We identified a total of 34 unique goals that we grouped into the four categories mentioned above. Most of the goals (24) were shared by at least two of the three cities. Ten goals were unique to a single city. Bogotá had the fewest number of goals (16), while Los Angeles had the most (29). Figure 2 shows an overview of all 34 goals identified.
While we identified these 34 goals either through our documentary analysis or the interviews, it was the interviews that allowed us to gain a better understanding of their relative importance. Through the interviews we realised that not all goals were equally relevant or perceived as equally important by the interviewees, but rather there were some goals that they perceived as having an oversized influence or importance in the governance actions that these stakeholders took. By interviewing multiple individuals and corroborating their perceptions of the relative importance of certain goals between themselves and with the documents analysed, we carried out a triangulation process to identify certain goals that we termed dominant goals, as those that were relatively more important and dominated the majority of the governance actions taken. These have been marked in bold on the diagrams presented for each case below. In the following sections we do a deep dive into each of the three case studies by providing a general context for each city, followed by a summary of the goals we identified, and finally a discussion of why and how the dominant goals influenced governance actions.
4.1 Regulating ridehailing services in Bogotá, Colombia
In September of 2013, the multinational company Uber started operating ridehailing services in the city of Bogotá. Before this date, the individual public transport sector was dominated by a long-established, privately-operated taxi industry that had been highly regulated via a series of national and local laws and regulations. These laws clearly defined the goals for the sector as: providing freedom of access, quality, and safety to users (Ministerio de Transporte de Colombia, 1996). In addition to this traditional taxi industry, after the 1991 constitution, the law established a ‘special individual transport’ category, similar to taxis, but that was meant to serve the transport needs of specific groups of users such as students, employees, or tourists. Locally, these special services were called ‘white cars’ or ‘white (number) plates’, as regulations require them to be painted white to distinguish them from other services. Unlike regular taxis, white cars cannot be hailed on the street, and their use requires the previous signing of a contract between the driver/owner and the users. Uber decided to provide its services using these white cars that were affiliated to already registered companies, effectively allowing them to circumvent existing taxi regulation even if their service was for all intents and purposes, identical to that of regular taxi services. Later, in 2014, Uber started providing services through private car owners. Both forms of operation were explicitly prohibited by the law (Colombian presidency, 2015). Uber was the first ridehailing service to operate in the country, however other companies followed suit in the following years. Still, Uber remained the visible face of ridehailing services.
Uber’s operations in Bogotá led to a series of governance actions at diverse levels of government: from the government of Bogotá using its authority to regulate individual transport services, to the national government through its three branches (executive, legislative and judicial) looking to either regulate or stop these services. Figure 1 below shows the goals we identified for these governance actions. As a reminder, goals marked in bold are those that we identified as dominant goals.
We identified three dominant goals shaping government responses to ridehailing in Colombia. These were: (i) Order and law enforcement, (ii) quality of service, and (iii) safety.
Regarding the first goal of order and law enforcement, since the way ridehailing operations were being done fell outside of the existing regulatory frameworks for taxis or white cars, the government could have either done nothing (laissez faire) or attempt to regulate these services. Practitioners belonging to the executive branch mentioned in interviews how they viewed that the responsibility to regulate these services belonged to the legislative branch since the existing laws did not consider a ridehailing service, and their role was to follow the law, not create laws. In the period between 2015 and 2020 the legislative branch introduced a total of 10 bills that aimed to regulate ridehailing services, but all of them failed to become laws. Without a new service typology, practitioners had no other recourse other than declaring ridehailing services illegal since they did not fit into the existing typologies of taxis or white cars. As a practitioner with the Ministry of Transport expressed in one of the interviews conducted: “under our current legal framework, when we say that Uber is illegal, what we are saying is that Uber is not an (authorized) transport company”. This interpretation of Uber falling outside the scope of Colombian law created a de facto constraint on any action that either the national or local governments could attempt, since there was no legal framework that would allow any type of regulation. Another high-level official again with the Ministry of Transport mentioned in one of the interviews how “The Ministry never said no (…) to the use of new technologies. But, while the current legal framework for (individual) public transport is in place, we have to respect it… It’s our duty”. This shows how practitioners perceived that their hands were tied when it came to regulating these services until congress acted, and their only option was using the existing enforcement mechanisms that the law already provided to try to stop these illegal services. This then led to the government imposing financial sanctions against Uber, and local governments directing transit agents to try to stop these services on the street. The goal of order and law enforcement can therefore be seen as an imposed goal that resulted from external factors outside the control of government practitioners.
The first goal led to the second and third goals of quality of service and safety. Practitioners interviewed agreed that the two most prominent perceived benefits of ridehailing services when compared to existing taxis were safety and quality. Taxi services in Bogotá were seen as dangerous, as there had been multiple media reports on muggings inside taxis (AFP, 2013). Furthermore, a constant complaint by taxi users was that drivers would refuse to take them to certain places in the city, especially during peak hours, and that taxis were dirty and drivers disrespectful (El Espectador, 2012). When Uber came along, they marketed their service as solving these issues by using GPS and vetoing drivers to address the safety concerns, and by using higher-end vehicles with trained drivers. Since practitioners could not directly regulate ridehailing services, they opted instead to try and improve the legally sanctioned taxi service to address the quality and security concerns of users. This approach led to the national government adapting the existing taxi regulations to provide for a ‘premium’ taxi service which would operate under the same legal structure as a regular taxi service but would incorporate different features including newer vehicles and the use of technological platforms for payment and hailing. Bogotá also saw that improving taxi services was one of their only recourses to address the issue of ridehailing since it, again, didn’t have any legal mechanism to regulate these services. The city therefore used the new directive from the national government to launch their ‘smart taxi initiative’ and in an interview given to a national newspaper in 2017, the then Secretary of Mobility in Bogotá said that their goal was not to counter Uber, but to have people regain trust in the existing taxi services (El Tiempo, 2017).
While improving existing services could be seen as a positive goal, the legal constraints on regulating rideahailing services were not the only reason why improving the quality of existing taxi services became a dominant goal for policy in both the local Bogota government and the national Colombian government. Multiple stakeholders mentioned in interviews how the existing taxi industry holds (and often exerts) its power through industry groups. Multiple taxi industry groups exist in the country representing different interests; taxi owners, taxi companies, or taxi drivers. Some of these groups either threatened or carried out multiple strikes since the introduction of ridehailing services whenever there was a new attempt to regulate these services in the country since they were content with the interpretation the governments had adopted of ridheailing being an ‘illegal’ service and saw any attempt at regulation as a way to legalise these illegal services. A high-level practitioner with the city of Bogotá said in one of the interviews: “(…) there’s always a tension, a pressure… on the (possibility of a) strike. On everything that it means… that you will always have a fear of tackling the problem head on because the taxis… the taxi strikes have completely paralysed Bogotá”.
This threat, combined with the political power that the industry groups hold by mobilising their members to vote for different candidates during election periods, led to an understanding within government officials that it was politically unviable to take any actions that could be seen as favouring ridehailing services and detrimental to the taxi industry. This included any attempt at making ridehailing services legal. In fact, the President at the time met with taxi industry representatives and made a commitment to combat ‘illegal’ services, referring specifically to Uber (Ospina, 2014; Taxibiris, 2014). This sentiment was explicitly transmitted to government officials, and as one interviewee would put it: “we received an indication from the top to ‘not create issues for us’”, meaning that the status quo in which ridehailing services had been interpreted as illegal was preferable, and the only possible actions from government were ones that would not “rattle the boat”; specifically this was interpreted as actions that would improve the safety and quality of existing taxi services, leading to these becoming two dominant goals in the country.
In summary, the goals pursued by public sector stakeholders in both the local Bogotá government and the national Colombian government were imposed on them by a series of events that prevented the creation of a regulatory framework that would allow the adoption of clear rules under which ridehailing services could operate, even if congress tried to act and the executive branch agreed with the creation of specific regulations (at least at the beginning of the process). With no regulatory framework, government stakeholders had to declare these services illegal, and therefore to the goal of order and law enforcement. The difficulty in creating this regulatory framework was exacerbated by the political pressure exercised by the taxi industry groups which saw the legalisation of ridehailing as a threat to their own interests. This then led to a strategy by the governments of betterment of the existing taxi industry, which therefore led to the adoption of the other two goals of safety and quality of service. As of 2023, there is still no specific regulation for ridehailing in the country, and ridehailing companies are operating under a legal vacuum.
4.2 Regulating shared micromobility services in Paris, France
Paris has a relatively long history of publicly-authorised shared mobility services going back to the implementation of its public bike sharing system Vélib’ in 2007, and the later addition in 2011 of the Autolib’ electric car sharing system. While these systems were privately operated, they were set up and through public tendering (or commission) with a contract existing between the city and private operators.
In 2013, drawing on the perceived success of these transport sharing systems, mayoral candidate Anne Hidalgo promised in her policy platform to create an electric moped sharing service (Hidalgo, 2013). She noted that such an improvement in transport services was a step towards Paris becoming a more “bright, fluid and pleasant” city, and that it would create public value, as well as contribute to improving population health in the city (Hidalgo, 2013, p.61). Once elected, Mayor Hidalgo explained the proposed system that was to be called ‘Scootlib’ in more detail to the city council, announcing that she planned for it to operate in the same way as Vélib’ and Autolib’, i.e. to be run by a private operator with a public tendering process and strict measures for safety, fares, design, and operations (Paris City Council, 2014).
At the same time as the mayor’s office was making these announcements, the private company CityScoot was planning the launch of its privately led shared moped rental service that would operate out of existing car parks, effectively allowing them to function without needing a contract from the city. CityScoot was the first of a series of at least 7 similar ventures that were deployed by private sector companies in Paris between 2014 and 2020, which included not only mopeds, but also bicycles, and e-scooters, and that were deployed without any intervention by the city government. In response to these deployments, the city government took multiple governance actions which resulted first in the adoption of a code of good conduct with all operators, and later a public tender leading to a direct contract with the city for three scooter operators in 2020. The national government also had to intervene and incorporate a new category of vehicles and services in their national mobility law (Loi d’Orientation des Mobilités – LOM) to allow such actions at the local level.
We identified four dominant goals in the case of Paris: (i) better use of public space, (ii) protecting pedestrians, (iii) reducing air pollution, and (iv) providing more mobility options.
In 2017 in the span of only three months, four bikesharing companies started deploying their vehicles in the city with no consultation with the government, and multiple other companies announced their plans to follow suit (Le Point, 2017). These announcements led to the city of Paris calling for a meeting with all interested operators. In the report of the meeting, the mayor’s office noted that they welcomed the boom of bicycle operators as cycling was an essential part of their strategy to reduce pollution, however they would not stand for a private economic model that left the city with all the negative externalities such as trying to clear the public right of way from abandoned bicycles, as had been seen in other cities around the world. Practitioners interviewed echoed this sentiment of fear, noting how they had been following what some of these companies had done in other places around the world, where they had massively deployed vehicles to later abandon them on the streets. Similarly, some members of the city council, and specifically some of the government coalition parties noted the ‘anarchic nature’ of these new services and councilmembers showed concern about how these vehicles had started to invade sidewalks all over the city creating issues with pedestrians, baby strollers, wheelchairs, and street cleaning services (Paris City Council, 2017). The press also took note and copied the expression of ‘road anarchy’ to refer to the situation on the city’s streets (Bontinck, 2018). A series of road incidents exacerbated the safety and street clutter concerns of the Paris government: “Every week there is a new situation: a disabled person prevented from circulating on a sidewalk, a mother and her child jostled while crossing the street, a woman hit in a garden and the victim of several broken bones in her hand. My role as Mayor is to defend these victims and prevent others from becoming victims too”. Noted Mayor Hidalgo in a press conference announcing changes in the regulations for these services (Hidalgo, 2019). A high-ranking officer with the office of the Deputy Mayor for public space confirmed that they perceived street clutter and safety as a major concern of the locals: “we were facing different wills of Parisians. There is the one who, and I think this is the most important, at least for the (…) political leaders in Paris, is to ‘securize’ and give a more quiet, and nicer public space to everyone. So, the most important for the political leaders on this is to be sure that this kind of new mobilities are not impacting the pedestrians, and the security of all the users of the public space”. Although it is hard to ascertain if these were real or perceived fears, this nevertheless led to the government adopting the goals of better use of public space and protecting pedestrians as central to their governance response to shared mobility services.
The next dominant goal we identified in the city was that of improved air quality. This goal can be easily traced to Mayor Hidalgo’s policy platform where she noted that, if elected, she would push for improvements in air quality as one of her main priorities (Hidalgo, 2013). This policy priority very quickly became a reality with the City Council’s approval of the Road Vehicle Pollution Control Plan in 2015 and the Climate-Air-Energy Territorial Plan in 2018. These plans make it clear that a cleaner air is one of the priorities of the administration and Mayor Hidalgo herself mentioned that: “The need to act with force and determination (against air pollution) is no longer debatable (…) I’ve made this fight one of my priorities.”(Mairie de Paris, 2015). Since she was elected on this platform, we can conclude that this is a goal that was democratically chosen by the citizens of Paris.
When analysing policy documents, we can see how the last goal of providing more mobility options is often used as a shorthand for reducing car usage and is therefore closely related to the previous goal of improving air quality and to the environmental goal of mitigating climate change by reducing CO2 emissions from the transport sector. Looking at it through the lens of Cashore and Howlett’s framework, providing more mobility options is an objective rather than a goal, however it has become such a prominent objective that it tends to be used as a heuristic for those environmental goals. In a council session from 2018 the then deputy mayor for urbanism explained how: “The objective that we share with the (national) Government is to promote digital tools, in particular multimodal information and ticketing services that facilitate multimodality for the benefit of fluidity of journeys and providing alternatives to private vehicles.”(Paris City Council, 2018). In fact, this goal was identified as a key one in 2013 when only the Scootlib’ project was starting to be considered in council. The council issued a declaration encouraging the executive to launch a feasibility study and specifically mentioned the “efforts of the City of Paris to, since 2001, allow a diversification of modes of transport in Paris.”(Paris City Council, 2013). This shows that governance actions linked to shared mobility services were seen to be supportive of providing more options to Parisians from early on and has been a goal that has transcended multiple mayoral terms. Like the air quality goal, providing more mobility options was part of candidate Hidalgo’s policy platform.
4.3 Regulating scooter sharing services in Los Angeles, USA.
The state of California is amongst the places with the longest history of shared mobility services, as many companies such as Sidecar, Uber, and Lyft emerged from the Silicon Valley area in the early 2010s. Los Angeles in particular has been a city of experimentation for many of these companies, as its regulatory environment has been seen as progressive when it comes to technology (Singer, 2022). In August 2016, the city government published its strategy to deal with mobility innovations where it presented itself as a “platform for transportation innovation” since it wanted to take advantage of technological advances in transport such as shared mobility and autonomous vehicles (Hand, 2016, p.i). In the strategy, shared mobility was identified as a scalable opportunity to move away from the traditional model of individual car ownership, and as such was perceived positively because it could be integrated into the other public transport services offered by the city, such as buses and rail. During the development of its strategy, the city launched its public bikesharing system MetroBike in partnership with the county (through Metro, the county’s transport planning agency and operator of the bus and rail system). While dockless bikesharing systems were already being deployed in other parts of the world, such as in China, these systems had not been permitted to operate in the city until the council decided to allow a pilot project in September 2017. This initial pilot project later evolved into one of the largest permitted scooter-sharing operation in the world with 37.000 permitted vehicles. The figure below shows the goals identified for this case study. We identified (i) innovation, technology, and modernity, (ii) control and power, (iii) equity, and (iv) road safety as the dominant goals for the governance of dockless scooter sharing services in the city.
Regarding the first goal, the push for innovation and technology came directly from the political leaders in the city:
“It was very much within the Mayor's brand to, um, to really think about how innovation, you know, leads to economic development, workforce development (…) at the same time there was a competitive spirit about who is going to be the innovative council member, really shepherding in this new technology” - Interviewee from the Los Angeles Department of Transportation.
This in turn can be seen as underpinned by broader normative values that are part of the American culture. As another LADOT staffer stated during an interview:
“Now, on the political layer in the United States, innovation is in and of itself seen as an American value. And you can observe, you know, the race to be the most innovative mayor in America. The most innovative governor in America... with really not a lot of care or consideration given to what you... what... what that innovation gets you in return”.
This therefore exemplifies how broad social values, norms, or expectations are integrated into governance actions mainly because they resonate with politicians’ constituencies, but there is little consideration given to what impact they might have on those theoretical goals for the transport sector of sustainability and access. In fact, multiple plans and policy documents that guide the policy response to shared mobility in Los Angeles mention factors such as a need to “leverage technology”, or to position the city as a “platform for mobility innovation” (Hand, 2016), showing how innovation and technology are seen as inherently positive when governing the mobility sector in Los Angeles.
The second dominant goal of control and power stems from previous experiences of stakeholders involved in the governance of this mode. In particular, the emergence of ridehailing services 10 years prior without close control and oversight from government was seen as a wrong strategy by some of the interviewees. The arrival of bike- and scooter-sharing services in the city was therefore perceived as a new opportunity for the government of Los Angeles to pursue a different strategy that allowed government to exert more control over these deployments. For example, an interviewee from LADOT mentioned how “(…) all of us who have been in transportation, who had had a front row seat to watching Uber and Lyft come in, the ways they came in, and the way they pre-empted local government, we had all been thinking about ways to try and level the playing field so that we did not… we did not end up in the same place”.
The third goal of equity is closely related to another goal which is that of providing more mobility options for residents of the city. Equity has multiple dimensions (racial, economic, gender, environmental, amongst others), however it’s the racial and economic dimensions which seem to be the focus for the city. LADOT mentioned in one of their planning documents how “(t)he use of one vehicle per person to get around this vast metropolitan region is no longer viable, creating structural inequality (…)” (Hand, 2016), linking a lack of mobility options directly with the topic of economic inequality. Furthermore, a LADOT staffer noted in an interview that “there are countless examples across multiple different arenas of both racial, and... and also gender inequities when it comes to transportation (and therefore) another goal that we have, is to correct racial inequities”. LADOT therefore understood that they could play a role in redressing past racial inequalities by taking actions that would benefit racial minorities in the scooter sharing program, such as by forcing operators to deploy vehicles in certain areas of the city that are predominantly inhabited by racial minority groups.
Equity is an objective that transcends LADOT and is for example mentioned as one of four key goals in other planning documents the city has published such as their sustainability plan (Garcetti, 2019). Looking at transcripts of council sessions, it was evident that equity as a goal was being defended by certain council members who represented impoverished areas of the city and can therefore be seen as a goal that represents the will of certain constituencies and that is democratically chosen. In one of the committee sessions, for example, LADOT staff responded to questions from certain councilmembers around the equity design of the scooter sharing program by saying: “we also wanted to provide equitable outcomes: we wanted to make sure that these new choices benefited everybody and not just the neighbourhoods in Los Angeles where people already have lots of choices on how to get around”. Showing how the governance actions taken by LADOT are trying to directly respond to the desires of these constituencies.
Like equity, road safety is a goal that is identified in a range of different planning documents in Los Angeles, most notably in a road safety planning document (Vision Zero plan) which has the explicit objective of eliminating traffic deaths by 2025. An LADOT employee stated in an interview that: “We're a vision zero city… and safety is a key concern. Especially in Los Angeles, you know, we're a big city so our numbers are really big: 250 people killed every year on the streets that we manage and operate- and about half of them are people walking and biking. So, safety is always front of mind for us.” This concern with safety flows hierarchically from the leadership of LADOT as another LADOT staffer mentioned in one of the interviews how the arrival of a new general manager in 2015 led to the prioritization of Vision Zero through new investments to tackle road safety, which then in turn percolated to some of the governance actions taken for the scooter program, such as educational campaigns for riders to promote safer behaviours or capping the speed of the vehicles in certain pedestrian areas.