84 to the government's acts under Chinese-style power division. Thus, how does the land misallocation
85 affect the quality of urban air environment? What is the influence mechanism?

86 According to our review of the literature, few literature reviews have directly studied promotion
87 mechanisms of urban air quality from the perspective of land misallocation. Even if some studies have
88 involved land misallocation and air environmental issues (Zhang and Xu, 2017), these researchers have
89 only mentioned a specific aspect of urban environmental quality (e.g. carbon emission), whereas none of
90 them has systematically discussed environmental quality in an overall fashion or let probed into land
91 misallocation's functioning mechanism. In this paper, we attempt to create a spatial econometric model
92 based on an analysis and summary of how land misallocation influences urban air quality, and use the
93 panel data of 283 Chinese cities at or above the prefecture level from 2003 to 2015 the sample to

94 systematically discuss the intrinsic mechanism and spatial spillover effect of land misallocation on
95 urban air quality.

96 Compared with the existing literature, the contribution of this paper are as follows. First, we
97 introduce land misallocation into the study of influencing factors of air quality, and systematically probe
98 the mechanism of land misallocation on urban air quality. Second, at present, the literature on the
99 mismatch of land resources in China mostly uses the published data of land transfer agreement and
100 industrial and mining storage land to measure the degree of mismatch of urban construction land, but
101 these two kinds of indicators can not directly reflect the real transaction situation of the land market.
102 This paper uses web crawler technology to collect the actual transaction data of commercial land,
103 residential land and industrial land of 283 prefecture level cities in China from 2006 to 2018 from China
104 land market network. Combined with the production function, this paper uses marginal output method to
105 calculate the misallocation index of industrial land, and directly measures the misallocation degree of
106 current urban construction land. Third, in this paper, $PM_{2.5}$ concentration is used to measure the air
107 quality. The existing literatures mostly use provincial $PM_{2.5}$ data to measure the air quality, but because
108 haze pollution mainly occurs in cities, the provincial data actually cover up the heterogeneity of air
109 quality in different cities. In this paper, by analyzing the satellite monitoring grid data of the global $PM_{2.5}$
110 annual mean concentration, the $PM_{2.5}$ annual mean concentration of 283 prefecture level cities in China
111 from 2006 to 2018 is obtained, and it can truly reflect the air quality of different cities, which is helpful
112 to further deepen the research. Last, we applied the spatial Durbin model (SDM) to further categorize
113 effects into direct and indirect effects. From the perspective of the heterogeneity of cities at different
114 levels, we analyzed land misallocation's spatial heterogeneous influences on air quality in different
115 cities.

116 **2. Analysis of how land misallocation affects urban air quality**

117 **2.1 Land misallocation's inhibition effects on urban environmental quality**

118 Land misallocation in this paper refers to the distortion of resource allocation caused by the biased
119 allocation of urban construction land in the industrial field. Since the reform of the tax distribution
120 system in 1994, the central government has reclaimed financial rights, but power division between the

121 central government and local governments remains basically unchanged. Local governments' financial
122 resources are becoming increasingly limited. To relieve financial pressure after the implementation of a
123 tax distribution system, on the one hand, local governments seek extra budgetary or governmental fund
124 income through land transfer, land mortgage and financial guarantee; on the other hand, they transfer
125 industrial land at a low price to attract investment and expand the tax base. In addition, under the
126 political promotion stimulation system, local governments may also transfer a large amount of land when
127 motivated by a developing local economy (Li et al., 2013; Zhang and Xu, 2017). This means that the
128 Chinese style financial power division system and the political promotion system jointly stimulate the
129 local government's land mismatch strategy and land transfer behavior (Wang et al., 2014). Many local
130 governments have attempted to increase land requisition and supply by establishing new urban districts,
131 industry zones, and development zones; strategically setting land leasing prices and sizes; and using their
132 monopoly of the land market and land disposal right. All these factors result in excessively rapid
133 urbanization and disordered sprawl of urban space. Disordered sprawl of urban space and the change in
134 land utilization and covering rate not only undermine the vegetation surrounding cities but also damage
135 the landscape and compromise ecological service functions (Wu et al., 2015); moreover, they exacerbate
136 consumption of resources and the environment, causing problems such as environmental pollution and
137 noise. (Wu and Yeh, 1999; Zhang and Xu, 2017) and directly imposing negative effects on urban air
138 quality.

139 Under the political performance assessment system and financial taxation maximization stimulation,
140 local governments strongly prefer the development of capital-intensive industry. The majority of
141 construction land flows to the field of productive infrastructure and capital-intensive industry, resulting
142 in overdevelopment of capital-intensive industries and heavy industry, exacerbation of resource
143 consumption and allocation distortion, and an undermining of urban environmental quality. Leasing of
144 industrial land involves economic growth and political performance. Under race-to-the-bottom pattern,
145 despite the race-to-the-bottom price of land leasing having severely limited leasing revenue from
146 industrial land, local economic growth is spurred by introducing industrial capital and attracting
147 enterprises, which increases the local tax base and, eventually, tax revenue. To this end, local
148 government adopts various industrial land preferential policies, infrastructure construction subsidies, and

149 so forth to compete for external industrial capital and launch a fierce business and capital tendering race.

150 Notably, the capital and tax attraction mechanism, from leasing industrial land under
151 race-to-the-bottom pattern, are not necessarily effective for all industrial sectors. Only by introducing
152 specific types of enterprises will this mechanism work. Lu and Ou (2011) reckoned that, driven by the
153 pressure of economic growth competition and the motivation of maximization of tax revenue, local
154 governments are tempted to develop capital-intensive industries or heavy industry that increases tax
155 revenue for the following three reasons: (1) under the same conditions, capital-intensive enterprises can
156 contribute more revenue tax compared with other enterprises; (2) compared with other enterprises, the
157 tax base of the industrial income tax of capital-intensive enterprise and heavy industry is bigger, and to
158 increase the return from income tax from superior governments, local governments must continue to
159 prioritize capital-intensive industries in business and capital tendering; and (3) compared with small
160 enterprises, the unit tax cost of large enterprises is lower. In tax collection, a scale economy prompts
161 local governments to be more biased toward large enterprises in business and capital tendering. Notably,
162 capital intensity in large enterprises is normally higher. Although an increase in capital-intensive
163 industries and heavy industry may result in rapid economic growth and tax revenue in the short term,
164 these industries consume an excessive amount of energy resources, imposing negative effects on urban
165 environment quality.

166 In the process of attracting investment, within a limited term of office, what local governments were
167 most concerned with is not the future benefits from by the official operation of these industrial projects,
168 but the economic growth directly driven by the investment of fixed assets pertinent to industrial projects
169 that the government cares about. In other words, the governments prioritize the scale, instead of the
170 quality, of investment attraction. Thus, in the process of industrial land leasing, in addition to expanding
171 land requisition and leasing scale, lowering the leasing price, the governments also compromise
172 investment attraction quality. Such an extensive economic development pattern is the main reason for the
173 environmental problems in today's China (Cai et al., 2008). Additionally, as a means adopted by local
174 governments to compete for economic growth, the biased allocation of land resources in the industrial
175 field has the characteristics of strategic interaction of competition imitation among different regions (Li
176 et al., 2013), which forces rapidly growing industries to surrender their respective resource endowment

177 advantage and leading to homogeneity of industrial structure, resulting in resources waste and allocation
178 distortion and exacerbation of environmental pollution.

179 Although land misallocation leads to urban space expansion and land supply increase, land
180 allocation normally biases toward capital intensive industry, and the lands reserved for real estate and
181 service industries are limited and expensive (The Joint Team of World Bank and the Development
182 Research Center of the State Council, 2014), which not only directly leads to housing price increases and
183 insufficient development of modern service industry but also increases production and operation costs of
184 the service industry, which obstructs upgrading industrial structure. Li and Wang (2015) asserted that
185 although land misallocation helps increase the speed of the process of industrialization, it has significant
186 inhibitory effects on the servitization of industrial structure. Local government's land supply strategies
187 such as leasing industrial land at excessively low prices and transferring commercial and residential land
188 at restrictively high prices have strengthened industrial structure rigidity dominated by low-end and
189 middle-end manufacturing industries. Land misallocation's inhibition effects on upgrading industrial
190 structure will hamper the improvement of urban air quality.

191 Based on the aforementioned analysis, we propose hypothesis as follows:

192 **Hypothesis 1.** Under financial maximization and political promotion incentives, land misallocation
193 not only directly causes the disordered sprawl of urban space but also damages landscaping, leads to
194 environmental pollution. In addition, the bias toward urban infrastructure construction and development
195 of capital-intensive industries is counterproductive to urban air quality improvement.

196 **Hypothesis 2.** Land misallocation lowers urban air quality by inhibiting the upgrading of industrial
197 structure.

198 **2.2. Land misallocation's spatial spillover effect on air quality**

199 In addition to affecting air quality of local city, land misallocation has an obvious spatial spillover
200 effect. First, urban air quality is featured by evident externalities. Normally, environmental pollution has
201 inter-regional diffusion effect, thus local governments may “hitchhike” regarding stipulation of
202 environmental standards to gain more opportunities for economic growth, driven by a political
203 promotion incentive; namely, efforts made by one region to improve environmental quality may enable
204 other regions to reduce their efforts to improve energy utilization efficiency and reduce air

205 environmental pollution. Second, actions made by one region to improve environmental quality may
206 prompt another local government to surrender to the pressure of public opinion and political
207 performance assessment and adopt similar actions when formulating energy conservation and emission
208 reduction policies. Such a demonstration effect creates the scenario of “one good example will make
209 others follow suit” regarding urban environmental quality (Han et al., 2018b). Third, growth competition
210 among regions in China will be indirectly reflected in the competition of pollution emissions standards.
211 Driven by growth competition and political promotion pressure, the action of one region to attract
212 enterprise investment and growth advantages by lowering environmental standards induces other local
213 governments to do the same; then, *one bad apple spoils the whole bunch*. (Ulph, 2000; Fredriksson et al.,
214 2003). Finally, affected by economic mechanisms such as industrial transfer, industrial agglomeration,
215 and development of transportation and communication facilities, air quality also demonstrates the feature
216 of positive spatial spillover. Han et al. (2018a) asserted that, affected by industrial space layout and
217 urban agglomeration economy, environmental pollution is characterized by evident spatial spillover.
218 Thus, the existence of “hitchhiking” and “demonstration effect” affects local regions and influences
219 surrounding regions through air quality’s spatial spillover effect.

220 **Hypothesis 3.** Land misallocation exerts a spatial spillover effect on air quality of surrounding
221 cities.

222 **3. Model design**

223 **3.1. Specification of the econometric model**

224 On the basis of an analysis of influencing mechanisms, the paper created the theoretical framework
225 and econometric model of how land misallocation has influenced urban environmental quality. Assume
226 production factors are capital and labor force; in city i , the production function of a representative
227 manufacturing firm is

$$228 \quad Q_i = aL_i^\alpha K_i^\beta \quad (1)$$

229 In which, Q_i is a manufacturer's output; L is the number of employees employed by the
230 manufacturer; K is a manufacturer's capital stock; α and β are the labor force and capital output's
231 elasticity coefficient, respectively; and $0 < \alpha < 1$, $0 < \beta < 1$, a is a constant. Assume a representative

232 manufacturer only produces one capital-intensive product Z , and in the production process, air pollutant
 233 P is produced. Because air pollution is caused in production, λ proportion of resources is put in to
 234 control air environmental pollution, and $0 \leq \lambda < 1$. $\lambda=0$ means manufacturer does not treat pollution at
 235 all, and its output is $Z=Q$. If $0 < \lambda < 1$, a manufacturer has allocated λ proportion of resources to control air
 236 pollution. Then, the output of Z is

$$237 \quad Z = (1 - \lambda) a L_i^\alpha K_i^\beta \quad (2)$$

238 Manufacturer's air pollution emission volume is

$$239 \quad P = \psi(\lambda) a L_i^\alpha K_i^\beta \quad (3)$$

240 In which, $\psi(\lambda)$ is the pollution emission function, and $\psi'(\lambda) < 0$. According to Copeland and
 241 Taylor (1994), the formula can be specified as follows:

$$242 \quad \psi(\lambda) = \frac{1}{A} (1 - \lambda)^{\frac{1}{\delta}} \quad (4)$$

243 In which, $0 < \delta < 1$, and A is total factor productivity, representing production technology. Combine
 244 equation (2), (3), and (4):

$$245 \quad Z = (AP)^\delta (a L_i^\alpha K_i^\beta)^{1-\delta} \quad (5)$$

246 Combine equation (2) and (5):

$$247 \quad P = a A^{-1} L_i^\alpha K_i^\beta (1 - \lambda)^{\frac{1}{\delta}} \quad (6)$$

248 Air quality improvement is negatively correlated with air environmental pollution degree. Then,
 249 equation (6) can be used to reflect the determination equation of air quality. Use $\kappa = 1 - \lambda$ to represent
 250 the proportion of the resources not devoted to improving air quality. Take the log of both sides of
 251 equation (6) and rewrite the matrix form as follows:

$$252 \quad \mathbf{P} = \mathbf{\Phi} - \mathbf{A} + \alpha \mathbf{L} + \beta \mathbf{K} + \frac{1}{\sigma} \mathbf{\kappa} \quad (7)$$

253 In which, $\mathbf{\Phi}$ is the $N \times 1$ vector of the log of the constant; \mathbf{A} is the $N \times 1$ vector of the log of
 254 production technology or total factor productivity; \mathbf{L} , \mathbf{K} , and $\mathbf{\kappa}$ are the $N \times 1$ vectors of the logs of labor
 255 force, capital, and proportion of none-pollution control resource, respectively.

256 According to the mechanism analysis of this paper, land misallocation not only affects total factor
 257 productivity of a city but also imposes a spatial spillover effect on that of surrounding cities.
 258 Furthermore, production technology or total factor productivity is not only reliant on the characteristic
 259 variable and production factor of a city but is also affected by technical progress in other cities (all other
 260 cities j in the economy system). Assume the interdependence of technical progress among cities works
 261 through spatial externalities, and technological externalities can breakthrough a city's boundary and
 262 reach other cities. However, under various frictional influences resulting from geographical distance and
 263 differences among society, the economy, and systems, the boundary effects among cities gradually
 264 reduce the strength of spatial externalities. Thus, production technology or total factor productivity(A_i)
 265 can be specified as follows:

$$266 \quad A_i = A_0 G_i^{-\eta} \prod_{j \neq i}^N G_j^{-\vartheta w_{ij}} A_j^{\delta w_{ij}} \quad (8)$$

267 In which, A_0 is the mutual exogenous technical progress of all cities; G is land misallocation; and η is the
 268 elasticity coefficient of land misallocation and $\eta > 0$. $G_j^{-\vartheta w_{ij}}$ and $A_j^{\delta w_{ij}}$ are geographically weighted
 269 averages of land misallocation, and technical progress of neighboring city j . ϑ and δ denote
 270 interdependence of land misallocation and technical progress among cities. We used exogenous friction
 271 term w_{ij} ($j=1, \dots, N$ and $j \neq i$) to represent the correlation degree between city i and its neighboring city j .
 272 The higher the correlation degree between cities, the bigger the w_{ij} .

273 Take the log of equation (8), and put it into the matrix form as follows:

$$274 \quad \mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A}_0 - \eta \mathbf{G} - \vartheta \mathbf{W} \mathbf{G} + \delta \mathbf{W} \mathbf{A} \quad (9)$$

275 In which, \mathbf{G} are the $N \times 1$ matrix of land misallocation, respectively, and \mathbf{W} is an $N \times N$ dimension matrix
 276 containing spatial friction term w_{ij} . If $\delta \neq 0$ and $1/\delta$ is not matrix \mathbf{W} 's characteristic root, equation (9)
 277 can be rewritten as follows:

$$278 \quad \mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{I} - \delta \mathbf{W})^{-1} \mathbf{A}_0 - \eta (\mathbf{I} - \delta \mathbf{W})^{-1} \mathbf{G} - \vartheta (\mathbf{I} - \delta \mathbf{W})^{-1} \mathbf{W} \mathbf{G} \quad (10)$$

279 Substitute equation (10) into (7) and multiply $(\mathbf{I} - \delta \mathbf{W})$ both sides as follows:

$$280 \quad \begin{aligned} \mathbf{P} = & \delta \mathbf{W} \mathbf{P} + \Omega + \eta \mathbf{G} + \alpha \mathbf{L} + \beta \mathbf{K} + \theta \boldsymbol{\kappa} \\ & + \vartheta \mathbf{W} \mathbf{G} - \vartheta_1 \mathbf{W} \mathbf{L} - \vartheta_2 \mathbf{W} \mathbf{K} - \vartheta_3 \mathbf{W} \boldsymbol{\kappa} \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

281 In which, $\Omega = (I - \delta \mathbf{W}) \Phi - \mathbf{A}_0$, $\theta = \frac{1}{\sigma}$, $\vartheta_1 = \alpha \delta$, $\vartheta_2 = \beta \delta$, and $\vartheta_3 = \frac{\delta}{\sigma}$. Based on equation (11),
 282 labor force, capital, and proportion of resources not devoted to pollution control all inhibit the air quality
 283 (promote the air pollution) of a city. However, those variables of surrounding cities have improved air
 284 quality of cities; thus, an increase in the labor force, capital, and proportion of resources not devoted to
 285 pollution control of surrounding cities has transferred the polluting enterprise of cities, improving air
 286 quality. Land misallocation reduces the environmental quality of local and surrounding cities. Rewrite
 287 the matrix form of equation (11) to the general form; then, the equation of environmental quality of city i
 288 can be as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 289 \quad \ln P_i = & \theta_0 + \delta \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} P_j + \eta \ln G_i + \alpha \ln L_i + \beta \ln K_i + \theta \ln \kappa_i \\
 & + \vartheta \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln G_j - \vartheta_1 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln L_j - \vartheta_2 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln K_j + \vartheta_3 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln \kappa_j
 \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

290 In which, $\theta_0 = \ln \Phi - \delta \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln \Phi - \ln A_0$.

291 In addition to the aforementioned variables, other variables affecting urban environmental quality
 292 may include, for example, foreign direct investment (FDI) and urbanization level (URB). Liu et al. (2018)
 293 asserted that FDI has an obvious effect on lowering regional pollution emission level. Urbanization is
 294 also a key factor affecting energy consumption and pollution emission (Poumanyong and Kaneko, 2010).
 295 Based on equation (12), the paper further introduces the control variables, as aforementioned, to obtain
 296 equation (13) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 297 \quad \ln P_i = & \theta_0 + \delta \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} P_j + \eta \ln G_i + \alpha \ln L_i + \beta \ln K_i + \theta \ln \kappa_i + \varphi_1 \ln FDI_{it} \\
 & + \varphi_2 \ln URB_{it} + \vartheta \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln G_j - \vartheta_1 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln L_j - \vartheta_2 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln K_j \\
 & + \vartheta_3 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln \kappa_j + \vartheta_4 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln FDI_{jt} + \vartheta_5 \sum_{j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \ln URB_{jt} + \varepsilon_{it}
 \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

298 In which, φ_1 and φ_2 are the influence elasticities of FDI and urbanization on urban air quality (air
 299 pollution), respectively, and ϑ_4 and ϑ_5 are elasticity coefficients of its lagged spatial variables. Because
 300 equation (13) contains both a lagged explained variable and explanatory variable but not a spatial
 301 interaction term of an error term, such a spatial econometric model is called a SDM (Vega and Elhorst,

302 2015).

303 **3.2. Variables, indicators and data source**

304 The sample was the panel data of 283 cities at or above the prefecture level nationwide from 2006
305 to 2018. To maintain the consistency and steadiness of the panel data, the data of six cities, namely,
306 Lhasa, Sansha, Haidong, Chaohu, Longnan, and Zhongwei was excluded. The data was mainly from the
307 China City Statistical Yearbook, China Land and Resources Statistical Yearbook, and China land market
308 network^①. Due to the lack of data for city-level price indicators, the paper adopts price indicators at the
309 provincial level to adjust city data. Price indicators at the provincial level are from the China Statistical
310 Yearbook. The concrete specification of the definition and measurement of the relevant variables and
311 indicators is as follows.

312 (1) Urban air quality (*P*). The paper uses the data of PM_{2.5} to measure urban air quality. PM_{2.5} is an
313 important source of urban air pollution. However, China only started PM_{2.5} monitoring in 2012 in
314 Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and other key regions, as well as
315 municipalities and provincial capitals. In 2013, PM_{2.5} monitoring was carried out in 113 key
316 environmental protection cities and environmental protection model cities. Until 2015, PM_{2.5}
317 monitoring was carried out in all cities above prefecture level. In order to solve the problem of missing
318 historical data of PM_{2.5} concentration, according to the study of van Donkelaar et al.(2015), we use the
319 grid data of global PM_{2.5} concentration annual mean based on satellite monitoring published by the
320 center for social and economic data and application of Columbia University, and used ArcGIS software
321 to analyze it into the specific annual PM_{2.5} concentration values of 283 prefecture level cities in China
322 from 2006 to 2018, so as to measure the urban air quality. The larger the index is, the lower the air
323 quality is.

324 (2) Land misallocation (*G*). In this paper, the marginal output method is used to measure the
325 misallocation of land resources. Classical microeconomics theory points out that factors can achieve the
326 optimal and most efficient allocation under the full competition of the market mechanism. At this time,
327 the marginal output of factors is consistent with the marginal cost and factor price. Therefore, under the
328 condition of complete market competition, the marginal output of land elements can be regarded as the

^① <https://www.landchina.com/>.

329 price when the land resources reach the optimal allocation, and the deviation of the actual price from the
 330 optimal price in the real world reflects the degree of land market distortion or land resources
 331 misallocation. This paper uses Cobb Douglas production function to measure the marginal output of land.
 332 The production function can be expressed as:

$$333 \quad \ln \bar{Y}_{it} = \sum_k \rho_{i,k} U_{it}^k + \eta_{i,1} \ln \bar{L}_{it} + \eta_{i,2} \ln \bar{K}_{it} + \eta_{i,3} \ln S_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (14)$$

334 Where, U_{it} is an indicator reflecting the technological progress at the city level, which can control the
 335 impact of different production efficiency on urban output, measured by the proportion of employees in
 336 urban information transmission, computer service and software industry, scientific research and technical
 337 service industry in the total employees. \bar{L}_{it} is the added value of urban industry, expressed as the GDP of
 338 the secondary industry; \bar{L}_{it} is the number of labor force in the industrial sector, expressed as the number
 339 of employees of the secondary industry in the city; \bar{K}_{it} is the capital stock of the urban industrial sector,
 340 calculated by the annual fixed asset investment and formula of $\bar{K}_{it} = (1-\psi)\bar{K}_{i,t-1} + I_t / \omega_{i,t}$, where, ψ is the
 341 annual depreciation rate, set as 5%; I_t is the investment in fixed assets; $\omega_{i,t}$ is the cumulative capital price
 342 index of each city; according to the practice of Han and Ke (2016), the industrial capital stock at the
 343 beginning of the period is estimated by the net value of current assets and fixed assets of Industrial
 344 Enterprises above the quota in each city. S is the area of urban industrial land, and the data is taken from
 345 China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook. $\eta_1 \sim \eta_3$ are elastic coefficients and $\eta_{i,1} + \eta_{i,2} + \eta_{i,3} = 1$; ξ
 346 is the random disturbance terms. The econometric equation used to estimate the elastic coefficients of
 347 each element can be obtained by changing equation (14) appropriately. That is,

$$348 \quad \ln \frac{\bar{Y}_{it}}{\bar{L}_{it}} = \rho_i U_{it} + \eta_{i,2} \ln \frac{\bar{K}_{it}}{\bar{L}_{it}} + \eta_{i,3} \ln \frac{S_{it}}{\bar{L}_{it}} + \xi_{it} \quad (15)$$

349 The estimation value $\hat{\eta}_{i,1}$ 、 $\hat{\eta}_{i,2}$ 、 $\hat{\eta}_{i,3}$ of $\eta_{i,1}$ 、 $\eta_{i,2}$ 、 $\eta_{i,3}$ can be obtained by estimating equation (15).

350 Then the marginal output of industrial land in each city can be calculated as follows:

$$351 \quad MP_S = \hat{\eta}_{i,3} \frac{\bar{Y}}{S} \quad (16)$$

352 In which, MP_S is the marginal output of industrial land. If r is the price of urban industrial land, the

353 degree of land resource misallocation can be expressed as the ratio of marginal output of industrial land
354 to its real price. That is,

$$355 \quad G = \frac{MP_s}{r} \quad (17)$$

356 Where, G equal to 1 means that there is no misallocation of industrial land; G greater than 1 means that
357 the due value of industrial land is greater than the actual price (that is, the actual price is undervalued),
358 and land resources present reverse misallocation; G less than 1 means that the due value of industrial
359 land is less than its actual price (that is, the actual price is overvalued), and land resources present
360 positive misallocation.

361 The calculation of industrial land price r is complicated. Due to the fact that there is no complete
362 price information of land for different types of use in cities at prefecture level or above, this paper uses
363 web crawler technology to collect transaction data of commercial land, residential land and industrial
364 land for 283 prefecture level cities in China from China land market network during August 1, 2006 to
365 December 31, 2018 The information of land transaction includes the object of land supply, the location
366 of the plot, the area of land supply, the transaction price, the mode of land supply, the type of land use
367 and so on. According to the type of land use, this paper sums up the land transfer area and price of each
368 project whose land supply mode is bidding, auction and listing according to the land use, and calculates
369 the ratio of transaction price and land transfer area to get the average land price (10000 yuan/km²) of
370 commercial land, residential land and industrial land in prefecture level cities every year. Finally, this
371 paper calculates 282 land resource misallocation indicators of prefecture level cities by substituting the
372 average annual industrial land price into equation (17). Table 1 reports the average value and change
373 trend of the degree of misallocation of land resources in China and cities of different grades.

374 *Insert Table 1*

375 The results show that the total average value of land resource misallocation in China is 1.8383, and
376 the average value of each year is above 1, which indicates that there is an obvious reverse misallocation
377 problem in China's land resource allocation. For cities of different grades, the total mean value of land
378 resource misallocation of type I and above cities is 1.0158, which is the lowest value among all types of
379 cities, and the degree of land resource misallocation from the year 2014 - 2018 is less than 1, which

380 indicates that the land resource allocation of type I and above cities is close to the optimal allocation
381 state in the market, which is consistent with the current situation of land resource allocation of China's
382 most mega cities. The larger the scale of a city and the higher the level of economic development, the
383 more perfect its market mechanism will be, and the higher the allocation efficiency of land resources
384 under the market effect will be. The total mean value of land resource misallocation in type II large cities
385 and medium-sized cities is 1.4625 and 1.4706 respectively, which indicates that the real price of
386 industrial land in these two types of cities is obviously undervalued. The total mean value of land
387 resource misallocation in small cities is 3.3155, which is significantly higher than the national average
388 level, indicating that there is a serious reverse misallocation in the allocation of land resources in small
389 cities in China, and the real price of industrial land is seriously underestimated. Generally speaking, the
390 degree of land resource misallocation in China is gradually decreasing with the continuous expansion of
391 urban scale.

392 (3) Other variables. The number of employees in all industries is collected from the number of
393 employees in units, as stated in the China City Statistical Yearbook (10,000 people). The paper uses the
394 total of the number of employees in units and individual employees in an urban district to represent
395 non-agricultural employment (10,000 people). Capital stock of a city is calculated by the annual fixed
396 assets investment in an urban district and equation $K_{i,t} = (1-\delta)K_{i,t-1} + I_t / \omega_{i,t}$. In the equation, $K_{i,t}$ is domestic
397 capital stock, and δ is yearly depreciation rate, which is specified as 5%. I_t is fixed assets investment. $\omega_{i,t}$
398 is the accumulated capital price indicator of all cities. The paper refers to Han and Ke's (2016) perpetual
399 inventory method for calculating FDI stock, and the depreciation rate is specified as 5%.
400 Input of pollution governance (λ) reflects urban pollution treatment strength. Generally, the greater the
401 treatment input, the greater the treatment and utilization capacity, and the better the environmental
402 quality, and vice versa. The paper uses output value of products made from waste gas, water, and solid
403 wastes in an urban district to represent a city's treatment input (RMB 10,000). because the products made
404 from waste gas, water, and solid wastes reported in the China City Statistical Yearbook are the data of
405 the whole city, the paper assumes that treatment input is in direct proportion to the economic scale of a
406 city. Thus, multiply the output value of products made from three wastes of the whole city by the
407 proportion of urban district's GDP in the total GDP to represent the treatment input level of an urban

408 district. Given that the data of the output value of products made from the three wastes in the Yearbook
 409 has been provided only up to 2010, the paper makes up the input indicators of the subsequent years by
 410 using an exponential smoothing method (because time series data of such indicators of most cities are
 411 evidently increasing, the smoothing coefficient is specified as 0.7).^① This paper uses the proportion of
 412 the non-agricultural population in the total population of an urban district to represent urbanization level
 413 (*URB*) of the cities at or above the prefecture level. Because such statistics in the China City Statistical
 414 Yearbook have been provided only up to 2010, the data of the non-agricultural population in subsequent
 415 years are made up according to China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook. All data
 416 regarding monetary value is adjusted with 2003 as a base period. Table 2 shows the sample statistics of
 417 land misallocation, environmental quality, and other variables of cities at or above the prefecture level in
 418 China.

419 *Insert Table 2*

420 **4. Spatial econometric test and result analysis**

421 **4.1 Spatial weight matrix and the spatial correlation of urban environmental quality**

422 Building a proper spatial weight matrix is the key to accurately measuring a spatial interactive
 423 effect among individuals. This paper constructs spatial weight matrices including a geographical distance
 424 spatial weight matrix (W_d), economic distance spatial weight matrix (W_e) and nested spatial matrix of
 425 geographical and economic distance (W_{de}). Details are as follows:

426 (1) Geographical distance matrix. Geographical distance among cities is a notable factor affecting
 427 spatial distribution of industries and population. W_d can be specified as follows:

$$428 \quad W_d = 1/d_{ij}, \quad i \neq j \quad (18)$$

429 In which, d_{ij} is the distance between cities calculated using latitude and longitude data, and when $i \neq j$, $i=j$,
 430 it is 0.

431 (2) Economic distance matrix. This paper uses per capita GDP to create W_e :

^①As time series data of such indicators of most cities are evidently increasing, the paper adopts 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 as smoothing coefficients for calculation. By comparing predicted standard errors under different smoothing coefficient values, the paper chooses 0.7, whose error is the smallest, as the treatment input's smoothing coefficient value.

432
$$W_e = 1/|\bar{Q}_i - \bar{Q}_j|, \quad i \neq j \quad (19)$$

433 In which, \bar{Q}_i is the per capita GDP of city j from 2003 to 2015. W_e measures the relative positions of
 434 cities in economic development. The closer the economic development levels of the two cities, the more
 435 similar their economic operation modes.

436 (3) Nested spatial matrix of geographical and economic distance. Geographic proximity and
 437 economic connection are key factors affecting spatial layout of economic activities. A geographical
 438 distance matrix and an economic distance matrix, based on relative geographical location and economic
 439 operation model, respectively, reflect mutual relations among spatial individuals. Nevertheless, in reality,
 440 a correlation effect among cities may not be merely from similarity regarding geographical location or
 441 economic development. Such effects may subject to the combined influence of geographical proximity
 442 and economic operation model. The spatial weight matrix, integrating a variety of factors of spatial
 443 individuals such as their geographical location and economic characteristics, can better reflect a dataset's
 444 distribution characteristics and spatial correlation in space. Thus, the nested spatial matrix of
 445 geographical and economic distance can be constructed as follows:

446
$$W_{de} = \kappa W_d + (1 - \kappa) W_e \quad (20)$$

447 In which, $0 < \kappa < 1$ is the weight of a geographical distance matrix representing the relative importance of
 448 geographic proximity in the spatial interaction. To find the optimal value of φ , we estimate the model for
 449 different values of φ , say 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9 and 1 and use the parameter value that provides the best
 450 performance. We also standardize the matrix, and the elements of each row are equal to 1.

451 The paper mainly uses nested spatial matrix of geographical and economic distance to carry out
 452 spatial econometric estimation on equation (13). By calculating Moran's I, the paper conducts spatial
 453 auto-correlation test of urban air quality^①. Meanwhile, in order to calculate Moran's I under various
 454 weight matrices, the paper follows the method of Shao et al. (2016) and temporarily specifies κ as 0.5. If

① The exponential formula is as follows:

$$Moran's\ I = \frac{n}{\sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{v=1}^n W_{jv}} \times \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{v=1}^n W_{jv} (X_j - \bar{X})(X_v - \bar{X})}{\sum_{j=1}^n (X_j - \bar{X})^2}$$

In which, X_i is the observed value of region i . W_{ij} is spatial weight matrix.

455 the Moran's I under W_{de} passes significance test, the paper will further discuss the accurate value of κ
456 when estimating spatial econometric model.

457 *Insert Table 3*

458 Based on various spatial weight matrices, the paper calculates urban air quality's panel Moran's I
459 value. Table 3 shows that, Moran's I values in W_d , W_e and W_{de} are respectively 0.0993, 0.0920 and 0.1065,
460 their concomitant probabilities are all 0.0000. After Moran's I controls explanatory variable, spatial
461 correlation is significantly positive, indicating city with relatively high air quality must be surrounded by
462 cluster of cities with high air quality.

463 **4.2. Estimation of spatial econometric model**

464 According to Elhorst (2014), we use the methods of Lagrange multiplier (LM), likelihood ratio (LR)
465 and Wald statistics to test the spatial econometric model. The results show that, this study should adopt
466 the spatial Durbin model with spatial and time-period fixed effects. For details, see Appendix A.

467 As in a SDM, the spatial lagged variable of urban air quality is an endogenous variable, we applies
468 the method of maximum likelihood estimation to acquire consistent parameter estimation. To accurately
469 confirm the value of κ in W_{de} , and to better compare and test the robustness of parameter estimation of
470 various variables, the paper calculates spatial weight matrices, when κ is 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7,
471 0.8, 0.9, and 1, respectively. Additionally, the paper uses SDM to conduct estimations. Table4 shows the
472 corresponding results of panel spatial econometric estimation.

473 *Insert Table 4*

474 According to Anselin et al. (2008), statistics including goodness of fit and log-likelihood are
475 integrated to judge and select the optimal spatial econometric models in Table 4 and confirm the value of
476 κ . The result in Table 4 shows that when $\kappa=0.4$, goodness of fit of SDM ($R^2=0.8932$) and log-likelihood
477 = -1973.884 are optimal in various spatial models. Therefore, in the geographical and economic distance
478 embedding matrix, $\kappa=0.4$ is the optimal weight for the geographical distance spatial weight matrix, and
479 its corresponding SDM is the optimal model in the empirical study in the paper. $\kappa=0.4$ means that in the
480 spatial interactions among cities, the spillover effect of environment relies on the joint function of

481 geographical distance and economic connection of spatial individuals. Among cities, proximity in
482 economy is more important than proximity in geographical distance.

483 In Table 4, most spatial auto-regressive coefficients ρ are significantly positive, implying that after
484 the exogenous space interaction effect between explanatory variables and air quality is controlled, spatial
485 economic connection and geographic proximity jointly prompt air quality to exert an endogenous spatial
486 interaction effect on cities. When there is a spatial spillover effect, change in a certain explanatory
487 variable causes air quality to vary along with it; notably, such a variation influences air quality of
488 surrounding cities and leads to a series of changes through cyclic feedback (Shao et al., 2016).

489 In the SDM where overall effect is specified, parameter estimation value of a variable and its
490 significance can only represent influential direction and effect of various vectors, not the marginal effect
491 on urban air quality. As asserted by LeSage and Pace (2009), judging whether there is spatial spillover
492 effect when using point estimation (ρ or θ) by one or more spatial regression models may lead to wrong
493 conclusions. However, they also asserted that, for different spatial model specifications, interpretation of
494 the partial differential of changes of a variable can better test whether there is a spatial spillover effect.
495 Thus, merely by SDM's point estimation result in Table 4, we cannot compare and analyze the effects of
496 land misallocation and other explanatory variables and cannot assess whether land misallocation and
497 other variables have a significant spatial spillover effect.

498 Thus, the paper refers to the method adopted by LeSage and Pace(2009). Based on the parameter
499 estimation result when $\kappa=0.4$ is in Table 4, the paper further estimates the direct and indirect effects of
500 land misallocation and other control variables on urban air quality in corresponding SDM; in which,
501 direct effects show explanatory variables including land misallocation's influence on air quality of local
502 city, including the spatial feedback effect. In other words, the change in an influence factor of a city
503 affects the air quality of surrounding cities, which affects the air quality of local city. Indirect effects
504 show the spatial influence on air quality by land misallocation of surrounding cities (or land
505 misallocation's influence on the environment of surrounding cities), which reflects the spatial spillover
506 effect.

507 Additionally, with the continuous optimization of the shift of local governments' assessment
508 standards, the competition among local governments is likely to shift from "competing for growth" to

509 “competing for welfare” (Li et al., 2013). This assertion means that local governments may devote the
510 profits from land allocation to pollution treatment, increasing treatment input. A multi-collinearity for
511 land allocation and pollution treatment in the equation may exist. Based on equation (13), the paper
512 introduces the variables of land misallocation and pollution treatment respectively and adopts stepwise
513 regression method to identify and control the multi-collinearity between the two variables. Table 5 shows
514 the direct and indirect effects of the SDM of W_{de} when $\kappa=0.4$.

515 *Insert Table 5*

516 First, we analyze the influence of land misallocation ($\ln G$). When pollution treatment ($\ln \lambda$) is
517 uncontrolled, direct and indirect effects of land misallocation in Model 5.1 are all significantly positive.
518 When land misallocation are uncontrolled, direct effects of pollution treatment in Model 5.2 are
519 obviously negative, and indirect effects have not undergone the significance test. When conducting
520 estimations by putting both of the variables into one econometric equation in Model 5.3, direct and
521 indirect effects of both land misallocation and pollution treatment have not fundamentally change,
522 suggesting no obvious co-linearity between them, that is, a local government has not devoted most of the
523 profits from land allocation to pollution treatment and air environmental improvement despite its
524 competition for welfare. Even if part of the land allocation profits is devoted, no obvious effect is
525 achieved. Parameter estimation of land misallocation ($\ln G$) exerts significant inhibiting effects on the air
526 quality of local and surrounding cities (promoting effects on $PM_{2.5}$ of local and surrounding cities),
527 which is consistent with hypothesis 1 and suggests that driven by financial taxation maximization and
528 political promotion incentive, land misallocation’s inhibition on air quality has outstripped the
529 environmental quality improvement effect resulting from a local government “competing for welfare.”
530 Thus, a local government's effort to gain more extra-budgetary revenue and economic growth
531 performance through land misallocation has worsened overall air quality. Additionally, under the
532 strategic interaction of competition and imitation among local governments, the impact of land
533 misallocation also has an obvious spatial spillover effect on surrounding cities.

534 Next, the paper analyzes the parameter estimation of the control variables. In all models, an
535 increase in labor force supply ($\ln L$) has a significant promoting effect on $PM_{2.5}$ of local and surrounding
536 cities, indicating that the increase in the labor force prompts local governments to request enterprises in

537 the jurisdiction to implement development strategies more conducive to employment and that
538 government has eased their regulations on high energy consumption, high pollution, and high emission
539 enterprises and lifted restrictions on the negative externality of enterprises, lowering environmental
540 quality. Such influence, under the strategic interaction of political promotion among all local
541 governments, sprawls in space through the demonstration effect, causing an increase in labor force
542 supply to exert a spatial spillover effect on the air quality of surrounding cities. Domestic capital ($\ln K$)
543 exerted a significant inhibiting effect on the air quality of local and surrounding cities, showing that
544 various regional capital investments remain biased toward high-pollution fields such as infrastructure
545 construction and heavy industry. Additionally, capital investment imposes a significant
546 demonstration-imitation effect, causing environmental pollution to continuously spread among cities.
547 Increases in pollution treatment ($\ln \lambda$) help improve the air quality of local city but have no significant
548 effect on surrounding cities, indicating that the improvement effects from the pollution treatment are
549 localized and do not cause similar behavior of surrounding cities. Environment treatments in different
550 regions are not significantly synergistic. FDI ($\ln FDI$) helps improve the air quality of the local and
551 surrounding cities, suggesting that foreign enterprises introduced by regions are at the medium or high
552 end of industrial structure, and their technological spillover effects help improve labor productivity,
553 reduce environmental pollution locally, and exert a positive spatial spillover effect on surrounding cities.
554 Urbanization ($\ln URB$) helps improve the air quality of local city but imposes negative effects on
555 surrounding cities. Normally, urbanization development has both negative and positive effects on air
556 quality. On the one hand, cities with a high urbanization level normally have substantial demand for
557 houses, home appliances, and vehicles and traffic jams, which lower air quality. On the other hand,
558 urbanization level improvement and population expansion may produce scale economy effect and lower
559 environmental pollution by enhancing the public transportation sharing rate and resource utilization rate
560 and sharing emission reduction facilities. Based on the analysis presented in this paper, through the scale
561 economy effect, urbanization obviously improved the air quality of local cities, and improvement in the
562 urbanization level caused the population of surrounding cities to migrate to local cities, weakening the
563 scale economy effect on emissions reduction by the expansion of the population in surrounding regions.

564 **5. Robustness test**

565 **5.1. Difference in air quality indicator: measurement based on pollution level**

566 In this part, we replace the PM_{2.5} indicator that measures the urban air quality with Industrial NO_x
567 emissions, industrial SO₂ emissions, and industrial dust emissions, to assess the robustness of land
568 misallocation's influential mechanism on urban air environment quality. Direct and indirect effects in the
569 SDM are presented in Table 6.

570 *Insert Table 6*

571 Table 6 shows that, direct and indirect effect of land misallocation are all significantly positive,
572 suggesting land misallocation has not only significantly increased pollution emission in local city, but
573 also hampered the improvement of air quality in surrounding cities. Based on land misallocation's
574 influence on urban environmental pollution, the results are consistent with Table 5.

575 **5.2. Difference in land misallocation indicator: measurement based on per capita land leasing**
576 **revenue and land misallocation dependence**

577 This paper also constructs two other indicators of land resource mismatch for robustness test. First,
578 under the condition that the city's annual land supply index is set, the biased allocation of construction
579 land in the industrial field will inevitably lead to less index of commercial land, resulting in the price of
580 commercial land far higher than that of industrial land. This paper further constructs the index of
581 deviation degree of industrial land price to measure the degree of land resource misallocation, and tests
582 the robustness of the index estimation result of equation (13). The calculation formula of industrial land
583 price deviation is:

584
$$\mathcal{G} = \frac{r_B - r_M}{r_B} \quad (21)$$

585 Where, \mathcal{G} is the deviation degree of industrial land price, measuring the degree of misallocation of land
586 resources; r_B is the price of urban commercial land; r_M is the price of urban industrial land. Second,
587 according to Li et al.(2016), This paper constructs the proportion of industrial and mining storage land
588 supply area in the total transfer area of construction land to measure the degree of land resource
589 misallocation. The results of robustness tests are presented in Table 7.

590

Insert Table 7

591 After replacing land misallocation with industrial land price deviation and the proportion of
592 industrial and mining storage land supply area in the total transfer area of construction land, Table 7
593 shows that land misallocation has greatly inhibited air quality of local and surrounding cities. The result
594 shows strong robustness.

595 **5.3. Difference in estimation method: empirical test based on spatial lagged explanatory variable**

596 LeSage and Pace (2009) asserted that the direct motivation for the creation of an SDM is that it can
597 solve the problem of missing variables and its resulting endogenous problems. Nevertheless, an SDM
598 cannot solve the simultaneous endogenous problem caused by the interaction between the explanatory
599 variable and explained variable. Notably, Not only land misallocation can affect urban air quality, but
600 also the quality of urban air environment will change the land allocation mode of local government
601 under the pressure of public opinion. For example, to overcome the environmental problems caused by
602 disordered urban sprawl, a local government may strategically lower its reliance on land biased
603 allocation. Given that there might be simultaneous endogeneity between land misallocation and urban air
604 quality, the paper uses the spatial model of lagged explanatory variables (SLX) by Vega and Elhorst
605 (2015) and the method of two stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the econometric model. The scale
606 and price of industrial land transfer are related to the terrain and altitude of the city. The larger the terrain
607 gradient and the higher the altitude, the smaller the scale of industrial land transfer may be, because even
608 if the local government lowers the price or zero land price to transfer industrial land, enterprises will not
609 invest and set up factories in the higher or steeper terrain for the consideration of land development and
610 transportation costs; and the terrain gradient and altitude, as the natural geographical conditions, will not
611 directly affect the urban air environment quality, so they meet the requirements of instrumental variable
612 selection. Because the samples used in this paper are panel data, the simple use of urban surface slope
613 and average altitude which do not change with time as instrumental variables will be automatically
614 eliminated in the fixed effect estimation due to the fixed effect. In order to solve this problem, this paper
615 uses the idea of Nunn and Qian (2014) to set instrumental variables, and uses the interaction terms of
616 average surface slope, average altitude (related to individual change) and the value of land resource

617 mismatch at the national level (related to time change) as instrumental variables of urban land resource
618 misallocation. The degree of land resource misallocation at the level of a single city will not affect the
619 overall land resource allocation of the whole country, and the air environment quality at the level of the
620 city is difficult to produce a feedback mechanism for the land resource misallocation at the level of the
621 whole country. Therefore, the interaction term can be used as good instrumental variables for urban land
622 resource misallocation. The results are shown in Table 8.

623

Insert Table 8

624 According to Vega and Elhorst (2015) and Pace and LeSage (2009), spatial spillover effect is
625 defined as the influence exerted by change in the explanatory variable of a specific spatial unit j on the
626 explained variable of other spatial unit v .^① Thus, when measuring the spatial spillover effect using SAR
627 and SDM, on the basis of the estimation result by using an SAR and SDM, the explanatory variable's
628 direct and indirect effects on explained variable (spillover effect) shall also be measured. The research by
629 Vega and Elhorst (2015) shows that, because of the conciseness of SLX, various measuring methods can
630 be used flexibly to conduct empirical analysis. In the model, the coefficient of a lagged explanatory
631 variable reflects the spatial spillover effect. When using SLX to conduct estimation, measuring direct
632 and indirect effects is not required. Additionally, a spatial spillover effect directly measured by SLX is
633 basically consistent with the indirect effects measured by SDM. Thus, SLX is a handy tool to test the
634 robustness of the estimation result from the SDM. The test result of F in Table 8 shows that the
635 instrumental variable is highly correlated with the endogenous variable. Sargan's test statistics accept all
636 the instrumental variable's effective null hypotheses. Thus, the instrumental variable the paper uses is
637 rational, and its estimation result is viable.

638 When the explained variable is air quality (PM_{2.5}) and explanatory variables are industrial land
639 price deviation and the proportion of industrial and mining storage land supply area, parameters of direct
640 and indirect effects of land misallocation are significantly positive in local and surrounding cities, which
641 is basically consistent with Table 5. When explained variables are industrial NO_x emissions, industrial SO₂
642 emission and industrial dust emission, the sign of parameters of land misallocation are opposite to Table
643 5 when the explained variable is PM_{2.5}, but the same as Table 6, further testifying to the robustness of the

^① Specific unit depends on the characteristics of study object and can be, for example, a manufacturer, city, or region.

644 result.

645 **6. Mechanism test**

646 The conclusion of the paper shows that land misallocation significantly hinders the improvement of
647 air quality. And the theoretical analysis shows that this effect is likely to be realized by the misallocation
648 of land resources affecting the adjustment of industrial structure. To verify such a mechanism, this paper
649 takes the proportion of the output value of secondary industry in the regional added value and the
650 proportion of the output value of tertiary industry in the regional added value as the mediator variables
651 of land misallocation, respectively, and refers to the method of Hayes (2018) to assess the transmission
652 mechanism of how land misallocation affects urban air quality. The mediation model can be set as
653 follows:

$$654 \ln P_{it} = \Phi_0 + \eta \ln G_{it} + \delta_j \sum_{j=1}^n \ln Z_{jit} + \zeta_{it} \quad (22)$$

$$655 \ln T_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \ln G_{it} + \delta_j \sum_{j=1}^n \ln Z_{jit} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (23)$$

$$656 \ln P_{it} = \Phi_0 + \eta_1 \ln G_{it} + \eta_2 \ln T_{it} + \delta_j \sum_{j=1}^n \ln Z_{jit} + \zeta_{it} \quad (24)$$

657 In which, T represents mediator variable, it is the proportion of the output value of secondary
658 industry in the regional value added ($ECBZ$) or the proportion of the output value of tertiary industry in
659 the regional value added ($SCBZ$); Z represents control variables; δ is its elasticity coefficient; and ε and ζ
660 are random errors. First, test equation (22) and verify whether land misallocation has exerted a
661 significant positive effect on air quality ($PM_{2.5}$). Second, regress equation (23) and equation (24), and
662 test whether land misallocation has significant effects on the mediator variables and the mediator
663 variables have significant effects on air quality. If they are both significant, it means that the
664 misallocation of land resources has obvious indirect effects on air quality. Third, test equation (24). If
665 coefficients η_1 is significant, it is considered that the direct effect of land resource misallocation on air
666 quality is significant. Finally, comparing the symbols of the product of γ_1 and η_2 with that of η_1 , if
667 they have the same sign, the indirect effects belong to partial mediation effects; if they have different
668 signs, the indirect effects belong to masking effects. Table 9 shows these estimation results.

669

Insert Table 9

670 First, let's look at the test results when the intermediary variable is *ECBZ*. In equation (22), the
671 parameter estimation of land misallocation's direct effect and indirect effect are all significantly positive,
672 meaning that land misallocation is not conducive to the improvement of air quality. Parameter estimation
673 of equation (23) shows that land misallocation's direct and indirect effect are all significantly positive,
674 suggesting that land misallocation apparently improved the proportion of capital intensive industries in
675 total value added. Parameter estimation of equation (24) shows that the direct and indirect effects of the
676 proportion of output value of the secondary industry are significantly positive, which means that the
677 indirect effect of land resource misallocation on air pollution is significant by increasing the proportion
678 of secondary industry output value (mainly capital intensive industries). The direct and indirect effects of
679 land misallocation ($\ln G$) also have significant positive parameter estimation, which shows that land
680 resource misallocation has a direct impact on air quality. Furthermore, the sign of the product of the
681 direct and indirect effects of the proportion of output value of the secondary industry in equation (24)
682 and the direct and indirect effects coefficient of land resource misallocation in equation (23) is consistent
683 with that of the direct and indirect effects coefficient of land resource misallocation in equation (24). It
684 means that the proportion of secondary industry output value has a partial mediation effect in the process
685 of land resource misallocation affecting air quality.

686 When the intermediary variable is *SCBZ*, the estimation of the direct and indirect effects of land
687 resource misallocation in equation (23) is significantly negative, which indicates that the biased
688 allocation of land resources in the industrial field significantly reduces the proportion of the output value
689 of the tertiary industry in the total output value, and inhibits the upgrading of industrial structure. In
690 equation (24), the direct effect and indirect effect parameters of the proportion of the output value of the
691 tertiary industry are significantly negative, indicating that the upgrading of industrial structure
692 (servitization of industrial structure) is helpful to reduce the air pollution of the city and its surrounding
693 cities, and improve the environmental quality of the city and its surrounding cities. At the same time, it
694 also shows that the indirect effect of land resource misallocation on air quality exists by reducing the
695 proportion of the output value of the tertiary industry (inhibiting the upgrading of industrial structure).
696 Furthermore, in equation (23) and (24), the parameter sign of the product of γ_1 and η_2 is consistent

697 with that of η_1 , which means that the proportion of the output value of the tertiary industry has a partial
698 mediation effect in the process of land resource mismatch affecting air quality. The results of the above
699 two mediation effect tests fully confirm the mechanism of land resource misallocation affecting air
700 quality through industrial structure adjustment.

701 **7. Further analysis based on a sample of cities at different levels**

702 Land misallocation may demonstrate obvious heterogeneity as city size varies. To reveal land
703 misallocation's influence on environmental quality in cities at different levels, the paper further builds up
704 the nested matrix of geographical distance and economic distance to conduct spatial econometric
705 analysis on the samples of different levels of cities. Categorization of city sizes in the paper refers to the
706 Notice of the State Council on Adjusting the Standards for Categorizing City Sizes adopted by the State
707 Council on November 21, 2014. According to the permanent population in the jurisdiction, cities in
708 China are categorized into four types: large cities of type I and above (population above 3 million),
709 type II large cities (population 1~3 million), medium-sized cities (population 0.5~1 million), and small
710 cities (population below 0.5 million). Type I large cities and megacities are in one type because there are
711 only a few such cities nationwide and the roles they play in a city cluster or certain region are basically
712 the same. Table 10 shows the estimation results of direct and indirect effects of cities at different levels.

713 *Insert Table 10*

714 The results in Table 10 show that in type I big cities, land misallocation has no apparent impact on
715 air quality of local and surrounding cities. In type II big cities, land misallocation's influence on a city
716 and surrounding cities are all negative and have failed the significance test. In medium-sized cities and
717 small cities, land misallocation greatly inhibits air quality of local and surrounding cities.

718 Regarding the parameter estimation of land misallocation in cities at each level, the bigger the city,
719 the less land misallocation's influence on air quality is, and vice versa. A possible explanation is that the
720 cities with a bigger size and a more developed economy always have a larger economy scale and higher
721 industrial agglomeration level. The larger the economy scale, the greater the tax base of fiscal revenue
722 and the less the government relies on land misallocation. Additionally, the higher the regional economic
723 density, the more the region's land plan is limited, and the smaller the land supply elasticity. Thus, the

724 room for local government to rely on land misallocation to acquire extra-budgetary revenue and
725 economic growth will be smaller^①, and the less will land misallocation reduce the air quality. Otherwise,
726 the smaller the city size, the lower the economic growth rate and the smaller the tax base of a local
727 government's fiscal revenue, causing governments to be more reliant on land misallocation, which exerts
728 a greater inhibiting effect on air quality.

729 **8. Conclusions and policy suggestions**

730 This paper systematically discusses the effects of land misallocation on urban air quality. The result
731 shows that stimulated by financial maximization and political promotion incentive, local governments
732 tend to allocate construction land to industry and related fields, which leads to the distortion of industrial
733 land price and the misallocation of land resources. The misallocation of land resources not only directly
734 leads to the expansion of urban space, and then reduces the quality of urban air environment quality, but
735 also reduces the quality of urban air environment by inhibiting the upgrading of industrial structure of
736 cities and their surrounding cities. Further analysis reveals that the bigger the city, the less the land
737 misallocation inhibits air quality. Otherwise, the tax base of fiscal revenue and economic growth
738 performance of local government will be less, making the government more reliant on land misallocation
739 and exerting greater inhibitions on air quality.

740 The following policy suggestions are made based on the conclusions of the paper. (1) Land
741 misallocation not only directly reduces urban air quality but also significantly inhibits the improvement
742 of air quality of neighboring cities. Thus, a suggestion is that a local government's land supply behavior
743 should be further regulated and supervised to make the scale and speed of land supply consistent with
744 urban industry and the size and rate of population growth. Land supply type shall fulfill the development
745 demand of local industries with comparative advantages to prevent disordered sprawl of urban space.
746 How a local government uses land misallocation should also be regulated and supervised. More
747 construction land should be devoted to the development of local industries with comparative advantages
748 based on market rule. A local government's disruptive actions of aimlessly advancing the development

^① Although regions with high density and more plan restrictions normally have a higher house price, a high house price may prompt a local government to acquire more extra-budgetary revenue through land misallocation. Nevertheless, as the central government continuously strengthens its effort to regulate and control housing prices, the room for price increases becomes increasingly smaller, a the room for a local government to gain land misallocation revenue from high prices decreases.

749 of capital-intensive industries through land misallocation should be corrected, making land allocation
750 contribute more to the development of advantageous industries and environmental protection.

751 (2) Land misallocation has significantly inhibited upgrading of industrial structure and urban air
752 quality. To reduce a local government's reliance on such a pattern, the solution should begin with the
753 root cause of land misallocation. First, deepen financial and taxation system reform, facilitate the
754 division of fiscal power and administrative authority between central and local governments, leave local
755 government room for fiscal revenue, and reduce local governments' reliance on land misallocation. In
756 addition, a local government's performance and promotion assessment standard or requirement should
757 be reformed. Change local governments' solely taking GDP growth as an assessment indicator and
758 further include industrial structure upgrading and environmental quality improvement in local
759 governments' performance assessment. Establish a growth quality indicator comprehensively reflecting
760 structural adjustment, transformation of development mode and ecological environment protection as
761 local governments' assessment criteria to reverse the scenario of biasing toward capital-intensive
762 industries through land misallocation, and facilitate upgrades to industrial structure and lift ecological
763 environment pressure.

764 (3) As difference in city size significantly affects the effect of land misallocation on urban air
765 quality, cities at each level shall refer to their own industrial structure, characteristics, and endowments
766 to properly develop their advantageous industries, based on which, they shall create an economic
767 foundation to eliminate the reliance on land misallocation and improve urban air quality. Type I and
768 above cities should further strengthen industrial structure upgrading, continuously adapt to and lead in
769 cutting-edge technologies and industrial restructuring, propel the development of advanced
770 manufacturing industries, and provide full play to industrial structure upgrades to improve
771 environmental quality. For type II cities, medium-sized cities, and small cities, land misallocation has
772 significantly inhibited the effect of industrial structure upgrade and air quality. These cities should
773 further consolidate the industrial foundation, promote industrial agglomeration, and improve the
774 economic scale and economic development level, according to their scale characteristics and
775 comparative advantages, so that the local government can reduce the possibility of obtaining extra
776 budgetary revenue and growth performance through the biased allocation of land resources, so as to

777 gradually get rid of the dependence on the biased allocation of industrial land and reduce the inhibition
 778 effects of land resources misallocation on urban air quality.

779 **Appendix A. Spatial econometric tests:**

780 According to Elhorst (2014), we use the methods of Lagrange multiplier (LM), likelihood ratio (LR)
 781 and Wald statistics to test the spatial econometric model. We first estimate the non-spatial model and
 782 employ the Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests to choose between the SAR and SEM models. If LM-lag is
 783 significant instead of LM-err, we select the SAR model; otherwise, we choose the SEM model. If both
 784 LM-lag and LM-err are significant, it is necessary to further compare R-LM-lag and R-LM-err. We
 785 select the SAR model if R-LM-lag is significant and the SEM model if R-LM-err is significant. Second,
 786 if the non-spatial model is rejected, we estimate the SDM model, and perform LR tests to determine
 787 whether a spatial fixed effect or temporal fixed effect exists. Third, we conduct a Hausman test to choose
 788 between the fixed effects and random effects model. Finally, we employ the Wald and LR tests to test
 789 our hypotheses, $H_0^1: \theta = 0$ and $H_0^2: \theta + \rho\beta = 0$, to determine whether the SDM can be simplified to the
 790 SAR or SEM. If both hypotheses are rejected, SDM best describes the data. However, if the first
 791 hypothesis could not be rejected and the LM (R-LM) tests also point to SAR, then the SAR best
 792 describes the data. On the other hand, if the second hypothesis could not be rejected and the LM (R-LM)
 793 tests point to SEM, then SEM is the best model to describe the data. If the LM (R-LM) tests highlight
 794 one model and the Wald or LR tests do so for another, then the SDM is more suitable for estimating the
 795 spatial panel model because SDM is the general form of spatial autoregressive and error models. Table
 796 A1 lists the test results for the spatial econometric model. ^①

797 **Table A1.** Spatial econometric tests under different spatial weighted matrices

| Contents | Methods | Geographic distance matrix | | Economic distance matrix | | Nested spatial matrix of geographical and economic distance | |
|------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------|--------------------------|---------|---|---------|
| | | Statistic value | p-value | Statistic value | p-value | Statistic value | p-value |
| SAR model and SEM model test | LM-lag test | 167.0531 | 0.0000 | 90.0561 | 0.0047 | 188.4365 | 0.0000 |
| | R-LM-lag test | 327.3158 | 0.0000 | 1.8029 | 0.2013 | 35.2691 | 0.0000 |
| | LM-err test | 1966.0259 | 0.0000 | 137.0296 | 0.0000 | 565.2890 | 0.0000 |
| | R-LM-err test | 2018.5131 | 0.0000 | 39.9042 | 0.0000 | 406.3771 | 0.0000 |
| The fixed | SFE-LR test | 4569.1766 | 0.0000 | 4799.5125 | 0.0000 | 4598.7102 | 0.0000 |

^① Since table 4 shows that $\varphi=0.4$ is the best weight for the geographic distance spatial weight matrix in the nested spatial matrix of geographical and economic distance, we mainly report the test results of land misallocation on urbanization environmental quality under the nested spatial matrix with $\varphi=0.4$.

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| effect test of SDM model | TFE-LR test | 36.6306 | 0.0038 | 348.3091 | 0.0000 | 110.0667 | 0.0000 |
| | STFE-LR test | 3866.9452 | 0.0000 | 5240.8208 | 0.0000 | 4772.9006 | 0.0000 |
| Hausman test of SDM model | Hausman test | 151.2367 | 0.0000 | 2735.4572 | 0.0000 | 630.8912 | 0.0000 |
| Simplified test of SDM model | Wald-lag test | 703.8295 | 0.0000 | 269.6435 | 0.0000 | 366.3512 | 0.0000 |
| | LR-lag test | 695.8451 | 0.0000 | 273.4327 | 0.0000 | 357.6580 | 0.0000 |
| | Wald-err test | 135.6152 | 0.0000 | 163.1849 | 0.0000 | 80.3617 | 0.0000 |
| | LR-err test | 166.3582 | 0.0000 | 149.5408 | 0.0000 | 86.5746 | 0.0000 |

798 The results show that LM-lag, LM-error, and R-LM-err tests are significant at the 1% level under
799 the geographic distance, economic distance, and nested spatial matrix of geographical and economic
800 distance, while R-LM-lag is not significant under the economic distance matrix, indicating that the SEM
801 model is more effective than the SAR model. Second, because the non-spatial model was rejected, we
802 estimate the SDM model and check for fixed effects. The LR test results indicate that we should
803 simultaneously control the spatial and temporal effects in SDM. The Hausman test results for SDM
804 under the three weight matrices support the estimation of the fixed effects spatial econometric model.
805 Finally, the Wald-lag, LR-lag, Wald-err, and LR-err statistics under the three spatial weight matrices are
806 significant at the 5% level, which means that the double fixed effects of the SDM model cannot be
807 simplified to a SAR or SEM model. According to the criteria, this study should adopt the spatial and
808 temporal fixed spatial Durbin model.

809 **Declarations**

810 **Ethical Approval:** Not applicable

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812 **Consent to Publish:** Not applicable

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814 Construction, test and result analysis of spatial econometric model, Zhuqing Jiang;
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