

Analytic modeling and risk assessment of aerial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus through vaping expirations in shared micro-environments

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1 Analytic modeling and risk assessment of aerial transmission of
2 SARS-CoV-2 virus through vaping expirations in shared
3 micro-environments

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8 **Abstract**

9 **Background.** E-cigarettes are an important harm reduction tool that provides smokers an
10 alternative for nicotine consumption that is much safer than smoking. It is important to assess its
11 safety under preventive and containment measures undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic.

12 **Methods.** We develop a theoretical risk model to assess the contagion risk by aerial trans-
13 mission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus carried by e-cigarette aerosol (ECA) in shared indoor spaces,
14 a home and restaurant scenarios, with natural and mechanical ventilation, with and without face
15 masks. We also provide the theoretical elements to explain the visibility of exhaled ECA, which
16 has important safety implications.

17 **Results.** In a home or restaurant scenarios bystanders exposed to ECA expirations by an in-
18 fectious vapor (and not wearing face masks) face a 1 % increase of risk of contagion with respect
19 to a “control case” scenario defined by exclusively rest breathing without vaping. This relative
20 added risk becomes 5 – 17 % for high intensity vaping, 44 – 176 % and over 260 % for speaking
21 for various periods or coughing (all without vaping). Mechanical ventilation significantly de-
22 crease infective emissions but keep the same proportionality in risk percentages. Face masks of
23 common usage effectively protect wearers from respiratory droplets and droplet nuclei possibly
24 emitted by mask-less vapers as long as they avoid direct exposure to the visible exhaled vaping
25 jet.

Conclusions. Vaping emissions in shared indoor spaces involve only a minuscule added risk
of COVID-19 contagion with respect to the already existing (unavoidable) risk from continuous
breathing, significantly less than speaking or coughing. Protection of bystanders from this conta-
gion does not require extra preventive measures besides those already recommended (1.5 meters
separation and wearing face masks).

26 **Keywords:** SARS-CoV-2 COVID-19, electronic cigarettes, aerosol visibility, risk modeling

27 **1. Introduction**

28 As alternative products whose usage represents a minor fraction of health hazards associated
29 with tobacco cigarettes, e-cigarettes have become a recognized harm reduction tool for millions

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30 of smokers worldwide who are unable or unwilling to quit smoking by other means, Vapers, as
31 users of these devices are known, are in various degrees living subjects of a personal decision to
32 follow a tobacco harm reduction strategy that empowers them as consumers who desire to quit
33 smoking to improve their health and welfare. This initiative contributes and complements the
34 effort to address the global burden of harm caused by smoking. However, as all lifestyle and
35 consumer habits in all walks of life, the personal harm reduction approach embodied in switch-
36 ing from smoking to vaping has been disrupted by preventive and containment measures imple-
37 mented by health authorities worldwide to address the current COVID-19 pandemic, including
38 various degrees of curtailment of social activities and home confinement recommendations and
39 ordinances that have induced and/or required millions of vapers to share indoor spaces with non-
40 vapers around them.

41 It is important to stress that vapers under confinement already perceive an important benefit
42 that reinforces their harm reduction initiative: bystanders under confinement exposed to aerosol
43 emissions from their e-cigarettes face only a negligible fraction of the hazard they would be fac-
44 ing if exposed to environmental tobacco smoke (as would be the case if home confined vapers had
45 kept smoking). However, there is another worrying concern that can be very disruptive for vapers
46 under these conditions, namely: the possibility that the environmental emissions of e-cigarette
47 aerosol (ECA) that they exhale (if infected by the SARS-CoV-2 virus) could transmit COVID-19
48 to those sharing with them indoor spaces under home confinement or in other common spaces.

49 While there is evidence of contagion through respiratory droplet emissions from the usual res-
50 piratory activities, such as breathing vocalizing, coughing and sneezing, there is no data and/or
51 direct evidence on this transmission through exhaled ECA. However, such possible COVID-19
52 contagion cannot be ruled out because vaping (like smoking) is a respiratory activity. Thus, a
53 theoretically objective assessment of the risks involved in this possible contagion route is cru-
54 cially necessary for the ongoing sustainment of the harm reduction approach pursued by millions
55 of vapers under the prevailing conditions of the current pandemic. The present article addresses
56 this necessity by providing a self-consistent risk model of COVID-19 contagion from this res-
57 piratory route in shared indoor spaces, considering relevant factors such as visibility, ventilation
58 and face mask wearing.

59 Given the lack of empiric evidence of occurrence of COVID-19 contagion through exhaled
60 ECA, and as a first approach, we have examined the plausibility and scope of droplet transmission
61 through vaping expirations, taking cigarette smoking and mouth breathing as useful proxies for
62 the respiratory mechanics and droplet emission that should occur through exhaled ECA modeled
63 as an intermittent turbulent jet evolving into a puff (see Sussman et al. (2020)). We have also
64 published a short paper Sussman et al. (2021) advancing some of the results of the present article,
65 adding comment on related issues, such as the difference between exposure to exhaled ECA and
66 environmental tobacco smoke, as well as a guideline for addressing these issues in public policies
67 during the current pandemic.

68 In the present paper we consider the results of Sussman et al. (2020) to elaborate a risk
69 evaluation of this transmission in shared indoor spaces: a home and restaurant scenarios with
70 natural and mechanical ventilation, assuming that respiratory droplets have been uniformly dis-
71 tributed throughout the full indoor volume (hence bypassing the distinction between “droplets”
72 and “aerosols”). For this purpose, we incorporate vaping exhalations into a simplified and mod-
73 ified version of the exponential dose-response reaction model developed by Buonanno et al.
74 (2020a,b) (hereafter BMS), based on the notion of “*infective quanta*” (the virus concentration
75 needed to infect 63 % of exposed individuals) constructed with actual data on SARS-CoV-2 in-
76 fective parameters and considering the specifics of natural and mechanical ventilation. In order

77 to provide a more meaningful context, our risk model incorporates into the risk model results
78 from Sussman et al. (2020) and BMS to evaluate viral quanta emissions, not only from vaping,
79 but also from speaking and coughing, all compared with respect to a control state of unavoidable
80 emissions from continuous breathing. We also discuss the risk involved for bystanders wearing
81 face masks exposed to emissions from potentially infected unmasked individuals, as vapers must
82 (at least) momentarily remove their face masks in order to vape.

83 We also discuss the visibility of exhaled ECA, which emerges from the optical properties
84 of ECA droplets (light scattering Ruzer and Harley (2012)). This property has significant psy-
85 chological and safety implications, namely: the fact that those surrounding potentially infectious
86 vapers can instinctively place themselves away from the area of direct exposure clearly delineated
87 by the visible exhaled cloud (something impossible to do with expirations from other respiratory
88 activities, except smoking).

89 It is necessary to issue the following important disclaimer: the present article is concerned
90 only with the risks of SARS-CoV-2 transmission through exhaled ECA, not with risks of COVID-
91 19 infection or illness of vapers due to possible effects of vaping in the respiratory system, or
92 other possible health hazards by users' exposure to inhaled ECA or bystanders to exhaled ECA
93 derived from the usage of e-cigarettes as substitute of tobacco smoking. Readers are advised
94 to consult the available literature on these subjects (see extensive reviews Farsalinos and Polosa
95 (2014); RCP (2016); McNeill et al. (2018); NASEM (2018); Polosa et al. (2019)).

96 Another important disclaimer: we will not address risk of COVID-19 contagion through res-
97 piratory droplets carried by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), though our risk evaluation on
98 low intensity ('mouth to lung' puffing style practiced by 80-90 % of vapers) applies with some
99 nuances to mainstream emissions of ETS (emerging from the smoker, as opposed to sidestream
100 emissions from the burning/smouldering tip of the cigarette which do not emerge from the res-
101 piratory system). However, we emphasize that indoor exposure to ETS is much more hazardous
102 than exposure to exhaled ECA in any aspect other than risk for SARS-CoV-2 virus transmission.

103 The section by section summary of the paper that illustrates its methodological structure is
104 as follows. Background material is presented in section 2, which provides a brief summary of
105 results of Sussman et al. (2020). In Methods I (section 3) we examine the visibility of exhaled
106 ECA, commenting on its safety implications in section 7. In Methods II (section 4) we present
107 a risk model of SARS-CoV-2 contagion in shared indoor spaces (home and restaurant scenarios,
108 natural and mechanical ventilation) based on an adaptation and simplification of the model pro-
109 posed by BMS (Buonanno et al. (2020a,b)). Our results on this risk model (without face mask
110 wearing) are presented in section 5 (notice that face masks are seldom worn in a home scenario
111 and compliance with this measure is lax in restaurant scenarios). A full discussion is provided in
112 section 6 on the effect of face mask wearing, while safety considerations are discussed in section
113 7. The limitations and our conclusion are presented in sections 8 and 9.

114 **2. Background**

115 *2.1. Respiratory droplets emission*

116 In order to evaluate infection risks from vaping expirations in shared indoor spaces we need
117 empiric data on relevant parameters of these expirations: tidal expired volume and characteristics
118 of exhaled ECA carrying respiratory droplets, droplet emissions in such expirations and distances
119 along which these droplets should be transported by them. As we argued in in Sussman et al.
120 (2020), the lack of this data requires its inference through theoretical modeling guided by phe-
121 nomena (on which this data exists) that can serve as proxies for vaping exhalations. Using this

122 inferred outcomes droplet propagation distances can be estimated through a model of a turbulent
123 intermittent jet evolving into a puff.

124 In what follows we summarize the main results of the theoretical modeling undertaken in
125 Sussman et al. (2020):

126 • **'Mouth to Lung' (MTL) low intensity vaping and smoking** The outcomes displayed
127 in Table SM(2) and Table 2 of Sussman et al. (2020) suggest mean expired tidal volumes
128 of $V_T = 700 - 900 \text{ cm}^3$ potentially carrying $N_p = 6 - 200$ respiratory droplets per ex-
129 halation (mean $N_p = 79.82$, standard deviation 74.66), overwhelmingly in the submicron
130 range (typically peaking at $d_p = 0.3 - 0.8 \mu\text{m}$) and droplet number densities well below
131 $n_p = 1 \text{ cm}^{-3}$. As shown in Figure SM(2) of Sussman et al. (2020), this is the style of vap-
132 ing involving low powered devices practiced by 80-90 % of vapers in the main consumer
133 markets (the US and the UK). However, the proxies we have used (cigarette smoking and
134 mouth breathing) exhibit a wide individual variation in expired volumes, puffing param-
135 eters and droplet emission, all of which should occur also in vaping. Thus, the inferred data
136 we have mentioned excludes the small minority of outlier individuals known as "super
137 emitters" possibly emitting as much as $N_p \sim 1000$ respiratory droplets per exhalation in
138 expired tidal volumes of up to 2 LT.

139 • **'Direct to Lung' (DTL) high intensity vaping.** It involves high powered tank devices
140 that allow for a wider spectrum of deeper respiratory intensity than MTL vaping. It should
141 involve a higher rate of droplet emission and expired volumes of 2-3 LT. Perhaps the closest
142 analogue to infer its droplet emission rate among the studies listed in Table 2 of Sussman
143 et al. (2020) is breathing at fractional residual capacity in Almstrand et al. (2010) that
144 reported emission rates of around 1000/LT. However, this style of vaping is practiced by a
145 small minority of vapers (roughly 10-20 %), with its upper end being extreme vaping (the
146 so called "cloud chasers") that is only practiced in competitions or exhibitions. Evidently,
147 this type of extreme vaping cannot be sustained for long periods and is not representative
148 even of even DTL vapers.

149 While the inferred droplet numbers in the upper end of high intensity DTL vaping can be compa-
150 rable with low end numbers for vocalizing, the latter involves modes with larger mean diameters
151 because of distinct droplet generation processes Asadi et al. (2019); Morawska et al. (2009);
152 Johnson et al. (2011).

153 2.2. Distance for direct exposure

154 The distance range that vaping expirations can transport respiratory droplets provides the spa-
155 tial scope of direct pathogen exposure through exhaled ECA, modeled in Sussman et al. (2020)
156 as an intermittent jet evolving as the exhalation ends into a turbulent puff. The scope of direct ex-
157 posure is the displacement or penetration distance of the jet in the direction of the momentum of
158 the jet at exhalation. The parameters characterizing the jet are expired tidal volume of air diluted
159 ECA mentioned in section 2.1 and exhalation centerline velocities estimated in Sussman et al.
160 (2020) as $U_0 = 0.5 - 3 \text{ m/s}$ (MTL vaping) and $U_0 = 1, 5 - 5 \text{ m/s}$ (DTL vaping), which (assuming
161 horizontal exhalation) yields a distance spread of 0.5-2.0 meters for the MTL vaping and over
162 2.0 meters for DTL. The maximal penetration goes beyond that afforded by the momentum thrust
163 of the starting jet, with the puff further evolving at lesser speeds. Before the puff stage centerline
164 velocities drop to about 0.2 m/s at different times and distances when fluid injection stops in all
165 cases.

166 Given its short time duration and close distance scope of the momentum trusted staring jet,
167 the analytic model analyzed in Sussman et al. (2020) provides a reasonably good inference of the
168 distance and direction that bystanders should keep to minimize the risk of direct exposure. As the
169 jet evolves it mixes with surrounding air, with entrained air reaching about 40 % of the jet mass
170 as exhalation (fluid injection) ends at the transition towards the puff regime Ghaem-Maghani
171 (2006); Ghaem-Maghani and Johari (2010). Since at this point the jet velocities become com-
172 parable to typical velocities of ~ 10 cm/s (and up to 25 cm/s) of airflow currents in home envi-
173 ronments, even in still air with natural ventilation Matthews et al. (1989); Berlanga et al. (2017),
174 the puff can be easily destabilized by vortex motion generated through turbulent mixing from
175 the large velocity fluctuations produced by the entrainment Wei and Li (2015); Vuorinen et al.
176 (2020).

177 Once the puff becomes disrupted bystanders face indirect exposure to mostly droplet nuclei,
178 as submicron respiratory droplets evaporate almost instantly as they are exhaled (see Nicas et al.
179 (2005)). Turbulence and thermal buoyancy and stratification become important factors when
180 the jet initial momentum decreases, more so when the vaper (the source) moves or walks Wang
181 and Chow (2011). Mechanical ventilation (mixed or displaced) He et al. (2011); Gao and Niu
182 (2007); Gao et al. (2008) producing a faster disruption and dispersion of the slow moving puff
183 through their own turbulent, thermal stratification and droplet dispersion patterns. In general,
184 the dispersed submicron droplets and droplet nuclei can remain buoyant for hours, with mixing
185 ventilation tending to uniformly spread them, whereas directed ventilation tends to stratify them
186 along different temperature layers. The detailed description of droplet dispersion after the puff
187 disruption is a complicated process that requires computational techniques that are beyond the
188 scope of this paper (see comprehensive analysis in Vuorinen et al. (2020)).

189 3. Methods I: Visualization of the respiratory flow

190 As shown in Sussman et al. (2020), respiratory droplets that would be carried by exhaled ECA
191 should be overwhelmingly submicron (just as ECA droplets). As a consequence, ECA droplets
192 and the much fewer respiratory droplets accompanying them, should follow the fluid flow of
193 ECA approximately as molecular contaminants, thus acting like visual tracers of the expiratory
194 flow Ai et al. (2020); Nazaroff (2004). This visibility is shared with smoking (see Gupta et al.
195 (2009, 2010); Ivanov (2019)), but is absent in other respiratory expirations (breathing, vocalizing,
196 coughing, sneezing). It has important psychological and safety implications, since bystanders
197 can instinctively detect (and avoid) the area of direct exposure. We provide here a brief discussion
198 of optical properties of aerosols that allow for their visualization (see comprehensive explanation
199 in Ruzer and Harley (2012); Hinds (1999); Kulkarni P and K (2011)).

200 Visualization and coloring of aerosols follow from the interaction of light with its particulate
201 phase through absorption and scattering (refraction, reflection and diffraction), which depends on
202 the particles' number density n_p , chemical nature and the ratio of their diameters to visible light
203 wavelengths: $\alpha = \pi d_p / \lambda$ with $\lambda = 0.4 - 0.7 \mu\text{m}$. This interaction is described in relatively simple
204 terms for ultra-fine particles ($d_p < 0.05 \mu\text{m}$ or $\alpha \ll 1$) by Rayleigh's molecular scattering theory
205 and for large particles with $d_p > 100 \mu\text{m}$ in terms of geometric optics. Particles with diameters
206 in the intermediate range correspond to Mie scattering theory, which becomes particularly com-
207 plicated for d_p roughly comparable to λ or $\alpha \approx \pi$, as is the case for ECA and respiratory droplets.
208 Since the latter are liquid droplets, they are in practice non-absorbing so that scattering is the
209 dominant effect.

210 A simpler approach to aerosol optics follows from the notion of light extinction, the loss of
 211 intensity I from absorption and scattering in the direction of an incident parallel non-polarized
 212 light beam, with intensity I_0 and cross section distance L within an aerosol. This is described by
 213 the extinction coefficient σ_e through the Lambert-Beer (or Bouguer) law

$$I = I_0 e^{-\sigma_e L}, \quad \sigma_e = \frac{\pi}{4} Q_e n \bar{d}^2, \quad (1)$$

214 where n is the total particle number density, \bar{d} is the mean particle diameter and, for non-
 215 absorbing particles, $Q_e \approx Q_{\text{scatt}}$ is the scattering extinction efficiency taken as constant (a valid
 216 approximation for a fixed λ and a very small diameter range around \bar{d}).

217 The fact that n in non-biological aerosols (like exhaled ECA) is much larger than in bioaerosols
 218 that are just “airborne” without ECA (as in “normal” respiratory activities) explains why exhaled
 219 ECA is visible while the bioaerosols are not. To illustrate this point quantitatively, consider the
 220 light extinction law (1) for an incident beam with wavelength $\lambda = 0.5 \mu\text{m}$ crossing an exhaled
 221 ECA jet (see figure 1 of Sussman et al. (2020)). From the mean diameters obtained in Sussman
 222 et al. (2020), we have $\bar{d} = \lambda = 0.5 \mu\text{m}$ and $\bar{d} = 0.4 \mu\text{m}$ for respiratory and ECA droplets (the
 223 latter just at exhalation before their rapid evaporation), while (from figure 16.2 of Hinds (1999))
 224 we have $Q_e = 2, 3.5$ respectively for ECA and respiratory droplets, as their respective refractive
 225 indices are roughly those of water and VG: $m = 1.33, 1.5$. While L is the same (same fluid jet)
 226 and \bar{d} and Q_e have comparable values for both types of droplets, the large difference in n makes
 227 a significant effect in light transmission through the beam that indicates the aerosol visibility in
 228 its specific direction if $I/I_0 < 1$. In numbers: we have $n_p \sim 10^7 \text{cm}^{-3}$ and $L = 15 \text{cm}$ for ECA
 229 just at exhalation, leading to impaired light transmission, $I/I_0 = 0.51$, while at 1 meter distance
 230 after significant dilution: $\bar{d} \sim 0.1, L = 25 \text{cm}$ and $n_p \sim 10^5 \text{cm}^{-3}$, we have almost full light
 231 transmission $I/I_0 = 0.99$. For respiratory droplets $n_p \sim 0.1 - 1 \text{cm}^{-3}$, leading to practically full
 232 light transmission $I/I_0 \approx 1$ irrespective of L (in the appropriate ranges delineated by the exhaled
 233 jet).

234 Extinction through a parallel beam provides a limited description of light scattering in an
 235 aerosol, which occurs through each droplet in all directions. The rigorous description through
 236 Mie scattering theory is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is evident that droplet numbers
 237 play a significant role since total scattered intensity is basically the sum of scattered intensity
 238 from each droplet. The light extinction law (1) is valid under the assumption that photons in
 239 all directions follow classical paths and their scattering complies with a Poisson distribution (a
 240 good approximation for sufficiently diluted aerosols). Under these assumptions the mean free
 241 path between scattering events is simply (see chapter 13 of Kulkarni P and K (2011)) $\ell = 1/\sigma_e =$
 242 $1/(C_e n)$, where $C_e \propto \bar{d}^2$ is the extinction cross section per droplet. Evidently, light scattering in
 243 the scales of the ECA jet is negligible for bioaerosols with very low n , as the mean free path ℓ
 244 becomes extremely large (much larger than the bio-aerosol scale). For $\bar{d} = 0.5 \mu\text{m}$, $Q_e = 2$ and
 245 $n \sim 0.1 - 1 \text{cm}^{-3}$ we have $\ell \rightarrow 10^8 - 10^9 \text{cm} = 10^3 - 10^4 \text{km}$, a huge value that explains the
 246 practical lack of scattering events in these bio-aerosols.

247 4. Methods II: Risk model of contagion

248 Having considered the inferred data obtained in Sussman et al. (2020) on exhaled tidal vol-
 249 umes, emission rates, type of respiratory droplets and exhalation distance spreads, as well as the
 250 visibility of these exhalations, we need to evaluate exposure risks of bystanders sharing indoor

spaces with infected vapers. Specifically, we seek a model that takes into account exposure to SARS-CoV-2 viruses potentially carried by a total mass of droplet emission in indoor spaces irrespective of whether the exposure is direct or indirect. However, given the visibility of vaping (and smoking) exhalations, it is safe to assume that bystanders sharing indoor spaces with vapers will, extremely likely, avoid direct exposure to the exhaled jet and thus will be mostly subjected to indirect exposure to (mostly) droplet nuclei dispersed by surrounding air currents once the jet has become a puff subjected to thermal buoyancy and turbulent mixing. It is also important for a consistent risk model to examine viral exposure of a total mass of droplet emission for other expiratory activities (breathing, vocalizing, coughing, sneezing) under the same assumptions, though for these activities avoidance of direct exposure is not instinctive because the exhalations are not visible.

The data inferred in in Sussman et al. (2020) considered generic respiratory droplets without reference to a specific pathogen/disease and have not evaluated infection risks of exposed susceptible individuals. We undertake now this evaluation, referring specifically to the available information on the parameters of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, assuming as well that emitted respiratory droplets or droplet nuclei potentially carrying this virus have been dispersed uniformly throughout a given indoor micro-environment.

Besides visibility, another extremely important feature that fully characterizes exposure risks from vaping expirations is the significant shortening of exposure time because of their intermittent and episodic nature: an infectious vaper (symptomatic or not) would emit respiratory droplets only while vaping (120-200 daily exhalations Dautzenberg and Bricard (2015); Cahours and Prasad (2018)), whereas the same vaper will emit respiratory droplets continuously just by normal rest breathing (17,000–29,000 daily exhalations for 12-20 breaths per minute for healthy adults).

4.1. Infective quanta

To evaluate indirect exposure risks from vaping we simplify and adapt the analytic risk model of Buonanno, Morawska and Stabile (hereafter BMS) Buonanno et al. (2020a) who have examined the potential SARS-CoV-2 virus transmission in various indoor micro-environments (see also their previous paper Buonanno et al. (2020b)). BMS develop this model by means of Monte Carlo simulations in which variability of droplet emission rates and exposure parameters is described by suitable probability distributions. Our approach is to assume median values for these variables (50 percentiles) of these distributions, similar to their approach in their previous paper Buonanno et al. (2020b). This is justified because our aim is to evaluate the risks from indoor COVID-19 transmission from vaping, speaking and coughing (all episodic or intermittent expirations) in comparison with what can be denoted as a “control case” scenario of risks in a space were the infectious vaper is only rest breathing (a continuous expiration). We are not aiming at providing a full comprehensive risk analysis for each respiratory activity separately under more realistic conditions (something that would justify a full separate study in itself).

BSM consider the notion of an infective “quantum”: the dose of airborne respiratory droplet nuclei necessary to infect 63 % of exposed susceptible individuals. They introduce the “quantum emission rate” ER_q (emitted quanta per hour) for various respiratory expirations

$$ER_q = \frac{c_v}{c_{RNA} c_{PFU}} \times f_{br} V_T C_d, \quad (2)$$

where c_v is the viral load (RNA copies/mL) in the sputum of a SARS-CoV-2 infected person (symptomatic or not), c_{RNA} is the number of RNA copies per PFU (plaque forming unit) needed




Figure 1: **Quanta emission rates.** The curves display ER_q (quanta/hour) as a function of viral load c_v (RNA copies/mL) for various expiratory activities: rest breathing (br), low and high intensity vaping (vp), speaking (bottom to top) 10, 20, 30, 40% of the hour (sp), coughing (cf) and speaking 100% of the time (sp100). Numerical values of ER_q for $c_v = 10^7$ RNA copies/mL (vertical line) are listed and discussed in the text. The ratios between these activities and rest breathing (taken as the case control scenario) is displayed in figure 4.

294 to generate infection and c_{PFU} is quanta-to-PFU conversion parameter, f_{br} is the number of breaths
 295 per hour and V_T the tidal exhaled volume, C_d is the droplet volume concentration (in mL/m^3 ,
 296 hence $C_d V_T$ is the total volume of exhaled droplets in mL). BMS define the product “ $\mathcal{R} =$
 297 $V_T \times f_{br}$ ” as an “inhalation rate”, but it can also be used as an exhalation rate expressible in units
 298 m^3/h .

299 For the infection parameters BMS consider values that have emerged from recent data: $c_v =$
 300 10^7 RNA copies/mL (average in the range $10^3 - 10^{11}$), $c_{RNA} = 1.3 \times 10^2$ RNA copies/PFU and
 301 $c_{PFU} = 2.1 \times 10^2$ PFU/quanta. For the droplet volume concentration they take as reference an
 302 experimental value that incorporated dehydration effects in droplets associated with loud speech
 303 Stadnytskyi et al. (2020), then using experimental data from Morawska et al Morawska et al.
 304 (2009) to scale this reference to other respiratory expirations, leading to the following values (in
 305 mL/m^3)

$$C_d = 2 \times 10^{-2} \text{ (loud speech), } 6 \times 10^{-3} \text{ (normal speech), } 2 \times 10^{-3} \text{ (rest breathing),} \quad (3)$$

306 In order to fit vaping expirations into these values we need to make some assumptions on the
 307 involved parameters, besides considering the effects on exposure from the time duration of ex-
 308 piratory activities. In particular, we need to evaluate their mean quanta emission rate *only* in the
 309 times when they occur and compare with the rates of normal rest breathing (which takes place all
 310 the time). To simplify matters, we assume that c_v , c_1 and $f_{(br)}$ are largely unaffected by the timing
 311 of these expiratory activities. We have then

- 312 • **Low intensity MTL Vaping.** A vaper breathes $N_{(tot)}$ times in (say) one hour and of these
 313 breaths $N_{(vp)}$ coincide with vaping expirations (puffs), the expression for ER_q in (2) must be

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modified as

$$\text{ER}_{q(\text{vp})} = \frac{c_v f_{\text{br}}}{c_{\text{RNA}} + c_{\text{PFU}}} \left[\frac{N_{(\text{vp})}}{N_{(\text{tot})}} V_{T(\text{vp})} C_{d(\text{vp})} + \left(1 - \frac{N_{(\text{vp})}}{N_{(\text{tot})}} \right) V_{T(\text{br})} C_{d(\text{br})} \right], \quad (4)$$

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where $N_{(\text{vp})}$ $N_{(\text{tot})}$ are the number of vaping puffs and total number of breaths per hour, $V_{T(\text{br})}$ $V_{T(\text{vp})}$ and $C_{d(\text{vp})}$, $C_{d(\text{br})}$ are the tidal volumes and droplet volume concentration for vaping and rest breathing. For low intensity MTL vaping we assume a tidal volume of $V_T = 750 \text{ cm}^3$ supported by data inferred and discussed in Sussman et al. (2020), while for droplet volume concentration we assume $C_d = 3 \times 10^{-3} \text{ mL/m}^3$, a plausible value denoting emissions slightly above rest breathing but below normal speech in (3), fitting the 'whispered counting' data of Morawska et al. (2009). For the number of breaths we can take the average values of 160 daily puffs in a 16 hour journey Dautzenberg and Bricard (2015); Cahours and Prasad (2018) and breathing frequency of $f_{(\text{br})} = 16/\text{min}$ (in the range 12-20), so that $N_{(\text{tot})} = 960$ breaths/h and $N_{(\text{vp})} = 10$ breaths/h.

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- **High intensity DTL vaping.** We assume $V_T = 2000 \text{ cm}^3$ as an average tidal volume. However, there is ambiguity in inferring a value for droplet volume concentration because of insufficient data on how much the larger tidal volume and deeper inhalation of DTL vaping can modify respiratory droplet numbers and diameters. As mentioned in section 2 of Sussman et al. (2020), higher powered devices associated with DTL vaping tend to increase ECA droplet sizes and diameters Lechasseur et al. (2019); Floyd et al. (2018) but it is not certain if this applies to respiratory droplets. However, as mentioned in section 3.3.2 of Sussman et al. (2020), speech involves droplet generating mechanisms that are distinct from those of breathing Asadi et al. (2019); Morawska et al. (2009); Johnson et al. (2011), resulting in higher rate of droplet emission even with a tidal volume only slightly larger than the breathing rest value of $400 - 600 \text{ cm}^3$ Bailey and Hoit (2002); Hoshiko (1965). Thus, we have two plausible options to account for a higher total volume of exhaled droplets $\mathcal{V}_d = V_T C_d$: it may follow simply from a larger V_T with the same value $C_d = 3 \times 10^{-3} \text{ mL/m}^3$ of low intensity vaping, or we might assume the larger value of C_d for normal speech in (3). Instead of choosing one option, we will keep the continuous range of $C_d = 3 - 6 \times 10^{-3} \text{ mL/m}^3$. Regarding the number of breaths we can assume the same values as low intensity vaping: $N_{(\text{tot})} = 960$ breaths/h and $N_{(\text{vp})} = 10$ breaths/h.

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- **Normal speech.** The equation for ER_q in (2) needs to be modified in a similar way as (4), replacing the droplet volume concentration C_d with the value for normal speech in (3) and we take as tidal volume the value $V_T = 600 \text{ cm}^3$, roughly 10% larger than the average rest value Bailey and Hoit (2002); Hoshiko (1965). To incorporate the timing we replace $N_{(\text{vp})}$ with a number count of breaths coinciding with a given percentage of an hour interval spent on continuously speaking in a given indoor environment. For 5, 10, 20, 30, 40% of the hour (960 total breaths) we have $N_{(\text{sp})} = 48, 96, 192, 288, 384$ breaths/h.

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- **Coughing.** The emission data from coughing in Morawska et al. (2009) is comparable to that of 'unmodulated vocalization' (repeating the vowel "aahh"). Hence, we can use (4) with the value for droplet concentration volume of loud speaking in (3) as a proxy for coughing, while for coughing tidal volume we have $V_T = 1400 \text{ cm}^3$ Gupta et al. (2009). Assuming a cough every 2 and 3 minutes, $N_{(\text{vp})}$ is replaced by $N_{(\text{cf})} = 20, 30$.

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Considering the plausible assumptions stated above, we display in figure 1 the logarithmic plots of quanta emission rate ER_q from an infectious individual as a function of viral load c_v , for rest

356 breathing, low and high intensity vaping, speaking for 10 %, 20 %, 30 % and 100 % of the time,
 357 as well as coughing every 2 and 3 minutes. The numerical values of ER_q in quanta per hour for
 358 $c_v = 10^7$ RNA copies/mL are

$$\begin{aligned}
 ER_{q(\text{br})} &= 0.3416, & ER_{q(\text{vpL})} &= 0.3562, & ER_{q(\text{vpH})} &= 0.3727 - 0.4139, \\
 ER_{q(\text{sp10})} &= 0.5063, & ER_{q(\text{sp20})} &= 0.6610, & ER_{q(\text{sp30})} &= 0.8158, \\
 ER_{q(\text{sp40})} &= 0.9705, & ER_{q(\text{cf})} &= 1.2637, & ER_{q(\text{sp100})} &= 1.8216,
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

359 where the symbols br, vpL, vpH, sp10, sp20, sp30, sp40, sp100 and cf respectively de-
 360 note breathing, vaping low and high intensity, speaking 10, 20, 30, 40, 100% of the hour and
 361 coughing 30 times. Notice that for low and high intensity vaping ER_q is very close to the control
 362 case of rest breathing (almost indistinguishable for low intensity vaping), while even speaking
 363 10 % of the hour (6 minutes) yields a larger ER_q value than the upper end of high intensity va-
 364 pping. Also, normal speech for a full hour (not uncommon) produces a higher quanta emission
 365 than coughing 30 times

366 4.2. Exponential dose-response risk model

367 In order to evaluate a time dependent risk for expiratory activities that incorporates quanta
 368 emission rates and indoor environment variables, BSM consider the “dose response exponen-
 369 tial model” given in terms of the the density of the quanta $n(t)$ in units quanta/m³ under the
 370 assumption that $n(0) = 0$ (no exposure at initial time $t = 0$)

$$R = 1 - \exp\left[-IR \int_0^T n(t) dt\right] = 1 - \exp\left[-\frac{IR [ER_q N T - n(T) V]}{IVVR V}\right], \tag{6}$$

$$n(t) = \frac{ER_q N}{IVVR V} [1 - \exp(-IVVR t)], \tag{7}$$

371 where V is the volume (m³) of the indoor micro-environment, N is the number of exposed suscep-
 372 tible individuals, IR is the inhalation rate (m³/h) of these individuals and $IVVR$ is the infectious
 373 virus removal rate, which which BMS take as the sum of three factors: $IVVR = \text{AER} + \kappa + \lambda_0$,
 374 where AER is the ventilation air exchange rate, κ is the particle deposition on surfaces and λ_0 is
 375 the virus inactivation (all of these quantities given as h^{-1}).

376 We evaluate in section 5 the risk R for vaping exhalations and other respiratory activities,
 377 aiming at the evaluation of their relative risk with respect to the control state of continuous
 378 breathing, assuming a home and restaurant scenarios with natural and mechanical ventilation.

379 5. Results I: Risk evaluation

380 To evaluate the risk of exposure to respiratory droplets carried by vaping exhalations in indoor
 381 environments we have adapted in section 4 the “dose response exponential model” developed by
 382 Bounnano, Morawska and Stabile (BMS) Buonanno et al. (2020a)¹. Specifically, we evaluate
 383 equation (6) that defines the risk R (as a fraction < 1) for the value $IR = 0.96\text{m}^3/\text{h}$ taken from the
 384 previous paper of BMS Buonanno et al. (2020b) and justified as a level of physical activity half
 385 way between standing and light activity. For the remaining parameters BSM assume the range

¹We do not assume face mask wearing in this subsection. Effects of face masks are discussed in section 6.

386 $\text{AER} = 0.2 - 0.5/h$ for natural ventilation and $\text{AER} = 9.6/h$ for a restaurant scenario with mixed
 387 ventilation. BMS compute the deposition rate by dividing typical gravitational settling velocity
 388 for supermicron particles (10^{-4} m/s) by the height of emission (1.5 m), leading to $\kappa = 0.24/h$,
 389 while for the viral inactivation they take the measured aerosolized SARS-CoV-2 virus mean life
 390 of 1.1 hours Van Doremalen et al. (2020) and even longer periods Fears et al. (2020), leading to
 391 $\lambda_0 = 0.63/h$. We consider the following home and restaurant indoor scenarios:

- 392 • Home scenario. We assume one infectious vaper and three exposed susceptible family
 393 members ($N = 3$). Total exposure time $T = 12$ h. Indoor volume 125 m^3 (small 50 m^2
 394 apartment with roof height of 2.5 m). For natural ventilation: $\text{AER} = 0.2/h$ we have $\text{IVVR} =$
 395 $1.07/h$.
- 396 • Restaurant, natural ventilation with open door. Thirty costumers ($N = 30$), total exposure
 397 time $T = 3$ h. Air exchange rate $\text{AER} = 0.5/h$, indoor volume 300 m^3 (100 m^2 area with
 398 roof height of 3 m), results in $\text{IVVR} = 1.37/h$
- 399 • Same restaurant endowed with mechanical ventilation: $\text{AER} = 9.6/h$ (taken from Bu-
 400 nanno et al. (2020b)), results in $\text{IVVR} = 10.47/h$

401 The infection risk R for home and restaurant scenarios is plotted in figures 2 and 3 as a function
 402 of time for breathing, low and high intensity vaping, various percentages of time spent speaking
 403 and coughing every 2 minutes, considering natural and mechanical ventilation. As expected
 404 from the quanta emission rates displayed in figure 1, the exposure time of different expirations
 405 is a crucial factor in computing R . As expected, the risk factor R increases with exposure time
 406 T , displaying an approximately growing linear dependence that keeps the same shape but is
 407 markedly decreased with mechanical ventilation in in each scenario: R decreases to one third
 408 (25 % to 8 %) after 12 hours exposure in a home environment with air exchange rate of 3/h and
 409 one fifth (25 % to 5 %) after 3 hours exposure in a restaurant environment with air exchange rate
 410 of 9.6/h. However, the key point is not the absolute values of $R(T)$ but its comparison for various
 411 respiratory activities and the control state of exclusive normal rest breathing. Figures 2 and 3
 412 reveal that exposure to vaping expiration (vaper doing 10 puffs per hour) poses an infection risk
 413 to bystanders that is very close to that from the control case scenario. In fact, for low intensity
 414 vaping the infection risk $R(T)$ is practically indistinguishable from the control case and even for
 415 high intensity vaping it is well below that from the same person speaking and coughing. Speaking
 416 only for 10 % of the time (6 minutes per hour) already yields a higher infection risk than high
 417 intensity vaping, while speaking 30 – 40 % of the hour yields up to 4 times the infection risk,
 418 which is roughly the values plotted in figure 4.

419 A good inference of the risk from intermittent and episodic expiratory activities (vaping,
 420 speaking, coughing) relative to the control case scenario of exclusive rest breathing (a continuous
 421 expiration) is furnished by the ratio $R_{(A)}/R_{(\text{br})}$, where $A = \text{vp, sp, cf}$ (see (5)). Plotting this ratio
 422 from (6)–(7) for every expiratory activity yields near constant curves around the values of the
 423 quotients $\text{ER}_{q(A)}/\text{ER}_{q(\text{br})}$ (see numerical values in (5)). This is not surprising since ER_q is the only
 424 variable in R that characterizes the infectious person (the other variables characterize the indoor
 425 micro-environment and the exposed susceptible persons). Hence, given the same indoor micro-
 426 environment and same number of susceptible individuals, we consider risks relative to the control
 427 case scenario of rest breathing in terms of the ratio of quanta emission. Using (4) we have

$$\varepsilon = \frac{\text{ER}_{q(A)}}{\text{ER}_{q(\text{br})}} = 1 + \left(\frac{\mathcal{V}_{d(A)}}{\mathcal{V}_{d(\text{br})}} - 1 \right) \approx \frac{R_{(A)}}{R_{(\text{br})}}, \quad (8)$$




Figure 2: **Infection risk in a home environment.** The curves display R as a function of exposure time T from (6). The abbreviations br, vpL, vpH, sp10, sp20, sp30, sp40 and cf stand for rest breathing, vaping low intensity, vaping high intensity (upper end option), speaking for 10, 20, 30, 40, % of time and coughing. Notice the dramatic reduction of R achieved by mechanical ventilation (moderate air exchange rate of 3/h). Also: the curves for the risks from vaping (full range of intensities) are practically indistinguishable from that of the case control scenario of rest breathing (red circles).




Figure 3: **Infection risk in a restaurant.** The same abbreviations as in figure 2 plus sp100 (speaking 100 % of the time, a possible outcome when spending 3 hours in a restaurant). As in figure 2, mechanical ventilation (air exchange rate 9.6/h) achieves a dramatic reduction of R and the curves for the risks from vaping are practically indistinguishable from the curve of the control case scenario of rest breathing (red circles).




Figure 4: **Added percentage risks of expiratory activities with respect to the control case scenario of rest breathing.** The percentage values with respect to the control case are: low intensity vaping 1.3 % (vpL), high intensity vaping 5.2-17.7 % (vpH), speaking 44% (sp10), 88% (sp20), 132% (sp30), 176% (sp40) for 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% of time, coughing 259% 30 times per hour (cf). These values were obtained from $(\varepsilon - 1) \times 100$ for ε defined for these expiratory activities by (8)–(10).

428 where $\mathcal{V}_{d(A)} = V_{T(A)} C_{d(A)}$ is the total exhaled droplet volume (in mL) for each expiratory activity
 429 “A”. Since $N_{(br)} = N_{(tot)}$, then for a heavy breathing activity in intense aerobic exercise ε might
 430 grow only because of the much larger tidal volume. However, for a truly intermittent expiration
 431 like vaping we have $N_{(vp)}/N_{(br)} \ll 1$ and thus $\varepsilon \approx 1$ holds even if we have $\mathcal{V}_{d(A)}/\mathcal{V}_{d(br)} \gg 1$ (large
 432 exhaled amount of droplets as with the large tidal volumes in extremely intense vaping). For the
 433 values of tidal volume and droplet volume concentration we have used the numerical values in
 434 (5), we have the following relative risks

$$\varepsilon = 1.25 \times \frac{N_{(vpL)}}{N_{(br)}} \quad (\text{low intensity vaping}), \quad \varepsilon = 5 - 11 \times \frac{N_{(vpH)}}{N_{(br)}} \quad (\text{high intensity vaping}), \quad (9)$$

$$\varepsilon = 3.6 \times \frac{N_{(sp)}}{N_{(br)}} \quad (\text{speaking}), \quad \varepsilon = 28 \times \frac{N_{(cf)}}{N_{(br)}} \quad (\text{coughing}), \quad (10)$$

435 which provides an intuitive indication of the added exposure risks relative to the control case
 436 from the different expiratory activities.

437 We display in figure 4 the numerical values of ε , as an added risk with respect to the control
 438 case for various expiratory activities with respect to the continuous presence of risk from rest
 439 breathing and under the assumptions we have used. These numbers clearly reflect the effects of
 440 the intermittence or duration time of each activity. Under normal vaping conditions (10-15 puffs
 441 per hour) the added risk of low intensity vaping respect to the control scenario of exclusive rest
 442 breathing is of the order of $\sim 1\%$ (since $\varepsilon - 1 \sim 10^{-2}$). For high intensity vaping it is $\sim 5 - 17\%$,
 443 given the ambiguity in the range of $\mathcal{V}_d = V_T C_d$, still it is of the order of $\varepsilon - 1 \sim 5 \times 10^{-2} - 10^{-1}$, also
 444 a low added risk since the low value of $N_{(vp)}/N_{(br)}$ compensates for the large exhaled tidal volume.

445 Notice that the added risk respect to the control case grows to $\sim 40\%$ just for talking for 10 %
446 of the time and easily reaches 176 % if talking 40 % of the time. Coughing is also intermittent,
447 possibly even more intermittent than vaping, but its large amount of exhaled droplets (large factor
448 of 28 in (10)) can offset this effect. For speaking ε can be large even if normal speech involves
449 a tidal volume close to rest breathing, but it also involves a much larger amount of time (larger
450 number of breaths in typical conversation).

451 6. Discussion I: Effects of face mask wearing

452 In our risk evaluation in a home and restaurant scenarios in section 5 we did not assume face
453 mask wearing by emitters and receivers of infective quanta. However, this fact has little real
454 life relevance in our risk evaluation for the home scenario because face mask are rarely worn
455 at home (even under confinement). Assuming that containment measures permit that bars and
456 restaurants remain open, our risk evaluation also remains roughly valid for such venues (if vaping
457 is allowed), even if vaping necessarily requires the vaper to remove the face mask (at least for
458 the brief time lapse of intermittent puffs). In fact, eating and drinking in a restaurant scenario
459 also require face mask removal, which in a convivial atmosphere (with conversations accompany
460 eating and drinking) should involve quanta emissions by mask-free patrons whose duration is
461 likely to exceed the strict time needed to eat and drink. However, it is still necessary to examine
462 exposure risks in hypothetical indoor scenarios in which universal face mask wearing is strictly
463 enforced. In particular, we need to emphasize the effects on those face masks that are usually
464 worn at a community level: surgical masks and/or those made of cotton and other fabrics.

465 Face masks, in their multiple designs and fiber characteristics (see review in Tcharkhtchi
466 et al. (2020)), filter aerosol particles through various physical processes: gravitational sedimen-
467 tation, inertial impaction, interception, diffusion and electrostatics, each of which govern and/or
468 becomes dominant in specific ranges of particle sizes, airflow, leaks and environmental factors
469 according to aerosol filtering theory (see Hinds (1999)). The key issue we need to assess is
470 how much cotton and surgical masks protect (in terms of filtering efficiency) their wearers from
471 *inward* emission when they are exposed to *outward* quanta emissions by potentially infectious
472 individuals not wearing face masks (as vapers when vaping). It is especially useful to compare
473 this protection with respect to the one they would get when exposed to emitters who are also
474 masked (*i.e. reciprocal masking*).

475 Filtering efficiency is high in outward emission for N95 respirators (over 90 %) and slightly
476 less so (74 %) in surgical masks in human emitters breathing, speaking and coughing Asadi
477 et al. (2020), with decreasing diameters of filtered droplets, though in these experiments droplet
478 counts excluded ultra-fine droplets below $0.3\ \mu\text{m}$ and leaks were not evaluated. Similar results
479 were obtained in laboratory conditions with a non-biological aerosol, though leaking decreased
480 efficiency in surgical and cotton masks between one half and two thirds Drewnick et al. (2021).

481 Evidently, face masks also protect their wearers from inward emissions, as revealed by the
482 following two laboratory experiments:

- 483 • In Sickbert-Bennett et al. (2020) two human subjects in different body postures, wearing
484 well fit N95 respirators and surgical masks (tied with stripes or ear loops), were exposed
485 to a non-biological polydisperse aerosol ($d_p = 0.02 - 3.00\ \mu\text{m}$) released in a chamber at
486 concentrations between $2000-5000\ \text{cm}^{-3}$. Fitted filtration efficiency was above 95 % in all
487 N95 respirators, 71.5 % for the surgical mask tied with stripes and 38.1 % for the one fit

488 with ear lobes. Efficiency decreased for the latter to 21.2 % when the subjects turned their
489 head left or right, showing the effects of leaks.

490 • In Ueki et al. (2020) a bio-aerosol generated by a nebulizer emitted at flow velocity of
491 2 m/s, simulating a mild cough airflow, was used to examine virus penetration (in terms
492 of virus titer) between two mannequins separated at distances of 50 and 100 cm, in ex-
493 periments wearing loose and fit N95 respirators, surgical and cotton masks. The filtering
494 efficiency was measured in terms of the detected percentage of virus titer in the receiving
495 mannequin with respect to the titer in the emitting one. For 10^5 PFU (plaque forming
496 units) when the receiver was wearing different face masks and the emitter was unmasked
497 filtering efficiency was: 17 %, 47 %, 57 % and 79 % for the cotton mask, surgical mask,
498 loose and fit N95 respirators respectively. When both mannequins wore a surgical mask
499 the filtering efficiency significantly rose to 60 %, 71 %, 69 % and 92 %. Efficiency was
500 about 10 % lower for 10^8 PFU. Virus titers decreased to 45 % and 31 % when mannequins
501 (both unmasked) were placed at distances of 50 cm and 100 cm with respect to their values
502 at 25 cm separation.

503 Both laboratory experiments describe, in spite of their idealization, the relatively low protection
504 afforded by cotton and surgical masks to bystanders exposed to either unmasked emitters at close
505 range and/or high droplet concentrations, flow and virus titer, which are precisely the conditions
506 characteristic of direct exposure that would likely affect bystanders (wearing such masks) placed
507 at the source (close to the mouth) and in the direction of the jet exhaled by an infectious vaper or
508 by someone infectious breathing, talking or coughing without wearing a mask.

509 However, as opposed to masked bystanders exposed to mask-less emissions from other respi-
510 ratory activities, we showed in section 3 that bystanders close to a vaper in shared indoor spaces
511 can avoid instinctively the spatial zone of direct exposure that is clearly delineated by the visi-
512 ble emission jet exhaled by a vaper. These are evidently very different exposure conditions from
513 those of the experiments described above, as bystanders wearing cotton or surgical masks located
514 outside the exhaled jet would be subjected only to indirect exposure to a very low concentration
515 of submicron droplet nuclei dispersing through air currents at ambient velocities that depend on
516 the ventilation regime (roughly below 10-20 cm/s with natural ventilation Matthews et al. (1989);
517 Berlanga et al. (2017)). In fact, the role and scope of SARS-CoV-2 transmission through indi-
518 rect exposure to these submicron droplets and droplet nuclei (what the WHO and most medical
519 literature denotes as “aerosols”) is still uncertain and controversial NAS (2020); Jayaweera et al.
520 (2020); Shiu et al. (2019); Sommerstein et al. (2020).

521 In particular, a much decreased airflow in indirect exposure implies a much decreased face
522 velocity U_f , the air velocity at the mask surface obtained by dividing the air flow (LT/min) over
523 the mask surface area. For the range of flow of rest breathing 10-25 LT/min, we have $U_f = 6 -$
524 12 cm/s (see Drewnick et al. (2021)), which is qualitatively analogous to characteristic velocities
525 of indoor circulation currents with natural ventilation. Intuitively, under these low intensity flow
526 conditions the masks capture more particles (droplets and nuclei) because the permanence time of
527 the latter favors the capture mechanisms that are dominant for the particle diameter $d_p > 0.3 \mu\text{m}$:
528 inertial impaction and interception. The dependence of the percentage of filtration efficiency E
529 on U_f when these mechanisms are dominant is given by $E \propto [1 - \exp(-U_f^{-4/9})] \times 100$ for a
530 broad range of filtering parameters (see equations 9.19 and 9.35 of Hinds (1999)), which for
531 $d_p > 0.3 \mu\text{m}$ yields $E > 90 \%$ (see figures 9.9 and 9.10 of Hinds (1999)). The same arguments
532 should apply to indirect exposure to drifting droplet nuclei from other respiratory activities that
533 are sufficiently small to remain buoyant for long times.

534 As a consequence, universal wearing of cotton and surgical face masks offers a significantly
535 higher level of protection against indirect exposure to small droplets and nuclei spread once
536 respiratory droplets have evaporated. Evidently, it would be extremely complicated to adapt the
537 relative risk model we have presented in section 4 to these conditions, since we would have to
538 re-calculate in terms of the filtering efficiency of the face masks the quanta emission assigned to
539 the control state of breathing emitters, of the comparative emitters talking and coughing, as well
540 as the exposed receivers. However, incorporating this complexity might not be worthwhile after
541 all, given the fact that the added contribution of vaping to the overall respiratory droplet emission
542 from the control state of breathing remains vary small.

543 7. Discussion II: safety considerations

544 The results of our analysis, as listed in detail in section 5 and figures 2, 3 and 4, reveal
545 that vaping expirations (by being intermittent and with low emission rates close to breathing)
546 represent a minor risk increase of exposure to SARS-COV-2 transmission with respect to the
547 control state: low intensity vaping (practiced by 80-90 % of vapers) involves a 1 % increase of
548 the risk while high intensity vaping involves an increase of risk of 5-17 % (the uncertainty follows
549 from the lack of a precise inference on its droplet emission rate). As a comparison (see figure 4)
550 speaking 6-24 minutes per hour increase the risk by 44–176 % and coughing 2 times per minute
551 in an hour by 259 %.

552 It is worth remarking that exposure time and ventilation modify the (approximately linear)
553 dependence of infective risk R exposure time T , but keeps the comparative relative risks plotted
554 in figure 4 roughly constant. This is consistent with the fact that figures 2 and 3, which display
555 $R(T)$ for the various respiratory activities under natural and mechanical ventilation for the same
556 micro-environment conditions (under the parameters used by BMS), show that the slopes for
557 vaping (low and high intensity) in all cases are practically indistinguishable with the slope for
558 the the breathing control state.

559 As mentioned in the introduction, there is an ongoing controversy on whether available ev-
560 idence favors as main aerial COVID-19 contagion factor direct exposure to “droplets” (droplets
561 with $d_p > 5 \mu\text{m}$) or indirect exposure to “aerosols” (small droplets and droplet nuclei $d_p < 5 \mu\text{m}$)
562 (see NAS (2020); Jayaweera et al. (2020); Shiu et al. (2019); Sommerstein et al. (2020)). Al-
563 though respiratory droplets potentially carried by exhaled ECA are well within the range of
564 “aerosols”, this controversy has practically no effect for the risk evaluation we have undertaken,
565 since our goal has been the evaluation of relative risks of respiratory activities in comparison with
566 a well defined control state of pure breathing. Evidently, the latter control state and the values of
567 the parameters used to compute risk of infection $R(T)$ for all respiratory activities might change if
568 either one of “aerosols” of “droplets” become the dominant factor, but this would roughly affect
569 all respiratory activities in similar ways, which suggests that the relative risks we have computed
570 are likely to keep roughly the same proportionality to the control state.

571 7.1. Safety considerations from the flow visualization

572 As shown in section 3, vaping expirations potentially carrying the SARS-CoV-2 virus are
573 visible (as opposed to other respiratory activities). Besides the evident psychological dimension
574 of this flow visualization, there are safety implications: vapers and those surrounding them have
575 a clear, instinctive and immediate delineation of the flow’s horizontal and vertical distance reach
576 and spreading direction along the exhaled jet. From the outcomes of the hydrodynamical analy-
577 sis carried in Sussman et al. (2020), we can recommend as a basic safety measure to avoid direct

578 exposure (irrespective of face mask wearing) by keeping a 2 meter distance away from the vaper
579 (when vaping) in the direction of the visible jet. However, notice that exhalation ranges above 2
580 meters are unusual, as 80-90 % of vapers use low powered devices whose exhaled jets reach well
581 below 2 meters (and typically exhaling with a 30 degrees downward angle, see Sussman et al.
582 (2020)). In other directions away from the jet (even at close distance) the exposure is indirect, but
583 nevertheless as a safety measure it is prudent to maintain 2 meters of separation in all directions
584 from anyone vaping when not wearing a face mask. Notice that these recommended safety mea-
585 sures coincide with the standard social separation recommendations adopted worldwide Hsiang
586 et al. (2020).

587 7.1.1. *Face masks.*

588 In computing exposure risks in section 5 we did not consider face mask wearing. This is
589 justified because face masks are not usually worn in a home scenario. Even in a restaurant or
590 bar scenario, patrons are likely to remain mask-less for extended periods because masks must
591 be removed for eating and drinking (as with vaping). As we discuss in section 6, face masks
592 of common usage (surgical and cotton) afford limited protection to bystanders wearing them
593 subjected to direct exposure to respiratory droplets from mask-free emitters. However, once
594 outside the direct exposure zone (visible and delineated for vaping), bystanders wearing common
595 usage face masks would be effectively protected from indirect exposure to dispersing droplets or
596 nuclei with diameters above $0.3 \mu\text{m}$ remaining buoyant for extended periods.

597 7.1.2. *Lockdown vs opening.*

598 Risk assessments are essential to provide evidence based support for preventive and mitigat-
599 ing policies that have been proposed and enacted worldwide (see review Hsiang et al. (2020)).
600 These assessments are sensitive to the wide variety of rapidly changing pandemic conditions and
601 scenarios. High levels of severity characterized by frequent contagion rates can be addressed
602 by lockdowns contemplating different levels and stages of home confinement. Under these con-
603 ditions the risk assessment for the home scenario that we presented is particularly relevant, as
604 a large number of vapers and smokers become home bound for a range of large periods. As
605 we argue in Sussman et al. (2021), the risk assessment undertaken in the present paper provides
606 valuable information for safety policies in this scenario: low intensity vaping only produces a
607 minuscule ($\sim 1\%$) extra contagion risk with respect to the control case scenario of continuous
608 breathing. Safety interventions should consider that abstention from vaping would not produce a
609 noticeable safety improvement, but could generate an undesired level of stress and anxiety under
610 long term confinement. High intensity vaping produces a higher increase of relative risk, but
611 still well below speaking and coughing. Notice that face masks are seldom worn in home bound
612 scenarios of family clusters.

613 8. Limitations

614 *Lack of empiric data.* Given the lack of experimental and observational data on respiratory
615 droplets carried by exhaled ECA, we had to consider as basic input for the risk model the data
616 inferred in Sussman et al. (2020) on the basis of theoretical speculation from the physical and
617 chemical properties of ECA and extrapolation from available data on other expiratory activities
618 (cigarette smoking and mouth breathing with a mouthpiece) that can serve as reasonable proxies
619 for vaping. Evidently, the present paper inherits another important limitations of Sussman et al.

620 (2020): the oversimplification of vaping styles by classifying a complex usage pattern into two
621 categories, “low” and “high” intensity” vaping, which cannot capture the full range and scope of
622 individual vaping habits.

623 *Oversimplification of infective parameters and individual variability.* The rates of emitted
624 droplets inferred for vaping are rough average estimates gathered from outcomes reported in
625 breathing studies (see Table 2 of in Sussman et al. (2020)), involving a wide variety of subjects,
626 including both healthy and individuals affected by respiratory conditions (not by SARS-CoV-2).
627 Also, we did not considered the small minority of outlier individuals who are super spreaders
628 emitting significantly larger numbers of droplets Asadi et al. (2019). Also, the data on infective
629 SARS-CoV-2 parameters gathered by BMS that we use in section 4 is also subjected to uncer-
630 tainties that they specifically recognize. In fact, numerous aspects associated with the spreading
631 and infection details of the SARS-CoV-2 virus remain uncertain and subject to large (often un-
632 explained) individual and environmental variability (a good summary of these uncertainties is
633 found in Klompas et al. (2020); Morawska and Milton (2020); Morawska and Cao (2020); NAS
634 (2020)). However, in order to be able to model a possible (previously unexplored) route of
635 droplet transmission and possible infection, it is necessary and unavoidable to simplify this com-
636 plexity and lack of data to obtain plausible order of magnitude estimates that can be verified once
637 empiric evidence is available.

638 *Oversimplification of the risk model.* The adapted BMS risk model that we presented in
639 section 4 is also simplified. While it fulfills our aim of providing a rough comparative estimation
640 of relative risks with respect to the control case of continuous rest breathing, we do recognize
641 its limitations: the risks are evaluated for a single vaper in highly idealized micro-environments,
642 assuming constant infection parameters and inhalation rates (which BMS also assume), ignoring
643 as well probability distributions of the quanta emission rates that convey individual variation on
644 infection susceptibility and other parameters (which the model of BMS does incorporate). A
645 more elaborate and complete approach should include a more robust methodology to quantify
646 exposure risks to intermittent and sporadic sources, as for example in Nazaroff (2004); Ai et al.
647 (2019). This task is left for a future analysis.

648 9. Conclusion

649 We have presented in this paper a risk analysis of COVID-19 contagion through direct and in-
650 direct exposure to the SARS-CoV-2 virus potentially carried by respiratory droplets and droplet
651 nuclei that would be carried by ECA (e-cigarette aerosol) exhaled by vapers in shared indoor
652 spaces (home and restaurant scenarios). This risk analysis is based on suitable adaptations of
653 the risk model presented by BMS (see Buonanno et al. (2020a,b)) that incorporates experimental
654 data on SARS-COV-2 infective quanta: we consider vaping expirations characterized by the res-
655 piratory parameters inferred in Sussman et al. (2020), we also considered the quantitative effects
656 of exposure from the characteristic duration times of vaping and of other expiratory activities
657 (breathing, vocalizing and coughing). In particular, given the fact that breathing is a continuous
658 (and unavoidable) expiratory activity, we considered the rate of infective quanta of pure breathing
659 (without vocalizing, coughing or vaping) as a “control state” that serves as reference to evaluate
660 comparative risks for the rest of the inspiratory activities. To complement this risk analysis we
661 also discussed the visibility of vaping expirations (section 3) and the usage of face masks in the
662 indoor scenarios under consideration (section 6).

663 Vaping expirations represent a minimal increase of risk with respect to continuous breath-
664 ing in home and restaurant scenarios with natural and mechanical ventilation (1 % and 5–17 %

665 for low and high intensity vaping). Visibility of vaping expirations is protective, as it allows
666 avoidance of the high risk of direct exposure to droplets and droplet nuclei potentially carrying
667 the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Those sharing indoor spaces with vapers do not require extra safety in-
668 terventions besides those already recommended for the general population: wearing face masks
669 and keeping a separation distance of 1.5-2 meters to avoid direct exposure. Setting aside harms
670 from environmental tobacco smoke unrelated to COVID-19, these recommendations should also
671 apply to sharing an indoor space with a smoker.

672 **List of abbreviations and symbols**

673 *Acronyms and abbreviations*

674	ECA,	E-Cigarette Aerosol
675	COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
676	SARS-CoV-2	Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
677	BMS	Bounnano, Morawska & Stabile
678	MTL	Mouth to Lung (vaping style)
679	DTL	Direct to Lung (vaping style)
680	RNA	Ribonucleic acid
681	PFU	Plaque forming units
682	br	Breathing
683	vp	Vaping
684	vpL	Vaping low intensity
685	vpH	Vaping high intensity
686	sp10	Speaking 10% of time
687	sp20	Speaking 20% of time
688	sp30	Speaking 30% of time
689	sp40	Speaking 40% of time
690	sp100	Speaking 100% of time
691	cf	coughing

692 *Units*

693	LT	Liters
694	mL	milliliters
695	m	meters
696	cm	centimeters
697	μm	micrometers
698	s	seconds
699	h	hour

700 *Variables*

701	V_T	Tidal volume
702	N_p	Number of particles
703	d_p	Diameter of particles
704	n_p	Number of particles
705	U_0	Exhalation velocity
706	α	diameter to wavelength ratio
707	L	Cross section distance within the aerosol
708	λ	light wavelength
709	I	Beam intensity
710	I_0	Incident beam intensity
711	σ_c	Extinction coefficient
712	Q_c	Scattering extinction coefficient
713	\bar{d}	Mean particle diameter
714	ℓ	Mean free path between scattering events
715	ER_q	Quanta emission rate
716	c_v	Viral load (RNA copies per mL)
717	c_{RNA}	Number of RNA copies per PFU
718	c_{PFU}	Quanta to PFU conversion parameter
719	f_{br}	Number of breaths per hour
720	C_d	Droplet volume concentration (mL/m^3)

721	IR	Inhalation rate
722	$N_{(tot)}$	Total number of breaths per hour
723	$N_{(vp)}$	Number of breaths/puffs per hour for vaping
724	$N_{(sp)}$	Number of breaths per hour while speaking
725	\mathcal{V}_d	Total volume of droplets
726	R	Risk for expiratory activities
727	T	Exposure time
728	n	Density of quanta
729	N	Number of exposed susceptible individuals
730	V	Volume of indoor space
731	$IVVR$	Infective virus removal rate
732	AER	Air Ventilation exchange rate (per hour)
733	κ	Particle deposition on surfaces (per hour)
734	λ_0	virus inactivation (per hour)
735	U_f	Face velocity
736	E	Efficiency of filtration

737 **Declarations**

738 Ethics approval and consent to participate

739 Not applicable

740 Consent for publication

741 Not applicable

742 Availability of data and materials

743 Not applicable

744 Competing interests

745 RAS has no competing interests to declare.

746

747 EG is currently employed by Myriad Pharmaceuticals, an independent company that man-
748 ufactures e-liquids and vaping devices in New Zealand. She also provides consultancy
749 work on research and development, regulatory affairs support, and formulation to several
750 independent vaping companies in the Pacific Region. In the past she has worked for several
751 pharmaceutical companies, including GlaxoSmithKline and Genomma Lab. She is also a

752 member of the standards committee of the VTANZ and UKVIA.

753

754 RP is full time employee of the University of Catania, Italy. In relation to his work in
755 the area of tobacco control and respiratory diseases, RP has received lecture fees and re-
756 search funding from Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, CV Therapeutics, NeuroSearch A/S, San-
757 doz, MSD, Boehringer Ingelheim, Novartis, Duska Therapeutics, and Forest Laboratories.
758 He has also served as a consultant for Pfizer, Global Health Alliance for treatment of to-
759 bacco dependence, CV Therapeutics, NeuroSearch A/S, Boehringer Ingelheim, Novartis,
760 Duska Therapeutics, Alfa-Wassermann, Forest Laboratories, ECITA (Electronic Cigarette
761 Industry Trade Association, in the UK), Arbi Group Srl., and Health Diplomats. RP is the
762 Founder of the Center of Excellence for the acceleration of Harm Reduction at the Univer-
763 sity of Catania (CoEHAR), which has received a grant from Foundation for a Smoke Free
764 World to develop and carry out 8 research projects. RP is also currently involved in the
765 following pro bono activities: scientific advisor for LIAF, Lega Italiana Anti Fumo (Italian
766 acronym for Italian Anti Smoking League) and Chair of the European Technical Com-
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772 Author contributions

773 Conceptualization, EG and RAS and; methodology, RAS.; investigation, RAS, EG and
774 RP.; resources, RAS, EG and RP ; writing-original draft preparation, RAS, EG and RP
775 writing-review and editing, RAS, EG and RP.; visualization, RAS and EG.; All authors
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Figures




Figure 1

Quanta emission rates. The curves display ER_q (quanta/hour) as a function of viral load c_v (RNA copies/mL) for various expiratory activities: rest breathing (br), low and high intensity vaping (vp), speaking (bottom to top) 10; 20; 30; 40% of the hour (sp), coughing (cf) and speaking 100% of the time (sp100). Numerical values of ER_q for $c_v = 107$ RNA copies/mL (vertical line) are listed and discussed in the text. The ratios between these activities and rest breathing (taken as the case control scenario) is displayed in figure 4.




Figure 2

Infection risk in a home environment. The curves display R as a function of exposure time T from (6). The abbreviations br , vpL , vpH , $sp10$, $sp20$, $sp30$, $sp40$ and cf stand for rest breathing, vaping low intensity, vaping high intensity (upper end option), speaking for 10, 20, 30, 40,% of time and coughing. Notice the dramatic reduction of R achieved by mechanical ventilation (moderate air exchange rate of $3=h$). Also: the curves for the risks from vaping (full range of intensities) are practically indistinguishable from that of the case control scenario of rest breathing (red circles).




Figure 3

Infection risk in a restaurant. The same abbreviations as in figure 2 plus sp100 (speaking 100% of the time, a possible outcome when spending 3 hours in a restaurant). As in figure 2, mechanical ventilation (air exchange rate 9:6=h) achieves a dramatic reduction of R and the curves for the risks from vaping are practically indistinguishable from the curve of the control case scenario of rest breathing (red circles).




Figure 4

Added percentage risks of expiratory activities with respect to the control case scenario of rest breathing. The percentage values with respect to the control case are: low intensity vaping 1.3% (vpL), high intensity vaping 5.2-17.7% (vpH), speaking 44% (sp10), 88% (sp20), 132% (sp30), 176% (sp40) for 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% of time, coughing 259% 30 times per hour (cf). These values were obtained from $(\epsilon - 1) \times 100$ for ϵ defined for these expiratory activities by (8)–(10).