Compliance, Complexity and Cephalopods- Disaggregated Responses to Participatory Marine Conservation &amp; Management

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-3395205/v1

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Compliance, Complexity and Cephalopods- Disaggregated Responses to Participatory Marine Conservation & Management

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3395205/v1

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Breaking of rules, whether formal regulations, or community agreed norms, remains one of the most widespread challenges to sustainable use of marine ecosystems. Non-compliance is especially difficult in small-scale fisheries as it can undermine the provision of nutrition and livelihoods to the many millions dependent worldwide. Although fishery compliance scholarship today is expanding beyond non-economic explanations of (non)-compliance behaviour, approaches and theory used fail to show the diversity of perceptions and dispositions that can underpin motivations. Thus a fuller understanding is lacking towards addressing the acute need for increased fisheries compliance. This paper takes a Zanzibari case of a rapidly spreading community-based intervention - periodic octopus closures - to explore compliance outcomes amongst a diverse range of participants. We take a qualitative approach aligning with an interpretive paradigm to carry out story circles, photo elicitation tasks and focus groups at three sites in 2019. Two sociological strands of theory were used to interpret how participants justify, are motivated by or dispositioned towards rules, rule-makers and rule-breakers. Generally the intervention was supported, signalling the potential for future compliance most commonly based on recognition of a degraded marine ecosystem in need of protection. However the diverse and dynamic responses by groups indicated on which basis and through which logics compliance behaviour was condoned or legitimated. This type of insight can aid managers gauge or anticipate the potential for non-compliance in participatory approaches that can impact the health of marine ecosystems.

Sociology

Anthropology

Gender Studies

Small-scale fisheries

gendered responses

diverse participant-types

Zanzibar

Interpretive paradigm

collaborative natural resource management

marine protected areas

Compliance with rules, how it is achieved and understood, is critical for the process and efficacy of fisheries governance (Rohe et al., 2017; Clark and Humphreys, 2020; Oyanedel et al., 2020). Breaking of rules, whether formal regulations, or community agreed norms, remains one of the most widespread challenges to sustainable use of marine ecosystems (Boonstra et al., 2017). Compliance is especially difficult in small-scale fisheries (SSF). It can undermine the provision of nutrition and livelihoods on which fisherfolk may be highly dependent (Oyanedel et al., 2020a). At the same time finance resources and technical capacities for enforcement are limited thus exacerbating non-compliance. The centrality of SSF compliance in achieving sustainable resource use is exemplified by the huge amount of scientific effort that has gone into this research area over the years (e.g. Hauck, 2008, 2011; Gezelius and Hauck, 2011; Arias et al., 2015; Nunan et al., 2018; Oyanedel et al., 2020).

Compliance scholarship in the past focused almost exclusively on economic, rational-choice or self-interested instrumental motivations e.g. cost-benefit analyses. In response to this, non-economic explanations expanded, stressing the importance of drivers like morals, values or traditions in the motivations of individuals and groups (Boonstra et al., 2017; Cepić and Nunan, 2017; Oyanedel et al., 2020b). Yet often theory and approaches used are binary (i.e. one breaks the rules or doesn’t) and fail to show the diversity of perceptions about what constitutes (non-compliance) and the dispositions that underpin behaviours (Boonstra et al., 2017; Cepić and Nunan, 2017; Oyanedel et al., 2020b). More recent attempts have aimed to go beyond the dichotomous interpretation of fisher's responses to introduce the diversity and distinctive attributes of fisher’s thoughts, attitudes and processes that lead to (non)-compliance (e.g. Boonstra et al., 2017a & Cepić and Nunan, 2017). This diversity in (non-)compliance remains under-investigated but could aid a better and fuller understanding, as a means to address the acute need for increased fisheries compliance (Oyanedel et al., 2020b).

In this paper we contribute to such a strand of compliance scholarship by presenting different types of fishery actors’ responses and positions in relation to an area-based fishery management intervention in Zanzibar, Tanzania. We draw heavily on work by Boonstra et al. (2017) and Cepić and Nunan (2017) and aim to explore the diversity and complexity in attitudes and motivations that underlie compliance outcomes. Specifically we ask, based on actor’s experiences and perceptions of a practise/intervention commonly used in marine conservation and management;

how do participants respond to regulations and authorities (including enforcement) associated with the management intervention?

how do participants justify or condone non-compliance?

how do these types of responses and attitudes towards non-compliance influence outcomes of the intervention?

Periodic octopus closures are a rapidly spreading co-management marine conservation initiative in the Western Indian Ocean (Benbow et al., 2014; Oliver et al., 2015; Rocliffe and Harris, 2015; Silas et al., 2022). They involve closing local fishing grounds (often 20% of the area) to octopus or all types of fishing for three months or more (ibid) (See Fig. 1 for some pictures of what the opening of an octopus closure can look like and the processes that take place on that day). They represent a participatory management approach e.g. co- or community-based, which are increasingly emphasized worldwide, especially in tropical SSF. Based on Ostrom’s design principles for managing common pool resources, participatory approaches assume that inclusion as well as local norm enforcement will improve incentives for resource users to follow rules (Ostrom, 1990; Jentoft, 2000; Nunan et al., 2018; Long et al., 2021). However, empirical evidence shows that such collaborative management models are also challenged by non-compliance (Dressler et al., 2010; Cinner and Huchery, 2014; Bixler and Shmelev, 2015). Such challenges occur for various reasons e.g. lack of legitimate participation or ‘inclusion’, but another reason could be an overly simplistic or binary understanding of rules and rule breaking in participatory management.

In this paper we show how SSF fishers and traders justify, are motivated by or dispositioned towards different (non-)compliant behaviours. Then in turn how this reflects their experience of fishery management practises as well as wider livelihood options and choices (Boonstra et al., 2017; Cepić and Nunan, 2017). This type of insight can aid managers gauge or anticipate the potential for non-compliance in participatory approaches that can impact the health of marine ecosystems (Boonstra et al., 2017).

We take an interpretive research approach, a paradigm which is based on the idea that reality is shaped by social contexts and experiences rather than being objective or singular (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Therefore the best way to understand or study it is through subjective interpretations of its participants within context (ibid). Initial inductive coding of interpretive fieldwork data led us to focus on non-compliance as rule breaking in various forms, corruption and lack of enforcement were so frequently mentioned. We therefore investigated and incorporated relevant compliance scholarship.

In the next sections we present our case study background, the theoretical Background supporting the paper followed by our methodology and the different methods. We present our results according to our first two research questions, followed by a discussion set against the relevant available literature to tackle research question three. The conclusion highlights where and how we believe we contribute to compliance scholarship in a participatory natural resource management (NRM) setting.

Our case study comprised community-based octopus closures in three villages on the two Zanzibari islands of Unguja and Pemba. Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous state, lies 50km offshore from the African mainland (Fig. 2), and has been part of Tanzania since 1964. Unguja is 60% larger, has over double the population of Pemba, contains Zanzibar’s capital, and has a well-developed tourism industry and transport links.

Octopus are important for local consumption and incomes but also for foreign export as a high value resource (Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002; Guard, 2009; Jiddawi et al., 2009; Oliver et al., 2015; Rocliffe and Harris, 2015). In the past decade, the demand for octopus has grown due to international exports and demands from Zanzibari tourism (Porter et al., 2008; Guard, 2009; Westerman and Benbow, 2013; Rocliffe and Harris, 2015; Wamukota and McClanahan, 2017). The sustainable management of octopus is thus of great social and economic importance.

Periodic octopus closures are compelling as unlike other types of protected or closed areas they lead to the rapid accumulation of biomass due to the high growth rates of octopus (Silas et al., 2022). When the reef is re-opened, the accumulated populations of large octopus are expected to provide tangible benefits to fishers, traders and others who become involved through fishing, selling, buying or celebrating (See Fig. 2 for some photos of an opening event). Octopus closures are traditional in Zanzibar, previously enforced by village elders before the involvement of state institutions e.g. Fishery department, when village level governance was much stronger (Jack-Kadioglu, 2017). These types of closures, which were typically linked to religious festivities, broke down approximately 15–20 years ago (ibid). They now have been (re-)introduced and/or reimagined in the WIO. This was initially done by the social enterprise Blue Ventures in 2004 (Rocliffe, 2015; Rocliffe and Harris, 2015) whom championed these management initiatives as catalysts for locally led marine conservation. This is based on the assumption that the low-cost nature plus immediate and tangible benefits from the octopus can positively affect self-organized common pool resource management and cooperation in the short term (Oliver et al., 2015). This octopus closure model is thus seen as a success case in the WIO and is today increasingly implemented by a number of NGO and state actors, not only in Zanzibar but across the region e.g. Rodrigues, Mauritius, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania mainland, and even beyond e.g. Indonesia. Given the rapid expansion and spread of this model, an urgent research question is how and whether it can address the challenges of non-compliance.

Theoretical background

Boonstra (et al. 2017), following Braithwaite (2009) and others, present four ‘motivational postures’ (commitment, resistance, reluctance and creativity) which distinguish different types of fisher responses to regulations and authorities (see Table 1 for details on postures). In sociology motivational posturing refers to people’s dispositional tendency for certain kinds of action, which is formed and expressed through tacit knowledge, habits and impulses (Boonstra et al., 2017; Strand and Lizardo, 2017). These postures are discursive tools which represent summary statements of how people think about their engagement with regulations and authorities (Braithwaite, 2009). The first two postures, commitment and resistance, are well described in literature from sociology, anthropology and cognitive sciences and produce respectively either compliant or non-compliant outcomes. The second two, reluctance and creativity, are based on fieldwork with Baltic fishers can lead to either outcome. None of the postures are mutually exclusive, neither are they bound to individuals, they change according to the social and ecological conditions a person is situated in (Boonstra et al 2017).

Table 1

Overview of theoretical concepts drawn on in the paper as sourced from the two studies Boonstra et al., (2017) and Cepić and Nunan, (2017). SE: Social-Ecological, LEK: Local Ecological Knowledge
Name of principle/mode	Behavioural/empirical evidence of response/justification	Compliance outcome	Levels of engagement & acceptance of regulations/authorities	Source
Commitment	Endorsement of regulation Willingness to commit and knowingly accept personal responsibility to uphold the rules	Compliance	Engaged and accepting	Boonstra et al, (2017)
Resistance	Dismissal of fishing authority and regulations Deny responsibilities, disengagement Rules seen as meaningless	Non-compliance	Defiant and disengaged	Boonstra et al, (2017)
Creativity	Rule elusiveness, fishers are not fully committed Fishers look for loopholes and how to use regulations for personal advantage Close attention paid to the rules, try to avoid obligations and get around the intentions	Both	Quite engaged but defiant	Boonstra et al, (2017)
Reluctance	Don’t reject the rules outright however do not like or accept the manner in which they were introduced, regulated or developed No state interventions wanted	Both	Not necessarily defiant, can accept but disengaged	Boonstra et al, (2017)
Superfluousness	Demonstrated by specific SE knowledge or LEK, perceptions of fish stock conditions and knowledge of resources Regulation is seen as superfluous, too much or unnecessary	Non-compliance	Engaged but not accepting	Cepić & Nunan (2017)
Autonomy	Fishers aim to be autonomous and not subject to the State They challenge State legitimacy, the State has no right to intervene Fishers have an entitlement to fish (similar to Boonstra et al- Resistance)	Non-compliance	Disengaged and defiant	Cepić & Nunan (2017)
Futility	There is a lack of social trust The legitimacy of the rules are diminished not because of the State but due to free riders Lack of compliance by others provides a justification to do it also. Futility of fishing legally due to lack of enforcement	Non-compliance	More engaged than detached, bordering on defiant	Cepić & Nunan (2017)
Necessity	Non-compliance is not a choice it’s a necessity due to low financial/socio-economic status and risks, especially for vulnerable groups. Non-compliance can be socially accepted if non-commercial, for household consumption or basic needs	Non-compliance	Accepting but disengaged due to lack of choice/situation	Cepić & Nunan (2017)
Capitulation	Not necessarily overly-committed but can be accepting of rules as a means to have authorities onside. ‘Keep them happy philosophy’ towards authority, aim is more of a blur.	Both	More detached than engaged, accepting	Braithwaite (2009)
Ecological need	There is a recognized need to conserve and protect ecosystem based on LEK. The poor ecological state e.g. small spp. sizes, signs of destruction, are used to justify/motivate rules & regulations.	Compliance	Engaged and accepting	Author (contrary to the Superfluousness principle)
Dependency	State/authorities called for to be directly involved, their presence is required for legitimacy	Both	Engaged but not accepting yet	Author (contrary to the Autonomy principle)
Provisioning	They support the rules/ management because of their difficult socio-economic situations, compliance allows them to access their daily/ household needs/income. The ecosystem can provide for them if rules are followed. Non-compliance not socially accepted due to someone’s situation/status.	Compliance	Accepting, more engaged than detached	Author (contrary to the Necessity principle)

These postures have commonalities with the four ‘modes of justification’ (superfluousness, autonomy, futility, and necessity) for non-compliance proposed by Cepić and Nunan (2017) following empirical fieldwork with Lake Victoria fishers and drawing on pragmatic sociology. These modes highlight the mechanisms through which normative or moral justifications for non-compliance occur, rooted in different conceptions of ‘common good’ e.g. knowledge, freedom, fish stock, trust. Cepić and Nunan (2017) point out that the modes are attached to situations rather than identities and are not mutually exclusive (see Table 1 for overview). So in both the motivational postures and modes of justifications frameworks (which present ideal types) individuals shift between the classifications, and are not prisoners to one or the other.

Although with a similar focus on the psychosocial complexities in (non)compliance there are key differences between the frameworks. Cepić and Nunan (2017) provide a more specific typology of moral reasonings in relation to non-compliant behaviour while Boonstra et al. (2017) is more general, capturing responses to authorities and the regulations rather than a focus on rule breaking. The former also goes further in unpacking different conceptions of the common good as part of the moral mechanisms that contribute to or motivate non-compliance. We bridge across these two frameworks in order to look at responses to regulations and authorities as well as non-compliance more specifically. Thus we explore the normative underpinnings of (non-) compliance amongst different stakeholders in our study system.

Analysis based on this theoretical background supported the addition of four more principles/modes (one from Braithwaite 2009 and three from the authors) as data didn’t neatly fit/align with the presented frameworks. We added our own three modes which are the opposite/antithesis of three of Cepić and Nunan’s (2017) modes (we named them ecological need, dependency and provisioning- see Table 1 for a description). Capitulation

was put forth by Braithwaite (2009) and also became evident through our data analysis. Figure 3 spatially presents all principles and postures together, showing their approximate levels of acceptance vs defiance, engagement vs engagement with the authorities and closure process.

Research was grounded in an interpretive approach which centred on the perspectives of our fieldwork participants i.e. fishers, traders, managers, leaders (see Wagenaar, 2011 for a description of the different interpretive approaches). This grounded approach prioritised their experiences and understandings as the target audience tasked with and operating within the octopus closure. Interpretive research is based on the insight that much human and social action is intentional and shaped by meanings (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). Such meanings are generated in the subjective mind and humans grasp the world by constantly interpreting our and others’ actions (Wagenaar, 2011; West, 2016). Thus, lived everyday human experience and understanding lies at the core of social reality (ibid).

We initially chose to engage with this type of paradigm as we wanted those directly involved in the intervention to interpret and define the “problem” for themselves so as to direct the rest of the three-year research programme in a direction that was of importance to them. Secondarily, in relation to the paper topic, collecting interpretations was necessary for qualifying compliance in this common pool resource management setting and for understanding the basis and logics driving the diversity of responses. We therefore used interpretive assumptions to explore the understandings of our participants and how and what meaning they gave to rules, regulations and (non-)compliance.

This methodological approach thus largely focused on attitudes and perceptions as expressed in discursive contexts of group discussions or interviews i.e. participants verbally explained their and others’ behaviours. Like Cepić and Nunan we were therefore limited in our capacity to verify how moralities translated into actual behaviours in the seascape or market. Inspired by Boonstra et al. (2017) we attempted to look for anecdotes including jokes, cynicisms or fantasies which could capture the less-consciously driven desires or values, the predispositions, although the language barrier and need for translations (between Kiswahili and English) limited our ability to analyse such culturally contingent expressions. Postures and responses were sometimes hidden behind the anecdotes and Swahili sayings or proverbial ways of expression. Despite this methodological limitation, we still found rich data, including non-rationalized explanations of behaviour, on the recognition and characterization of fisher’s and trader’s own agency in explaining (non-)compliance, something previously under theorized (Boonstra et al., 2017).

Data collection methods

A team of three members consisting of the lead author (A white Irish researcher based in Sweden), a member of the Zanibari NGO implementing the intervention and an independent data collector (both from Pemba) carried out fieldwork in collaboration with the NGO, local village leaders (Sheha and village councils) and the Shehia (ward) Fishing Committee (SFC). The SFC in each site acted as the fieldwork gatekeepers, providing guidance, organizing the meetings, the spaces and selecting participants according to our requests for different gendered livelihood groups (see Table 2 for an overview of the participant group types we met with). They, with the support of the NGO were the responsible and implementing actors of the octopus closures within their villages.

Data collection was performed in October and November of 2019 with each site visited consecutively for approximately a week. We selected three sites in three different Shehias in both Unguja and Pemba, at various stages of closure implementation i.e. stopped, less than two years old and more than three (for more details on each Site 1–3 see Section 1 in appendices). In total we met with ~ 80 participants three times each within respective participant group settings. All mentions of groups in the manuscript are to these gendered livelihood groups presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Overview of the participants, the numbers we met with, their ages, links to octopus, other fishing and livelihood activities. Referred to in text as participant groups or simply groups.
Participant group types	#	Ages (Avg. Min-Max)	Octopus fishing/Trading	Other fishing?	Other livelihood activities
Footfisherwomen	17	42 (34–67)	Using sharpened metal or wooden sticks ‘uchokoo’, at spring tides ‘bamvua’ each month or at openings only- not going underwater	Eels, catfish, sea cucumbers and sea snails also targeted by foot with sticks, hand or ‘khanga’ (material)	Seaweed farming and/or crop agriculture
Footfishermen	13	43 (28–76)		Full time fishers using boats of different types to fish with handlines or gill nets for other species.	Crops and animal husbandry
Skin divers	13	34 (24–52)	Using spears, spear guns, nails ‘msumari’, sharpened wooden or metal sticks ‘uchokoo’, at spring tides ‘bamvua’ each month or full time	Other species caught during diving, boats and nets used by three men to fish other species at other times	Crops and animal husbandry, Tailoring, Fish trading, Gravel makers
Traderwomen	13	33 (21–44)	Octopus fried or made into soup for sale locally, few sold fresh. At least 5 went octopus fishing themselves at opening with ‘uchokoo’	Only one fishing eels by foot	Seaweed farming, gravel makers, Fish retail, Petty trade, Crop agriculture, Food retail
Tradermen	12	40 (23–50)	Smaller-scale trade: sell fresh at landing sites or locally. Larger scale: sell to tourist hotels/restaurants, sell to Kenyan Export agents, Export to Unguja from Pemba.	Only one fishes large open water fishes	Crops and animal husbandry
Shehia Fishing Committee SFC	10 2 ♀	43 (31–54)	All bar two men fished octopus using metal & wooden sharpened sticks ‘uchokoo’, nails ‘msumari’, and spears at spring tides ‘bamvua’ each month or at openings only	Only men, bar one who collected sea cucumbers, fished using boats of different types with lines and gill nets for other species.	Crops and animal husbandry, Seaweed farming, Government employee, Petty trade

The first meeting consisted of story circles, a narrative based research method that does not rely on probing and uses broader prompts than traditional focus group discussions (c.f. Hebert et al., 2020). We and participants (average 5) sat in a circle and each person had 5 minutes of uninterrupted space to tell their story of how the octopus closure in their village was introduced, started and currently runs or finished. See Fig. 4 for some photos of the methods being caried out.

The second meeting, with the same participants, involved a photo elicitation task (e.g. Bignante, 2010). Here participants sat around a spread of ~ 90 photos representing different aspects of WIO octopus fishing, trading, value chain dynamics and closure processes e.g. management meetings, trainings (see figure A1 in appendices for the photos). Photos were used as transitional objects to allow for people to talk about more sensitive subjects (e.g. gender relations, power) as well as a means to reach back and draw out feelings and memories of past events.

The final meeting was a semi-structured focus group discussion about rules, compliance and closure outcomes. At this point we had built some rapport with participants, so used this last interaction to talk about difficult and contested topics i.e. breaking rules. Many of the data from these meetings are reported in this paper, although all three were important for our understanding of the topic.

By grounding data collection in open story circles and building on them chronologically we were able to capture complex and diverse narratives of compliance processes from different perspectives in different situations. Here we view narratives as vehicles for the expression of different meanings in regulations, authority and compliance outcomes and how they highlight aspects of social complexity in the phenomenon of compliance (sensu Masterson et al., 2017).

All meetings were voice recorded, transcribed and translated by a Masters student in Natural Resource Management at the University of Dar es Salaam. Translations were checked at random by the field team to ensure validity and accuracy of the transcripts.

Before field visits the research underwent a thorough ethics review according to the principles and procedures for research ethics at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, which included reference to data archiving with Stockholm University’s legal guidelines. Verbal consent was obtained before any interaction with participants through a plain language statement and consent form, both read out in Kiswahili.

Data analysis methods

Data analysis was done through qualitative coding of all translated transcripts in the software MAXQDA (VERBI software, 2019). Coding and, engagement with the data in general, followed an iterative process of going back and forth between transcripts, the coding framework and an excel file where processes and events were summarised according to different phases of the closure e.g. introduction of the intervention, awareness raising and education, rulemaking, opening events, affects or outcomes. The first round of coding was thematic, inductive and based on the story circles (See Chap. 2 Boyatzis, 1998 for development of themes and codes). Here we identified, the main concepts and events that people brought up in their closure stories. These were largely expressed through benefits or disbenefits associated with the intervention and this is where non-compliance emerged as something of great importance to participants. This first round provided us an initial opening into people’s experiences within the intervention, what they felt was important to tell us in this first meeting. We added to the resulting coding framework with a second round of more deductive coding based on the research questions and theoretical background of this paper.

We introduce the subjective world of participants and specifically their understanding of compliance in the following results section.

The results section is split into three sections; two sections addressing our first two research questions and directly drawing on theoretical insights from Boonsta et al. (2017) and Cepić and Nunan (2017). A final section examines the links between motivational posturing and normative explanations of non-compliance. We present the data largely in terms of group type i.e. trader and fisher groups, due to the intersectional approach used and group diversity is subsequently broken out into sites and methods.

Responses to regulations and authorities

The motivational posture we saw most commonly across our sample was commitment (Boonstra et al 2017 found none in the Swedish Baltic setting), which entailed a real responsibility for the closure rules in fishing and trading activities as well as mobilising others to accept the intervention (See Table 3 for illustrations of each of the following mentioned postures). Thus supporting an assumption that a participatory-based approach can improve the quality of compliance. All groups, bar Divers, positioned themselves most frequently this way, especially the Traderwomen. It was the Divers that were blamed by multiple groups across sites as the main rule-breakers, especially by Fisherwomen, but also by leaders e.g. Sheha and SFC. Also admitting to it themselves.

Commitment was additionally displayed through an appreciation of how the rules were introduced and developed (a chance to be present/involved) as well as the associated awareness raising and conservation education. This was evident in our second site, where we decidedly saw the most commitment amongst all groups bar the Tradermen. The latter were disgruntled by the illegalities in trade at the openings as well as the current market conditions e.g. low prices. This site had the longest running closure system and generally responses were overtly more endorsing and supportive. Participants here had had the chance to understand and experience both closure costs and benefits for a longer period. Interestingly they also seemed to be the most accepting of the authorities and regulations.

Participants had a higher tendency to exhibit a committedness during the photo elicitation tasks (see figure A1 in appendices for photos used). Closure benefits tended to be elaborated more often here through selected photos of octopus landings and openings and in discussions during the task about closure effects, personal participation and responsibilities.

Secondly, all participant groups tended to capitulate to the regulations and implementers, not necessarily in a committed way but in recognizing leaders’ authority and their own lack of choice with regards the adoption of the process i.e. it was decided already. They were accepting only in knowing the potential benefits to come but in general more lukewarm and nuanced about the whole process. People can accept it under certain conditions or if X, Y or Z were to be changed. We saw this position rather evenly across groups and methods, but most common at Site 1.

The least common social position was creativity, interestingly it was mainly in discussions with the Divers i.e. the poachers or rule breakers, where it emerged. These actors appeared to know the rules, their development and implementation closely and were able to creatively react to questions and discussions through short biographical accounts e.g. see the excerpt about clothes changing in Table 3.

Anecdotes airing grievances and mistrust emerged frequently as reluctance, through unhappiness with the rules and their development and less often as resistance itself i.e. direct refusal or conflict with the closure. Reluctance was also associated with corrupt activities by official guards, SFC and the Government (e.g. allowing people to enter the closed area for a stake in the catch). In the few cases where we understood resistance, it was mostly within transcripts of Footfishermen and women, in particular the former at Site 1. Notably, this was the site with a long history of conservation interventions and interaction with western development projects. They therefore had expectations about what “mradi” (project in Kiswahili) meant, often associated with direct cash-gains e.g. “a pension”, an expectation of NGOs in Zanzibar not unique to this site (Levine, 2007) (see appendix 1 for background on sites). When the closures didn’t meet expectations a lot of resistant posturing was recognised.

Table 3

Excerpts of different motivational postures from the data.
Participant type	Postures	Illustration
Footfishermen	Commitment	“We just fish in the area which are left free because in the closed area we cannot enter because it is closed, but in the open areas you can go and get, you get food with your children, you get fish, so we are convinced much with this project in our village”. Site 2 Stories
Tradermen	Commitment	Speaker 1: ”We participate by getting earlier to our opening areas, then we help in security so that the octopus will not leak (poached/removed illegally), to remain here where it is obtained so that our thing goes well”. Speaker 2: “As my colleague said, we go to the sea earlier to provide security because some people enter the area before the time for fishing, so we prevent them from entering till the time for opening then we enter the area.” Site 2 Photos
Fisherwomen	Commitment	“If I decide to fish I could fish but you respect the rules because if it is yours, God will give you…you say “I have seen the Octopus in the closed area”, I get the passion on it (want it) but we leave it because of the rules we agreed, we left it and we continued to go to where we are allowed to fish as we agreed till the day for opening and we went to search for what God wanted us to get.” Site 3 Discussions
Traderwomen	Commitment	“This photo shows the big octopus. I take this photo because this is the grace and benefits of closure, when we were not closing we couldn’t get, even when you go to the coast you get one small octopus and not enough but now you can go to the coast on the opening day and this is the benefit. This photo reminds me that this is the grace that God has given us to get this project and get this blessing, because we were not getting like this but now we get.” Site 2 Photos
Fisherwomen	Capitulation	“We accepted this closure rules, but we did so because we had no good harvests in the sea before conservation, but after the advice on conservation we accepted, when we got to open we saw the changes that, the things have changed, not like the past”. Site 2 Discussions
Traderwomen	Capitulation	“We all participated because we were called in a meeting and we were told to close the coast so that we benefit by having children going to school and other developments”. Site 3 Discussions “I see that our life is the same, I think it is better we close that coast, when we close the coast, after opening, at least things will change a little bit, we will be satisfied, though you will be going and miss or get sometimes, you will thank God”. Site 3 Photos
Divers	Creativity	“Also we don’t have like fibre boats to rush when we see them (poachers), they are three divers. But a diver knows that the guard stands out of the water so he cannot spot me, thieves have many techniques, you may see him wearing these clothes but when he gets there he changes his clothes, when he finishes to fish he changes again, so you have seen him with white clothes, when he comes back he is in black, you will be waiting for the one with white clothes in vain.” Site 3 Discussions
Divers	Reluctance	“I took this photo, it reminds me that, one day we were called in a meeting to get education on the closure but there was a conflict, some of us were not aware of the closure, some of us wanted and some did not want, myself when I sat down and think, I said that it is better we do.” Site 2 Photos
Tradermen	Reluctance	“Sometimes the committee are not fair, We agreed to close but there are people who are….stealing, I told the committee that the people who steal the octopus are supposed to be taken to the court…but the committee didn't consider my views.” Site 1 Discussions
Footfishermen	Resistance	“but there was a person who came few days back and say there is now a project, I want to give up because there is no benefit, the villagers will be exploited, we only depend on what we are getting when we open the octopus. There is no need of closing.” Site 1 Photos “I wait but nothing like that happened, then I have realized that this was all lies, they are liars, the committee lied to us, there is no project, if it is a project we could get benefit.” Site 1 Stories ”So they closed and after like three months they opened, they said that the project has good results so we have to close again, but for us fishers and all the villagers did not notice any difference in terms of income, we asked where is the pension we were promised?” Site 1 Stories

Modes of justifying & condemning non-compliance

Participants recognised three main types of rule breaking; poaching, entering illegally at openings and unauthorised trading at openings (see table A1 and A2 in appendices for more details on the broken rules and perceived rule breakers). We found the most frequent principle or area of justification was ecological need, the contrary to superfluousness i.e. non-compliance justified through a belief that the ecosystem was in good condition (Table 4 for illustrations of each mode of justification). This type of response i.e. ecological need, was also what Cepić and Nunan (2017) found in Lake Victoria amongst the majority of respondents. Our participants felt the rules were necessary based on their local ecological knowledge (LEK), bad ecological conditions highlighted the need to conserve. Often illegal or destructive fishing practices were part of this concern. Thus, there was generally no moral justification to break rules based on LEK, the degradation of the marine ecosystem was clear. It was Site 2 (by far) where the most awareness of this ecological need for closing was found, largely and not surprisingly among the fisher groups. Again, it was the Photo Elicitation-Tasks that appeared to induce this response over the other methods. This is not necessarily unexpected as we introduced a large array of photos depicting the marine environment in different conditions. Overall, only a few instances of potential non-compliance being motivated by a belief in a healthy ecosystem were found and this was with male fishing groups across sites.

The clearest driver of non-compliance was evident in the principle of futility i.e. it’s not worth it to fish legally due to a general lack of compliance. This was exhibited in our data through frustrations with lack of enforcement and the frequency of poaching. Social trust was clearly diminishing, both with the closure implementers and within communities themselves. As a result of the continued issues with non-compliance people were influenced to give up and also rule break. Why follow the rules and lose access to certain resources while others benefited from this? Futile responses were most evident in the Pemba sites, particularly in Site 3, where the closures collapsed due to a large-scale poaching event a few years before fieldwork. It was with the Divers here we discovered the most evidence of futility. They articulated the lack of social trust within the villages and especially with the Divers- even if they ended up in the closed area by accident they were not believed (see Table 4, Diver’s futility). Divers also demonstrated the lack of rule legitimacy as a result of the continued illegal and destructive fishers e.g. blast fishers from Unguja, local SCUBA fishers. This enforcement issue spills into the principle of autonomy (explicated below) and people’s interpretation of the Governments’ role in the process.

Justifications based on the autonomy principle reflected Cepić and Nunan (2017)’s experience in their data. In both our cases the legitimacy of the state to intervene was almost completely unchallenged (autonomy was the most infrequent response coded in our case). In fact the involvement of the state was directly called for many times in the Pemba sites amongst mainly the male groups (not in Unguja)- a principle we named Dependency. They saw the state’s participation as a necessity to prevent non-compliance and to increase the legitimacy of the whole process. The principle of autonomy was also evident through God and God’s ownership of the resource, which gave people (largely poachers) an entitlement to fish regardless the closure (c.f. Cepić and Nunan, 2017). Contrarily Fisher- and Trader- women saw the closure as part of God’s intention to provide for them, putting their trust in Him (See excerpts in Table 3 within responses of Commitment).

Finally, we uncovered contradictory evidence for the principle of necessity, a mode we coined Provisioning. Non-compliance was not commonly justified through low socio-economic status or vulnerability but rather this influenced support for the rules and complying with them (by female-groups most frequently). The closure and acceptance of it allowed people to access their basic needs, other community benefits or address difficult situations. For female groups (all in Site 2 and 3) the closure process was particularly important for their children’s education- for school fees and uniforms (income from sales).

Table 4

Excerpts of different modes of justifications of non-compliance from the data.
Participant type	Modes	Illustration
Footfishermen	Ecological need	“…we see the area from X to Y is destroyed by the neighbouring villages, they use harmful fishing gears, that’s why I was convinced to close because our neighbours are destroying our area”. Site 1 Photos
Tradermen	Ecological need	“…when the coast is conserved, many things are controlled, breaking of corals, and many things, the coast becomes fresh.” Site 3 Discussions “In this photo I can see the benefits of Octopus Closure, we can see after the closure, when we harvest our income will be high. As I can see people taking their Octopus to the market for sale, So this shows that if we preserve these creatures we generate income. And if we preserve our Octopus from destruction and overfishing we are going to harvest much.” Site 1 Photos
Traderwomen	Ecological need	“Octopus Closure Is good because octopus closure helps in conserving the environment, for example in this photo I see an ocean which looks good with corals, octopus and fishes which are protected, it looks good and if you get in there, you get everything you need.” Site 1 Photos “In the first photo I see the beauty of the corals, It makes me see the importance of protecting the corals they are looking good.” Site 1 Photos
Divers	Ecological need	“The situation of the sea after the conservation of these areas, the corals were in a very good situation, but after the end of the project the corals are like we see here, they are destroyed because the one with hammer comes to break them, the one with drag nets use nets and destroy, the one with bomb/ blast throws and it dies… If there will be conservation, these issues of coastal destruction will disappear.” Site 3 Photos
Fisherwomen	Futility	“I think, when we closed for the first time theft was not too much like this, but now, when one person is caught they say that “ok they are not punished” they start to be many, they increased, they are now difficult to control”. Site 2 Photos “To add on that, the committee should strengthen the security, we just hear that there is patrol but We suggest that they have to call us upon the events like when they Catch those who steal the Octopus because we won’t know what happened to the thieves, so they have to elaborate like “this man has stolen one Octopus and the punishment should be this” the person won't repeat the same tomorrow, but if they don’t inform us we cannot benefit and we will feel like the octopus are not seriously closed and we can also attempt to steal”. Site 1 Stories
Tradermen	Futility	“The fishers are not satisfied, they may agree that lets close but after a short period of time they lose trust and start chaos.” Site 3 Discussions “…is there not any rules that exploit (penalizes)the fisher who break this rule? And that’s why sometimes you see that people enter the conservation area then we penalize him, but when we take him forward it becomes local, no implementation of that rule. Still the implementation of these issues is not stable”. Site 3 Discussions
Traderwomen	Futility	“…if this one said that the coast (is) to be closed, and I have said that the coast should not be closed, when it is closed you enter, so even I who support the coast to be closed I will say “anyways, is the profit all mine? First of all I don’t benefit because I am not a fisher, So I give up”, so every one gives up. As a result there will be no cooperation on the closure.” Site 3 Discussions
Divers	Futility	“We all supported but after we have seen Wakojani (migrating fishers with nets) fishing in our closed area, the community started to react that “ you are not fair because if you have closed the coast why are they fishing while we don’t, so till now there are complaints that the villagers are prevented, they are not going to that place while Wakojani, people with bottles are diving (SCUBA), they can’t accept”. Site 3 Discussions “whatever they see me with, they assume that I took from the closed area, though I fished from other areas, they won’t trust you, so that's where the rules affect us.” Site 3 Discussions ”That's why we said when there will be the guards who are not the people of this island there must be at least one person who is not from the island because we don’t trust each other”. Site 3 Discussions
Traderwomen	Provisioning	“We participate so that we can have our rights, and we produce so that the children go to school, that’s why we participate in these rules.” Site 3 Discussions
Fisherwomen	Provisioning	“This photo reminds me that we have to agree together and close so that we can get our basic needs like this, people should go to fish and come back and go to sell in the markets.” Site 2 Photos “Those who say that the life is hard, we just wonder like, don’t we have difficult life? Why do we obey the rules, so, for us we want to conserve so that the condition of the sea will be restored.” Site 2 Discussions
Tradermen	Provisioning	“We the traders we comply with the rules because we see it as the best way to make us get enough load (octopus) Also the octopus we get from there will be of big weight. That’s why we protect the rules the most and emphasize the strength of this issue.” Site 3 Discussions
Fishermen	Dependency	“Also we want it to involve the government so that the project will became reputable and will be respected and security will be there.” Site 2 Stories “And when the government join us there will be success because everybody will be afraid of going to destroy and when he is afraid of destroying the harvests will be available to a large extent because everybody will be afraid of going there, will know that when I enter and destroy I will be punished, so everybody will be scared but without punishment I think we will fail to go on with this project.” Site 2 Stories
Tradermen	Dependency	“…the issue of conservation, the government wanted the citizens of each Shehia to do conservation of their areas but still it is not emphasized by the Ggovernment, if the Government could emphasize it would be seen as the Government, because it reaches a place…(that) there is no any rule that exploit the fisher who break this rule (enforcement). And that’s why sometimes you see that people enter the conservation area then we penalize him, but when we take him forward it becomes local, no implementation of that rule.” Site 3 Discussions

Common patterns & nuances amongst complex responses

If we look at our data solely by participant group type (across all the different methods) then we can see a common pattern is for the more committed groups to exhibit ecological need. A pattern driven mainly by Site 2. People’s knowledge of the marine environment and the need for protecting it meant they were ready to uphold the laws and endorse the process. This convincing logic supports the relationship of LEK to compliance motivation seen in many other cases (Crona and Bodin, 2006, 2010; Boonstra et al., 2017; Cepić and Nunan, 2017).

One of the outliers to this pattern was presented by Divers (Site 3), whom were inclined to exhibit the most dynamic posturing. Capitulation, creativity and a clear reluctance towards the rules or authorities translated largely into the blaming of migrants as free riders i.e. its futile to follow the rules; “why preserve for guests to come and take?”.

On the other hand we found that it was female groups that tended to be more fixed in their positions on rules and rule-breaking throughout fieldwork and also within the same sessions. The Traderwomen’s high commitment to the process was associated with strong moral opposition to the breaking of rules based on necessity (i.e. provisioning). This dynamic was also seen with fisherwomen, though their commitment more commonly translated into moral justifications supporting the principle of futility. They largely targeted “men” as the free riders, subsequently Divers. “Women” were generally presented, both by themselves and others, as rule followers with less propensity to poach than “men” and a much higher likelihood to attend meetings e.g. about rules and regulations.

Ultimately at a general level the intervention was a supported system signalling a likelihood of future compliance (at a general level), we most commonly witnessed commitment and condemnation of rule-breaking based on an ecological need. However the diverse and dynamic responses by groups indicated on which basis and through which logics compliance behaviour was condoned or legitimated.

How can understanding responses and attitudes towards rules and regulations contribute to the intervention process?

The responses to and modes of justifying or condoning non-compliance showed us which groups were more likely to reveal unexpected or diverse responses to the intervention, despite outwardly compliant, or even non-compliant, behaviour (c.f. Boonstra et al. 2017). Though such behaviour might look stable in a fishery system, once examined as we did, there can exist a collection of opinions, beliefs or motivations that can create unstable compliance outcomes (ibid). For example, we were able to better understand which groups were more likely to be supportive and stand firm i.e. female groups versus those who might suddenly switch or disregard the intervention based on lack of social trust e.g. Divers in Site 3. By combining the two frameworks we could unpack why we might have found these types of stances in certain groups. We were able to trace the rationale through reactions to regulations, authorities, rule-breaking and rule-breakers simultaneously. Thus understanding for example if it was support for a certain rule or the Government in general or a particular common good that separately or in combination fuelled (non-)compliance. Understanding on which moral and/or normative grounds fishery stakeholders are willing to support an intervention, those implementing it as well as the associated rules means the process can become more targeted to the different types of people it aims to support i.e. on what premise are fishers or traders more likely to follow what rule in what situation? If people are committed based on, for example, the condition of the ecosystem and their dependency on it, then emphasizing the ecological side of the process through an accommodating regulatory regime (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Murphy et al., 2009; Boonstra et al., 2017) could be an important step at a localized i.e. gendered livelihood groups, rather than general ‘community’ level. For example stronger thorough environmental education across groups at step zero. As could understanding what specific dynamics may lose support e.g. erosion of social capital through increased poaching/rule-breaking. This could be dealt with through another regime-approach e.g. a focus on within community trust building by linking across disparate groups (who normally wouldn’t have the chance to meet/discuss intimately/deeply) through facilitated meetings (c.f. Grafton, 2005).

Collecting the diverse interpretations of marine resource users’ understandings of rules, authorities and rule-breaking can help participatory management interventions to understand and maybe anticipate changes in compliance e.g. a large-scale poaching event (Boonstra et al. 2017). It also shows us how non-compliance is represented by a spectrum of acceptability with different actors and actions occupying different overlapping positions on it at different times and situations (Hampshire et al., 2004; Hauck, 2011; Fabinyi, 2012).

Within a democratic management regime, capitulation and commitment tend to be high (something we also witnessed) (Braithwaite, 2009). However a good amount of resistance can actually promote debate, just enough that would allow for critical assessment (ibid). Resistance is in fact, more desired than disengagement altogether (ibid). Therefore the struggles we witness at our sites can be seen as a good response, though an indicator of the amount of resources needed on-the-ground to resolve the issues at play (ibid).

Reflections on the gendered nature of responses

In our case we found different types of people with different propensities to comply, trust, believe or respond to authorities and/or rules. Gender as a category, among many other axes of difference, was articulate by participants through their struggles with non-compliance and ability to benefit from the closure e.g. ‘Men’ were blamed for non-compliance, evading meetings and the male poachers (the Divers) in particular manifesting their ‘god given right’ to fish. These type of results reflect other cases of non-compliance by ‘men’ of different types in SSF interventions, including skin divers (e.g. Fabinyi, 2007, 2012; Rohe et al., 2017; Pauwelussen, 2021). Our Divers as a group require attention for their prominent role in and reactions to non-compliance. In our Zanzibari context skin divers had a lower social status to fishermen with vessels (Woroniecki, 2013). At the same time legislation at multiple scales (local up to national) marginalized them by outlawing their main method (spear fishing) (The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2014). Closure regulations targeted their main species (octopus) (Sindano, 2019) while directly enabling others not previously engaged with octopus to benefit through the creation of opening events. Upon consideration, Divers’ poaching could be seen as a token of resistance against unjust regulations or lost claims (Scott, 1985; Fabinyi, 2012). Emblematic of forfeited catches, impacted livelihoods and identities, hidden under a diversity of postures and justifications. The attention given to these fishers by other participant groups as well as gender as a category more generally, in a non-compliance frame of reference, highlights the need to properly and meaningfully engage with ‘lower-status’ or unrecognised groups like Skin Divers’, or Footfisherwomen (de la Torre-Castro et al., 2014; Fröcklin, 2014; Stiepani et al., 2022). Not doing so can mean unknowingly provoking non-compliance while increasing the burden on others’ shoulders e.g. to provide School uniforms or fees through a diminishing fishing income as a result of overexploitation.

BOX 1: Personal reflections on the research process & methods (first author)

My main feelings during this research in the Zanzibari Archipelago was the usual one of discomfort, the same questions plagued me which have done so for years. What am I, a white Irish researcher doing here? What right do I have to enter these systems and take their knowledge? How should I do this in as ethical a way as possible? Should I just go back to Ireland? As I adopted an interpretive paradigm I was even more acutely aware of my role within the data collection, my shaping of it through my relationship with the participants, the historical postcolonial context of Zanzibar and the widespread parachute marine science (Hakkarainen et al., 2020; Stefanoudis et al., 2021)that exists there. Dwelling in this constant discomfort I was driven by my personal goal; to provide useful research to collaborating closure practioners who don’t have the time or resources to perform it themselves. However, in the Zanzibari context, as in many places, a convoluted relationship exists between the State, external protected area managers and local communities (Levine, 2007; Woroniecki, 2013). The role of external researchers adds another layer of complexity to this (Hakkarainen, 2018; Hakkarainen et al., 2020). This specific history and context naturally influenced participants’ positioning to the rules and authorities in relation to me and the field team. In the eyes of many participants the field team represented the NGO carrying out the closures, this invoked different reactions. I felt there was evidence of groups “letting off steam” and using the discussions to overtly express criticism at the NGO, rather than their deeper or more nuanced feelings i.e. Site 1 and ‘Mradi’ (c.f. Boonstra et al. 2017). This was especially so for my first encounter, the story circles. However such responses softened out with the photo elicitation (most “supportive” positions in this method). I believe it was with such a qualitative methods portfolio I was able to better get at inner thoughts. The ability to express their thoughts across three methods allowed for some type of self-reflection e.g. life goals or outlooks, as participants had opportunity to speak in detail and get things “off their chest” to a third party. I felt that together the particular methods helped address and nuance the overly critical or committed responses I experienced at different sites as a result of who I was in the Zanzibar setting. Additionally, when coupled with the theory and approach, the methods allowed me to simply provide a space where participants were empowered to present their side of the octopus closure story. What the intervention meant to them and how and what they thought about non-compliance and its solutions

Ultimately, I think that the interpretive approach to applying the compliance frameworks i.e. a discursive approach with discursive tools, pushed participants’ own social realities of (non-)compliance to the forefront, giving me valuable insight into the lived everyday experiences of individuals and groups in a compliance setting*.

*These insights were shared on a feedback trip (July 2022) with participants who validated the stories I presented back to them based on their voices in 2019.

We contribute an empirical exploration of two theoretical frameworks which bridge beyond simplistic interpretations of (non-)compliance(Boonstra et al., 2017; Cepić and Nunan, 2017), thus adding to their novel scholarship in this field. We provided a diversity of participant-types, beyond fishermen (the usual focus of compliance scholarship in fisheries) which adds breadth to the quality of (non-)compliance. Additionally three more modes of justifications were developed based on Cepić and Nunan’s (2017) work.

In our case of a participatory management intervention, participants generally supported the programme and its rules, preferring closure processes (than no intervention) despite the impacts of rule-breaking. This was most often connected to their experiences of marine resource degradation (evidenced in the literature e.g. Colbert-Sangree, 2012; Mkumbukwa, 2014; Levine, 2015). Though many groups looked outwardly compliant (i.e. committed) and saw ecological need in the rules, thanks to our interpretive approach, there materialized a more intricate ‘repertoire of posturing’ or logics in levels of engagement and acceptance with rules and authorities. The common outward commitment didn’t automatically imply a normative consent to regulations e.g. fisherwomen were commonly committed but at the same time we found frequent evidence of futility and thus non-compliance (c.f. Boonstra et al., 2017). With the rich qualitative frameworks we were able to show on which logics or grounds to address the threat of non-compliance. This in turn provided valuable insight into why assumptions around participation in such collaborative management approaches don’t necessarily lead to compliance. These quite detailed frameworks provided the chance to be more situated in the Zanzibari institutional context of participatory NRM. Thus drivers of participation in, and in turn sustainment from NRM, were better understood e.g. the opportunity to access basic needs or resistance against lost claims.

Acknowledgements

This work is funded through the research project grant “Sustainability and resilience – Tackling consequences of climate and environmental changes” funded jointly by the Swedish Research Council and Sida through the Swedish Government’s development aid funds, and by Formas’ and Forte’s research appropriations. Grant number: 2018-05862. With additional support from the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University (Sweden), the University of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), and the University of Pwani (Kenya). Thanks all that kindly took the time to review the manuscript- Andrew Wamukota and Maja Schlüter especially. We are most grateful to all the participants that gave up their valuable time to this purely academic endeavour.

The authors report there are no competing interests to declare

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APPENDICESDruryONeill2023.pdf

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Compliance, Complexity and Cephalopods- Disaggregated Responses to Participatory Marine Conservation & Management

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Abstract

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Introduction

Case study background

Methodology

Results

Discussion

How can understanding responses and attitudes towards rules and regulations contribute to the intervention process?

Reflections on the gendered nature of responses

Conclusions

Declarations

References

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