The Impact of Antimonopoly Regulation on Innovative Entrepreneurship in the Context of the Epidemiological Crisis: on the Example of Foreign Developed Countries and Russia

Today, entrepreneurs are trying to compensate for the nancial losses that they incur due to the epidemiological crisis. At the same time, they can use illegal ways to increase prots, driving competitors out of the market and infringing on the rights of consumers. In such conditions, there are two opposite trends: on the one hand, the state softens control, on the other — in a number of industries, regulation, on the contrary, increases. The article is devoted to the study of the inuence of antimonopoly regulation on the development of innovative entrepreneurship in unfavorable conditions. It is generally believed that competition is the incentive for the development of innovations. Therefore, the task of maintaining the competitive state of the markets is the main task of the antimonopoly authorities. In fact, the actions of the antimonopoly authorities may not always achieve the set goal, sometimes the results of antimonopoly regulation may be the opposite of the desired ones, up to the appearance of anti-competitive effects. In this regard, the study of the of antimonopoly the of innovative entrepreneurship in the of in order to is timely and relevant.


Introduction
In modern conditions, the main source of economic growth of any country in the world is innovation.
Innovation activity is particularly high in a competitive environment. "Free" competition in the market of goods and services is the basis for the effective development of an innovative economy. In turn, "free" competition in the markets of goods and services implies effective antitrust regulation.
The fact that the development of innovations in Russia lags far behind the leading countries is shown by the data on Russia's place in international rankings. In the ranking of the GII-2019 (Global Innovation Index 2019), Russia is 46th out of 129 (the United States is 3rd). In terms of the quality of innovation, Russia ranks 27th (the United States rst) (Global innovation index, 2019), (Rating enforcement, 2019).
The same can be said about the state of competition in Russia, which plays a stimulating role in the development of innovations. In the World Economic Forum's global competitiveness ranking, Russia ranks 43rd (the United States ranks second after Singapore) (The Heritage Foundation, 2017).
In this regard, the study of the impact of antitrust regulation on the development of innovative entrepreneurship in order to assess this impact is timely and relevant.
Increasing the level of concentration and monopolization of markets is traditionally considered as a factor that hinders competition and reduces incentives for innovation. However, world experience proves that it is the large companies that have monopoly power that have signi cant nancial resources necessary for research and development. There is an understanding that in modern conditions, innovative activity is the main means of obtaining a competitive advantage for organizations.
In this regard, questions arise: -does the antimonopoly policy contribute to the creation of a favorable competitive environment for the development of innovations?
-is there a need for special measures of Antimonopoly regulation for innovative entrepreneurship?

Methods
The aim of the work was to nd out whether the Russian antimonopoly regulation meets the new challenge that has developed in the economy, and what is its impact on innovation in the unfavorable conditions of the epidemiological crisis.

Theoretical Background
Maintaining the competitive state of the markets in order to stimulate the development of innovation and economic growth is one of the main tasks of the antimonopoly policy. To solve this problem, extensive legislation has been created, which is based on competition laws and antitrust laws, which aim to prevent and prevent anti -competitive actions, to prevent high market concentration, that is, to protect competition.
Antimonopoly policy in Russian economics is understood as a set of measures aimed at de-monopolizing the economy, controlling and monitoring the processes of concentration in the markets, suppressing monopolistic actions of unfair competition, removing administrative barriers and ensuring conditions for the development of competition in the market. This concept also includes the advocacy of competitionthat is, the promotion and dissemination of knowledge that contributes to the creation of equal conditions for all market participants and the formation of public consciousness in favor of the development of market forces (Knyazeva I.V., 2011).
For the rst time, laws on antitrust regulation were adopted in the United States: these are the laws of Sherman (1890), Clayton (1914), the law "On the Federal Trade Commission" (1914) (Knyazeva I. V., 2014).

Conceptual stages of the development of antitrust legislation in developed countries
It seems reasonable to distinguish ve conceptual stages of the development of antimonopoly legislation.
1. The formation of precedents for the legislative restriction of monopolistic behavior in the markets (late XIX century) Sherman Act, United States of America (1890) 2. The formation of the world's antitrust legislation in the United States  1)The Clayton Act (1914) 2)Federal Commercial Commission Act (1914) 3) The Robinson -Nutman Act (1936) (1950) 3. Formation of antitrust legislation in Europe and the world  1) Competition laws in Western Europe and Japan;

4)The Law Of Sellar Of Kitwara
2) The Rome Convention, which provides for a single EU competition policy; 3) The intensi cation of the adoption of cruel and restrictive competition legislation in the world according to the American model 4. Liberalization of competition law after the liberalization of economic models  1) Abandonment of social and political goals and antitrust policies, if the promotion of competitive values can lead to a weakening of economic e ciency; 2) Liberal attitude to mergers and acquisitions, noti cation of agreements.
5. Formation of the international system of competition regulation (since 1990). 1) Formation of competition and antimonopoly policy in 130 countries.
2) The globalization of world economic relations and the establishment of complex rules of international trade in connection with the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995.
3) Stop using the methods of deconcentration of the oligopolistic market as an instrument of antitrust policy. 4) Creation of a supranational body in the countries of the European Union.
The rst two stages are characterized by active and strict interference in competition in the market, prohibited associations in the form of a trust, collusions or agreements for the purpose of monopolization. Antitrust policy was aimed at protecting the rights of small owners, in the face of the attack on these rights of the formed trusts and monopolies.
The third stage is characterized by the adoption of antitrust legislation in Germany and Japan in 1947.
The post-war German economy was militarized and had a high concentration of markets. Therefore, the German antitrust legislation at the initial stage was aimed at preventing market abuse by large dominant companies. A similar situation is typical for Japan.
The fourth stage of antimonopoly regulation falls on the period of 70-80-ies and is characterized by a change in conceptual approaches towards liberalization. This was facilitated by the creation of large multinational companies that successfully competed in world markets.
The fth stage in the development of antimonopoly regulation continues the trend of liberalization of antimonopoly policy, against the background of integration processes in the world economy. The main feature of this stage is its versatility and fundamentally new economic and legal approaches to the antitrust regulation policy itself.
At the fourth and fth stages, there is a transition from the principle of prohibitions to the principle of reasonable behavior, and an understanding comes that antitrust regulation can both promote and hinder the development of the economy.
Antimonopoly legislation in Russia appeared relatively recently-about 40 years ago. Its formation began during the reformation of the Russian economy, in fact, from scratch, since the command and administrative system that was present in the management of the economy until quite recently excluded the existence of free competition in economic activities.
The main goal of the antimonopoly policy was to develop competition in the commodity markets, including through de-monopolization -the unbundling of enterprises.
However, competition in the markets is possible in the presence of small and medium-sized businesses, which at that time simply did not exist in Russia. As for the unbundling of enterprises, this goal was achieved partly due to privatization, partly due to the ongoing economic policy.
The arbitrary regulation of prices for the products of monopolistic enterprises, the xing of prices, the establishment of minimum prices and maximum pro t margins as a result have harmed the development of the national market. The antimonopoly policy has actually turned into an anti-market one. This is especially evident in the example of the machine-building complex. In four years, 96% of enterprises in this industry have become almost bankrupt, and their meager share in the domestic market did not pose any threat to competition. A similar situation was observed in many sectors of the Russian economy at that time.
It should be noted that the United States antitrust policy at the initial stage is also assessed as anticompetitive, since it was directed against the destructive competition from large businesses for small businesses.
In 1994-1995, regulatory legal acts were adopted that changed the approaches to antimonopoly regulation. These are the federal laws "On Natural Monopolies"," On Advertising", and the new version of the law"On Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activity in Commodity Markets". Despite some The Law "On Protection of Competition" is a "living" document. Changes to it are made in two aspects: -within the framework of antitrust packages -when changes are initiated by the state and involve the introduction of several legislative acts at the same time, such changes are in the nature of reforms, and the "packages" themselves are actively discussed by the legal community; -within the framework of point changes that are initiated by all participants in the legislative process.

Development of the Russian antimonopoly legislation in accordance with the global trends of liberalization of antimonopoly regulation measures
The proclamation of the development of the innovative economy as the goal of Russia's economic policy led to the inclusion of special loyal regimes for innovative rms in the antimonopoly legislation. At the same time, granting a privileged position to individual rms in the commodity markets is obviously not linked to the fundamental principle of antitrust law -the creation of equal conditions for all market participants. In any case, we can talk about a potential con ict between the two goals under consideration. Are special antitrust measures necessary for innovative rms, and how will they affect the achievement of the economic policy goal of creating an innovative economy?
It is impossible not to agree with the opinion of experts that the speci city of developing countries is that institutions that can formally bear the same names and perform the same functions as in developed countries, de facto function differently. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the work.
Analyzing the evolution of antimonopoly policy in Russia and abroad, we can draw the following conclusions. The state of commodity markets during the formation of antitrust regulation was different. For the United States, the initial period is characterized by the presence of a large number of small owners and the encroachment on their rights of trusts and monopolies, for post-war Germany is characterized by high concentration and monopolization, in Russia there was practically no competitive market, as well as small and medium-sized businesses. Antitrust regulation in Russia is quite "young", only a few decades, while in the United States it has been developing for more than a hundred years. Of course, miscalculations are possible along this path, as was the case in Russia in the early 90s, when strict control over enterprises included in the register of monopolists and pricing contributed, among other reasons, to their nancial collapse. The need to include certain "preferential" provisions for innovative rms in the Russian antimonopoly legislation is also debatable.
Nevertheless, the development of antimonopoly legislation was carried out according to a single scenario: from strict measures to limit monopoly power to more "soft" measures to protect competition, from the principle of unconditional prohibition (per se) to the principle of reasonable grounds (rule of reason).

Market power and Innovation
Currently, there is a rejection of the classical model of market assessment, when the basic criterion is the assessment of the shares of companies in the market, and antitrust measures are applied to rms that have exceeded the established concentration threshold.
There is an understanding that achieving a competitive advantage and increasing market share can be the result of fair competition based on the development and introduction of innovative products to the market. Many experts believe that in modern conditions, innovation is the main means of obtaining longterm and signi cant competitive advantages for organizations.
We will try to analyze the evolution of theoretical views on the nature and relationship of monopoly, competition, and innovation, and answer the questions: what are the criteria for the optimality of the competitive environment that ensures high innovation activity of organizations, and whether monopolies are interested in innovation.
In scienti c research, the concept of innovation appeared in the 19th century.
Thus, J. Schumpeter in his writings de ned innovation as a means of entrepreneurship aimed at making a pro t. Russian scientists consider innovation as the nal result of intellectual activity in the form of a new object or object that signi cantly differs in quality characteristics from its counterpart (Schumpeter J., 2016) According to scientists, innovative entrepreneurship differs from other types of entrepreneurship by using new ways of enterprise development: the creation of new products, technologies, and new forms of management (Shimshirt N. D., 2016).
Thus, innovative activity is the result of intellectual activity, embodied in a new or improved product, technological or organizational process that has economic demand and commercial effect. Innovations in economic analysis are divided into the main, decisive ones -those that fundamentally change the production process or provide an opportunity to release a previously unknown product, and secondary ones that modify the shape of the product or process.
Competition in the market and for the market is the core of the mechanism that ensures the e cient use of limited resources and the generation of innovations. There is a clear trend of correlation between competitiveness indicators and innovation development indicators. Out of the top ten countries in the competitiveness index, 8 countries are in the top ten and in the innovation index.
In Russia, these indicators also correlate: 43rd place in terms of competitiveness, corresponds to 46th place in the innovation development index.
Let's try to gure out what should be changed in the antitrust regulation to make the innovation environment in the country more favorable.
It is generally believed that it is the state of competition that determines the level of innovation and contributes to economic growth. However, only economically free economic entities can compete with each other. And their motivation to develop may be reduced due to the fear of attracting the attention of regulatory authorities.
It is also necessary to note the excessive activity of the Russian antimonopoly authorities and its negative impact on competition. Indeed, the scope of antimonopoly policy in Russia includes a fairly large number of tasks, and in recent years it has only expanded.  To sum up: the desire of the antimonopoly authorities to protect competition by increasingly regulating the behavior of rms in the markets has led to the opposite effect: the restriction of the economic freedoms of entrepreneurs as the basis of real competition. The restriction of competition has a negative impact on the development of innovation activities. In this regard, the transition to a liberal antitrust policy cannot be called successful.
A large range of tasks within the scope of antimonopoly policy dissipates resources and reduces quality, and encourages the overproduction of the volume of antimonopoly regulation as a public good.
In Russia, it is necessary to focus the antimonopoly policy on the main goal-the protection of competition, not to try to solve other tasks with the help of the antimonopoly authority: social (price control), economic. At the same time, the competition protection policy should exclude the possibility of restricting the freedom of entrepreneurship.
The liberalization of antimonopoly policy implemented in Western countries is precisely aimed at expanding the economic freedom of economic entities, removing or reducing restrictions on economic activity.
Let us consider whether the evolution of the Russian antimonopoly legislation corresponds to the declared course of liberalization.
There are contradictory trends in the transformation of the Russian antimonopoly legislation. On the one hand, the antimonopoly legislation re ects such signi cant provisions as the separation of agreements and coordinated actions, vertical and horizontal agreements, the introduction of the concept of "cartel", the introduction of the institution of warnings and warnings. The practice of application is also changing, and there is a transition from unconditional prohibitions to a "balanced approach".

Directions Of Antimonopoly Policy Of Russian And Foreign Regulatory Authorities In The Context Of The Pandemic
There are ve main directions of the antimonopoly policy of the Russian and foreign regulatory authorities that seek to effectively apply the legal tools for regulating innovative entrepreneurship.

Monopolistically high (low) price
In Russia, the law "On Protection of Competition" de nes a monopolistically high (low) price -this is the excess (understatement) of the price over the price of a comparable market, the excess (understatement) of the price over economically justi ed costs and pro ts. The concept of a monopolistically high price is the most controversial in the antimonopoly legislation. The objectivity of its comparison with the pro t, cost and price of a comparable market is particularly controversial. The price may increase due to increased demand, which is not available in another comparable market, and the amount of pro t may be high as a result of the planned investment.
The traditions of direct state regulation of prices are quite strong in Russian society, and the state responds to these expectations. For this reason, the norm on the monopolistically high price is applied in Russia by the antimonopoly authority very actively. While in other countries, there is no signi cant practice of its application. Russian researchers note that in the United States, which are the founders of antitrust regulation, the opinion has been formed that high prices attract new participants to the market, and therefore are a factor in the development of competition. This fact is also con rmed by Russian practice.
In the context of the pandemic, the demand for certain categories of products is naturally growing around the world: food products, medical devices and equipment, medicines, personal protective equipment and disinfection, as well as other socially important goods. A number of countries conduct daily monitoring of prices by xing them in online stores, checking the availability of goods on sale. This constant monitoring is due to the fact that cases of unjusti ed price increases and deliberate creation of shortages for products with high demand have been repeatedly identi ed in speci c markets.
The Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia conducts daily monitoring of prices for goods from the category of essential and vital nature. In addition, an operational headquarters has been formed to monitor the situation in certain markets. The Government of the Russian Federation has been given the opportunity to set for a certain period of no more than 90 days the maximum allowable retail prices for medicines and medical devices that are not included in the list of vital necessities, but may actually become so.
Similar measures are being taken by the Competition and Markets Authority in the Great Britain. He calls on entrepreneurs and manufacturers to jointly ght against unfair pricing by setting maximum retail prices for products, such as basic medical devices. Moreover, a special task force has been created to identify illegal pricing methods and ensure compliance with the law.
In the European Union, the European Competition Network, in its guidelines, reminded manufacturers that they are allowed to include maximum prices in the terms of contracts. The European Competition Network members in the document "Temporary Framework for assessing antitrust issues related to business cooperation in response to situations of urgency stemming from the current COVID-19 outbreak" expressed extreme concern about the practice of unfair pricing as a result of cartel collusion or abuse of a In Russia, the Antimonopoly Authority is taking measures to combat the unfair behavior of companies that mislead consumers in order to persuade them to purchase goods and services presented as COVID-19 treatments. So, several cases were initiated for false information about the effectiveness of medicines against coronavirus. In addition, cases were opened against veterinary clinics that offered services for the diagnosis, vaccination and treatment of coronavirus in cats and dogs.
In Italy, online trading is gaining momentum as the best way to meet the needs of customers with minimal effort. The Italian antitrust authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato) has brought cases against Amazon and eBay on the grounds of not only unjusti ed price increases for masks and disinfectants, but also false advertising.
In China, online platforms are advised to keep a particularly close eye on price algorithms to prevent Markets" established that rms with a market share of 65% or more are recognized as dominant. In the law "On Protection of Competition", the threshold of dominance is reduced to 50%, that is, the number of dominant rms can increase by the number of rms whose market share is from 50% to 65%. Moreover, rms with a share of less than 50% can be recognized as dominant, if this is established by the antimonopoly authority, based on their share relative to the shares of competitors, the possibility of market access, or based on other criteria that characterize the commodity market.
In Russia, the law "On Protection of Competition", along with the amended concept of an agreement, introduced the concept of coordinated actions, established prohibitions on agreements restricting competition and coordinated actions. Agreements that restrict competition are prohibited and recognized as a cartel. At the same time, coordinated actions are not recognized as cartel collusion, the very fact of agreements is already considered a violation of the law. This allows the antimonopoly authorities to consider any synchronous increase in prices on the market as unjusti ed and apply penalties. Thus, the application of this article prohibits such a form of economically justi ed behavior as price leadership. According to paragraph 4 of part 1 of article 10 of the Federal law "On protection of competition" in Russia, the abuse of a dominant position, is considered to be economically or technologically unjusti ed reduction or cessation of production of the goods, if this item has a demand or orders are subject to availability, its cost-effective production, if it is not stipulated regulations.
Analyzing the above articles, taking into account the expanded powers of the antimonopoly authorities and the established practice of application, it is di cult to recognize the liberalization of the antimonopoly legislation as having taken place. Restrictions for entrepreneurs in terms of setting prices, output volumes, contracts, and contracts remain quite active Today, unstable market conditions have become a catalyst for anti-competitive agreements. In various jurisdictions, the Supervisory authorities shall take measures to combat the crisis cartels.
In Russia, there has long been a tendency to strengthen anti-cartel policies, including tougher responsibility for collusion. Currently, the antimonopoly agency is particularly active in monitoring the food and pharmaceutical markets, which are potentially the most susceptible to monopolization. The FAS (Federal Antimonopoly Service) of Russia, after monitoring and unscheduled inspections, has already identi ed several cartels that set high prices for such scarce goods as protective masks and buckwheat.
In addition, special attention is paid to the behavior of natural monopolies in imposing unfavorable conditions and services, as well as refusing to conclude contracts, unjusti ably in ating prices in the context of a pandemic.
In the United States of America, the Justice Department expects a surge in cartel cases. To support the business, entrepreneurs begin to cooperate with competitors. For example, they may agree not to cut prices or how to reduce excess capacity when faced with falling demand. As stated by United States of America Attorney General William Barr, the Department of Justice will take measures to prevent illegal actions in the production, distribution and sale of medical products in ways that violate antitrust laws, such as setting prices or colluding in auctions (COVID-19 and Antitrust Law, 2020).
The European Union is reluctant to grant exemptions from competition law in connection with COVID-19. The antimonopoly authorities of the European Union member states issued a joint statement dated 23.03.2020 (Impact of COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic on European Antitrust Enforcement, 2020), in which they noted that they will not actively interfere with necessary and temporary business measures taken to avoid product shortages or di culties in the transport and logistics eld. In other words, anticartel rules will not apply when cooperation is aimed at the bene t of society. However, the actions of companies seeking to misuse their market power through a cartel or abuse of a dominant position will be stopped, even if these are only temporary measures due to an emergency situation.
In addition, the EU (European Union) emphasizes that the cartel reporting exemption program continues to apply regardless of the emergency situation (Impact of COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic on European Antitrust Enforcement, 2020) In the UK (United Kingdom), the Competition and Markets Authority has indicated that competitors are allowed to provide information about inventory, price and delivery conditions. But he stressed that further harmonization of prices charged to suppliers or end-users is still strictly prohibited.
The exibility shown in antitrust regulation does not give companies the right to participate in collusions that can harm consumers. As noted by the Competition and Markets Authority, it is not allowed to: exchange between competitors commercially important information about pricing policies or business strategies used without urgent need; refuse to cooperate with small competitors to ensure the security of supply; collusion between enterprises aimed at mitigating the adverse commercial consequences of falling demand by arti cially maintaining high prices to the detriment of consumers; coordination between enterprises that is actually unnecessary and unjusti ed, for example, in terms of the distribution of goods or services in areas not affected by the pandemic.
Price manipulation is typical not only for cartels, but also for the abuse of a dominant position. Therefore, the Competition and Markets Authority warned that unfair practices of enterprises that occupy a dominant position (even if it is due to the circumstances of the crisis) will be stopped if they lead to arti cially in ated prices for goods and services that are vital for consumers (Competition and Markets Authority approach to business cooperation in response to COVID-19, 2020) In Poland Antimonopoly service initiated an investigation of alleged abuse of dominance suppliers of medical equipment, which terminated the contracts for the supply medical mask hospitals, to renew, but setting higher prices of goods are controlled by the competition authorities.

Special "preferential" conditions for innovative rms
Theoretical and empirical studies of scientists and economists con rm that innovations develop more actively in a competitive environment. This is probably what the legislators were guided by when introducing special provisions for innovative rms, believing that the introduced "bene ts" would promote competition as a driving force for innovation.
What mechanisms for the development of competition are laid down in these provisions?
1) The creation of special conditions for individual innovative rms violates the basic principle of competition -ensuring equal access to the market for all participants in the market process.
2) These provisions exclude the motivation of the company to introduce qualitatively new products due to the desire for competitive advantage, and therefore reduce the intensity of competition.
Thus, they contain, in fact, anti-competitive mechanisms.
The creation of special privileged conditions for individual innovative rms in the market does not contribute to the achievement of the goal of antimonopoly policy-the protection of competition. In this case, there is a potential con ict between the goal of antitrust policy and the goal of economic policy -to achieve economic growth through innovative development. Achieving this goal of economic policy is possible through the use of other instruments (tax, nancial). As for the antimonopoly policy, the creation of competitive conditions that are equal for all economic entities would be its contribution to innovative development.
According to scientists, the release of any of the competitors from compliance with the general rules means not only a deviation from the principle of equality, but also an obstacle to progressive changes in the economic system (Taranukha Yu.V., 2019).
The slowdown in the pace of innovative development in Russia is the best proof of this. It should be noted that in countries with developed competition law, such as the United States and the European Union, there are no such exceptions (except for partial exceptions for technology transfer agreements in the European Union). However, this does not prevent them from taking a leading position in the international rankings of innovation development 5.6. Easing antitrust regulation to deal with the consequences of the pandemic However, against the background of a severe epidemiological situation in a number of countries, antitrust regulation is being relaxed for some cases of horizontal cooperation aimed at combating the consequences of COVID-19. Exceptional measures (exemptions) are applied restrictively to speci c business sectors that are particularly affected by the crisis, since their joint activities contribute to the restoration of supply chain gaps and more effectively meet consumer demand. The rest of the competition law continues to apply in full.
In the United Kingdom, competing retailers (food stores) are allowed to coordinate joint actions in order to improve the distribution of goods and ensure access to them (Coronavirus and the Competition Act, 2020). Coordination is possible if such measures are: appropriate and necessary to prevent shortages or ensure the security of supply; are in the public interest; bene t consumers; address key issues raised by the pandemic; and do not last longer than is necessary to address critical issues.
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have approved acceptable forms of joint activities aimed at improving the health and safety response. Such cooperation includes the following activities: integration of production, distribution or service networks to facilitate the production and distribution of supplies related to the pandemic; joint research in the eld of treatment methods or the development of a vaccine against COVID-19; development of the best order of patient care in medical institutions; joint agreements on the procurement of personal protective equipment to improve their effectiveness; exchange of information on experience and best practices in solving problems related to COVID-19. In the European Union, the Eurocommerce Association has spoken out about a possible relaxation of antitrust regulation in order to allow retail businesses to interact freely with each other. In response, the European Commission indicated that there would be no suspension of the legislation, but this did not preclude joint activities if they were effective, useful and did not eliminate competition.
The European Commission is ready, in exceptional cases, to provide companies with a letter of recommendation (letter) regarding speci c cooperation projects that need to be implemented quickly to combat COVID-19, especially if it is not clear at all whether such initiatives are compatible with European

Union competition law.
Other examples, the competition authority of Iceland temporarily released representatives of the tourism sector (travel agents, hotels and tour operators) from the application of anti-cartel norms to them.
Companies are allowed to cooperate in nding ways to reduce the number of canceled ights and increase the demand for Icelandic tourism, but they are not allowed to discuss pricing and business conditions together (Antitrust authorities are ghting coronavirus, 2020).
The Norwegian government has temporarily exempted rival airlines SAS and Norwegian Airlines, as well as rail and water transport, from the rules on the prohibition of cartels. This was done so that the companies could cooperate and ensure minimal air transport of people and goods across countries (COVID-19-Antitrust regulators in Europe began taking action, 2020).

Conclusion
General features of antimonopoly regulation in the context of a pandemic It is possible to note the trends of anti-crisis antimonopoly regulation that are common for different countries.
1. Price monitoring is the most common preventive practice in a pandemic. It contributes to the effective detection and suppression of unfair manipulation of pricing in relation to goods, the greatest availability of which should be ensured in the current conditions. With the help of this tool, both in Russia and abroad, the price policy aimed at protecting consumers is stabilized in socially important markets.

A thorough investigation of collusion in the food and pharmaceutical industries prevents companies
from improperly enriching themselves during the crisis. However, the most innovative measures relate to the development of a list of cases where the cooperation of competitors can be recognized as permissible. In fact, the state transfers to business the tools with which to meet consumer demand and mitigate the consequences of the pandemic.
In Russia, the antimonopoly authorities have not yet provided for such changes. Although it would be advisable, by analogy with some States, to allow competitors to cooperate in the eld of highly innovative pharmaceutical research for the development of a vaccine, as well as in the retail sector to avoid shortages, for example, the production of masks. At the same time, it will be di cult for Russian business to prove the validity of such horizontal cooperation, and it is necessary to clearly de ne the criteria for the admissibility of joint activities. Preliminary approval of the forms of horizontal cooperation with the antimonopoly authority allows companies to protect themselves from the risks of violating competition law.
4. The suspension of approval of mergers and acquisitions in foreign countries is a natural reaction of the antimonopoly authorities, due to the fact that interaction with economic entities has become more complicated. However, this may negatively affect both the internal relations of the parties to the transaction due to the forced delays and the resulting uncertainty, as well as the nancial component.

Declarations
Availability of data and materials -All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article Competing interests -The authors declare that they have no competing interests" in this section All authors read and approved the nal manuscript.