Redistribution mechanism design aims to redistribute the revenue collected by a truthful auction back to its participants without affecting the truthfulness. We study redistribution mechanisms for diffusion auctions, which is a new type of mechanisms on social networks [1]. The key property of a diffusion auction is that the existing participants are incentivized to invite new participants to join the auction. Hence, when we design redistributions, we also need to maintain this incentive. Existing redistribution mechanisms in the traditional setting are targeted at modifying the payment design of a truthful mechanism, such as the Cavallo modification on the Vickrey auction. In this paper, we do not focus on one specific diffusion mechanism. Instead, we propose a framework to redistribute the revenue for all truthful diffusion auctions for selling a single item. The framework treats the original truthful diffusion auction as a black box, and it does not affect its truthfulness. Under the framework, we also give the conditions to satisfy the property of asymptotical budget-balance.