Graduate Students and the U.S. China Initiative

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Graduate Students and the U.S. China Initiative

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3403751/v1

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The 2018 China Initiative systematically targeted international Chinese scholars as possible spies for China. Previous research demonstrated ways that the China Initiative engaged in racial profiling, resulting in scholars of Chinese descent feeling unwelcomed in U.S. higher education institutions and insecure in their engagement as researchers. Graduate students were not exempt. This study explores the nuanced ways that Chinese graduate students felt discriminated against and racially profiled in comparison to their non-Chinese peers during the height of the U.S. China Initiative. Additionally, this research assesses how those experiences impacted students’ future educational mobility plans. As international Chinese enrollments in the United States are declining, our study seeks to identify the factors that may be contributing to this trend.

Educational Philosophy and Theory

International Relations

International Students

Chinese Students

Discrimination

Higher Education Mobility

Geopolitics

The China Initiative, established under the Trump Administration in 2018, had a chilling effect throughout the scientific research community. Although racially profiling Asian people existed long before the COVID-19 pandemic or Trump’s admittance into the Oval Office (Kim, 2021; Ruiz et al., 2021; Hvistendahl, 2020), the China Initiative expanded federal investigations into Chinese nationals and their affiliated organizations (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020), resulting in over 162 cases (Pelham & Sun, 2022; MIT Technology Review, 2021). Of these, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought forth 12 cases involving fraud and economic espionage within higher education. Notwithstanding the concerning fact that, “significantly more than 12 research integrity cases” were listed on the DOJ’s prosecutions list before records were deleted (Guo et al., 2021), the integrity and transparency of the China Initiative has and continues to be criticized.

The opaque investigatory processes paired with President Trump’s antagonistic language towards China fostered “a climate of fear amongst Asian Americans” (Lucas, 2022), and trepidation within the scientific community (Lee & Li, 2021, Lin & Sun, 2021; Xi et al., 2023; Mervis, 2023). Following several concerning reports (Lee & Li, 2021; MIT Technology Review, 2021) and petitions to end the China Initiative (Winds of Freedom, 2021), Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Olsen, announced the China Initiative would be terminated, stating:

While I remain focused on the evolving, significant threat that the government of China poses, I have concluded that this initiative is not the right approach…by grouping cases under the China Initiative rubric, we helped give rise to a harmful perception that the department applies a lower standard to investigate and prosecute criminal conduct related to that country or that we in some way view people with racial, ethnic or familial ties to China differently (U.S. Department of Justice, 2022).

Current trends suggest that the “anti-Asian scrutiny has only intensified since the controversial [China Initiative] ended one year ago” (Gilbert, 2023) and although the name has been changed, the concern that racial profiling will continue to permeate U.S. academic research continues (Mervis, 2022).

Within this paradigm, Chinese graduate students are caught in the crosshairs of political strife. On the one hand, the success of U.S. scientific output relies on collaboration with Chinese scholars (Haupt & Lee, 2021) while on the other hand, Chinese scholars have been systematically targeted by niche, albeit powerful, political discourse that accuses them of economic espionage. Chinese students are not exempt from this narrative (Redden, 2018). The purpose of this research paper is to 1) examine Chinese graduate students’ experiences with discrimination and 2) review their mobility plans in comparison with their non-Chinese counterparts following controversial policies stemming from the 2018 China Initiative and extending into the post-Trump presidency.

Scientific research is fundamentally borderless and necessitates open collaboration as well as the free exchange of ideas. This is oftentimes at odds with U.S. protectionist strategies. The Department of Justice is quick to assume that U.S. scientists who engage with Chinese researchers are exporting information to benefit the Chinese government, regardless of the nature of the collaboration. While the academy by in large supports collaboration, the DOJ “does not understand the ethos of science,” (Schaefer, 2023, p. 9) and thus makes inaccurate assumptions about U.S. scientific conduct. Sharing information with support staff, including graduate students, is vital for the success of many research projects and programmatic interventions. To avoid being targeted by the U.S. government, many U.S.-American researchers are suspending or terminating their collaborative projects with Chinese affiliates (Lee & Li, 2023), while other scientists, specifically those of Chinese ethnic heritage, have avoided applying for U.S. federal grants (Xi et al., 2023; Lin & Sun, 2021). As Chinese scholars pursue research with collaborators in less hostile nations such as Japan and in Europe (Silver, 2020), it is presumed that graduate students face similar diminished opportunities.

Over the years, the body of literature highlighting the consequences of the China Initiative has grown extensively. Research by Lee and Li (2021) and supported by the Committee of 100, briefly discusses the impact that the China Initiative and its concurrent U.S. policies have had on international Chinese graduate students. However, this was not the primary study focus, and the authors encourage additional empirical research into these effects. Expanding upon this whitepaper, the authors’ subsequent research (Lee & Li, 2023) assesses the sociological and geopolitical effects of the China Initiative and argues that U.S. educational policy has made it increasingly difficult for Chinese students to enter the United States and pursue higher education. For example, Proclamation 10043 suspends entry into the United States for Chinese graduate students whose focus may support the Chinese government’s military strategy (Proclamation 10043, 2020) and student visa restrictions have been imposed on Chinese graduate students pursuing research in sensitive disciplines, such as aviation and robotics (Mervis, 2018) reducing the duration from five years to one year. The negative outcomes these policies espouse, such as reduced student enrollment (Redden, 2019), are well documented amongst U.S. news media outlets.

Supporting the authors’ past findings, other research teams have sought to further examine the effects of the China Initiative. In one such study, an online survey featuring responses from 1,304 U.S. researchers of Chinese heritage found that respondents frequently feel unwelcomed, targeted, and unsafe to conduct their research in the United States. Respectively, “65% are worried about collaborations with China; and a remarkable 86% perceive that it is harder to recruit top international students now compared to 5 years ago” (Xie et al., 2023, p. 3). These findings substantiate an earlier institutional survey conducted by Lin & Sun (2021) which also warns against “brain drain” within U.S. scientific research and highlights that 31% of faculty witnessed a decline in student and postdoc enrollment who turndown their U.S.-based opportunities due to its unwelcoming environment.

It is common for Chinese graduate students to gravitate to ethnically Chinese faculty when selecting an advisor and research collaborator (Borjas et al., 2018). However, if newly awarded PhD recipients are pursuing professional positions and academic appointments outside of the United States, and those who stay continue to express a lack of willingness to engage in research with Chinese affiliates (Xie et al., 2023), then Chinese graduate students will face diminished learning, research, and mentorship opportunities. To this end, faculty, fearing they will not be able to support their graduate students, have reduced their laboratories and halted taking on new graduate students (Mervis, 2023).

Although previous research illustrates the negative sociological effects of the China Initiative, the paucity of empirical evidence into international and domestic Chinese graduate students’ 1) direct experiences with racial discrimination influenced by the China Initiative, and 2) mobility plans pertaining to higher education enrollment, challenges social scientists to measure the net impact for this higher education population. To our knowledge, this research is the first attempt to investigate and document these experiences and educational mobility decisions in tandem.

Asian Discrimination

It is common for international students to experience discrimination on campus, particularly for those transitioning to the United States from non-Western cultural contexts (Lee, 2010). Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) students are more likely to experience racial discrimination than ethnically European students (Chen et al., 2014) and the variable experiences between Asian students who were raised in the United Sates versus Asian students raised abroad, including international Chinese students, are prominent. For example, the latter population experiences “lower levels of perceived discrimination and higher racial color blindness,” which can largely be attributed to a narrow understanding of U.S. systemic racism and limited opportunities to feel its effects in comparison to their U.S.-based counterparts (Wang et al. 2019, p. 27). For Chinese graduate students, who come from ethnically homogenous backgrounds, they often feel that racism is a distant problem that effects other societies and populations until they transition to the United States (Wang, 2010). Upon facing a loss of privilege along ethno-racial identity lines, many find they are racially profiled along one of two categorizations: As a model minority or as a nefarious spy (Chen & Wen, 2021). Our research focuses on the latter.

Briefly, the model minority myth is a harmful social construct imposed on Asian students, which classifies this population by their high achievement (Poon et al., 2016), predilection for math and science (Cheran & Monin, 2005), and cultural context that emphasizes grit and perseverance (Yoo et al., 2010), amongst other sweeping generalizations. These assumptions extend to Chinese graduate students who are often labeled under this social group within academia. Facing prejudice, Chinese graduate students may experience increased pressure to perform to elevated and untenable levels in order to uphold this stereotype (Wang, 2010). Simply stated, the inaccurate and misleading nature of the model minority myth is damaging for Asian students (Yoo et al., 2010), including those of Chinese ethnic heritage.

Many positive, albeit damaging, characteristics outlined in the model minority myth are also leveraged in the U.S. political discourse. As reported by Elizabeth Redden (2018), former President Trump claimed that the majority of Chinese students living and studying in the United States were spies for China. He later explained his intention to address current immigration policies and allow the top international students to retain residency in the United States for up to five years. Trump’s characterization of Chinese students, paired with his proposed “dangling the carrot” immigration policies, is a prime example of how some U.S. political leaders have exacerbated racial profiling and forced students to overcome additional social hurdles. In the Trump multiverse, international Chinese students were profiled as adversaries to U.S. interests unless they embraced the model minority myth and rose as “top performers” demonstrating a level of goodness and worth to U.S. interests (Chen & Wen, 2021). This construct frames the model minority myth as both a social pressure and a political one that is necessary to uphold in order to stay in the United States.

Such language and policies enacted over the last five years have resulted in negative consequences for international Chinese students. Racial profiling, exemplified through the Trump lexicon is a tool for the United States government to target Chinese students and faculty under the guise of U.S. national security, when in reality it is, “warranted to preserve the U.S. imaginary of a safe, White-European country…[where] immigration is still allowed and even encouraged, but only for a certain kind of immigrant – those who resemble the dominant race and culture” (Lee, 2020, p. 3). White students, even those who are international, generally feel more comfortable, welcomed, and supported in their higher education environments as opposed to students whose cultural backgrounds are less valued in U.S. society (Lee & Rice, 2007). Chinese students in particular have faced challenges due to negative stereotyping, accelerated by COVID-19 (Koo et al., 2021; Chen & Wen, 2021) and aggravated by the China Initiative (Lee & Li, 2023; Chen & Wen, 2021).

A recent survey found that over the last 30 years, rising tensions between the United States and China has contributed to an increase in the number of incidents of anti-Asian xenophobia and perceived discrimination (U.S.-China Education Trust, 2023). As the China Initiative overlapped with the COVID-19 outbreak, much of the literature on Chinese students’ experiences with discrimination focus on the latter. In some instances, International Chinese students were profiled as “backward and contagious…[and] a threat to public wellbeing” (Chen & Wen, 2021, p. 85). Other incidents include threats of violence, verbal assaults, and demands to return home, (Koo et al., 2023). Chinese students are facing discrimination on U.S. college campuses and there appears to be an increase in incidents over the last few years.

Mobilization

Within higher education, international student mobility refers to students’ transition from one country to another to pursue college or university enrollment within a host country for which they are not a citizen (OECD, 2023). A variety of factors influence international students' decisions to study in the U.S. and their mobility plans upon graduation. Although the positive sociological factors, such as personal development, educational attainment, and career preparation, encourage Chinese students to enroll in U.S. institutions (Bartlett et al., 2018; Chao et al., 2017; Wang, 2021), social, familial, economic, and career-based factors support student decisions to either stay in the host country or return to their home country following their time abroad (Zweig, 1997; Mok et al., 2022). In both of these contexts, the literature on international student mobility decisions resulting from political factors remains underexplored.

Mobility into the United States

Today, Chinese students comprise the largest population of international students in U.S. higher education, although enrollments showcase a 22.1 percent decrease between FY19/20 and FY21/22 (IIE, 2022a). The COVID-19 pandemic is the most direct cause of declining Chinese student enrollments however, this is not independent from the intertwined geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China that existed before the pandemic (Guiake & Felix, 2023). Political activities such as “rising anti-Asian racism [and] rocky U.S.-China relations” (Chen, 2023), exemplified by Proclamation 10043 and visa duration reductions, imposed myriad challenges for Chinese international students to enter the United States and pursue their education in U.S.-based higher education institutions.

According to Holland et al. (2020), when Proclamation 10043 was first enacted, it had the potential to affect between 3,000 and 5,000 Chinese graduate students who were under U.S. suspicion of supporting the Chinese military. While the China Initiative may have been dismantled (Lucas, 2022), and President Biden demonstrates less antagonism towards China than President Trump, the political structures enacted by the latter president continue to impact Chinese student mobility plans, relevant to entering the United States and pursuing an advanced degree in a range of academic disciplines. Under the Biden administration, Chinese student mobility into the United States continues to be scrutinized. For example, in July 2021, 500 Chinese students were denied student visas into the United States (Yu, 2021). While the number of non-immigrant F1 visas issued to people from Mainland China declined from 105,775 in FY2019 to 61,894 in FY2022 (U.S. Department of State, n.d.), reflecting a 41.48% decrease.

Many Chinese students are motivated to pursue their education in the United States. However, U.S. policies, such as Proclamation 10043, reflect at their core, an arms race between the United States and China. Chinese students are the casualties of such geopolitical antics (Anderson, 2021). As we emerge from the pandemic, the United States has looked to other countries, including India to increase its international student enrollment (IIE, 2022b). Chinese students are a vital population within U.S. academia. We will have to wait to see whether the United States implements more attractive and inclusive educational policies to recover from lost enrollment over the last three years or if the trend to make it increasingly difficult to pursue mobility prevails.

Mobility Plans After Graduation

Resoundingly, scientists facing discrimination intend to leave the United States (Xi et al., 2023; Lin & Sun, 2021; Lee & Li, 2021). However, the literature on whether Chinese students and recent graduates feel the same is an area for additional inquiry. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic or the China Initiative, research on international student mobility has focused on movement from home country to host country, and vice-versa that often neglected other conceptions, such as feeling a sense of belonging in multiple places or feeling nowhere to be home. Student mobility plans are driven in part by a need to establish places. This process may be disrupted by negative experiences, including discrimination or loss of culture, motivating individuals to move back to their home (ancestral) country (Wu & Wilkes, 2017). In the wake of increased discrimination and anti-Asian hate, to what extent are Chinese graduate students feeling this urge to migrate to more welcoming environments?

Historically, there are a host of political factors that impact student mobility decisions. In a recent survey, 359 participants, reflecting 58.2% of the total number of participants, indicated that cultural challenges were a factor driving their mobility decisions. Furthermore, 153 participants, reflecting 24.8% of the total number of participants, indicated that their motivation to move was based in racial challenges (Gesing & Glass, 2019). Generally, mobility decisions are not separate from the social and political contexts of students’ home and host countries.

As the U.S.-China geopolitical tensions escalated, Li (2023) found that Chinese international students who intended to stay in the U.S. after graduation encountered many obstacles. These challenges included a delayed Optional Practical Training (OPT) application process, diminished prospects for securing an H-1B visa, and a reluctance among employers to hire them. Although most students persevered through these challenges and adhered to their original plans of staying in the U.S., the author cautioned that Chinese students’ resilience might not endure if U.S.-China geopolitical tension persists. In addition, considering more than half of the participants in Li’s study were undergraduate students, it is likely that graduate students could be more affected by political circumstances.

Research conducted by Wang (2021) looked at the push-pull factors, as well as reverse push-pull factors, that influenced both undergraduate and graduate Chinese students’ mobility plans. The findings suggest that the political factors that determine student mobility are dependent upon U.S. and Chinese travel regulations, geopolitical tension, and considerations for safety and security. Furthermore, coming out of the pandemic, rising gun violence, increased prestige of Chinese universities, and less hostile immigration policies in other countries have motivated students to look outside the United States (Chen, 2023). Again, because the political factors affecting Chinese student mobility overlap with the United States’ management of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is increasingly difficult to parse through the root causes, warranting additional research into the specific political factors that drive student mobility decisions amidst the China Initiative socio-political landscape.

Conceptual Framework

Neo-racism, which “refers to discrimination against particular populations on the basis of culture between ethnic groups” (Lee, 2021, p.12), is the principal theoretical framework guiding this study. Conceptually, neo-racism highlights the social hierarchy of culture and national identity framed through a Western lens, which extends beyond racial identity. This manifests in how individuals, families, groups, and communities navigate U.S. social constructs, which benefit those who assimilate into the dominant culture, above those who do not. Students from Western countries are placed higher along the cultural hierarchy above students from non-Western countries (Lee & Rice, 2007; Hou, 2023), and international Chinese students generally fall within this latter category.

As “neo-racism justifies discrimination on the basis of cultural difference or national origin rather than by physical characteristics alone” (Lee, 2006, p. 4), we suggest that ethnically Chinese students who were raised in China and transition to the U.S. as international students will have different experiences with discrimination than ethnically Chinese students who were raised in Western countries. These nuanced differences, underpinned by neo-racist political and social pressures, are at the heart of our analysis towards determining how international Chinese graduate students contextualize their experiences in U.S. higher education institutions.

To examine Chinese graduate students’ experiences and mobility plans as opposed to their non-Chinese counterparts, we drew the data from a larger national survey carried out between May and July 2021 among scientists in 83 prominent U.S. universities (Lee & Li, 2023), following the University of Arizona’s research ethics approval. Designed to uncover the impact of the China Initiative and FBI investigations on the scientific community, the survey encompassed questions addressing scientists’ experiences and perspectives related to collaborations with China, racial profiling, and mobility plans concerning China. For this study, we specifically focused on graduate students and their experiences with racial profiling and mobility plans.

Data

The original sample consisted of 1,949 scientists in STEM fields, among which 1,448 reported their roles as graduate students, postdocs, faculty members, or others. This study focused on 544 graduate students who reported their ethnicity, reflecting 37.6% of the larger sample. Table 1 shows the number of participants by ethnicity and citizenship. Since Chinese scientists were purposefully oversampled in the survey (Lee & Li, 2023), half (49.3%) of the graduate students self-identified as Chinese. A majority (86.2%) of the Chinese graduate students were foreign citizens.

Table 1

Participants
Ethnicity	Citizenship	Number of Participants
Chinese	Foreign citizen	231
	U.S. citizen	36
	Did not identify citizenship	1
Non-Chinese	Foreign citizen	69
	U.S. citizen	207
Total		544

We used descriptive analyses and proportion tests to examine the differences between Chinese and non-Chinese graduate students, as well as between Chinese students with and without US citizenship, in their sentiments of racial profiling and intentions of leaving the US due to the China Initiative and/or the FBI investigations. Additionally, we employed structural equation modeling (SEM) to explore the mediation effect of racial profiling on graduate students’ mobility plans. We adopted the composite variable of feeling racially profiled from Lee & Li’s (2023) study. This variable indicates that a participant reported at least one of the four items related to racial profiling. These four items are (a) feeling racially profiled by the U.S. government, (b) feeling considerable fear and/or anxiety of being surveilled by the U.S. government, (c) having experienced difficulty obtaining funding for a research project in the U.S. as a result of race/nationality/country of origin, and (d) having experienced professional challenges (i.e., promotion, professional recognition) as a result of race/nationality/country of origin.

Chinese graduate students were more likely to feel racially profiled than their non-Chinese counterparts. Among Chinese students, 48.7% felt considerable fear and/or anxiety of being surveilled by the U.S. government, 40.7% felt being racially profiled by the U.S. government, 34.8% had experienced professional challenges (i.e., promotion, professional recognition) as a result of race/nationality/country of origin and 29.1% had experienced difficulty obtaining funding for a research project in the U.S. as a result of race/nationality/country of origin. The percentages were only 13.8% (z = 74.14, p < 0.001), 10.7% (62.0%, p < 0.001), 17.6% (z = 15.09, p < 0.001), and 14.4% (z = 12.05, p < 0.05) respectively for non-Chinese graduate students. Using the composite variable of feeling racially profiled, the results for Chinese and non-Chinese graduate students differed significantly. Around two-thirds (68.1%) of the Chinese students reported at least one of those four issues, while around one-third (34.6%, z = 41.3, p < 0.001) of the non-Chinese students did so.

When further breaking down the data by citizenship, racial profiling was a particularly concerning issue among Chinese international graduate students as opposed to Chinese American students. More than half (53.3%) of the Chinese students with foreign citizenship felt considerable fear and/or anxiety of being surveilled by the U.S. government, while only 16.7% of the Chinese American students reported having such fear and/or anxiety (z = 15.46, p < 0.001). The discrepancy between foreign and US citizens was also salient, although not statistically significant, in their perceptions of racial profiling by the U.S. government (42.9% vs. 25.0%, z = 3.43, p = 0.06) and experiences of having difficulty obtaining funding for a research project in the U.S. as a result of race/ nationality/country of origin (33.1% vs. 6.9%[1]). In terms of experiences of professional challenges as a result of race/nationality/country of origin, there was no significant difference between Chinese students with foreign and U.S. citizenship (35.4% vs. 32.3%, z = 0.02, p = 0.89). Overall, there was a significant difference between these two groups by using the composite racial profiling variable (72.8% vs. 41.4%, z = 9.69, p < 0.05).

Among foreign citizens, 39.1% of the Chinese graduate students considered leaving the U.S. due to the China Initiative and FBI investigations, while only 5.8% of the non-Chinese graduate students reported so. The SEM result revealed that racial profiling was an essential factor that resulted in graduate students’ changing mobility plans (Fig. 1). Being Chinese did not have a significant direct effect on considering leaving the U.S. due to the China Initiative and/or FBI investigations (b = 1.13, p = 0.474). However, confirming the descriptive analysis, Chinese graduate students were significantly more likely to feel racially profiled (b = 0.45, p < 0.05). Additionally, feeling racially profiled significantly led to considering leaving the U.S. (b = 0.58, p < 0.001). This result suggests that one’s Chinese ethnic identity itself did not necessarily lead graduate students to consider leaving the U.S. under the political circumstances of the China Initiative and/or FBI investigations unless they felt being racially profiled.

The results of this study are concerning. Although neither the methodology of our analysis nor the results of our findings equip us to suggest direct causation between policies such as the China Initiative and adverse social interactions including discrimination exist. However, during the peak of the China Initiative between 2018 and 2021, Chinese graduate students living in the United States felt more targeted by the U.S. government and more racially profiled at their institutions, in comparison to their peers of non-Chinese heritage. Additionally, the differences between American Chinese students and international Chinese students further delineate these variable experiences, suggesting that the neo-racist political discourse targets the latter population more pointedly.

There is room within the empirical literature to further investigate how policies such as the China Initiative directly contribute to feelings of discrimination. While our research notes that international Chinese graduate students feel discriminated against in comparison to non-Chinese peer groups, our research does not delve into the nuanced activities that led students to feel racially profiled. Addressing this limitation, a future narrative inquiry that captures student experiences would help to contextualize racial profiling. For example, exploring the specific circumstances and activities that make international Chinese graduate students feel that they are under U.S. government surveillance, would add additional depth to the current literature.

As it pertains to mobility, international Chinese graduate students expressed an interest in leaving the United States due to feelings of being targeted by the U.S. government, which did not exist to the same degree for international non-Chinese graduate students. Furthermore, while feeling racially profiled was a motivating factor for disclosing an interest in leaving the U.S., ethnic identity in and of itself, was not a contributing factor. Our research speaks to how feelings of discrimination are linked to students’ self-identified interest in leaving the United States.

The findings from our study suggest that Chinese international students consider leaving the United States under conditions in which they feel racially profiled. Given the state of the current social-political landscape, paired with recent enrollment trends, the data suggests these conditions have been met, motivating international Chinese graduate students to move elsewhere. However, the myriad reasons why students pursue education at home or abroad necessitates further inquiry into student mobility motivations and enrollment patterns in response to political influences.

Chinese students represent an important population within U.S. higher education. As discrimination against Chinese graduate students persists, the U.S. is likely to lose its S&E workforce from China, which would have a negative impact on its economy and innovation. As such, colleges and universities must be aware of these trends and create the appropriate support structures to meet student needs. To this end, we recommend higher education institutions consider ways to combat the negative effects of discrimination. Increased positive social interaction to buffer against the negative effects of discrimination (Trice, 2004; Cohen & Wills, 1985; Sun et al., 2021), is one such strategy, although additional research into this area is necessary. In the interim, assessing current enrollment patterns and exploring the root cause for feelings of discrimination may help inform institutional practices to recruit and retain qualified international Chinese graduate students to U.S. higher education institutions.

The China Initiative unduly targeted Chinese scholars, including Chinese graduate students. The empirical literature shows that international students have consistently faced discrimination in higher education, which was exacerbated by U.S. policies such as Proclamation 10043 and newly instated visa restrictions. Furthermore, while the United States remains a top destination for Chinese graduate students, U.S. policies that limit migration impacts students’ ability to migrate to the United States for their education. Our research shows that international Chinese students on the whole feel racially profiled against by the U.S. government. These experiences are higher for ethnically Chinese students in comparison with non-ethnically Chinese students, and the differences between international and domestic Chinese students are also prominent. Broadly speaking, racially targeting students has impacted student motivations to stay in the United States post-graduation.

Disclosure:

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Footnotes

1. All appropriate ethical guidelines for the use of human subjects have been followed. Any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee review has been obtained. Additionally, all necessary patient/participant consent or assent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.

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Proportion test was not conducted because assumptions were not met.

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Graduate Students and the U.S. China Initiative

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Abstract

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Introduction

Literature Review

Asian Discrimination

Mobilization

Mobility into the United States

Mobility Plans After Graduation

Conceptual Framework

Data & Methodology

Data

Results

Discussion

Conclusion

Declarations

References

Footnotes

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