We investigate whether competition between appraisers induce them to better conduct the valuation of a property that they are likely to sell subsequently. We first show that the impact of competition is in theory ambiguous, both on information disclosure and on price levels. Second, we conduct an empirical study to settle this question when considering real estate brokers in France. Using data from an online company connecting brokers with clients who want to sell their housing properties, we show that more competition or lower opportunity to collude induce brokers to raise their initial price estimation of properties' value by more than 3%. This is observed upstream, when experts appraise the property for sale. Competition partially prevents brokers from biaising downward evaluations, and appears beneficial to the client since it translates into a positive effect on listing prices without a negative effect on the subsequent sale process (time on the market and selling price).
JEL Codes: L15 - D8 - D83 - R30 - L85