The present study is a descriptive-analytical cross-sectional study conducted with the aim of determining reproductive history, attitude towards childbearing and related factors in women in Rafsanjan City, 2021.
Out of 875 women studied, 530 (60.6%) were childless and not pregnant. If we remove 50 divorced women who also did not have children from it, the number of women who are active for seeking childbearing becomes 480 (engaged or married without children). This finding shows that despite three years of marriage, most of the samples (86.54%) did not have children and the pregnancy rate in this region is low. One of the causes related to this finding could be the numerous economic challenges that childbearing entails (28).
According to the findings of our study, 240 people are still engaged and have not been able to start their independent lives even after about three years of marriage. Living apart and the inability to start a life together can be an important factor in explaining the causes of declining fertility. Another study showed that in Iran, one of the significant causes of inability to start a married life is financial problems for holding wedding celebration, providing dowry and housing. Also, more than 90% of young people aged 15–29 live with at least one of their parents, in this study, Increasing unemployment and housing costs are important economic causes lead to delayed family formation in young people (29).
Most of the 235 women with one child gave birth via cesarean section. Also, of the 19 women who had 2 children, 17 (89.5%) had a cesarean in their second pregnancy. Despite national policies to increase the rate of normal vaginal delivery, most births in primi parous women in this area are cesarean section, which itself can be associated with reduced fertility.
The percentage of abortion among all pregnancies in this study was calculated to be 26.01%. Considering the miscarriage rate, which varies between 11 and 22% in different societies (30), it seems that this percentage cannot be only due to miscarriage and there is a deliberate and illegal abortion involved.
According to an estimate by the World Health Organization, 73 million induced abortions occur worldwide each year, of which nearly 45% are unsafe and 97% of these abortions occur in developing countries (31). Unsafe abortion is more likely than safe abortion to cause endometritis, bleeding, retention of products of conception, uterine perforation, and complications from misoprostol (32, 33), and in Iran, approximately 7.9% of maternal deaths are due to unsafe abortion (34).
Another issue that has been raised in recent years in Iran to increase fertility rate is restricting access to free family planning services. In the past, restriction on access to family planning facilities has led to a temporary increase in fertility rate along with an increase in maternal complications and mortality resulting from the termination of unwanted pregnancies through unsafe abortion (35). While one of the goals of family planning programs is to promote maternal and child health through appropriate spacing between children and plan for becoming pregnant at the right age (36), this goal has been neglected by eliminating these programs. Secondly, this restriction only affects women with a low economic and social level who have a large number of children (35). Another important point is that in 2014 (before the ban on the provision of family planning services in public health centers) only 7% of the decline in fertility was due to the use of governmental contraception services (37).
The findings of this study showed that the mean age of women engaged is significantly lower than other groups. This finding was not unexpected, as usually girls who are engaged are younger than married women. This finding confirms another finding of this study; since among women in engagement, diploma education was more than other groups. Obviously, with marriage at a younger age, the level of education will also be lower.
The mean reported score of religiosity was 7.55 of 10 and did not differ significantly between the study groups. In terms of religiosity and marital commitment, contrary to the results of our study, other studies have shown that adherence to religion is a major factor in marital stability and commitment (38–41). The reason for our finding could be the cultural difference between our samples and the samples of other studies. In addition, in our study, the divorce rate was low, which reduces the generalizability of this finding. In this study, after three years of marriage, out of 875 marriages, 51 people (5.83%) divorced. Official statistics from the Iranian Statistical Center show that in 2015 in Kerman province, 18.38 divorces occurred out of every 100 marriages, while in Iran as a whole, 23.90 divorces occur out of every 100 marriages (42). This finding shows that the divorce rate in our study is lower than the provincial and national rates.
The mean attitude toward childbearing score was 67.07. Only one study in Zanjan city had used this questionnaire, and the average score was 70.46. In this study, a score of 68 or higher was an indicator of a good and high attitude towards childbearing (43). Therefore, the attitude of people towards childbearing in our study is also considered good and high. Despite the high attitude towards childbearing, the number of people who have child in our study (39.31%) is low.
The results of the study showed that there is no statistically significant correlation between the attitude toward childbearing score and the women's age, which is similar to the findings of some previous studies (44, 45). However, the results of a study (2020) showed that women aged 15–19 have a higher desire to have children (46). In the study by Ahmed et al. (2022) and Erfani et al. (2019), age also has an inverse relationship with fertility desire (47, 48). The probable reason for this difference is the selection of a different sample; in the two studies similar to our study, the sample members entered the study around the time of marriage; it is likely that around this time, attitude and desire towards childbearing does not differ between different age groups.
The mean attitude toward childbearing score was lower in women with a master's degree or higher than in other women. Education is often considered one of the most important socioeconomic factors affecting fertility (49). In line with our study, according to Miller, having children has an inverse relationship with educational attainment, as education and the opportunities associated with it promote activities incompatible with childbearing (50). This relationship was significant in several research studies (45, 51–57) (58, 59) However, in contrast to our study, in the study by Ahmed et al. (2022), the positive motivations for fertility in women with high school and university education were higher than illiterate women and those with primary education (47). This result can be explained by the fact that there is a difference between fertility intentions and actual fertility. People with higher education may have a higher desire to have more children, but in reality they have fewer children. This is because they marry at a later age and may not be able to have the number of children they desire (60, 61).
The findings of the study showed that women who have children are more likely to have no income than other groups, and the mean attitude toward childbearing score is higher in women with no income than in other groups. This finding is in contrary to a number of studies. According to these studies, individuals with higher incomes had higher positive motivations for fertility and childbearing (28, 47, 62, 63). The economic challenges of Iranian society today affect people's attitudes towards childbearing, and people would have more proclivities towards childbearing, if they have a higher income, after rationally comparing the costs and benefits of childbearing. The high impact of income and its direct relationship to the desire to have children is a warning sign for fertility in Iran that should be considered by policy makers (28). There are probably intervening factors like culture that cause differences in results.
On the other hand, there are two views in support of our study. One is that parents with higher incomes pay more attention to the quality of life of their children, and as a result, would have less offspring due to economic constraints (64). The second view is that having more children leads to less income, as it is hard to work during childbearing and childrearing periods. Therefore, women with higher incomes are also likely to have fewer children (65). As a result of these two views, the attitude of women with higher incomes towards having children is probably lower. Also, in support of our finding, individuals with a higher socioeconomic status have a more negative attitude towards childbearing than other classes (57). People from the upper socioeconomic classes believe that the fewer children they have, the better they can take care of their own interests and raise their children. They also are more aware of the emotional and psychological costs and opportunities for their children (66).
An independent two-sample t-test showed that the mean attitude toward childbearing score is higher in unemployed women than in employed women. This finding was confirmed in the study by Naderipour et al (45). Employed women are less likely to want more children (46). In addition, educated or employed women have less time to be mothers and prefer to have fewer children for maintaining their social and economic benefits (67). Also employed women face intra- and inter-occupational challenges that reduce their desire to have children (68). A negative relationship between fertility rate and women's employment was reported in the study by Iman et al (2015) (69).
The results of this study showed that the frequency of living in the city was higher in women with children compared to other women. This finding is not unexpected, given the greater and better opportunities in the city for education and living. However, the mean attitude toward childbearing score differs significantly between women's place of residence, and rural women have a better attitude towards childbearing than urban women.
According to the wealth framework theory in contemporary societies, families with a higher social and economic level believe that more children impose an additional burden on the family and take their time. While in societies with a lower social and economic level, more children mean more security in old age and a source of work in traditional agriculture (70, 71). According to the Kaufmann and Skirbekk theory (2012), religion in Islamic societies plays a secondary role, and a set of socioeconomic factors such as illiteracy, rural residence, barriers to access to birth control and the benefits of large children in traditional agriculture play a much more important role in the high fertility rate in religious groups (72).
In this study there is no statistically significant difference between the mean attitude toward childbearing score in engaged women and married women without children. Considering that the most important problem in starting a married life is economic problems and that the attitude towards childbearing in the engaged group is the same as the married group, if economic problems are solved, there is a possibility that the fertility rate will increase.
There is a weak and significant positive correlation between the attitude toward childbearing score and woman's religiosity. In another study, fertility behavior was also weakly and directly correlated with religiosity (73).
In a study (2020), people with an Islamic lifestyle have a positive attitude toward childbearing (74). Religious affiliation affects fertility through socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, for example, by prohibiting or not prohibiting the use of contraceptives (75, 76). While in the study by Kaveh Firouz and colleagues (2021), there was no significant relationship between religiosity and fertility intention, but there was a significant positive relationship between family values and fertility intention, and it seems that religiosity indirectly through family values affects fertility intention (77). Religiosity and familyism, as two important traditional factors in our Iranian culture, can play a role in people's attitudes toward childbearing (78). With increasing loyalty to family and religious values, the tendency to childbearing increases (79). Other studies have also confirmed this finding (57, 80–83).