To inspire an active citizenry and nurture scientific minds, the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA, 2020) advocates for educators to support constructivist principles for learning. To meet the aim of supporting scientific literacy in K-16 education as outlined in the Next Generation Science Standards (NRC, 2013), it is useful to engage students in learning about characteristics about the nature of science (Lederman, 2007; Lederman & Lederman, 2014; NSTA, 2016). One pedagogical method that has been advocated as a powerful tool for acquiring content and perspective on the nature of science (NOS) is inquiry. However, as Abd-El-Khalik and colleagues (2004) pointed out, inquiry, as practically enacted by teachers, tends to be disjointed from the expert definition. Scientific thinking is recognized as having implications for a healthy and equitable society (NASEM, 2021); however, challenges remain for teachers to support the processes of scientific inquiry. While a variety of factors impede the implementation of powerful instruction in science (Abd-El-Khalik, 2004), calls have been made for a practical heuristic that can “increase the likelihood of impacting classroom practices related to inquiry” (p. 415).
Many of today’s teacher candidates experienced schooling in a “traditional model” that leaned on memorization and recitation of facts. This results in a tendency to rely on authority as sources of knowledge and experience learning through resources such as textbooks (Tabak & Weinstock, 2011). A teacher candidate may impart perspectives from a trusted authority to teach science from a position of “comfort with the basics in managing a classroom” with a premium placed on delivering science as “endpoints” (Duschl, 2008, p. 286). In other words, a teacher imparts knowledge in a manner that reduces the messy process of knowledge development to convey that discovery is a straight and clean process. This can “foster absolutist positions” or a belief that knowledge is fixed and static (Tabak & Weinstock, 2011, p. 184). When this view is held by teachers it presents a barrier to process-focused thinking (Kuhn, 1999).
Another challenge for teaching and learning within the science domain is grasping that the nature of scientific knowledge (NOSK) is a product of human construction (Sandoval, 2005). This relates to characteristics of science as tentative but durable; a challenging concept (Cofré et al., 2019) and an oft neglected aspect of curriculum in teacher education programming both in the U.S. and internationally (Cofré et al. 2015). For the science educator, the aforementioned concepts are important epistemic considerations that relate to instruction (Sandoval, 2005).
Given that education is concerned with development (Dewey, 1916), and pluralistic societies are concerned with different ways of knowing, especially with increased importance of the social and cultural dimensions in the nature of science (Duschl, 2008), epistemic development, or a concern for being metacognitive about knowledge and processes for developing knowledge, is an important way forward for teacher education programs (Hofer, 2001; Barzilai & Chinn, 2017; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2017). Despite the importance of epistemic education, there is a lack of documentation on how student teachers can consider aims and plan to teach based on what they deem important intentions for knowledge in elementary science. Although not all aims need to be epistemic for effective instruction (Greene, Sandoval & Braten, 2016), research can benefit from a focus on identifying teacher candidates’ aims and how these are actualized in specific teaching contexts (Chinn & Barzilai, 2018,).
Barzilai and Chinn (2018) and Lunn Brownlee et al. (2019; 2022) established a baseline for epistemic performance from experts' reasoning and reflexivity in domain specific situations, however, to date, there is no study that has determined reasonable expectations for student teachers' epistemic performance for learning to teach science, using the (3R-EC) framework developed by Lunn Brownlee, Ferguson, and Ryan (2017) with and for teachers.
This exploratory study focused on understanding how students engage in epistemic reflexivity to plan in an elementary science course. This was done with the intention to inform and enrich approaches to science education. Therefore, two aims guided the development and informed the outcomes of the study:
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Explore the ways student teachers engaged in reflexivity for teaching elementary science using the 3R-EC framework.
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Discuss the extent engagement in reflexivity was useful to plan and evaluate methods of science instruction in the elementary classroom.
Theoretical Frame
This study was informed by the field of epistemic education as well as literature grounded in epistemic characteristics about nature of science (NOS) and how discoveries are made, known as nature of scientific knowledge (NOSK). These terms were differentiated by Lederman and Lederman (2019) but effectively mean the same thing and are used interchangeably in this project but will mirror the citation of the original work cited. Epistemic education is concerned with the development of “critical thinking, argumentation, and inquiry” while drawing from metacognitive aspects of knowledge and knowing (Chinn & Barzilai, 2018, p. 354). The concepts labeled as NOS are epistemic constructs at its root (Lederman, 1992). Greene et al. (2017) advocate for scholarship across related epistemic constructs, sharing that there is “much to be gained from reading broadly across the many academic disciplines that consider epistemic issues and ideas” (p. 505). The purpose of this review is to share literature concerning epistemic cognition related to teacher’s planning and evaluation of pedagogy useful for supporting inquiry-based science instruction.
Inquiry as a Method of Instruction
Inquiry, at the heart of science, is often inspired by a curiosity and undertaken by a process of discovery made precise through attention to detail. It is likened to a cognitive journey that attempts to resolve uncertainty under ideal conditions (Dewey, 1938; D’agnese, 2017). The uncertainty of knowledge is an epistemic construct and is considered from two traditions: A. epistemic education and B. scientific ways of knowing or the nature of science. Each construct is reviewed separately below.
A. Epistemic Education
Epistemology is the field of study about what defines knowledge and its acquisition. This field of research has developed over 40 years, with origins in Western perspectives on views and processes of developing knowledge (Perry, 1968/1970). This work is derived from principles of philosophy and education psychology. There are many traditions and lines of inquiry within this field, but epistemology generally can be defined as the network of beliefs an individual has about knowledge and the processes of acquiring knowledge (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1990). A popular conception is that these beliefs are reflective of dimensions that include the source, certainty, simplicity, and justification of knowledge (Hofer, 2004).
In educational settings, these beliefs have been shown to influence how an individual approaches learning and instruction (Feucht & Bendixen, 2010), affect how a teacher teaches (Weinstock & Roth, 2011; Tsai, 2002), and determine the resources a teacher chooses to use in the classroom (Schraw & Olafson, 2010). A specific emphasis in this field has been on teachers as learners (Brownlee, 2001; Walker, Brownlee, Exley, Woods & Whiteford, 2011). The explicit connection to personal epistemology and teaching reveals mixed results with misalignment of espoused and enacted beliefs in practice (Kang, 2008). Fives (2011) concluded that epistemic beliefs filter learning experiences and guide teacher planning, but inconsistencies have been found between teachers’ beliefs and actions. She noted beliefs may not develop in a coherent fashion due to contextual factors related to the classroom.
Epistemic beliefs have been explored as well from the standpoint of learning, showing an influence on conceptual change (Mason, 2003) and cognitive change and strategic decision making (Kardash & Howell, 2000). A dimensional stage like progression view of epistemic beliefs (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Hofer, 2000) and developmental progression of beliefs (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) has led to seeking intervention to teach for epistemic change (Kienhues, Bromme & Stahl, 2008; Mason & Scrivani, 2004; Bendixen, 2016).
Hofer (2012) has noted that the field has evolved from application of epistemic beliefs in a general manner to seeking the influence in subject specific contexts. This turn suggests that beliefs an individual holds about knowledge and knowing are proposed to be within a discipline (e.g., science, math) or topic (e.g., a chemistry experiment) versus an individual possessing a belief that guides decision making in an all-encompassing way, although both domain general and domain specific beliefs can be drawn from to influence decisions (Muis et al., 2006). These beliefs have been found to be unique to a context within the discipline (e.g., VanSledright & Lemon, 2006; Lee et al., 2021).
Researchers have challenged the direction of epistemic education (Barzilai & Chinn, 2018) and how epistemic cognition is measured (Greene & Yu, 2013; Greene, Sandoval & Braten, 2013). This shift in direction has renewed Elby and Hammer’s (2001) call for a view that accounts for differences in context on how beliefs translate to practice. Hammer’s (2005) critique supports a resource view, suggesting “students as having rich collections of epistemological resources, rather than as a single position” (p. 21). The resource perspective supports individuals capable of diverse thinking, triggered by task and instructions, rather than stage-like developmental progressions. This contributed in part to Chinn, Buckland, and Sumuaguvarn’s, (2011) expansive view of epistemic cognition that incorporates Hammer and Elby’s (2002) notion of “fined grained beliefs” (p. 162).
Chinn, Rinehart, & Buckland (2014) have clarified the tenets set forth in Chinn et al. (2011) to explain how individuals come to know and process information as accurate or inaccurate. This framework is known as the AIR model, comprised of three aspects: the components begin with the individual’s goals or Epistemic Aim/s, proceed to consider the individual’s Epistemic Ideals and Reliable Processes used in processing information (AIR). The AIR model allows introspection into cognitive workings of an individual engaged in an inquiry. The AIR model allows the participant to consider the goal or the information, understanding, and/or knowledge needed; as well as the approach necessary to decide about accuracy, utility, and truth.
Epistemic Aims. Each aspect of the AIR model is articulated with detail and examples by Chinn, Rinehart, & Buckland (2014). When an individual seeks to determine that something is true that person has an intellectual aim for gaining knowledge. The researchers assert that an aim is tightly bound with personal values. When an individual selects an aim that is scientific in nature, there can be a certain value that person puts on achievement of that aim. In contrast, the value for gaining the knowledge influences the aim sought. The authors assert that research benefits from learning the aims an individual draws from when seeking knowledge. In this way, when a topic or information is presented the aim of the individual (and value) will determine what happens as the person encounters different perspectives on the topic. Goals that are related to knowledge and ways of knowing can be considered epistemic aims. Conversely, aims not related to knowledge may be due to a personal inclination are termed non-epistemic. The authors name examples such as adopting a belief for self-preservation and passing a college course.
Epistemic ideals. These are criteria used to evaluate if the aim is met. Chinn et al. (2014) included this construct based on the work of Toulmin (1972), a philosopher of science, who argued a scientist’s use of “explanatory ideals” is to develop a proper explanation based on criteria that is deemed acceptable by the community (p. 433). This is where the Chinn et al. (2014) model merges Hofer & Pintrich’s (1997) long recognized dimensional view of beliefs where categories of justification and structure of knowledge are subsumed under criteria for how ideals are justified by the individual. The professional scientist has standards that are well documented and made explicit through training and reporting to others for verification of a claim. Some criteria the scientist recognizes to support a claim may rely on data collection and analysis, as well as refutation of counter evidence. These examples are termed ideals (Chinn et al., 2014). What is more, Chinn and colleagues suggested that an individual with a personal stake in a claim, like one related to the effects of coffee and health, may reject the methodology of a study to preserve their existing belief about how wonderful coffee can be. The same individual may require many studies to begin to shift their long-held belief. This suggests that the “evidentiary standard” is higher for a belief that is personal (Chinn et al., p. 432). A teacher who is approaching an educational technique or method that has not been used in their “apprenticeship of observation”, or formative experience in K-12 schooling where the planning for teaching was obscured from the learner, may not yet be clear on the intention behind certain strategies for instruction (Lortie, 1975).
Reliable processes. To meet a chosen aim an individual makes judgments to select methods that are appropriate for meeting the task. These are the “thinking processes” that are “necessary to achieve aims” or reliable processes (Chinn et al., 2011/2014). This is opposed to a common practice that Chinn and his colleague shared where students are offered “a large array of processes” to verify claims and that it is not “effective” to share these as reliable or not (p. 448). In science, students are asked to reason and make judgement about what they can discover through consideration of claims. Through this interrogation they consider what these claims reveal about the aims, REPs and criteria for judging if these met their goals.
Epistemic Reflexivity
Lunn Brownlee, Ferguson, and Ryan (2017) extend Chinn and colleagues’ (2011) model to support teaching by including reflexivity with the AIR components. The concept of epistemic reflexivity (EC) was articulated by Lunn Brownlee, Ferguson, and Ryan (2017) and refined by Lunn Brownlee, Rowan, Ryan, et al. (2019). Reflexivity is an integral component of the (3R-EC) framework (adapted by Lunn Brownlee et al., 2017; Lunn Brownlee & Schraw, 2017; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016). The 3R (Reflection, Reflexivity, and Resolved Action) is purposeful thinking focused on epistemic cognition (EC) that leads to action. Lunn Brownlee and colleagues (2017) argued that reflecting on epistemic cognition in the specific context of one’s teaching practices can be regarded as a process of reflexivity. The authors share this was built on Ryan and Bourke’s (2013) assumption that reflexivity can influence change in teaching practices. The 3R–EC framework was empirically tested in teaching to/about diversity in teacher education (Lunn Brownlee, Rowan, Walker, Bourke & Churchward, 2019).
Lunn Brownlee, Ferguson, and Ryan (2017) carry forward the notion that development can occur when teaching practices are aligned with epistemic cognition. This change is supported when a candidate’s actions are in direct response to their epistemic reflexivity. The (3R-EC) framework was developed as a tool to support the calibration of reflexivity and action. It serves to permit thinkers to engage in reflexivity as a tool to support epistemic change. This is built on a theory that leverages social construction for development of academic ideas, with a goal of achieving a well-considered change in thinking. The model extends Chinn, Buckland, and Sumuaguvarn’s (2011) tenets for AIR and is based on Archer’s (2012) constructs of discernment, deliberation, and dedication (3D). Lunn Brownlee et al. (2017) explain reflexivity as an:
internal conversation that includes discernment (reflecting on a key issue or aim for them as a teacher or person, e.g., student well-being), deliberation (reflexively weighing personal and contextual concerns including motivations, priorities, and the impact of potential subversion of expected practices such as teaching to the test), and dedication (resolved action). (p. 247)
The epistemic aims are the anchor for this model and the 3R’s of reflect, reflexivity and resolved action are the means to engage in purposeful activity to meet the aim. The steps of the 3R model are useful for personal insight into how to approach a problem in relation to their epistemic aims and ability to consider reliable ways to achieve those aims. In this study, this framing supported the development of a protocol for new teachers to develop an informed position on curriculum and instruction.
Epistemic aims can focus teachers’ attention to what matters in planning science engagements reflective of their aims. Understanding the ways teacher candidates engage in reflexivity about science and the aims of the work can provide insights into supporting knowledge development in teachers, and in turn, their students (Chinn et al., 2011). Documenting how cognition occurs when learning to teach is important given the complexity of teaching and the varied goals teachers have for learners.
B. The Tentative Nature of Science
When seeking to develop “effective teaching approaches” to further the aim of epistemic education it is important to “involve disciplinary research” (Barzilai & Chinn, 2018, p. 381). Therefore, this section outlines perspectives on NOS and how teacher pedagogy can consider the notion of “tentativeness” in science that is described as a key attribute of the Nature of Science Knowledge (NOSK) or the Nature of Science (NOS).
NOSK has been considered through various lines of inquiry over the past 100 years. A common thread is how science is characterized (Lederman, 2007; Lederman et al., 2014). At its origin, the field of scientific discovery is a constructivist enterprise, a point made in Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) seminal work, as shared by Lederman (2019). This points to innovation and discovery benefiting from following a question to its logical conclusion without a preconceived outcome. It can be valuable for the learner to engage in these principles as well as the professional scientist. This has benefits for motivation, engagement, and the development of evaluative thinking necessary for scientific inquiry (Kuhn, 2005).
Lederman et al. (1987) has been influential in exploring science teachers’ conceptions of NOS and their influence on teaching. Research underscores the importance of approaching NOSK as an explicit instructional goal in the classroom alongside traditional science instruction (Lederman & Lederman, 2019, p. 7).
The specific aspects of NOSK that are emphasized differs based on educational goals. For example, Sweeney (2010) found twelve aspects, while Akerson et al. (2010) highlighted five as key. The NGSS (2013) highlighted eight aspects that define scientific knowledge. These are outlined these alongside their related processes and concepts as follows:
• Scientific Investigations Use a Variety of Methods
• Scientific Knowledge is Based on Empirical Evidenc
• Scientific Knowledge is Open to Revision in Light of New Evidence
• Science Models, Laws, Mechanisms, and Theories Explain Natural Phenomena
Those understandings associated with Crosscutting Concepts are:
• Science is a Way of Knowing
• Scientific Knowledge Assumes an Order and Consistency in Natural Systems
• Science is a Human Endeavour
• Science Addresses Questions About the Natural and Material World
(Lederman & Lederman, 2019, p. 6)
A meta-analysis by Cofre et al. (2019) concluded there is no clear determination on one strategy that is more effective for teachers learning about aspects of NOS. This leaves room to explore a cognitive approach that recognizes the complexity and variability in understanding and teaching NOSK, and how it can inform instructional practices.
One central tenet is that knowledge is tentative (Lederman, 2007). This means that facts, theories, and laws are not established and writ in stone, but subject to change. The evolution of knowledge in science is due to the field being a human endeavor, or a social construct, that requires inferences made using evidence and evolving technologies. New ideas shift how evidence can be interpreted and what is known and considered as truth (Abd-El-Khalick et al., 2002).
Perla and Carifio (2008) suggested the tentative nature of science is justified as useful for educators and researchers, having been “empirically validated” by science experts across many domains (p. 5). However, they caution against a simplistic semantic interpretation of the nature of science. The authors suggest that language used to express NOS concepts is complex and requires nuance to be accurately communicated and understood. In relating Olson and Clough’s (2003) perspective, the authors posited that scientific findings and proofs that are “tentative” are epistemic concerns for practice and research without this attention there is a risk of misconceptions (as cited in Perla and Carifio, 2008, p. 4).
Perla and Carifio (2008) point out that language used to communicate the tentative nature of science can be misunderstood, leading to generalizations which are akin to teaching through transmission of a “slogan” (p. 13). They suggest that instruction needs to convey the nuanced nature of tentativeness. Drawing from traditions in logic and philosophy, the authors breakdown the notion of “tentative” to reveal inconsistencies in the use of the term. They share where this idea can become an overly simplified understanding (i.e., reporting of scientific findings) and problematic for researchers and educators of science.
Perla and Carifio recommend that science education should support nuanced thinking about the constructs of the NOSK. To do so, they suggest consideration of ambiguity of empirical findings as a result of human construction. They pointed out that expert scientists are subject to account for the ambiguity in their work and the science educator benefits from interrogation of these constructs as well. Perla and Carifio (2008) expressed this sentiment: "[s]ince we know that students and many teachers have difficulty with epistemic terms and concepts, great care should be exercised in constructing and using such terms and concepts” (p. 14).
Being intentional with use of complex terms can benefit from interrogation of the characteristics of science as tentative. Perla and Carifio suggested that without consideration to the qualifications of “tentative” then the learner may encounter misconceptions. The authors suggested that instructional materials for kindergarten through tertiary schooling may create explicitly and implicitly held misconceptions due to lack of “philosophical” nuance in meaning of the term tentative. Therefore, the authors concluded it is valuable for the novice, not just the professional, to develop “a sound appreciation for understanding the nature of science” (p.15).
To avoid misconceptions, it is important to provide clear and nuanced opportunities to learn about the semantic and epistemic aspects of the nature of science. One way to do this as recommended by Duschl (2008) is to use the term “responsive” instead of tentative (p. 274). This helps learners understand that scientific inquiry involves evolutions in thinking and reasoning about evidence. The language of responsiveness helps the novice to move from a notion of tentative that is possibly misconstrued as “unsupported by evidence” (p. 274). This can allow a shift in curriculum that permits Schwab’s notion of “enquiry of enquiry” (as cited in Duschl, p. 276).
Consideration of the NOSK provides a strong impetus for engagement in epistemic cognition and supporting scientific literacy in school. Education and instructional practice, like the “specialized fields” of history or science, has its own culture (Weinstock et. al., 2017, p. 288). Teacher candidates who have explored competing theoretical perspectives can foster deeper engagement in epistemic cognition about teaching instruction, and these efforts have been noted to support epistemic change (Parkinson & Maggioni, 2017).