Countering the Covid-19 pandemic in Hong Kong. A Successful Securitization in an Environment of Low Political Trust.

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-2571613/v1

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Countering the Covid-19 pandemic in Hong Kong. A Successful Securitization in an Environment of Low Political Trust.

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2571613/v1

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In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, authorities around the world securitized the virus and enforced unprecedented tactics. A successful securitization presupposes a common understanding between the authorities and the public about the calibre of the threat and the necessity of the extraordinary measures. A trustworthy government should securitize an issue of its preference easier than an untrustworthy government. Hong Kong, our case study, is unique because of the government’s success with securitizing the pandemic in a context of extremely low political trust. Among the exceptional mechanisms that the government of Hong Kong utilized to control the outbreak were smart technologies. This paper examines the extent to which trust in the government and trust in smart technologies influenced the success of the securitization of the COVID-19 pandemic in Hong Kong. To answer this question, we build on publicly available surveys assessing political trust in Hong Kong, on tailormade questionnaires investigating the sentiments of Hong Kong citizens towards smart technologies and on a Focus Group exercise with carefully selected residents of Hong Kong. The results of this study suggest that under certain circumstances, governments can successfully securitize a health-emergency even when they do not enjoy high levels of political trust.

Other Political Science

Health Policy

Securitization

Hong Kong

Smart City

Political Trust

Covid-19

Pandemic

At the onset of 2020 a novel virus emerged as a major disruption of global affairs. What later became known as the COVID-19 pandemic had a large impact on the individuals’ lives and the economies of all the world’s countries. Although a health emergency would, under normal circumstances, be dealt with by political means, many governments chose to treat the pandemic as a security threat. Governments across the globe utilized exceptional, and sometimes extraordinary measures, to control the spread of the virus. The government of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, China (hereafter Hong Kong) followed this pattern. During the pandemic, the political leadership of Hong Kong acknowledged the critical nature of the situation, resorted to unprecedented moves, and urged the citizens of Hong Kong to abide with some exceptionally restrictive directives.

The response of the Hong Kong government to COVID-19 resembles to what international relations scholars have labelled as securitization.[1] A securitization occurs when powerful actors, usually political elites, allege that an issue constitutes an existential threat to a referent object. Based on these allegations, they claim the right to evade normal political procedures and use emergency, extraordinary, and potentially unlawful means to tackle the perceived threat. Researchers from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CSSS) theorized securitization as a process that contains three main elements: the securitizing speech act (when an actor alleges that an issue constitutes a threat to a referent object- e.g. a prime minister claiming that refugees threaten the social cohesion of his/her country), the emergency action (exceptional legislative or administrative acts and measures, inconsiderable times of normality), and the acceptance by the targeted audience which, in most of the cases, is the general public. Only if, and when the targeted audience ‘accepts’ the securitizers’ rhetoric can we claim that the securitization is successful, argued Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, the founders of the securitization theory ¹.

In the case of Hong Kong, the authorities repetitively represented the pandemic as a security issue. Based on that narrative, the government urged the citizens to abide with social distancing measures, the success of which depended on the citizens’ eagerness to utilize COVID-19 specific instruments that we usually observe in the studies of smart cities. In Hong Kong, the most up to date surveys indicate that large numbers of the citizens distrust their government. Since the success of a government in controlling an outbreak heavily depends on the co-operation of the general public ² ³, one would expect that the Hong Kong citizens would not comply with the authorities’ directives condemning the struggles of the government to fail. Against all odds, the numbers of infections and deaths caused by the pandemic (as of October 2021[2]) indicated that Hong Kong successfully controlled the virus. The Hong Kong residents seemed to abide with the government’s securitizing narrative despite their apparent distrust in it.

Building on the case of Hong Kong, this study aims to explore the factors that make a securitization successful in contexts of low political trust. Is, after all, political trust a determinant of the securitization’s audience acceptance element, and by extension, of the securitization’s success? In the case of Hong Kong, another interesting fact that relates to the trust-audience-acceptance-securitization nexus concerns the Hong Kong government’s fostering of ‘smart’ and ‘digital’ technological instruments to contain the pandemic. Smart technologies in the context of smart cities are based on the use of sophisticated information tech to improve citizen participation, implement public policies, or provide public sector services ⁴. The question is whether the high levels of Hong Kong citizens’ trust in smart technologies compensated for the low trust in the government and accounted for the successful securitization of the pandemic despite the low levels of institutional trust?

Our main assumption is that political trust influences the success of a securitization. However, we contend that, where political trust is limited, trust in smart technologies may contribute to the efforts of securitizing actors to effectively securitize an issue. By testing these assumptions, and by examining the relationships between securitization, political trust, and the smart technology tools, we contribute to the literatures on securitization, smart cities, and political trust. At the same time, we bring into the spotlight the element of trust in the process of securitization, an element that is underdeveloped, undertheorized, and understudied in the current literature. Thus, theoretically, we illuminate the relationship between securitization and political trust and we test the intersubjectivity assumption of the current securitization literature. Methodologically, we develop a model that links political trust, trust in technology and securitization and we emphasize its usefulness in studying wicked crises like that of the COVID-19 pandemic. Empirically, we utilize the results of the Focus Groups exercise and a tailormade survey. By doing so, we conduct a different type of study than in the current literature on political trust which is mainly based on the quantitative analysis of publicly available data. Our empirical findings illuminate aspects of Hong Kong’s management of the COVID-19 crisis unaddressed by related studies.

[1] The concept of securitization used in this study is different than the securitization concept used in investment, insurance, and risk management studies.

[2] We cover the temporal context between January 2020 and October 2021 as this falls within the primary data gathering period and encompasses the most serious developments of the pandemic.

Securitization

The CSSS defines securitisation as a process during which agents (the securitizing actors/securitizers) declare, through a security speech act, a non-traditional security issue as an existential threat for a referent object ⁵. The founders of the securitisation theory argue that only when the targeted audience of the securitizing actors accepts the securitizing moves can we talk about a successful securitization ⁶. Hence, the audience of the securitization constitutes a critical variable of a securitization’s success ⁷. Although the confidence of the targeted audience in the securitizing actors might influence the extent to which that audience accepts the securitizing move, rarely have researchers examined the importance of trust in the process of securitization ⁸.

Moreover, despite its relevance, the securitization framework has been rarely used in studies of the COVID-19 pandemic. Kirk and McDonald observed the based-on securitization language justifications for emergency responses in 3 countries to suggest that it is necessary to study the context of securitization ⁹. Baele and Rousseau examined the securitizing speech acts of the US President and the UK Prime Minister to argue that the securitizing language of the latter was more intense than that of the first ¹⁰. Dimari and Papadakis used Rita Floyd’s Just Securitization Theory to prove that the securitization of the COVID-19 on Greece was just and fair ¹¹. Rubin and Bækkeskov described the case of the securitization of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in Sweden and Denmark as an expert-led securitization where the autonomous public health expert agencies led the national securitization processes and claimed that their findings from the 2009 pandemic are highly applicable in the Covid-19 outbreak ¹². Baele suggested that when leaders suffer from low social capital, legitimacy can be an output of securitization ¹³. Karyotis and collaborators used the securitization framework to examine what drove the support for social distancing in Britain during the COVID-19 outbreak ¹⁴. Other recent studies of the securitization of COVID-19 focus on the metaphoric discourse of Viktor Orbán in Hungary ¹⁵, the securitization and militarization of the crisis in Israel ¹⁶, and the securitization of the pandemic in Greece ¹⁷, Taiwan, USA, and Japan ¹⁸, Brazil ¹⁹, and Philippines ²⁰. However, none of these studies examined the role that institutional trust played in the securitization success.

Trust and securitization

There is limited literature examining how trust in political authorities, or, in processes (like digitalization and smart technologies) influences the tendencies of the citizens to accept, or reject, a securitizing move ²¹ . This should not be that case. Trust might be an influential variable of audience acceptance in the context of a securitization. Trust can be a central determinant of a securitization’s success, and by extension, of a government’s effectiveness in administering a health crisis ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵. This is because the success of a securitizing actor in elevating an issue to the security realm and implementing the measures corresponding to that realm depends heavily on the actor’s ability to persuade his/her targeted audience, the general public, about the imminence of the alleged threat and the necessity of the proposed exceptional measures. A securitizer who is considered as highly trustworthy by the general public is more likely to have his/her allegations ‘accepted’. Hence, trust is an important securitization variable but also a significant predictor of a government’s effectiveness with controlling a pandemic ²⁶.

Trust and compliance

Trust in government is an important determinant of citizens’ compliance with public health policies, restrictions, and guidelines ²⁷ . This happens because at the onset of a highly contagious virus, governments should convince their citizens to comply with certain public health measures. Trust in government influences the success of the governments’ efforts to control the spread of contagious diseases ²⁸. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Orachorn, Yu and Li examined the relationship between public trust and the compliance of the general public in adopting protective measures in Thailand and found a positive and significant correlation ²⁹. In France and Italy, trust in government increased compliance with governmental rules ³⁰. An international consortium of researchers assessed data from 177 countries during the first 9 months of the outbreak to conclude that there was an association between trust and compliance with public health guidance ³¹. Examining the association between trust and compliance during past outbreaks of highly contagious communicable diseases, other researchers also established a close relationship between governmental trust and compliance ³² ³³ ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁶ ³⁷ ³⁸.

Trust in Technology

Observing the linkage between trust in government and trust in technology Li recorded the mistrust of the Hong Kong citizens towards their government and the applications developed by it as contributing to the citizens’ unwillingness to follow the government’s directives at the first stages of the pandemic ³⁹. Contrastingly, a study of Horsburgh and collaborators concluded that trust in government was not correlated with trust in facets of e-government service provision and that the more intensive internet users were more likely to trust e-government services ⁴⁰. Welch and colleagues found that citizens’ satisfaction with e-government services was positively associated with trust in government and concluded that electronic government strategies are important factors indirectly affecting trust ⁴¹. Similarly, evidence from Tolbert and Mossberger suggested that e-government can increase process-based trust by improving interactions with citizens and perceptions of responsiveness ⁴².

State and society relationship in Hong Kong

Hong Kong qualifies as the ideal case study to examine the relationship between securitization and trust because of the unique characteristics of its political sociology. First, Hong Kong is not a fully democratic administration in which the government owes its legitimacy and is accountable to the general public/voters. But Hong Kong is also not a fully authoritarian regime in which the citizens trust the authorities blindly or are forced to comply with the directives of the leadership out of the fear of facing severe punishment for non-compliance. Although Hong Kong used to be a ‘liberal enclave’ under Chinese sovereignty with a distinctive system of administration, fiscal, judiciary, final appeal, legislature, and socio-cultural liberties, this is not the case anymore ⁴³. In the aftermath of the anti-extradition law protests (anti-ELAB) of 2019, the political order and state-society relationships have been remapped ⁴⁴. Since 2019, the state has become even more powerful while the political influence of the civil society has significantly weakened. What is more, Hong Kong is a city where there exist intense conflicts between a state dominated by undemocratically elected politicians and civil society ⁴⁵. In this context, one would expect the state to fall short of dealing with the pandemic ⁴⁶. Social division, distrust and hostility towards the government could undermine public health measures and negate the capacity of the Hong Kong institutions to control the pandemic ⁴⁷. In this environment of deep institutional distrust, scholars have underlined various reasons accounting for the relative success of the Hong Kong authorities in controlling the pandemic from January 2020 to October 2021 ⁴⁸ ⁴⁹. In this study, we assess the extent to which the familiarity and trust of Hong Kong residents in the smart city in general, and the smart city tools related to the COVID-19 in particular, influenced Hong Kong’s success.

In this study, we perform a single case study analysis in which we assess the three main elements of securitization in relation to political trust and trust in smart city technology. We treat political trust as an intervening variable between the securitizing narratives and audience acceptance and between the emergency measures and audience acceptance. In an environment of high political trust, we expect that the audience would accept both the securitizing rhetoric and the emergency actions. In situations of elevated political trust, hence, an attempted securitization would have substantial chances to succeed. Conversely, in situations of low political trust, the securitizing moves would likely fail. We also hypothesize that in environments of high ‘technological literacy’, trust in technology might influence the public’s inclination to accept or reject the securitizing move and measures. Especially, when some, or most, of the emergency actions are based on the instrumentalization of smart tools, we assume that an audience that ‘trusts’ technology will not resist to the adoption of ‘smart’ emergency measures. Thus, trust in smart city tools may influence the success of an attempted securitization. How securitization could interact with political trust and trust in smart city instruments is illustrated in Figure 1.

“Insert here Figure 1”

The interaction of audience acceptance with political trust and trust in smart city technology results in the following configurations:

“Insert here Table 1”

In configuration A, trust in smart city is a complementary form of output legitimacy which contributes to guaranteeing audience acceptance and thus, the success of the attempted securitization. Configuration B states the obvious. Where there is no political trust or trust in smart city, the securitization is likely to fail because audience acceptance is unlikely to be achieved. Configuration C assumes that trust in the smart city compensates for the low level of political trust. But this could go both ways (Configuration D). Configuration E assumes that trust in smart city does not suffice for offsetting low political trust. Configuration F describes a situation of high political trust but low trust in technology resulting in audience disapproval of the securitizing move and discourse and by extension in a failed securitization.

Our data covers the temporal context between January 2020 and October 2021. To build our arguments we utilize first-hand and secondary sources. The latter consists of dozens of Hong Kong government communications and press releases about the pandemic, and evidence from the publicly available surveys of Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI). Our primary sources consist of a tailormade survey conducted by PORI, and a focus group exercise. The survey was conducted in Hong Kong between 24 March and 16 April 2021. The target population was that of Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong residents of age 18 or above with diverse political stances. Data was collected from a random sample of 808 respondents. The survey was based on a random sample, with attitudinal questions formulated in a standard 1-10 format (to provide continuous data), along with nominal or ordinal scales for the demographic data (generation, gender, income, social class, trust profile, positional types). Also, four specially convened focus groups, representing distinct audiences, each lasting for around one hour, accompanied the survey and purposive interview sample. Group 1 (FG1-10 participants) consisted of young (18–25-year-old) Chinese students; Group 2 (FG2) – (25-37 years old) was a mixed group, also with 10 participants; Group 3 (FG3) consisted of 11 civil servants and public officials, while Group 4 (FG4) encompassed 11 participants working for private companies. The focus group exercise took place on the 8th of December 2021.

The Security speech acts

The most important political agent of Hong Kong during this period, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor (hereafter Carrie Lam), the Chief Executive (CE) of the region, employed a mild securitizing discourse[3].

During the first month of the pandemic, Carrie Lam represented the situation as “very serious, prompting tremendous public health concern and anxiety to people”[4]. Based on the seriousness of the situation, Lam decided “to raise the response level to emergency and implement a series of strategies and measures […] to tackle the disease”[5]. Already in these first months of the pandemic, Lam clearly indicated that her main targeted audience was the public. On January 28 of 2020, she “appeal[ed] to the public to work together in disease prevention and control”[6]. A month later, she represented the situation as “severe” and appealed, once again, to the public to support the work of the Government and “fight the epidemic together”[7]. In March 2020, Carrie Lam emphasized the word “protection”. She appealed to those citizens who were under home quarantine to observe the rules and requirements of the quarantine in order to protect themselves, their family members and Hong Kong from a major outbreak[8]. A few days later, Carrie Lam, admitted that the measures undertaken were “draconian” and justified them by using the metaphor of “[sailing] through a wave” which necessitated “suppression” measures, “otherwise, we’ll not be able to sustain”[9].

In May 2020 the epicentre of the pandemic had moved from Mainland China to Europe and the United States. It was during that time that Carrie Lam, for the first time used the words “very major public health crisis” to describe the epidemic[10]. She did so to explain that even though severe measures (like lockdowns) were necessary, her government did not employ such solutions. The government of Hong Kong mainly had recourse to enforcing social distancing measures. Carrie Lam underlined that, in addition to the factors of public health and economic concerns, it was the acceptance (or tolerance) of the people that determined the success of the social distancing measures. The government, according to Lam, attempted to find a balance amongst the three factors, namely public health concerns, the impact to the economy, and acceptance of the measures by the people[11]. In July 2020, the CE likened the outbreak to a wave and warned that a potential community outbreak could lead to a “collapse of [Hong Kong’s] hospital system and cost lives”[12]. More stringent measures and the co-operation of the Hong Kong public were necessary, according to Lam, for “supressing this epidemic again”[13]. By August 2020, the leader of Hong Kong framed the situation as “severe” and described “living with the virus” as the “new normal”[14]. Eventually, the situation was controlled.

Dealing with a novel but short outbreak in November 2020, Carrie Lam used various security-charged words. She spoke about a “critical stage”, a “wave” of the epidemic, “fight”, “protection”, “critical” upcoming weeks, and “collapse” of Hong Kong’s medical system[15]. All these words used by the most official mouth of Hong Kong, illustrated how serious the situation was perceived to be by the Hong Kong government and the willingness of Hong Kong’s administration to treat the pandemic as a threat despite its limited impact. Entering 2021, and although the coastal city appeared to control the outbreak, the Hong Kong’s leadership kept on ‘mildly securitising’ the situation in order to motivate the Hong Kong’s citizens to get vaccinated. Within the first days of the Hong Kong’s Vaccination Programme, Lam represented the efforts to control the pandemic as a “fight against the virus”, and as a “battle” which the Hong Kong should “win”[16]. In May 2021, and whilst Hong Kong recorded close to zero local infections daily, Lam framed the vaccines as “more than a jab because [the jab] is the lifeline of Hong Kong”[17].

The above excerpts from the Hong Kong Chief Executive’s speeches, interviews, and statements demonstrate that, even though Hong Kong was not as impacted by the pandemic as other places, its leader regularly used security-charged words and phrases to urge the public to accept and tolerate the implemented exceptional measures.

The emergency actions

Although the authorities of various states employed strict and lengthy quarantine and lockdown methods to control the virus, the government of Hong Kong opted for social distancing measures to tackle the ‘threat’ inside Hong, and to restrict non-residents entering Hong Kong. Interestingly, the Hong Kong government’s measures were not consistent throughout the pandemic. Their nature and severity changed according to the developments of the epidemic within Hong Kong and the advancement of the methods to deal with the virus (vaccines, quarantines, lockdowns etc.).

At the beginning of the pandemic, after a short period of desecuritization of the threat and hesitance to impose border controls to visitors from Mainland China and after being urged by the medical workers and segments of the citizenry, the government strengthened health screening at boundary control points, required hospitals and doctors to report suspected cases, set up a surveillance system, and reminded the public to observe public hygiene[18]. The Hong Kong government’s strategy aimed to cut off the transmission of the virus by enhancing public education and calling on the public to take precautionary measures and reduce social contacts. Further, the Hong Kong authorities increased isolation and quarantine facilities, enhanced the capacity of the Public Health Laboratory Centre of the Department of Health to support the Enhanced Laboratory Surveillance Programme for the early identification of potential cases of infection, initiated projects under the Anti-epidemic Fund, and adjusted the special working arrangement for civil servants[19].

Some of Hong Kong’s emergency measures required the citizens and the government to utilize smart technology tools. Carrie Lam, in her March’s address to the Hong Kong people, appealed to them to make use of the “e-Report Room” online platform to report breaches of quarantine orders[20]. In July 2020, the CE made known that she had requested the Police Force to make use of its ‘supercomputer’ to help with contact tracing for confirmed cases[21]. However, the ‘smartest’ measure undertaken by the Hong Kong government to control the epidemic, was the launch of the mobile app ‘LeaveHomeSafe’ aiming to encourage the public to keep a record of their whereabouts[22]. Catering businesses and scheduled premises open for business were requested to apply for a ‘LeaveHomeSafe’ venue QR code from the government and display the QR code at a conspicuous position at the entrance of the premises[23].

Other smart city tools widely used throughout the pandemic included the electronic wristbands for monitoring persons under quarantine and the ‘StayHomeSafe’ app[24]. The tracking wristbands were used to monitor quarantine compliance. Quickly, the flimsy paper wristbands progressed to Bluetooth-equipped plastic ones ⁵⁰. All iterations were accompanied by a mobile phone application called ‘StayHomeSafe’, which the traveller should use upon reaching home to map out and upload their residence’s GPS coordinates ⁵¹. Other ‘smart’ measures included the ‘Local Situation Dashboard’ to keep the public abreast of the latest information on cases, the CuMask+^TM which included face masks that could be reused dozens of times and were provided for free to the public, the reagent for rapid tests, and the building sewage testing technology that helped to detect confirmed cases[25].

The measures that the Hong Kong authorities undertook in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic reveal that the government’s tactics were less restrictive than those enforced by other governments across the world. The government of Hong Kong did not impose strict lockdowns as in many places in Europe, Asia, and Oceania. The residents of Hong Kong were not restricted within the premises of their households, the police did not have to ensure that unnecessary commuting was avoided during the epidemic, and the economy of Hong Kong was less impacted by the crisis than elsewhere. However, although the measures were not as draconian as in other places, some of them were ‘smart’ and most of them required the co-operation of the public. Some of the measures were based on the advanced digitalization of Hong Kong governmental services and the familiarity of the Hong Kong citizens with advanced tech apps.

Public satisfaction and public trust

To examine the audience acceptance element in the securitization context we rely, among others, on publicly available surveys of PORI. We use descriptive statistics, portrayed in Figure 2 and Figure 3, to observe whether the percentages of public trust in government increase, or decrease, in a parallel manner with the percentages of the satisfaction of the Hong Kong citizens with their authorities. In the absence of any survey that directly examines the opinion of the citizens about the securitizing rhetoric and measures, we consider citizens’ satisfaction with the government as a predictor of audience acceptance. For establishing the trust of the Hong Kong people in smart technologies, we investigate the results of a first-hand survey commissioned by Hong Kong Baptist University and conducted by PORI. We further consult the findings of the focus group exercise (N= 43) to determine the confidence of the Hong Kong residents in the government, the smart tools, and LeaveHomeSafe.

In terms of trust in the government of Hong Kong, PORI’s findings[26] suggest that the public did not consider the authorities as trustworthy. In February 2020, just 14,2% of Hong Kong citizens ‘trusted’ the government. As expected, distrust was very high (75,9%). Two months later, and with Hong Kong showing a robust response to the pandemic, trust in government reached 28,5%. That was more than 10% higher than in February 2020. Nevertheless, the numbers of distrust remained high (60,3%). In August 2020, the government scored the highest trust numbers (30,2%). That was right after the territory managed to contain a relatively short COVID-19 outbreak. From May to December 2020, the numbers of distrust fluctuated between 49,4% (lowest) to 62,9% (highest). Till July 2021, the percentages of trust remained always above 30% while the numbers of distrust never exceeded 53,5%.

In terms of public satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the performance of the Hong Kong government, in February 2020, 82,5% of the Hong Kong public answered that it was dissatisfied while only 8,8% was content with the government’s performance[27]. In April 2020, the numbers of satisfied Hong Kong citizens jumped to 20,8%. That was the highest percentage of citizens’ satisfaction with the government recorded in 2020. Regarding dissatisfaction, this fluctuated between 59,6% (December 2020) and 70,6% (June 2020). In 2021, the Hong Kong government scored better results than in 2020.

“Insert here Figure 2”

“Insert here Figure 3”

To conclude, the Hong Kong government scored very poor results regarding public satisfaction. Having recorded such low numbers, it is difficult to establish that the Hong Kong securitizing actors succeeded in persuading their securitization audience. The low numbers of satisfaction with the government went hand in hand with the low percentages of trust in the government.

In such an environment of limited satisfaction with the government’s performance and deficient numbers of trust, one would expect the people of Hong Kong to reject the government’s directives relevant to the pandemic. As a result of this anticipated disobedience, it was also likely that Hong Kong would record very large numbers of COVID-19 related deaths and cases. However, by August 2021, Hong Kong had remained relatively intact by the pandemic. As of 17 August 2021, there were only recorded 212 COVID-19 deaths and 12,040 confirmed cases.[28] These figures are minute if compared with the numbers of cases and deaths in countries having a similar population with that of Hong Kong.

Did trust in the smart city technology employed by the Hong Kong government to fight the outbreak counterbalance the distrust in the government? To investigate the extent to which Hong Kongers were confident in smart technologies, we consult the bespoke survey administered by PORI and the responses of the participants in the four Focus Groups.

Regarding the LeaveHomeSafe mobile application, 52% of the survey’s respondents considered it as important while 27% thought that LeaveHomeSafe was unimportant. If these figures gave broad-brush evidence, the focus group exercise allowed the research team to drill down and capture deeper responses. The participants deliberated on support for and trust in the LeaveHomeSafe app. Some of the interlocutors appeared to be neutral in or supportive to the utilization of the LeaveHomeSafe. Some others did not trust the application at all. For example, one participant, a young student-resident of Hong Kong who had arrived from Mainland China, underscored the importance of the app and suggested that Hong Kong should learn from Mainland China and merge the LeaveHomeSafe with WeChat, or the equivalent of WeChat in Hong Kong (Participant 6, FG1). A member of FG2, the mixed group, revealed that (s)he was not very sceptical about using LeaveHomeSafe because the domestic legislation (Hong Kong Personal Data Privacy Ordinance) promises to “keep Hong Kong citizens to have a good privacy”. Participants 1 and 7 of FG3 (civil servants) criticized the government for not “putting enough effort to develop the LeaveHomeSafe app”, the development and production of which “was outsourced”. Participants 8 and 10 of FG3 added the political reasons and privacy concerns to those triggering the Hong Kong public scepticism towards LeaveHomeSafe. Similarly, Participant 5 of FG4 (private sector employees) blamed the bad timing (the aftermath of the anti-ELAB protests) for the distrust in LeaveHomeSafe. The participant stated that “if we trust the government more, we will maybe download the [sponsored by the government] apps”. Interestingly, another interviewee of FG4 did not relate the downloading of the apps with trust in the government (Participant 6).

In terms of the LeaveHomeSafe downloads and installations, by April 2021, nearly four million people (3,8 million) out of the seven million citizens of Hong Kong had downloaded it.[29] Two months earlier, just 840 thousand Hong Kong citizens had downloaded it. Although the sharp increase of downloads from February to April could indicate an expansion of public trust in the LeaveHomeSafe application (and by extension, to smart city technologies), by April 2021, Hong Kong was still far from influencing the entire population of Hong Kong to download and use the application. Moreover, the installation of the LeaveHomeSafe app did not necessarily relate to the utilization of this app. Many HongKongers downloaded the application without actually using it to record their whereabouts. Participant 9 from FG2 and Participant 6 from FG4 mentioned that many Hong Kong residents bought new mobile phones to prevent the leakage of their personal data via the real-name registration used by LeaveHomeSafe.

Although the development of smart technology could trigger privacy issues, the respondents of the tailormade survey seemed to support the installation of smart lampposts (49%), the utilization of electronic identities (32%), and the activation of the 5G network (43%). Regarding trust in various organizations or modes in providing smart city-related services, 37% distrusted the government of Hong Kong to provide them. The Legislative Council and the Chinese-funded companies were even more distrusted than the government (47% and 42% respectively) to provide such services. When PORI’s respondents were asked whether using smart technology to collect data infringed their privacy, by 49% answered that they agreed. This indicates that, despite the public’s trust in smart technologies, when these technologies originated from or were related to the government or mainland Chinese companies, the trust in this smart technology diminished. The above discussions show that there is a high take up of the smart city apps in Hong Kong in spite of mistrust in the government. Hence, securitization can function in the absence of trust.

Interestingly, the findings of the survey were not replicated by all the participants of the FG exercise. A young Mainland Chinese resident of Hong Kong from FG1 would gladly trust the government to collect his/her private information as “a constant top-down surveillance would make the members of the society more civilized” (Participant 1). Intrusion of privacy by smart apps was not a concern for most of the Hong Kong residents originating from Mainland China (FG1 Participants 1,3,4,7). Private and International providers of smart city tools and services would be trusted by most FG1 interviewees only if they were strictly controlled by and accountable to the government (Participants 1,3,4,7). Growing up in Mainland China, where the central government is highly trusted by supermajorities of the citizens, potentially influenced the answers of FG1 participants. The participants of FG2, the mixed group, produced diverse responses on that matter. Participant 2 trusted neither the government nor the private companies to collect his/her private data (FG2). Participants 5, 7, 9, and 10 trusted the government more than the foreign and local private companies to implement smart city projects because the private companies “care solely about profit” while “the government cares about the citizens welfare” (FG2). Participant 1, though, after insisting that Hong Kong is highly advanced in the usage of smart technologies, pointed to the recent social upheaval as the reason behind the low trust of the citizens in the government and in the smart apps developed and sponsored by the government (FG2). The participants of FG3 (civil servants) raised concerns about disclosing personal details and privacy to organizations collecting big data (Participants 9, 10). Participant 9 in particular (FG3) “trusts the government to use [his/her] data, because the reputation of the government is good, and it has a good management of the [smart] devices”. Participant 6 (FG3), on the other hand, considered as risky the implementation of the smart lampposts project which would allow the government to monitor the movement of the citizens. Participants from FG4, the private sector employees, were more comfortable with trusting international companies than the government because the international companies have the resources to compensate for potential losses of private data (Participant 1). One of the reasons that the Hong Kong government was not trusted to operate smart city instruments was, according to Participants 1 and 5, the utilization of outdated and “quite lame” electronic systems (FG4). Hence, most of the focus groups interviewees revealed a certain level of confidence to smart city applications. The participants, especially those with mainland Chinese background or employment relationships with the government of Hong Kong, trusted the government to provide and operate the smart city technologies. For them, there was no distinction between trust in government and trust in smart technologies. For some other participants though, trust in smart technology could counterbalance the low trust in government for as long as the latter was not involved with the design and operationalization of the smart city apps.

To conclude, the combination of PORI’s publicly available, tailormade survey and focus group exercise indicate low levels of trust in and satisfaction with the government of Hong Kong and its attempts to control the epidemic. Trust and confidence in the importance of smart technologies was high, but it diminished when the government provided such smart services. In that environment, it is difficult to suggest that the securitizing moves, and measures of Hong Kong’s government had been widely accepted by the public. The relative success of Hong Kong in securitizing and controlling the pandemic more effectively than other administrations around the world seems to be, therefore, a paradox. The investigation of some other factors, peculiar to the situation in Hong Kong, could decode this paradox.

[3] The wording of the CE’s discourse that is ‘security-charged’ is emphasized with Italics letter font.

[4] “CE announces activation of Emergency Response Level in relation to novel coronavirus infection,” 25 January 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202001/26/P2020012600087.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[5] Ibid.

[6] “HKSAR Government announces enhanced measures for disease prevention and control,” 28 January 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202001/29/P2020012900006.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[7] CE” visits Fire Services Department and inspects infection control measures at Queensway Government Offices”, 28 February 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202002/28/P2020022800882.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[8] “Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting”, 17 March 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202003/17/P2020031700439.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[9] “Transcript of remarks of press conference”, 21 March 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202003/21/P2020032100756.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[10] “Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting”, 19 May 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202005/19/P2020051900372.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[11] “Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting”, 16 June 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202006/16/P2020061600456.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[12] “CE appeals to public in fight against COVID-19”, 29 July 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202007/28/P2020072800713.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[13] Ibid.

[14] “Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting”, 18 August 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202008/18/P2020081800431.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[15] “Transcript of remarks of press conference”, 30 November 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202011/30/P2020113000901.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[16] “CE appeals to public to get vaccinated against COVID-19”, 22 February 2021, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202102/22/P2021022200784.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[17] “Transcript of remarks of press conference on "Early Vaccination for All" campaign”, 31 May 2021, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202105/31/P2021053100924.htm (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[18] “Article by the CE: Continue Our Fight Determined to Win”, February 2020, https://www.ceo.gov.hk/eng/pdf/article20200225.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[19] Ibid.

[20] “Article by the CE: Two Months into Our Fight Continue to Stay Vigilant”, March 2020, https://www.ceo.gov.hk/eng/pdf/article20200325.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[21] “Article by the CE: Fighting the Virus for Six Months Battling Another Wave of the Epidemic Together”, July 2020, https://www.ceo.gov.hk/eng/pdf/article20200725.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[22] “Article by the CE: Fighting the Virus For Ten Months Sparing No Effort in Combating a Rebound and Achieving “Zero Infection”, November 2020, https://www.ceo.gov.hk/eng/pdf/article20201127.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[23] Ibid.

[24] “Article by the CE: Fighting the Epidemic for One Year Consolidating Our Experience”, January 2021, https://www.ceo.gov.hk/eng/pdf/article20210127.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[25] Ibid.

[26] “People’s Trust in the HKSAR Government”, PORI, 2021, https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/government-en/k001.html?lang=en (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[27] “People’s Satisfaction with the HKSAR Government”, PORI, 2021, https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/government-en/h001.html?lang=en (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[28] “Local Situation Dashboard”, The Government of Hong Kong, 2021, https://www.coronavirus.gov.hk/eng/index.html (accessed on 17 December 2022).

[29] “Coronavirus: contact-tracing ‘Leave Home Safe’ app records 3.8 million downloads – representing over half of Hong Kong’s population”, South China Morning Post, 11 April 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/health-environment/article/3129105/coronavirus-contact-tracing-leave-home-safe-app (accessed on 17 December 2022).

The CSSS securitization framework emphasizes the importance of intersubjectivity in the securitization process ⁵². In the securitization context, intersubjectivity equals to ‘audience acceptance’, or the capacity of the securitizing actors to persuade their targeted audience about the imminence of the alleged threat and the necessity to adopt exceptional measures. The CSSS’ theorists suggest that audience acceptance is a precondition of a successful securitization. When the public is the targeted audience, ‘audience acceptance’ is translated into limited public opposition to the securitizers’ allegations and actions. In the case of Hong Kong, we observe an anomaly. The Hong Kong government appears to have successfully securitized the pandemic despite the low numbers of trust in the government and the smart apps developed by it.

From a CSSS’ perspective, we can observe Hong Kong’s response to the pandemic from three different angles and still maintain that the Hong Kong government’s securitization attempt was successful. The first angle is that associating the success of a securitization with the acceptance or rejection of the government’s rhetoric and measures. Considering that no substantial opposition has been recorded to the Hong Kong government’s plans for COVID-19 containment, it is implied that from this first angle that the government’s securitization of the pandemic was a success. From the second angle, we observe whether the government encountered any resistance to implementation of the securitizing measures. The Hong Kong authorities managed to draft, discuss, vote, and enforce the exceptional measures rapidly without facing any resistance by the public. Thus, from this second angle too, Hong Kong’s securitization appears fruitful. From the third angle, we examine the outcome of the securitization of the pandemic in Hong Kong. The purpose of the securitization of the COVID-19 outbreak was to keep the numbers of COVID-19 deaths and infections low. Since Hong Kong was (up to October 2021) one of the best performing administrations worldwide in keeping new cases and casualties close to zero, also from this third angle, Hong Kong’s securitization was a success.

To sum up, the infection and death rates of Hong Kong indicate that after the arguably mild securitization rhetoric of Carrie Lam, the city was successful in keeping COVID-19 out of its territory. However, the Hong Kong’s general public, the targeted audience of Carrie Lam’s securitizing rhetoric, and the most critical determinant of Hong Kong’s success to control COVID-19, mistrusted the government. How was it possible that, while Hong Kong’s general public mistrusted the government and doubted its governance capacity, it complied with the measures proposed by the same government? Could the familiarity with and trust in the ‘smart’ measures activated in the context of the pandemic explain this outcome?

Public acceptability of the ‘smart’ measures, like the LeaveHomeSafe app, influenced the extent to which the government contained the pandemic. The more the citizens registered their whereabouts in the LeaveHomeSafe, the higher the chances for the government to trace the close contacts of infected residents, quarantine them, and break the transmission chain. Although the register with the LeaveHomeSafe downloads has shown that most of Hong Kong residents complied with the directives of the government to download the app, the discussions within the focus groups revealed that some citizens resorted to trickeries in order to avoid registering their whereabouts. These residents did not download the app in their primary mobile device in which they used a sim card. They downloaded LeaveHomeSafe to a secondary mobile phone that did not carry a sim card, and hence could not register their whereabouts when they scanned the QR code of the premises that they visited. The residents who deceived the authorities did not do so because they did not trust smart technology per se. They did so because they distrusted the developer and regulator of the smart app, the government of Hong Kong. As the tailormade survey disclosed, although the majority of Hong Kong residents was satisfied with technology in general, it did not trust the government to provide the smart technology services. This shows that low levels of trust in the government impact the willingness of the citizens to utilize smart technology sponsored and controlled by the same government. This was also confirmed by some interlocutors of the FG exercise. They linked their low confidence in smart technologies fostered by the government with their distrust in the government. But the reason provided by some of the FG participants not to trust the Hong Kong government was the response of the latter to the 2019 protests. Hence, if we view the situation in Hong Kong through the lenses of the configurations outlined in the methodological section, we see that a conditional Configuration C might be applicable. Trust in smart technologies could counterbalance distrust in government and result in ‘audience acceptance’ and securitization success. However, this was not the case in Hong Kong. The smart apps that were employed to support the control of the pandemic were developed, controlled, and operationalized by the government. As such, they were not trusted by the citizens. However, the citizens of Hong Kong were not opposed to smart technology. Although smart technology tools were operationalized by the Hong Kong government, the applicability of such tools did not increase mistrust in the government. The reasons behind the success of Hong Kong in securitizing and controlling the outbreak should be traced elsewhere than in the (mis)trust in government or trust in technology.

First, to contain the virus, Hong Kong relied on the strict quarantine requirements that dissuaded many potential visitors from traveling to Hong Kong and many Hong Kong residents from departing. Other places, like New Zealand and Australia, also imposed stringent quarantines on the new arrivals. However, New Zealand and Australia regularly imposed strict lockdowns on their domestic populations too. Until the end of 2022, Hong Kong never proceeded with ‘locking down’ its entire territory or large districts. Switching Hong Kong from ‘Asia’s World City’ to ‘Asia’s Walled City’ seems, to a large extent, to be accountable for Hong Kong’s relative success in controlling the pandemic.

Second, within Hong Kong’s territory, the people abided with the proposed social distancing measures, not necessarily because they resonated with their government but mainly because of their past experiences with similar highly contagious infectious diseases, and their Confucian culture which focuses on the importance of personal ethics and morality ⁵³. In Hong Kong, communitarianism is in line with the Confucian principles enshrined in the society ⁵⁴. These cultural characteristics of Hong Kong’s society promote civic engagement that make the communities work together to curb the spread of the virus ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶.Community capacity and social mobilization could, hence, compensate for the lack of formal state capacity and inadequate governmental response ⁵⁷ ⁵⁸. What is more, the SARS outbreak in 2003 found Hong Kong unprepared. Although SARS’ duration was shorter than that of COVID-19, SARS resulted in 1,755 cases and 299 deaths. The traumatic experience of Hong Kong with SARS encouraged the authorities to fortify the territory for the eventuality of a future pandemic like SARS. At the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak, while the rest of the world’s governments, medics, and societies speculated on how to respond to the novel communicable disease, the government and health professionals in Hong Kong activated protocols designed since SARS to deal with similar situations. This increased the efficacy of the Hong Kong authorities’ response.

To conclude, securitization in general, and smart city technologies in particular, can be very useful governmental instruments in the hands of governments when they deal with health emergencies. By treating an infectious disease outbreak as a security issue that necessitates the activation of emergency procedures and the utilization of exceptional methods, political actors may achieve the abidance of the public with the suggested social distancing measures which if combined with high degrees of public acceptability may contribute to the effectiveness of a government to contain a pandemic. In the case of low political trust, a government could instrumentalize smart technologies to benefit from the public’s trust in such technologies and achieve public acceptability of the securitization rhetoric and emergency actions. Admittedly, trust in smart tech is not the explanatory variable of Hong Kong’s success to control the pandemic. The experience of Hong Kong people and health system with SARS in 2003, the social mobilization, the community capacity, and the citizens’ adherence to the values of Confucianism were instrumental for Hong Kong’s successful containment of the pandemic. The case of Hong Kong, therefore, shows that trust in government ought to be one of the variables taken into consideration when studying securitizations’ audience acceptance. The case of Hong Kong also shows that a securitization could be successful despite the securitizing agents being distrusted by the securitization audience.

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5 Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J. de Wilde. 1998. Security a New Framework for Analysis.

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6 Ibid.

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8 Vultee, F. 2010. Securitization: A new approach to the framing of the “war on terror. Journalism Practice 4 (1): 33-47.

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12 Rubin, O., and E. Bækkeskov. 2020. Expert-Led Securitization: The Case of the 2009 Pandemic in Denmark and Sweden. Politics and Governance 8 (4): 319-330.

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20 Hapal, K. 2021. The Philippines’ Covid-19 Response: Securitizing the Pandemic and Disciplining the Pasaway. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 40 (2): 224-244.

21 Vultee, F. 2010. Securitization: A new approach to the framing of the “war on terror. Journalism Practice 4 (1): 33-47.

22 Blair, R.A., B.S. Morse and L.L. Tsai. 2017. Public Health and Public Trust: Survey Evidence from the Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic in Liberia. Social Science and Medicine 172: 89-97.

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24 Hartley, K., and D.S.L. Jarvis. 2020. Policy making in low-trust state: legitimacy, state capacity, and responses to COVID-19 in Hong Kong. Policy and Society 39 (3): 403-423.

25 Yuen, S., E.W. Chung, N.H.K. Or, et al. 2021. A Tale of Two City-States: A Comparison of the State-Led vs Civil Society-Led Responses to COVID-19 in Singapore and Hong Kong. Global Public Health 16 (8-9): 1283-1303.

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27 Blair, R.A., B.S. Morse and L.L. Tsai. 2017. Public Health and Public Trust: Survey Evidence from the Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic in Liberia. Social Science and Medicine 172: 89-97.

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44 Ibid.

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47 Miao, Q., S. Schwarz, and G. Schwarz. 2021. Responding to COVID-19: Community Volunteerism and Coproduction in China. World Development 137, art. 105128.

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51 Ibid.

52 Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J. de Wilde. 1998. Security a New Framework for Analysis.

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53 Liu, J., Y. Shahab, and H. Hogue. 2022. Government Response Measures and Public Trust during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Around the World. British Journal of Management 33: 571-602.

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56 Miao, Q., S. Schwarz, and G. Schwarz. 2021. Responding to COVID-19: Community Volunteerism and Coproduction in China. World Development 137, art. 105128.

57 Hartley, K., and D.S.L. Jarvis. 2020. Policy making in low-trust state: legitimacy, state capacity, and responses to COVID-19 in Hong Kong. Policy and Society 39 (3): 403-423.

58 Yuen, S., E.W. Chung, N.H.K. Or, et al. 2021. A Tale of Two City-States: A Comparison of the State-Led vs Civil Society-Led Responses to COVID-19 in Singapore and Hong Kong. Global Public Health 16 (8-9): 1283-1303.

Table 1 Securitization-Trust Configurations

Configuration	Trust Relations	Audience Response	Form of Securitization
A	Political Trust + Trust in Smart City	Audience Acceptance	Successful Securitization
B	Distrust in Government + Distrust in Smart City	Audience Disapproval	Failed Securitization
C	Distrust in Government + Trust in Smart City	Audience Acceptance	Successful Securitization
D	Political Trust + Distrust in Smart City	Audience Acceptance	Successful Securitization
E	Distrust in Government + Trust in Smart City	Audience Disapproval	Failed Securitization
F	Political Trust + Distrust in Smart City	Audience Disapproval	Failed Securitization

Competing interests: The authors declare no competing interests.

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Countering the Covid-19 pandemic in Hong Kong. A Successful Securitization in an Environment of Low Political Trust.

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