Now we aim to discuss an example of a possible application of this formulation to explain prior psychological experimental results. Psychological time has been an important topic of research for more than a century61,62. Early theorists speculated about possible differences in duration judgments between younger and older adults. James (1890)63 claimed that ''the same space of time seems shorter as we grow older." Mach (1900) described that the psychological unit of time lengthened with age. There are several kinds of models to explain duration judgments61. One model is based on an internal clock that may be influenced by biological variables such as metabolism and brain temperature, etc.64. The slowing of a biological clock would presumably give rise to the feeling that external time passes faster. Another kind of model proposes that duration judgements are cognitive constructions that are influenced by attention and memory processes61. Several kinds of methodological and individual factors may influence duration judgments due to their effects on attention and memory61,65,66. The ratio of the subjective duration of time (how long an individual perceives an hour to be) to the objective duration of time (the actual duration of an hour) is called the duration judgement ratio (DJR). This is a standard measure calculated and reported in many “duration judgement” studies67. An individual with lower DJR experiences time as being contracted and an individual with higher DJR experiences time as being expanded. Different circumstances can change DJR. For example, in the same surroundings one person may have high DJR when paying close attention to time, but another person may have low DJR in a state of distraction and time would seem to contract to them. Intentional binding is another factor that influences DJR. As mentioned previously, humans also tend to have a general impression that time passes more quickly as we grow older. Friedman and Janssen tried to quantify this impression by constructing a long-term (hour to year) memory model68, but it seems that this problem is too complicated for this model to comprehensively and satisfactory uncover the mechanism controlling the variations in DJR.
On the contrary, little by little, subjective temporal order in shorter timescales (as experienced by humans) has been getting more quantified, and can be systematized in a physical way. Stetson et al.47 suggested that dynamic temporal order recalibration is needed to define temporal order of actions and sensations. Their experiment involved 2 participants: the individual and the instrument. (Hereafter individual defined in this experiment is written in italic text in order to distinguish this label from an individual as a generic term.) The individual is a human and the instrument is a machine. The individual presses a key (motor-driven event) to activate a flash event (sensory event). This recurring flash event would at first consistently appear with a fixed delay (τ0) (TEST I). After several fixed-delay-flash event cycles, the flash would be suddenly presented with a shorter delay (τ) (TEST II) and this event would tend to be perceived as appearing before the button press (a subjective reversal of temporal order). The point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) is an indicator created by this group to evaluate a particular human brain’s subjective timing error47. A PSS equal to 0 would indicate that motor and sensory events would be perceived as synchronous when they physically occur at the same time. In their motor-sensory test, PSS was positive, indicating that it would be possible for an event which occurred in the past and an event occurring in the present according to the objective instrument could be perceived as subjectively simultaneous by the individual. Stetson et al. concluded that "temporal order judgements between motor acts and sensory events dynamically change in order to keep causality assessments appropriately calibrated." However, subjective temporal order reversal was observed also between cross-sensory events47 (such as automatic tapping of the individual's finger by the key instead of a keypress initiated by the individual). Since the individual did not cause the following event, there is no causal relationship between these events. Therefore, it seems unreasonable to use the causality as a condition to construct this argument. In contrast, employing a premise that relies on the consistency of events shared by the individual and the instrument (consistency of event sharing) seems more trivial and reasonable.
With an analogy of the previous muon-instrument discussion, Stetson's experimental results can be reformulated as follows: as the individual becomes accustomed to a certain duration of fixed delay by experiencing recurrent motor-sensory (or cross-sensory) feedback, the amount of the delay (τexpect) of the individual's GDG is fixed by sensory gating with their own internal clock to be ~ τ0. Sensory gating is the brain's natural response to attenuate irrelevant stimuli69,70. Accordingly, Stetson's experiment can be rephrased in the following way. The individual presses the key which triggers an opening the instrumental gate to allow the instrument to accept the individual signal, and the instrument detects this individual signal. In this case, there is a causal relationship between the keypress and the instrumental gate opening. Next, the instrument opens the individual gate so that the individual can receive the instrumental signal. Figure 4 shows the time series of the gate opening/closing corresponding to the time series shown in Fig. 2. With this experimental configuration, the individual and instrument continuously emit signals respectively to the instrument and individual, but they can receive these signals only when their gates are opened.
The instrument opens the individual's gate at τ0 (in the frame of signal) after the instrument receives the individual signal. This process is repeated several times. Then, abruptly, the delay τ0 changes to τ (in the frame of signal) which is much shorter in duration. SE1 for the individual is defined as these 2 events: the individual's opening the instrumental gate (keypress event) (A1) and the individual signal departure to the instrument (B1). SE2 for the individual is defined as: the instrumental signal arrival at the individual (A2), and the individual's cognition of the instrumental signal (B2). The time required for the signals to travel from the individual to the instrument is negligible. The condition: consistency of event sharing requires that the following relationship:
t(A1)- t(B1) = 0, (2 − 1)
t(A2)- t(B2) = 0, (2–2)
holds both in the individual's frame and the signal's frame, where t(A1), t(B1), t(A2), and t(B2) are respectively the moments when A1, B1, A2, and B2 occur, namely:
[t(A1)- t(B1)]individual - [t(A1)- t(B1)]signal =0, (2–3)
[t(A2)- t(B2)]individual - [t(A1)- t(B1)]signal =0. (2–4)
Eqs. (2–3) and (2–4) also must hold for non-causal events.
Next, the individual's internal GDG is modeled according to the following description: (A) “Fixed delay (τ0)” is the objective time interval (labeled as “instrument” as shown in Fig. 4A) between SE1 and SE2. On the other hand, the corresponding subjective time interval (labeled as “individual”) is defined as the interval between SE1 and SE2; this subjective motor-sensory time interval is determined by the time interval (κτ0), where κ is a compression factor that is a function of τ071. Previous works have quantified that our perception of when an event occurs depends on the influence of intentional binding (IB) which is the temporal compression that occurs when the brain makes a connection between a voluntary action and its ensuing sensory effect72. However, in order to make the current modeling simpler, the IB effect is not considered, i.e., κ ~ 1. The individual is recurrently exposed to this delayed sensory feedback, and eventually, the amount of delay of the individual's internal GDG is set to be τ0 (Fig. 4B red dashed lines). (B) “Variable delay (τ)” (Fig. 4A) is the objective interval between SE1 and SE2 after exposure to recurrent fixed delayed sensory feedback.
The recalibration offset defined in the previous section is re-labeled as recalibration memory offset (RMO) since in the case of the individual, the past events are all stored in their memory, and are expressed with only 2 parameters: γ1 and γ2. The moment when the individual observed the signal is defined as time zero (TZ) (Fig. 4), and here Eq. (2–3) must hold. However, when τ≠ τ0, Eq. (2–3) doesn't hold without the RMO (Fig. 4B), thus from Eq. (1–3), the memory timeline must be shifted with a magnitude of:
δT = τ0(γ1-τ/τ0), (3)
to hold Eq. (2–3) (Fig. 4C), where the RMO is always associated with the forward direction as long as τ0-τ > τ. Here for simplicity, variations in the subjective passage of time was not considered. Therefore, γ1 = 1. Accordingly, the memory of the individual's opening the instrumental gate (key press event) is shifted forward. As a consequence, the temporal order between the memory of the keypress event and the moment when the individual perceived the instrumental signal is reversed. As was suggested in the reference47, it is also possible to explain this reversal as resulting from the correction of the causal simultaneity between the keypress event and the instrumental gate opening event. However, it is difficult to conclude that causality is the main driving factor of this recalibration. Since the memory of the keypress event is also shifted forward along with the instrumental gate during this timeline correction process, this subjective causal simultaneity is still violated. Moreover, the non-zero PSS found in Stetson's experiment showed that subjective temporal order is reversed also for cross-sensory events; hence this reversal occurs for non-causal events47. Therefore, it is reasonable to explain that this temporal order reversal was the result of that the individual tried to keep the consistency of event sharing: the gate opening event must be shared by the individual and the signal at exactly the same time as long as they are located exactly at the same location. The outcome is that the subjective temporal order reversal is a natural consequence of the binding condition: the consistency of event sharing.
The condition: consistency of event sharing is trivially applicable to both the individual and the instrument (and also to all instruments and human beings). It is also reasonable to assume that the path of least resistance is applicable to the neurological process of human beings. In order to confirm this effect is present, the following experiment is proposed. Figure 5 shows a hypothetical experimental scheme to confirm the path of least resistance. In this configuration, the individual send the individual signals to the instrument twice, and the instrument receives these two temporally distinguishable signals (SE1 and SE2). The time interval between these two actions is shorter than τ0. When the instrument receives these two individual signals, the instrument opens the individual gates after different delays (τ1 and τ2), and the individual receives two identical but temporally distinguishable signals (SE3 and SE4). τ0,τ1, and τ2 hold the following relationship: τ0-τ2 > τ2, τ0-τ1 > τ1, and τ1 > τ2. Since these two signals are identical, the individual cannot distinguish which signal was triggered by which action. If the path of least resistance is applicable, the RMO is optimized so that the action is minimized. In this specific case, the RMO shift is not needed (Fig. 5B). On the other hand, if the path of least resistance is not applied, other options to keep consistency of event sharing exist and consequently, subjective causal order will be occasionally reversed (Fig. 5C).
In reality, RMO fluctuates due to several reasons: (A) the amount of delay of the internal GDG (τexpect) may depend on individuals; (B) τexpect may fluctuate as a function of time; (C) the internal GDG may not always function during the measurement; (D) the parameters (A)-(C) may depend on the individual's group we chose. There are other several possible reasons for the fluctuation of the RMO. Therefore, it is convenient to define the averaged RMO, the RMO averaged over the measurement time or the RMO averaged over a certain individual's group (for example, a certain age group).
Vercillo et al.73 reported that children (< 8 years old) do not recalibrate motor-sensory temporal order after exposure to delayed sensory feedback. This result indicates that the children's averaged RMO is smaller than the adult's averaged RMO. Therefore, based on our formulation, it is inferred that the fraction of individuals with their own GDGs is smaller in the children's group than in the adult's group. Davies et al.74 reported that normal adults and typical children show significant differences in sensory gating (testing stimulus)/(conditioning stimulus)(T/C) ratios. A small T/C ratio indicates good sensory gating ability. The report by Davies et al. showed that the typical children's T/C ratio is significantly larger (almost doubled in the N100 component) than the adult's T/C ratio, indicating that the children's GDG doesn't function well; hence, children's averaged RMO is significantly smaller than the adult's averaged RMO.
In conclusion, subjective temporal order was studied for the first time from the instrumental particle physics point of view. Based on the phenomenological investigation with high-energy muon arrival time measurements in different locations, it was found that the timeline defined in a different frame has to be shifted either forward or backward under the condition: consistency of event sharing. We called this shift a recalibration offset. This recalibration offset was defined in the (passage of time)-(time interval) space in conjunction with the path of least resistance. This formulation was applied to the time recalibration of human memory. Consequently, it was derived that reversal of the subjective temporal order is a natural consequence under this condition. Our results indicate different conclusions from the ones in Kant’s Prolegomena which states that causality is a priori; according to this idea, there cannot be particular causal laws that cause specific effects, meaning causal order is absolute, independent from individual perceptions, and cannot be explained by any rule. While this might be true for objective causality which doesn't include individual perceptions, its validity breaks down in some subjective situations. The current work infers that subjective causal law is based on the consistency of event sharing. Consequently, it was concluded that it is more reasonable to explain that the human brain subconsciously segregates any information that violates the consistency of event sharing rather than causality and human memories can be optimized according to the path of least resistance. As a result, the subjective temporal order is occasionally reversed. A valuable next step in this research might be to conduct an experiment to measure the PSS shift for the individuals having different (A) sensory gating T/C ratios and (B) subjective passage of time (γ1 ≠ 1) perceptions.