Today, aviation causes 2.5% of the world’s CO2 emissions1. Although the last two decades saw a 2% annual improvement in aircraft fuel efficiency2, CO2 emissions kept growing due to a 4% increase in annual demand, doubling aviation’s contribution to global anthropogenic CO2 emissions (barring temporary reductions caused by Covid-19 pandemic)3. Besides flight CO2 emissions, aviation contributes to climate change through “non-CO2 effects” in the atmosphere4 via release of short-lived climate forcers (SLCF). Although associated with large uncertainties, the understanding of non-CO2 effects has improved over the years, allowing characterization of the relationship between atmospheric SLCF emissions and increase in radiative forcing (RF) with acceptable accuracy (see Lee et al.4 and Allen and co-workers5–8 for the relevant state-of-the-art).
The European Commission acknowledges the need for policies targeting aviation’s full climate impacts9; a recent analysis it commissioned10 suggested ways to regulate non-CO2 effects. Yet they are rarely considered in policy and roadmap documents, misestimating the effort needed to reduce the aviation contribution to climate change. Mitigation relies on improving air traffic management, producing larger, more fuel-efficient aircrafts, introducing sustainable aviation fuels, and compensating for any leftover effect. In the roadmap “Destination 2050”, EU-based aircraft manufacturers, airports and airlines aim at cutting CO2 emissions by 92% by 2050, while compensating the rest through, e.g. carbon removal projects2. Other national11 and international12–16 organizations, and some airlines17,18, follow a similar approach. However, these neither include non-CO2 effects nor underline the need for low-carbon electricity for synthetic jet fuels to become climate-neutral19,20. Furthermore, a recent report reveals that none of the efficiency or alternative fuel-related targets expressed by the industry in the last two decades has ever been met21. Furthermore, the effectiveness of some of the carbon offset schemes may be questioned22 as in practice non-reversibility and avoidance of double-accounting of carbon credits are often not ensured23,24.
As the European Union actively develops initiatives to decarbonize aviation, e.g. ReFuelEU25, first, we assess the climate impact of a fossil-based European aviation fleet over the 2018–2100 period under different socio-economic pathways and demand evolution scenarios. Second, we explore the potential of two technology options to limit aviation’s climate impact and to meet different mitigation scopes: CO2 removal (CDR) and use of synthetic fuels. Finally, for each technology option, we quantify the associated life-cycle costs, energy, and natural resources needs. We find that failing to consider the climate impact caused by the production of synthetic fuels from a life cycle perspective, as in two recent papers26,27, would neglect about half of the total impact caused by a growing European fleet. Furthermore, unless demand is reduced, fully and truly offsetting aviation’s climate impact in the future will require an important use of resources, whether synthetic jet fuel is used or not.
Main
Beside the reference scenario where European aviation relies exclusively on fossil jet-fuel, we consider two technology options, i.e., mitigation approaches, that can be deployed to reduce climate impact: (a) CO2 removal performed by Direct Air Capture (DAC) and permanent geological storage of CO2 (aka DACCS) to offset aviation’s climate impact for a fossil-based fleet (Fig. 1a); (b) syn-jet fuel (short for synthetic jet fuel), produced from CO2 captured from air (i.e., DAC with CO2 utilization, i.e. DACCU) and hydrogen synthesized through water electrolysis, with the remaining impacts offset by DACCS (Fig. 1b). Like the EC-proposed ReFuelEU initiative, we assume that syn-jet fuel is initially blended with conventional jet fuel, with a volume percentage of 5% in 2030, 63% in 2050, and finally 100% in 2063 (i.e., + 2.6% per year). As we focus on DAC-based approaches, other sustainable aviation fuels (e.g., bio-27 and solar-jet fuels28), though worth further investigation, are beyond the scope of this work.
To highlight the relevance of non-CO2 effects in designing measures to reduce the climate impact of the European aviation fleet, we consider three scopes of mitigation over the second half of the century: (i) flight-CO2 neutrality, where flight-CO2 emissions only and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to the mitigation approach itself are eliminated (1 and 5 in Fig. 1a); (ii) warming neutrality, achieved by mitigating any increase in climate impacts with respect to 2050 levels (1 to 5 in Fig. 1a, and 2 to 5 in Fig. 1b); and (iii) climate neutrality, achieved by mitigating all climate impacts caused by the fleet from 2018 onwards (1 to 5 in Fig. 1a; 2 to 5 in Fig. 1b). While climate neutrality implies that the total radiative forcing (RF) caused by the fleet is brought to net-zero after 2050 onwards (with respect to 2018), warming neutrality only requires that the forcing is stabilized at the 2050 level.
Furthermore, we consider three different air-traffic demand trajectories, assuming the European aircraft fleet reaches and exceeds its pre-Covid-19 level by 2024. There is consensus within the industry about this28, but also the chance that the Covid-19 pandemic may have profound, irrevocable behavior-changing effects on air travel’s future demand29. The European air-traffic demand trajectories considered from 2025 after the post-Covid recovery onwards are: (i) growing demand, whereby the European air traffic, in terms of kilometers flown, converges towards a 2% annual growth rate; (ii) stationary demand, whereby European air traffic stabilizes shortly after 2024; and (iii) declining demand, whereby global air traffic reduces at the annual rate needed to achieve warming neutrality without using carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Furthermore, we consider two future socio-economic pathways (“climate scenarios”) to project future LCA-based GHG emissions embodied in electricity, materials and services: a scenario in line with the Paris Agreement objectives (i.e., SSP 2-RCP 2.6), aiming at a global temperature increase below 2°C by 2100 compared to pre-industrial levels, i.e. the 2°C scenario; and a baseline scenario (i.e., SSP 2-RCP 6), corresponding to a global temperature increase of approximately 3.5°C by 2100 compared to pre-industrial levels, i.e. the 3.5°C scenario. These scenarios offer a wide range of projected cumulative GHG emissions by 2100, which are plausible and consistent with the emissions growth rates of the past two decades30. Both climate scenarios consider, to a different extent, the expected improvements in aircraft light-weighting, engine efficiency, seating capacity and occupancy, but also the progress in other sectors like electricity and syn-jet fuel production, until 2050. No further advancements are considered thereafter due to limitations and uncertainty in projected performances, except for the electricity mix which is projected until 2100 (see Methods for details and values). We exclude other potentially impactful innovations (e.g., improved air traffic management, notably to avoid ice supersaturated regions31,32), revolutionary aircraft designs, biomass-based alternative fuels33, hydrogen-powered aircrafts34,35, and battery electric aircrafts35. We report the results for the 3.5° C scenario in the following, and those for the 2° C scenario in Extended Data Figures.
For each scope of mitigation, air-traffic demand trajectory, and climate scenario, the performance of the two technology options is assessed in terms of emission of climate forcers, total RF, and CDR requirement for the European fleet. Furthermore, their impacts on resources (costs, electricity, geological CO2 storage capacity, and land and freshwater use) are quantified using a life-cycle environmental and cost assessment model, based on previous studies29,30.
In the following, we distinguish flight emissions (emissions 1 and 2 in Fig. 1) from surface emissions (emissions 3, 4 and 5 in Fig. 1), with the latter caused by the supply of infrastructure, aircrafts, fuel (fossil or synthetic), and by DACCS operation. Surface emissions include CO2 but also SLCF such as methane, hydrogen, and various refrigerants (CFCs, HCFCs, HFCs). Flight emissions include CO2 and SLCF such as Sulphur oxides, black carbon, and water vapor released in the troposphere (i.e., below 9,000 m), nitrogen oxides released in the stratosphere (i.e., above 9,000 m), and the formation of cirrus clouds. Atmospheric lifetimes and radiative efficiencies of surface forcers are sourced from Chap. 7 of the IPCC AR6 WG1 report36, while those for flight forcers from Lee et al.4. The RF of both types of emissions is calculated via the linear impulse-response model, except for cirrus clouds, whereby we apply an empirical relationship to correlate the kilometers flown to the cirrus-induced RF, following the literature4,26. However, unlike these studies which use the so-called GWP* metric introduced by Allen and colleagues5,6,37,38, the warming contribution of flight and surface emissions is expressed as timeseries of CO2 emissions that would cause identical warming through the Linear-Warming-Equivalent (LWE) method, introduced by Allen et al.7, which is both exact and metric independent. The amount of CO2-LWE to sequester to compensate for the warming caused by SLCF emissions is calculated by inverting the linear impulse-response model routinely used for metrics calculation. We present this approach in detail in Radiative forcing and warming contribution of emissions. Another significant difference with the approach used in Brazzola et al.26 is that we consider the life-cycle emissions of CO2 and SLCF related to the manufacture of the aircrafts, infrastructure (e.g., airport), fuel (including electricity), as well as to DACCS operation. Applying the method of LWE to a timeseries of emissions calculated by prospective life-cycle assessment is in itself a novel approach.
Conventional jet fuel vs. Synthetic jet fuel
We analyze two scenarios, in which the European aviation fleet relies either on fossil-based jet fuel (Fig. 2), or on syn-jet fuel with a blend volume percentage increasing from 5% in 2030 to reach 63% in 2050 and 100% by 2063 (Fig. 3). In both cases, DACCS is deployed to mitigate the remaining contributions to climate change. The syn-jet fuel is produced through Fischer-Tropsch synthesis, fed by hydrogen (H2) from water electrolysis and carbon monoxide (CO) from the reverse water-gas shift reaction using CO2 from DAC – further information on the relevant processes is given in Methods.
Growing air-traffic demand. Despite higher fuel efficiency and larger seating capacity and occupancy than today, a fossil-based fleet growing at its average historical rate unmitigated will directly emit 24 GtCO2 during the 2018–2100 period (Fig. 2.a), while SLCF would cause over two thirds of the RF (Fig. 2.d). By 2100, unmitigated emissions of CO2 will increase three-fold relative to 2018 (Fig. 2.d). Using low-aromatic, hydrogen-rich syn-jet fuel appears attractive as it avoids flight-CO2 emissions of fossil origin (Fig. 3.a), while reducing soot and ice particle formation at high altitude in ice supersaturated regions (based on data extrapolation from Ref. 39). This reduces the cloudiness and lifetime of cirrus clouds, and their associated effective RF by 65%40. Overall, the use of 100% syn-jet fuel reduces the fleet-induced climate warming by one third in 2100, as opposed to using jet fuel (Fig. 3.d). In addition to stabilizing the contribution of flight-CO2 to the total RF after 2063, the increase of syn-jet fuel share in the blend decreases flight SLCF emissions (Fig. 3.a). Unfortunately, this positive effect is cancelled out by the increase in fleet activity, resulting in a growing share of RF due to SLCF emissions (Fig. 3.d). Furthermore, the forcing caused by surface CO2 emissions increases linearly until 2100 (Fig. 3.d), as the annual production of syn-jet fuel increases from 110 billion liters in 2063 to 205 billion liters, mainly due to electricity consumption for DAC and H2 production, despite the reduction in the carbon intensity of the energy mix (i.e., from 130g CO2/kWh in 2050 down to 30g CO2/kWh in 2100). Furthermore, H2 leaks, represented by a 1% mass loss related to venting, storage and boil-off along the supply chain41, also contribute to the overall forcing induced by a syn-jet fuel-based aviation by extending the atmospheric lifetime of methane42 (Fig. 3.d, Surface-others).
Should mitigation measures be deployed, the amount of CO2 to sequester via DACCS would vary largely depend on the mitigation scope and would be lower for the fleet relying on syn-jet fuel (Figs. 2.g and 3.g). Regardless of the fuel, achieving climate neutrality from 2050 onwards implies an important removal the first year (2050) to offset the cumulated RF caused by aviation between 2018 and 2049. This is difficult in practice, and the use of CDR could start before 2050 to avoid such peak. It is followed by an increasing removal effort due to the raising RF induced by the fleet. Pursuing warming neutrality would reduce the CDR effort needed over the 2050–2100 period by 50% (jet fuel) to 60% (syn-jet fuel), stabilizing the Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) increase caused by the fleet to ca. +0.015° C (Figs. 2.d and 3.d). Most importantly, failing to consider the additional RF caused by the production of syn-jet fuel from a life cycle perspective, as in Brazzola et al.26, would neglect about half of the impact caused by a growing European fleet activity (Figs. 3.d). This holds true, although to a lower extent, in a more climate-ambitious scenario, where the electricity is already decarbonized by 2030–2040 – see Figure E.2, Extended Data Figures. Mitigating solely flight-CO2 emissions would require a significantly smaller CDR effort but would leave most of the climate change impacts unmitigated. Additionally, in the case of syn-jet fuel, as its share in the blend increases, the decrease in the RF caused by cirrus clouds (based on Refs. 39,40) more than compensates for the warming caused by other forcers, resulting in a net negative amount of CDR (Fig. 3.g).
The GHG emissions associated with electricity supply for DACCS operation increase the overall CDR requirement by 36% in 2050, but this decreases to 5% by 2100 as the electricity decarbonizes (see difference between dashed and solid lines in Figs. 2.g and 3.g).
The uncertainty around the RF caused by non-CO2 effects is significant, as discussed by Lee at al4 and represented in Figs. 2 and 3 by the large error bars, which are obtained from the 5th and 95th percentile values of the effective RF indices for each non-CO2 effect, also from Ref 4. Most of the spread stems from the uncertain time- and location-dependent effect of cirrus clouds formation. In this respect, the more recent work of Digby et al.43 indicates a lower central estimate for the RF of cirrus clouds formation, while maintaining equally important uncertainty ranges. Consequently, climate- and warming-neutrality exhibit wider uncertainties than flight CO2-neutrality: the CDR requirement scales with the uncertainty associated with non-CO2 effects, which are left unmitigated in the case of flight CO2-neutrality, as shown by the shaded areas in Fig. 2.g and 3.g.
Stationary air-traffic demand. Stabilizing the fleet activity at the 2024 level results, in the second half of the century, in a constant forcing caused by SLCF (mostly cirrus and NOx) and an increasing forcing from CO2 (either flight- or surface-CO2), because CO2 cumulates (Figs. 2.e and 3.e). The climate impacts of the fossil- and syn-jet fuel-powered European aviation fleets decrease in 2100 by 60% and 50%, respectively, with respect to the growth scenario
As the net contribution of aviation to climate change reduces, the need for compensation via DACCS to achieve climate neutrality decreases as well, for both fuel options (Figs. 2.h and 3.h). Under the scenario of a fossil-based fleet, flight-CO2 and warming-neutrality mitigation targets tend to converge as the forcing caused by SLCF is kept at the 2024 level, and thus require a similar amount of CDR (Fig. 2.h). By using syn-jet fuel, warming neutrality is achieved as soon as 2050 without the need for DACCS, thanks to the stabilization of the fleet activity (Fig. 3.e). Indeed, the RF caused by the European fleet decreases with respect to 2050, resulting in a negative CDR requirement if warming neutrality is pursued. However, as the fleet relies exclusively on syn-jet fuel from 2063 onwards, the cooling effect of the decreasing RF from SLCF is counterbalanced by the increase in surface CO2 emissions due to fuel production (especially hydrogen synthesis). Similarly, flight-CO2 neutrality is achieved after 2050 solely using syn-jet fuel without the need for DACCS, owing to the constant fleet activity after this onset year (Fig. 3.e).
Declining air-traffic demand. A limited decline in aviation activity (i.e., kilometers flown) of up to 0.8% per year if the fleet is powered by jet fuel would eliminate the need for CDR to reach both flight-CO2 and warming-neutrality (Figs. 2.i and 3.i). Such decline could be limited to 0.4% per year if the fleet uses syn-jet fuel instead. The decline in SLCF emissions would counteract the additional RF caused by the accumulation of CO2, with respect to 2050 (Figs. 2.f and 3.f). The cooling effect (with respect to the onset year) caused by the fall in SLCF emissions would effectively act as an offset mechanism for CO2 emissions. For warming- and flight-CO2 neutrality, DACCS need is virtually eliminated thanks to the continued decrease of SLCF emissions (mostly reduced formation of cirrus clouds). On the other hand, climate neutrality cannot be achieved through demand reduction measures alone and requires a large amount of CDR the first year (2050) to compensate for the RF cumulated between 2018 and 2049, followed by a decreasing CDR rate to compensate for newly emitted forcers, to an extent similar to the Stationary scenario (Figs. 2.i and 3.i).
Climate-neutral European aviation and resources
Although syn-jet fuel and DACCS could offer feasible climate impact mitigation pathways for the aviation sector, Fig. 4 puts these options in the context of resources needed.
If growth in air-traffic demand is sustained, using syn-jet fuel combined with DACCS would require substantial amounts of resources, among which deeply decarbonized electricity (i.e., with a carbon intensity of 30 gCO2/kWh in 2100). To achieve climate neutrality, almost 80 times the electricity production of the European Union in 202044 (i.e., 2,600 TWh) would be needed cumulatively between 2018 and 2100 (~ 200,000 TWh) – but mostly during the second half of this century, and predominantly for hydrogen production. In other words, 1.6 times the current annual production of electricity in the EU-28 would be needed each year between 2050 and 2100. The cumulative abstraction of freshwater and use of land between 2018 and 2100 would also reach unreasonable levels: over between 200 and 250 million hectares-year of land would be required, while the freshwater needed would correspond to one time the annual consumption of the EU-28. Most of the use of land and freshwater stems from renewable electricity production (i.e., solar, wind, biomass and hydropower plants), despite considering efficiency improvements in the LCA database – e.g., the area occupied by PV panels per kW installed decreases by 50% between 2020 and 2050 to reflect the expected increase in the conversion efficiency; such footprints could be partially reduced by using an alternative low-carbon electricity mix, but at the risk of impacting other resources. Such massive demand for decarbonized electricity, land and freshwater suggests that the entire large-scale syn-jet fuel supply for Europe cannot be produced domestically. On the other hand, using (fossil) jet fuel and offsetting the climate impacts via DACCS would decrease the use of electricity, land, and freshwater by 50 to 60%, relative to using syn-jet fuel complemented with DACCS. However, this would prolong our dependance on fossil energy and require a CO2 storage capacity larger than the proven storage capabilities of the Norwegian North Sea. This CO2 storage capacity may turn out to be a limited resource, due to both limitations in scale-up and competition for CO2 storage space with other hard-to-decarbonize sectors45. Under the 2° C scenario, land occupation increases (i.e., higher share of supply from renewable energy plants and use of biomass-based power), whilst the abstraction of freshwater decreases (i.e., among other reasons, less cooling water is used, as the share of combustion-based power plants decreases). Moreover, the CO2 storage requirements are lower: a low-carbon electricity helps decrease the amount of CO2 to mitigate from the production of fuel and the operation of DACCS. Finally, using (fossil) jet fuel rather than syn jet-fuel and offsetting the climate change contribution with DACCS is less costly across mitigation scopes (despite accounting for cost reductions due to learning-by-doing). However, as the mitigation scope becomes more stringent (i.e., warming-neutrality), the differences in costs between the two fuel options disappear. In fact, the climate scenario seems to be a stronger determinant for costs than the fuel option. Reducing the demand for air-traffic should be a priority as it significantly decreases the amount of resources needed, regardless of the climate scenario or technology option considered.