

Wildfire-mitigating power shut-offs promote household-level adaptation but not climate policy support

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Article

Keywords: energy systems, electricity, climate change, climate risk, climate-mitigation

Posted Date: June 22nd, 2021

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-631250/v1>

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Version of Record: A version of this preprint was published at Nature Energy on July 21st, 2022. See the published version at <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-022-01071-0>.

Wildfire-mitigating power shut-offs promote household-level adaptation but not climate policy support

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June 18, 2021

Abstract

Unmitigated climate change threatens to disrupt energy systems, for example through weather- and wildfire-induced electricity shortages. Public responses to these energy crises have the potential to shape decarbonization trajectories. Here, we estimate the attitudinal and behavioral effects of Californian power shut-offs in 2019, intended to reduce wildfire ignition risks. We use a geographically targeted survey to compare residents living within outage zones to matched residents in similar neighborhoods who retained their electricity. Outage experience increased respondent intentions to purchase gas or diesel generators and home battery systems, but reduced intentions to purchase electric vehicles. Respondents blamed outages on their utility, not local, state, or federal governments. However, outages did not change climate policy preferences, including willingness-to-pay for either wildfire or climate-mitigating reforms. Our findings show that, in reaction to some climate-linked disruptions, individuals may undertake adaptive responses that, collectively, could exacerbate future climate risks.

1 Climate change is already exposing the public to damaging extreme weather and natural
2 disasters (Reidmiller et al., 2019). These lived experiences may reshape individual and political
3 incentives to address climate change (Howe et al., 2019): exposure to high temperatures (Egan
4 and Mullin, 2012; Zaval et al., 2014; Bergquist and Warshaw, 2019), wildfires (Hamilton et al.,
5 2016; Hazlett and Mildenberger, 2020), hurricanes (Shao and Goidel, 2016), and flooding (Spence
6 et al., 2011; Demski et al., 2017; Albright and Crow, 2019) have sometimes increased public
7 climate concerns and pro-climate behaviors. However, climate change will also indirectly threaten
8 transportation, wastewater, and energy infrastructure (Hummel et al., 2018; Burillo et al., 2019;
9 Chester et al., 2020). For example, extreme weather has already undermined grid reliability and
10 energy provision in places like South Australia in 2016, California in 2019, and Texas in 2021.
11 We still know little about public responsiveness to such climate-linked disruptions. Because
12 the causal chain linking climate change to the public’s lived experiences during infrastructure
13 crises is more indirect, people may not associate their experience with climate change (Levy

14 et al., 2018). In turn, these climate impacts are less likely to shape public support for climate
15 mitigation and adaptation policies.

16 Pre-emptive power outages, also termed public safety power shutoffs (PSPSs), are one in-
17 creasingly common disruption to energy infrastructure. PSPSs are intended to reduce wildfire
18 ignition risks and are likely to become more frequent in fire-prone landscapes like California as cli-
19 mate change intensifies wildfire hazards (Gonzalez et al., 2018). PSPS events can be widespread
20 and affect large populations. In Fall 2019, one of the California’s major utilities, Pacific Gas
21 and Electric (PG&E), conducted a series of widespread PSPS outages in Northern California.
22 During an initial shut-off from October 9 through 12, PG&E “de-energized” over 730,000 cus-
23 tomers across 35 counties.¹ Another 177,000 customers were de-energized during a second event
24 between October 23 and October 25,² followed by two successive outage events beginning on
25 October 26 and 29 that impacted another 941,000 customers.³

26 Here, we report the results from a new, high spatial resolution survey of Californians fielded
27 in the immediate aftermath of these widespread outage events. Unlike traditional surveys that
28 rarely achieve geographic resolution below the ZIP code, we use a mail-to-web recruitment
29 strategy that allows fine-grained spatial control (see Methods for details). Briefly, we used the
30 spatial boundaries released by PG&E to generate a sample of addresses subject to at least one
31 outage during October 2019, oversamples of addresses within 1km inside or outside the outage
32 boundaries, and targeted samples of non-outage addresses that were otherwise similar to outage
33 zone addresses. We visualize this sampling frame as Figure 1. All sampled addresses were mailed
34 a letter inviting resident participation in a web-based survey in the second week of November,
35 and then sent a postcard reminder in the first week of December. In total, we received complete
36 survey responses from 890 Californian households (see SI Figure A1 for map of respondents’
37 addresses).

38 Our data allows us to describe the experiences of the average respondent in the outage zone.

¹PG&E. 2019. “AMENDED PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC, Oc-
tober 9-12, 2019 De-Energization Event.” Available online at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2019/PGE%20Public%20Safety%20Power%20Shutoff%20Oct.%209-12%20Report_Amended.pdf. The utility also de-energized 11,300 customers in the North Sierra foothills which are not captured by our sampling frame. See PG&E. 2019. “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC October 5-6, 2019 De-Energization Event. Available online at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2019/PGE%20Public%20Safety%20Power%20Shutoff%20Oct.%205-6%20Report.pdf

²PG&E. 2019. “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC October 23-25, 2019 De-Energization Event.” Available online at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2019/PGE%20Public%20Safety%20Power%20Shutoff%20Oct.%2023-25,%202019%20Report.pdf

³PG&E. 2019. “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC October 26 & 29, 2019 De-Energization Event.” Available online at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2019/Nov.%201%202019%20PGE%20ESRB-8%20Repor%20for%20Oct.%2026%202019%202019.pdf




Figure 1: *Left*: Survey sampling zones associated with Public Safety Power Shut-offs events in Northern California, Fall 2019, see Methods for details. *Right*: Inset map with dots illustrating addresses selected for sampling in the East San Francisco Bay Area.

39 We can also exploit spatial variation in the distribution of PG&E power outages to evaluate how
 40 exposure to energy infrastructure disruption shaped the public’s adaptive behaviors and climate
 41 attitudes. In general, the boundaries of PSPSs are a function of local transmission networks
 42 that remain opaque to most residents. Because transmission networks play a negligible role in
 43 structuring where people choose to live, we can estimate the effect of outage exposure on public
 44 attitudes by matching respondents within outage zones with otherwise similar respondents just
 45 outside outage zones. Overall, we find that outage experience increased respondent intentions to
 46 purchase gas or diesel generators and home battery systems, but reduced intentions to purchase
 47 electric vehicles. At the same time, outages did not change climate policy preferences, including
 48 willingness-to-pay for either wildfire or climate-mitigating reforms. Broadly, our findings sug-
 49 gest that, in reaction to some climate-linked disruptions, individuals may undertake adaptive
 50 responses that, collectively, can exacerbate future climate risks.

51 Respondent experiences with October 2019 PSPS events

52 Survey respondents in the outage zones reported significant disruptions from October 2019 PSPS
 53 events, with 44 percent reporting power losses for three or more days. These experiences were




Figure 2: Outage-impacted respondent concerns during the October 2019 PSPS outages in Northern California.

consequential. Majorities of outage-impacted respondents were worried about being able to contact people (64%) and complete household tasks (55%), and 46% were worried about caring for family (Figure 2).

In our survey, we asked respondents why they thought the electricity was shut off, using an open-ended text field. 426 respondents offered responses (see Methods for coding details). Overall, 53 percent mentioned weather as a cause, generally either wind or wildfire. 28 percent mentioned some negligence or corruption on the part of PG&E (this included comments expressing that PG&E was only concerned with reducing their own liability), while 9 percent referred to PG&E safety efforts. Just 1 percent of respondents referred to government negligence or corruption. Only 4 respondents (less than 1 percent) mentioned climate change.

Most respondents in outage areas took preparatory actions in advance of the PSPS events. 64 percent reported buying additional food, and 65 percent reported buying gasoline. 50 percent reported buying flashlights, candles or rechargeable batteries. Most respondents who experienced power shutoffs stayed in their own homes (78%), even if their power was shut off over night. Few stayed with friends or relatives (4%) or at a hotel or a motel (2%). 155 respondents answered an optional question asking how much money they spent on preparations. The average reported

70 amount was \$327, with responses ranging from a low of \$0 to a high of \$5000.

71 In sum, respondents self-reported that the PSPSs had psychological and economic effects
72 on their households. We now evaluate whether these experiences shaped respondent’s behav-
73 ioral intentions and climate attitudes. Simple comparisons between individuals exposed and not
74 exposed to outages would likely produce biased estimates; respondents “treated” with outages
75 may differ systematically from non-exposed respondents, including as a result of differences in
76 neighborhood characteristics.⁴ Accordingly, we combine our spatially targeted sampling with
77 matching algorithms to match treated respondents with similar unexposed households to esti-
78 mate the causal effect of outage exposure (see Methods for details).

79 **The effects of outage experience on behavioral intentions**

80 We first consider behavioral intentions related to adaptation. Here, we examine whether re-
81 spondents planned to take the following actions over the subsequent year:⁵ 1) change home
82 landscaping to reduce wildfire risk, 2) upgrade home building materials to reduce wildfire risk,
83 3) install a home battery system, 4) install gas or diesel backup generation, 5) move, 6) purchase
84 additional food and water supplies to prepare for future shutoffs, 7) and install solar panels.⁶ We
85 also asked respondents whether they thought the next car they purchased would be an electric
86 vehicle (EV) which is, instead, a mitigation behavior that could help reduce the risk of future
87 climate-related hazards. The perceived benefits of EVs might also be affected by reliability of
88 electric service. In the outage-exposed area, 50 percent of respondents reported plans to pur-
89 chase additional food and water, 24 percent reported plans to install backup generation, and
90 another 19 percent reported plans to change home landscaping. On the other hand, just 4 per-
91 cent reported plans to upgrade home building materials, 9 percent reported plans to install a
92 home battery system, and 7 percent reported plans to install solar panels.

93 When we compare average household-level adaptation outcomes between matched respon-
94 dents inside and outside outage areas, we find that outage exposure shaped certain adaptation
95 outcomes, but not others.⁷ As demonstrated by Figure 3, exposure to an outage had the strongest
96 effect on respondents’ plans for installing a backup gas or diesel generator; individuals exposed

⁴While outage boundaries may be exogenous, topographical differences still create differences between neigh-
borhood types, property values and other characteristics within 1km of outage boundaries.

⁵We excluded respondents who had already taken the activities prior to outage onset.

⁶We recognize that the ability to take these actions can depend on home ownership and income. Since the
great majority of the sample owned their homes (86 percent), we were unable to estimate heterogeneous effects
by home ownership. We also do not find statistically significant differences in adaptation behaviors by income
(see SI Section 3).

⁷We present differences in means in the matched sample in the main text, with estimates from covariate-
adjusted OLS regression in the SI Section 2.




Figure 3: **Effect of outage exposure on household-level adaptation and purchasing intentions.** Figure presents proportion of matched respondents in outage and non-outage zones stating their intention to adopt a given behavior. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Stars represent significance of difference-in-means between outage and non-outage sample for given behavior; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$.

97 to outages were 16 percentage points [SE=.03, $p < .01$] more likely to plan generator installa-
 98 tion. Outage-exposed respondents were also more likely to say they planned to install a home
 99 battery system, but only by 4 percentage points [SE=.02, $p < .1$]. In addition, outage-exposed
 100 respondents were 7 percentage points more likely to report that they planned to change their
 101 home landscaping to reduce wildfire risk [SE=.04, $p < .1$]. Finally, outage-exposed respondents
 102 were 7 percentage points less likely to report that they planned to purchase an EV as their next
 103 car [SE=.04, $p < .05$]. We do not find statistically significant effects for other household-level
 104 adaptations including building upgrades, plans for rooftop solar installations, plans to move, or
 105 preparing for future outages by buying additional food and water. On balance, we find that
 106 outage-exposed respondents tended to focus on their individual-level adaptive needs. Collec-
 107 tively, at least some of these behaviors (an increase in fossil fuel generator purchases and a
 108 decrease in EV purchases) might inadvertently exacerbate the climate risks that contribute to
 109 power outage events. Respondent openness to installing home battery systems suggests one
 110 potential countervailing measure that might support climate change mitigation.

111 Figure 4 presents estimates of the effect of outages on these behaviors, splitting the sample




Figure 4: **Heterogeneous effects of outage exposure on adaptation by respondent acceptance of climate science.** Figure presents estimated effect of outage exposure on adaptation intentions among respondents who accept that global warming is caused mostly by human activities (n=547), and those who do not (n=128), all within the matched sample. Bars provide 95 percent confidence intervals.

112 by whether respondents accept that global warming is caused mostly by human activities. We
 113 generally do not find major differences in the effects of outages conditional whether respondents
 114 accept climate science. The one exception is with respect to electric vehicle uptake, where we
 115 find that the negative effect of outage exposure on EV uptake is concentrated among those who
 116 deny anthropogenic global warming. We do not find significant differences in adaptive responses
 117 to outages by partisan identification (see SI Section 3).

118 **The effects of outage experience on utility and government trust**

119 Our second set of outcomes concern respondents' attitudes with respect to electric utilities and
 120 government officials. Since outage decisions were made by electric utilities (principally, in this
 121 case, PG&E), we would suspect that being exposed to outages might affect respondents' attitudes
 122 towards their electricity providers. We measured respondents' trust in their electric utility, the
 123 degree to which respondents held their utility responsible for power shut-offs, whether they held
 124 PG&E liable for damages from their equipment, and whether they thought PG&E's corporate
 125 governance should be restructured as part of its bankruptcy proceeding. Overall, respondents

126 held negative attitudes toward their utility provider. The average level of trust (across outage-
127 exposed and non-outage areas) was "somewhat," more than half of respondents felt that PG&E
128 was "completely" responsible for the shut-offs, and 80 percent agreed that PG&E is liable for
129 wildfire damage caused by their equipment. Just 23 percent of respondents felt that PG&E
130 should continue to operate as a privately-owned utility.

131 These attitudes were amplified by outage exposure. As shown in Figure 5, outage-exposed
132 individuals reported statistically significantly lower levels of trust towards their electric provider
133 than individuals in the control group. 43 percent of outage-exposed respondents reported they
134 completely distrusted their utility, compared to 29 percent in the non-outage-exposed area
135 [SE=.04, $p < .01$]. They also were more likely, by nearly half a standard deviation, to hold their
136 electric utility responsible for causing the planned power shut-offs. 70 percent of outage-exposed
137 respondents reported that the utility was completely responsible, compared to 58 percent else-
138 where [SE=.04, $p < .01$]. However, we do not find that outage exposure was causally associated
139 with respondents agreeing that utilities should be liable for the damage from wildfires caused by
140 their equipment, nor with respondents advocating for a major restructuring in PG&E's corpo-
141 rate governance. These latter results may stem from limited variation in the outcome measure
142 (even in non-outage-exposed areas, 79 percent of respondents reported holding PG&E liable,
143 and 77 percent advocated for a major restructuring).

144 The strong effects of outage exposure on electric utility attitudes contrasted with minimal
145 overall effects on attitudes towards politicians. In Figure 6, we do not find evidence that exposure
146 affected overall attitudes towards former President Trump, California Governor Gavin Newsom,
147 or local politicians. However, when we split the sample by partisan identification, we find
148 some evidence that outage exposure affected politician approval among political Independents.
149 Independents exposed to outages had lower approval of California Governor Newsom [13 points
150 on 100 point scale, SE=5.32, $p < .05$], and higher approval of (then) President Trump [17 points
151 on 100 point scale, SE=5.62, $p < .01$]. Democrats exposed to outages had slightly lower approval
152 of Trump [3 points on 100 point scale, SE=1.46, $p < .1$].

153 **The effects outage experience on climate attitudes**

154 Our final set of outcome measures relate to climate attitudes, including willingness-to-pay for
155 climate- and wildfire-mitigating policies. As shown in Figure 7, outage exposure was not asso-
156 ciated with differences in policy views on clean energy and climate policies like achieving net
157 zero emissions by 2035 and implementing a Clean Energy Standard. Exposure was also not




Figure 5: **Effect of outage exposure on attitudes towards utilities.** Figure presents proportion of matched respondents in outage and non-outage zones who take stated position with respect to their electric utilities, primarily PG&E. Stars represent significance of difference-in-means between outage and non-outage sample for given behavior; ** $p < .05$.




Figure 6: **Effect of outage exposure on politician approval ratings.** *Left:* Average politician approval rating for matched respondents in outage zones and non-outage zones. *Right:* Estimated effect of outage exposure on approval ratings in matched sample by partisan identity. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.




Figure 7: **Effect of outage exposure on policy and global warming attitudes.** Figure presents average policy views for matched respondents in outage and non-outage zones. For worried about global warming outcome, the opposed position corresponds to less worried. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

158 associated with increased concern about global warming.⁸

159 In addition to evaluating the degree to which outage exposure affected behaviors and atti-
 160 tudes, we also leveraged the survey to evaluate respondents' willingness to pay (both financially
 161 and in terms of days without power) to reduce fire risk and make the electricity system more
 162 stable in California (see Methods for details). First, we estimated that the median respondent
 163 was willing to live without electricity for 6.7 days a year to reduce fire risk— 6.6 days in the outage
 164 area and 6.9 days outside it (no statistically significant difference). We also estimate that the
 165 median respondent would be willing to pay a surcharge of just \$4.19 per month to avoid future
 166 planned power shutoffs— \$2.19 in the outage area and \$7.89 outside. Again, this difference was
 167 not statistically significant due to large standard errors in the willingness to pay analysis. This
 168 contrasted with a high willingness to pay, \$49.35 per month, to bury power lines underground
 169 to improve overall system stability and resilience (\$50.22 in the outage area, \$47.73 outside it,
 170 no statistically significant difference).

⁸For policy attitudes, unlike politician approval ratings, we do not find significant heterogeneous effects by partisan identification.

171 Discussion

172 Public safety power shut offs (PSPSs) are becoming frequent in California, and represent a
173 class of indirect climate-linked energy system disruptions that impact public welfare across the
174 world. Our results suggest that California households were not well-prepared for the power
175 outages, but the experience of the outage catalyzed adaptive behaviors like installing back-up
176 power. By contrast, outage exposure did not encourage behaviors that might mitigate climate
177 change, or broadly shift climate change attitudes. These results are, for the most part, robust
178 to a number of alternative specifications that we present in our supplementary materials. These
179 include adjusting by a set of covariates (SI Section 2), including matched Southern California
180 respondents in the sample (SI Section 4), and excluding respondents within 1000-meters from
181 the spatial outage boundary (SI Section 5). One exception is the finding that outage exposure
182 reduced intention to purchase an EV, which weakens in some alternative specifications.

183 Broadly, public responses to these power outages reflected households' short-term and prox-
184 imate needs— maintaining power and reducing fire risk— rather efforts to climate change, a sys-
185 temic but indirect driver of the energy system disruption. Moreover, outage-exposed respondents
186 tended to blame their utility, who made the proximate decision to implement the outages, rather
187 than the politicians who could potentially be held accountable for the policies that may reduce
188 climate change risk through mitigation and adaptation. Our findings trouble assumptions that
189 individuals will change their attitude and behaviors if simply informed about the ways that
190 climate change will personally affect them or if they experience a climate-related hazard event,
191 particularly when - as was the case with the 2019 Californian outages - climate change was not
192 portrayed as a major event driver. Efforts to decarbonize our energy systems cannot assume
193 that all climate-linked disruptions will mobilize the public in support of clean energy reforms.

194 Methods

195 Our data collection protocol began with creating a spatially disaggregated sampling frame that
196 allowed us to target individuals who experienced at least one PSPS as well as groups of otherwise
197 similar residents. During the Fall 2019 PSPS events, we collected spatial polygon files publicly
198 shared online by PG&E for each successive shut-off event. We intersected all outage polygons
199 to define the spatial extent of Californians who were projected to experience one or more PSPS
200 events in the PG&E service area during October and November 2019. We also recorded the
201 number of overlapping projected outages experienced in each part of the service area.

202 We then defined a series of additional spatial zones using buffering methods. First, we
203 defined a spatial zone containing all areas within California located between 0 and 1 km *inside*
204 the projected outage zone boundaries. Second, we defined a spatial zone containing all areas
205 located between 0 and 1 km *outside* the outage zone boundaries. Third, we defined a spatial
206 zone containing all areas located between 1 and 20 km *outside* the outage zone boundaries. For
207 all zones, we excluded Sonoma county because active wildfires and evacuations associated with
208 2019 Kincadee fire remained in effect in Sonoma County during our survey period. Figure 1
209 illustrates these different spatial zones that structure our survey sampling frame.

210 Using the WorldPop gridded 100 meter population dataset as a probability surface, we gen-
211 erated 1 million points within Northern California county boundaries, weighted by population
212 distribution. This point dataset simulated a random sample of the population within our target
213 counties. For every point, we extracted its CalFire fire threat zone from CalFire gridded data
214 (<https://frap.fire.ca.gov/mapping/gis-data/>) as well as its census tract ID. We then subset this
215 Northern California point sample layer by clipping to each of our four spatial zones: 1) 0-1 km
216 buffer outside outage boundaries, 2) 0-1 km buffer inside outage boundaries, 3) 1-20 km buffer
217 outside outage boundaries, 4) actual outage boundaries. This created four point sample layers
218 for geocoding. Within each layer, we randomly sampled 6000 points. Then, using the Google re-
219 verse geocoding API (via the ggmap package (Kahle and Wickham, 2013)), we reverse geocoded
220 the coordinates of each sample point in all four layers. Reverse geocoding produced a street
221 address (if available) for each point and a label indicating whether the address was a “premise”
222 (Google’s label for a dwelling unit). We then subset reverse geocoded points to only those with
223 street addresses identified as premises and removed duplicates. Finally, we randomly subset
224 3000 addresses in each zone, except for the full outage zone, where we selected 6000 addresses
225 to sample. In Figure 1 we also visualize local-scale sampling points in the East Bay Area.

226 We also generated a list of control addresses in Southern California that were as closely
227 matched as possible to addresses in our sample within 1 km inside and 1km outside the outage
228 boundaries. First, we prepared a map of Southern California counties (San Luis Obispo, Santa
229 Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, Imperial). Again
230 using the WorldPop gridded 100 meter population dataset as a probability surface, we generated
231 500,000 points within these county boundaries, weighted by population distribution. Third, we
232 took all sample addresses from Northern California living within 0-1km area outside and the
233 0-1km area inside the outage boundary; we calculated the proportions of population within each
234 census tract within each fire threat zone. Using entropy balancing (via the eBal package in R),

235 we generated weights for every Southern California census tract so that the weighted average
236 of all Southern California tracts on a variety of socio-demographic characteristics matched to
237 the distribution of tract attributes in our Northern California sample. We generated weights
238 based on the following characteristics: percent of census tracts that were unzoned, or under low,
239 medium, high, and very high threat per CalFire threat zones; propensity scores for tract-level
240 wildfire occurrence between 2000 and 2017, and between 2008 and 2017; average household size;
241 unemployment rate; percent of tract residents who are homeowners; percent who are married;
242 percent with bachelors degree or higher; percent who speak English as first language; percent
243 below poverty level; percent veterans; percent with jobs in management, business, science, and
244 arts; percent with jobs in service sector; percent firefighters or working protective services;
245 percent working in farm, fishing or forestry; percent white; percent Hispanic; percent Black;
246 percent who drive alone to work; percent who use public transit; and percent who work in-state.
247 We then randomly sampled, with replacement, from these census tracts, using the entropy
248 balance weights as sampling weights. This produced a list of census tracts. We then randomly
249 sampled points within each census tract in this list, and reverse geocoded these points as before.
250 We included the first 3000 addresses identified as premises.

251 Overall, this sampling process resulted in a list of 18000 addresses: a representative sample
252 of 6000 addresses from within the PSPS outage zone, a representative sample of 3000 addresses
253 from 0 to 1 km inside the outage boundary, a representative sample of 3000 addresses from 0 to
254 1km outside the outage boundary, a representative sample of 3000 addresses from 1 to 20 km
255 outside the outage boundary, and a sample of 3000 Southern California addresses matched to
256 Northern California sample addresses within 1km inside or outside the outage boundary.

257 On November 14, 2019, we mailed a customized letter to each of these 18000 addresses,
258 inviting one resident from each household to participate in an online survey on California's
259 electricity system (see SI Figure A14 for example recruitment letter). Each letter contained
260 a customized URL so that we could identify the spatial location for every survey response.
261 Respondents who completed our survey received a \$5 digital gift card by email that they could
262 redeem at dozens of different online retailers, or that they could donate to a charity of their choice.
263 As a result of our initial letter, we received 565 complete survey responses. On December 3rd, we
264 sent a follow-up letter to all individuals who had not completed the survey, again inviting them
265 to participate. This generated an additional 325 survey responses. In total, we received 890
266 complete response, a 4.94% response rate. In Table 1 we show response rates across sampling
267 zones, with observed elevated response rates in areas that had experienced a PSPS event. We

Zone	All Outage	Inside 0-1 km	Outside 0-1 km	Outside 1-20 km	Southern Cal.
Response Rate	5.73	5.03	4.97	3.87	4.33
Observations	495	151	149	116	130

Table 1: Survey response rates and sample size by spatial sampling zone

268 provide the full text of our survey instrument as SI Section 7.

269 Among our sample of respondents located within the outage zones released by PG&E, 85%
270 reported experiencing at least one recent power outage. Of those respondents, the majority
271 (57%) reported experiencing more than one outage. Among respondents who experienced an
272 outage, a majority were without power for three or more days.

273 Respondents living in an outage zone differed systematically from respondents who were not
274 exposed to outages, as demonstrated by Table 2. This may be a function of topography, where
275 distances of 1km from the outage boundary in Northern California include stark differences in
276 urban (low-lying) vs. suburban and periurban neighborhoods (hillside) across the Bay Area. In
277 particular, those exposed to outages were more likely to identify as Democrats, were more liberal,
278 were more likely to identify as female, and were older. As a result, we should suspect underlying
279 differences in attitudes and behaviors when making naive, direct comparisons between these
280 groups.

281 To address these possible underlying variations between treated untreated groups, we used a
282 matching algorithm to construct a plausible control group and estimate the effect of exposure to
283 outages (Dehejia and Wahba 2002, 1999). Specifically, we leveraged genetic matching (Diamond
284 and Sekhon 2012) via the *Matchit* package in R to identify a set of individuals that were not
285 exposed to outages that are otherwise comparable to the individuals exposed to outages.⁹ In this
286 way, our spatially resolved sampling helps us to identify high quality likely matches for treated
287 respondents; likewise, the quasi-arbitrary nature of outage boundaries reduces somewhat the risk
288 of persistent unobserved confounders. The matching algorithm identified 678 respondents (of
289 890 in the full sample) for whom we were able to achieve balance on key covariates. 485 resided
290 in areas that spatial data provided by PG&E indicate were exposed to outages, while 193 resided
291 in areas that were, according to the PG&E data, unaffected. This is reflected in survey responses
292 to questions about respondents' experience of power outages. In total, 66 percent of respondents

⁹An alternative approach is to compare individuals on either side of the boundary between outage-exposed and non-outage areas through a geographic regression discontinuity design (Keele and Titiunik 2015). If the boundary is randomly placed, we would expect, within a small geographic window around the boundary, no systematic differences between treatment and control groups. The problem with this approach in our case is imprecision in the spatial data specifying the outage-exposed areas. Only 25 percent of respondents living between 0 and 1000 meters on the inside of an outage zone reported exposure to planned outages— while 12 percent of respondents living between 0 and 1000 meters on the outside of an outage zone reported exposure. Given this imprecision, the matching design provides much greater leverage for estimating the effect of outages exposure.

Table 2: Covariate balance between treatment and control groups in overall and matched samples

	Overall sample			Matched sample		
	Treated mean	Control mean	P-value (t-test)	Treated mean	Control mean	P-value (t-test)
Party ID	2.248 (0.066)	2.57 (0.082)	0.002	2.241 (0.067)	2.301 (0.111)	0.648
Ideology	3.431 (0.066)	3.681 (0.077)	0.015	3.437 (0.067)	3.466 (0.107)	0.817
Educational attainment	4.526 (0.042)	4.457 (0.051)	0.289	4.522 (0.042)	4.435 (0.076)	0.321
Age	55.491 (0.69)	53.453 (0.831)	0.064	55.544 (0.699)	51.857 (1.124)	0.006
Income	2.639 (0.15)	2.648 (0.158)	0.893	2.648 (0.149)	2.736 (0.221)	0.265
Female	0.505 (0.022)	0.398 (0.025)	0.001	0.505 (0.023)	0.477 (0.036)	0.504
Married	0.675 (0.021)	0.62 (0.024)	0.092	0.676 (0.021)	0.658 (0.034)	0.651
Employed	0.562 (0.022)	0.595 (0.025)	0.318	0.563 (0.023)	0.617 (0.035)	0.199
Non English at home	0.238 (0.019)	0.281 (0.023)	0.151	0.237 (0.019)	0.311 (0.033)	0.057
Smoke level	2.473 (0.045)	2.349 (0.046)	0.054	2.478 (0.045)	2.534 (0.065)	0.484
Observations	495	395		485	193	

Notes: Ideology was measured using a standard 7-point Likert scale (1 is most conservative, 7 most liberal). Education was measured on a 5-point scale (less than high school, high school diploma or GED, some college, associates degree, bachelors degree of higher). Income was measured using a 4-point scale (less than \$40,000, \$40,000 to \$100,000, \$100,000 to \$250,000, over \$250,000). Smoke level is 4-point measure of degree to which smoke has made air quality in respondents' community worse since beginning of October, 2019.

293 in the matched treatment group reported that they experienced a planned outage, compared to
 294 just 11 percent of respondents in the matched control group.¹⁰

295 Table 2 presents summary statistics on the individuals in the full sample and the matched
 296 sample. While respondent age and whether respondents speak a language other than income at
 297 home are unbalanced in the matched sample, that results are robust to adjusting by these (and
 298 other) covariates (see SI Secton 2) suggests these imbalances are not driving estimated effects.

299 Throughout, we estimate the effect of outage exposure by estimating a simple linear model
 300 among respondents in the matched sample:

$$y_i = \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 X_i + \alpha + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

¹⁰The measurement error reduces the precision of our estimates, making it more difficult to detect treatment effects, but does not produce bias. Lack of precision in outage maps, combined with uncertainty of the accuracy of survey responses, makes it difficult to establish the ground truth of outage experiences.

301 Respondents are indexed by i . T_i denotes outage exposure and X_i is a matrix of demographic
302 covariates measured the respondent level. α is an intercept, and ε_i represents standard errors.¹¹
303 Discussion of covariates included, and estimates from covariate-adjusted models, are provided in
304 SI Section 2. Throughout, all statistical tests are two-side.

305 In addition to using the survey for causal inference, we also leveraged the survey to gain
306 insights about the public’s understanding of reasons for the planned electricity outages. For
307 respondents who had reported experiencing a shutoff, we asked: “In a few words, why do you
308 think your electricity was shut off?” For respondents who did not report that their own electricity
309 was shut off, but that electricity of other homes in their communities was shut off, we asked: “In
310 a few words, why do you think the electricity of other homes in your community was shut off?”
311 426 respondents offered answers to the open-ended question. We first conducted an analysis of
312 the most common words used. The five most common words were “fire” (177 times), “wind”
313 (129), “PG&E” (125), “power” (91), and “high” (91). From this preliminary analysis, and from
314 inspecting the first 100 responses, we generated five non-unique (e.g. a single response can fall
315 into multiple) keys for responses: weather and fire risk; PG&E taking action to protect public
316 safety; negligence or corruption on the part of PG&E; government negligence or corruption; and
317 uncertainty as to what caused the shutoffs. We discuss the proportion of responses that fell into
318 each category in the main text.

319 In the main text, we also report median respondent willingness to pay (both financially and
320 in terms of days without power) to reduce fire risk and make the electricity system more stable.
321 To estimate willingness-to-live without electricity to reduce fire risk, asked respondents: “Would
322 you be willing to live without electricity for X days each year to reduce the risk of wildfires in
323 California?” We randomly assigned X from among 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 14, and 21, and used the
324 function *sbchoice* from the package *DCchoice* in *R* to compute median willingness-to-pay. We
325 conducted similar analysis for the other willingness-to-pay items. To estimate willingness-to-pay
326 a surcharge to reduce future planned power shutoffs, we asked: “Would you be willing to pay
327 a surcharge of \$X every month on your electricity bill to avoid future planned power shutoffs?”
328 We randomly assigned X from among 1, 2, 5, 7.5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, 75, 100, 150, and 250.
329 To estimate willingness-to-pay to bury power lines underground, we asked: “How much would
330 you support burying power lines in California if it cost you \$X more per month on your utility
331 bill for the next 10 years?”¹² For this question, we randomly assigned X from among 1, 2, 5,

¹¹We exclude income from the covariates in regression adjustment because high missingness reduces sample size considerably. Table 2 indicates balance on income.

¹²We provided more detail in a prior vignette: “A number of different policy ideas are being discussed to try to make the electricity system in California more stable. One idea is to bury power lines underground. This

332 10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 110.

333 This study was reviewed and approved by the University of California Office of Research as
334 Protocol 22-19-0808.

335 Data availability

336 Data and replication scripts that support the findings of the study will be deposited in the
337 Harvard Dataverse repository to accompany publication of this article, available at [URL TO
338 BE ADDED].

339 Statement of Contributions

340 MM and PH jointly participated in all stages of this study, including design, data collection,
341 analysis, and writing. SM participated in analysis and writing. LS and ML participated in
342 design, data collection and writing.

343 Financial Competing Interests Statement

344 The authors declare they have no financial interests in this research.

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would likely cost \$3 million per mile. Currently, California has over 175,000 miles of overhead power lines. This means that burying all California power lines would cost over \$525 billion dollars, more than twice the state's total annual budget for all government spending."

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389 Supplementary Information

390 1 Distribution of completed survey responses

391 Figure A1 visualizes the distribution of complete survey responses received. (See Methods in
392 the main text for a detailed elaboration of sampling strategy).




Figure A1: Locations of all complete survey responses

393 2 Robustness to covariate adjustment in matched sample

394 In the main paper, we present the difference in means within the matched sample between
395 treatment (outage zones) and control (non-outage zones) groups for key outcomes. Here, we
396 present estimates from OLS regression with the outcome on the left-hand side, and treatment
397 (outage zone) and a matrix of covariates on the right-hand side (see Equation 1 above). Overall,
398 we recover consistent results when we include covariates in the analyses.

399 The following covariates were included: age, gender, education, ideology, income, partisan-
400 ship, whether employed, whether a language other than English is spoken at home, and whether
401 there were children in the household. Education was measured on a 5-point scale (less than high
402 school, high school diploma or GED, some college, associates degree, bachelors degree of higher).
403 Ideology was measured using a standard 7-point Likert scale. Income was measured using a 4-
404 point scale (less than \$40,000, \$40,000 to \$100,000, \$100,000 to \$250,000, over \$250,000).




Figure A2: **Covariate-adjusted estimates of effect of outage exposure on household-level adaptation and purchasing intentions.** Estimates from OLS regression on matched sample. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.




Figure A3: **Estimated effects of outage exposure on attitudes towards utilities.** Estimates from OLS regression on matched sample. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

405 3 Heterogeneous treatment effects

406 This section presents a number of analyses of heterogeneous effects of exposure to outages based
 407 on respondent-level covariates (e.g. income, partisanship). We first explore heterogeneous treat-
 408 ment effects of outage exposure on household-level adaptation. Figure A4 presents analysis of
 409 individual-level adaptation responses to outage exposure by income, recognizing that income
 410 may moderate the ability of respondents to adapt. However, we do not estimate heterogeneous
 411 treatment effects when we split the sample into two income groups (over / under \$100K).




Figure A4: **Estimated effects of outage exposure on adaptation, by income.** Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

412 We also, as demonstrated by Figure A5, do not estimate significant heterogeneous effects of
 413 outage exposure on adaptation responses by partisan identity.




Figure A5: **Estimated effects of outage exposure on adaptation, by partisan identity.** Estimates from OLS regression on matched sample. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

414 Household-level adaptation might also plausibly depend on distance from outage zones for
 415 those in the control group, and relatedly, whether respondents have a close friend or family
 416 member who was exposed to outages. However, Figure A6 indicates no statistically significant
 417 differences among those in the control group by distance to the outage zone (splitting the control
 418 group by the median distance to the outage zone). And Figure A7 indicates no statistically
 419 significant differences among control respondents by whether they have a friend or family who
 420 was exposed to outages.




Figure A6: **Adaptation intentions by distance to outage zone.** Far from outages indicates more than 1048 meters (median distance in the control group). Estimated proportions drawn from matched sample. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.




Figure A7: **Adaptation intentions by whether friends or family exposed to outages.** Estimated proportions drawn from matched sample. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

421 On the other hand, Figure A8 indicates that household-level adaptation did depend on the
 422 length of outage exposure. In particular, those exposed to longer outages were more likely to
 423 express an intention to install backup gas or diesel generation. They were also more likely to
 424 report plans to change home landscaping to reduce wildfire risk, and less likely to report that
 425 they planned to purchase an EV as their next car.




Figure A8: **Adaptation intentions by self-reported length of exposure.** Estimated proportions drawn from matched sample. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

426 At the same time, we do not observe statistically significant heterogeneous treatment effects
 427 by length of outage exposure when it comes to attitudes towards utilities, as demonstrated by
 428 Figure A9.




Figure A9: **Utility attitudes by self-reported length of exposure.** Estimates from OLS regression on matched sample. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

429 4 Robustness to including Southern California sample

430 We implemented two sets of analyses to ensure that main results were robust to changes to the
 431 composition of the sample. In the first, we include respondents in the control group sampled
 432 from Southern California census tracts similar on demographic variables to the outage-exposed
 433 regions. This increased the matched sample size from 678 to 718. As demonstrated by the figures
 434 below, we recover broadly consistent results, except when it comes to estimating the effect of
 435 outage exposure on plans to purchase an EV.




Figure A10: **Effect of outage exposure on household-level adaptation and purchasing intentions, including Southern California sample** Figure presents proportion of respondents stating intention to adopt behavior in outage-exposed zones and matched non-outage exposed zones. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. ** $p < .05$ estimated treatment effect.




Figure A11: **Effect of outage exposure on attitudes towards utilities, including Southern California sample** Figure presents proportion of respondents stating each position with respect to electric utilities, particularly PG&E. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. ** $p < .05$ estimated treatment effect.

436 5 Robustness to excluding those within 1km from boundary

437 In the second broad robustness check, we excluded individuals within 1km of the boundary
 438 between outage and non-outage exposed areas, lowering the matched sample size from 678 to
 439 426. This robustness check is meant to account for the fact that treatment close to the boundary
 440 was fuzzy (e.g. some respondents in outage areas did not report experiencing outages). We,
 441 again, recover broadly consistent results, except when it comes to estimating the effect of outage
 442 exposure on plans to purchase an EV.




Figure A12: **Effect of outage exposure on household-level adaptation and purchasing intentions, excluding observations close to boundary** Figure presents proportion of respondents stating intention to adopt behavior in outage-exposed zones and matched non-outage exposed zones. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. ** $p < .05$ estimated treatment effect, * $p < .1$.




Figure A13: **Effect of outage exposure on attitudes towards utilities, excluding observations close to boundary** Figure presents proportion of respondents stating each position with respect to electric utilities, particularly PG&E. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. ** $p < .05$ estimated treatment effect.

443 6 Example Recruitment Letter

Your Invitation


Public Opinion Research Survey on California's Power System

November 12, 2019

To: Current resident

Current Resident

1 18



Dear fellow Californian,

As you know, there have been a lot of power outages across California over the past month. We hope that you or other members of your household were not harmed by the power outages or fires. We are **inviting you to participate in an online survey** to help understand the views and experiences of Californians about these important recent events. There is a lot of confusion about how people were affected, so your participation will help California officials make informed policy decisions.

Your address was randomly selected from a public list of California addresses, and we would invite anyone age 18 or over in your household to complete the survey. We expect this will take between 8 and 12 minutes. Responses are voluntary and will be kept confidential.

Summaries of our research findings will be made available to the public, the media, and to policymakers in California. Also, as a small token of our appreciation, we will send you a **\$5 digital gift card for completing the survey, redeemable at over 100 online vendors like Amazon or iTunes.**

To answer the survey or to learn more, use your smartphone or computer to visit **<http://ucsurvey.com/P7061>** and then enter the log-in information below. If you have any questions, or are having trouble accessing the survey, you can email Principal Investigator Matto Mildenerger, the project director at mildenerger@ucsb.edu.

ucsurvey.com/P7061

By taking a few minutes to share your thoughts and you will help us understand what Californians want. The survey is available now. We would appreciate if you would respond by November 27.

We hope you enjoy completing the questionnaire and look forward to receiving your responses. Many thanks,

Matto Mildenerger

Professor of Political Science, University of California Santa Barbara

Figure A14: Sample recruitment letter with address blanked out

444 **7 Survey instrument**

445 **Quality of life**

446 Looking into the future, over the next five years, do you think the quality of life in your city,
447 town, or community will...

- 448 • Get significantly better
- 449 • Get somewhat better
- 450 • Stay the same
- 451 • Get somewhat worse
- 452 • Get significantly worse

453 **Electricity Provider**

454 We'd like to ask you a few questions about your home. Who is your electricity provider?

- 455 • Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGE)
- 456 • Southern California Edison (SCE)
- 457 • San Diego Gas Electric
- 458 • Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
- 459 • Other
- 460 • Don't know

461 **Outage occurrence**

462 Since the beginning of October, did the electricity in your home get shut off at any time?

- 463 • Yes
- 464 • No

465 **Outage occurrence: result of planned power shutoff**

466 [if YES] Was your electricity shut off as part of a planned power shutoff?

- 467 • Yes
- 468 • No
- 469 • Don't know

470 **Outage occurrence: frequency**

471 [if YES] How many times was your power shut off as part of a planned power shutoff?

- 472 • Once
- 473 • Twice
- 474 • Three times
- 475 • Four times
- 476 • Five or more times

477 **Outage occurrence: duration**

478 [if YES] How many days total was your power shut off, across all planned power shutoffs?

- 479 • 1 day or less
- 480 • 2 days
- 481 • 3 days
- 482 • 4 days
- 483 • 5 days
- 484 • 6 days
- 485 • 7 days or more

486 **Outage occurrence: reason**

487 [if YES] In a few words, why do you think your electricity was shut off? [Text Entry]

488 **Outage occurrence: longest outage**

489 Now we'd like you to think about the longest power shutoff you've experienced since the beginning
490 of October. This might be the most recent shutoff you've experienced, but it could also be an
491 earlier shutoff. How long did your longest power shutoff last?

- 492 • Less than 1 hour
- 493 • 1-6 hours
- 494 • 7-24 hours
- 495 • 1 day
- 496 • 2 days
- 497 • 3 days
- 498 • 4 days
- 499 • 5 days or more

500 **Stay during outage**

501 Where did you stay overnight during the shutoff?

- 502 • In my own home, even though the power was shut off
- 503 • In my own home, but my power was never shut off overnight
- 504 • At the home of a friend or relative
- 505 • At a motel or hotel
- 506 • Other (please specify)

507 **Worry about outage**

508 How worried were you personally about the following issues during the shutoff? [Scale: Very
509 worried, Somewhat worried, Not very worried, Not at all worried]

- 510 • Running out of food
- 511 • Running out of water

- 512 • Running out of medicine or medical supplies
- 513 • Traveling to and from work
- 514 • Completing basic household tasks
- 515 • Not being able to contact people (e.g. losing cell phone signal)
- 516 • Caring for your family

517 **Outage warning**

518 Did you receive adequate warning about the planned power shutoff?

- 519 • I received enough warning to adequately prepare
- 520 • I received a warning, but could not adequately prepare
- 521 • I received no warning and was completely surprised

522 **Outage warning mode**

523 How did you hear beforehand about the planned power shutoff in your community? (Check all
524 that apply)

- 525 • Word of mouth from friends, family or colleagues
- 526 • Radio
- 527 • Internet
- 528 • Television
- 529 • Newspaper or print media
- 530 • Email
- 531 • Phone call from your utility
- 532 • Other
- 533 • I did not hear about the shutoff beforehand

534 **Outage preparations**

535 Before the recent power shutoffs, did you take any of the following actions to prepare in advance
536 for a power shutoff? (Please check all that apply)

- 537 • Buy additional food
- 538 • Buy a diesel generator
- 539 • Buy gasoline
- 540 • Charge my electric car fully
- 541 • Get additional refills for my medicine
- 542 • Fill up my bathtub with water
- 543 • Buy extra drinking water
- 544 • Buy flashlights, candles or rechargeable batteries
- 545 • Buy a camp stove
- 546 • Other
- 547 • None

548 **Financial impact**

549 Which of the following statements best characterizes the impact that the recent power outages
550 had on you financially? In answering this question, please consider both the costs of preparing
551 for the outages (e.g. buying supplies) and, if applicable, responding to the outage (e.g. eating
552 out, hotel costs, loss perishable food, loss of medications)?

- 553 • I couldn't afford what I needed during the outages
- 554 • It was difficult to afford the outages, but I was able to make ends meet
- 555 • The outages impacted my finances a little bit, but not seriously
- 556 • The power outages did not impact me financially

557 **Financial impact: preparation estimate**

558 About how much money did you spend during the outage on preparing (e.g. buying supplies)
559 for the outage? (Optional) [TEXT ENTRY]

560 **Financial impact: response estimate**

561 If applicable, about how much money did you spend during the outage on responding to the
562 outage (e.g. eating out, hotel costs, loss perishable food, loss of medications)? (Optional) [TEXT
563 ENTRY]

564 **Workplace impact**

565 Since the beginning of October, did any of your close friends or family experience a planned
566 power shutoff?

- 567 • Yes
- 568 • No
- 569 • Don't know

570 **Contact impact**

571 Since the beginning of October, did any of your close friends or family experience a planned
572 power shutoff?

- 573 • Yes
- 574 • No
- 575 • Don't know

576 **Area impact**

577 Since the beginning of October, did you travel anywhere (local stores, neighborhoods) that was
578 experiencing a planned power shutoff?

- 579 • Yes
- 580 • No
- 581 • Don't know

582 **Time in current residence**

583 About how long have you lived in your current place of residence?

- 584 • Less than 1 year
- 585 • 1 to 5 years
- 586 • More than 5 years

587 **Home ownership status**

588 Do you rent or own your current place of residence?

- 589 • Rent
- 590 • Own
- 591 • Other (please specify)

592 **Wildfire risk zone**

593 To the best of your knowledge, what wildfire risk zone is your home located in?

- 594 • Not in a wildfire zone
- 595 • Low
- 596 • Moderate
- 597 • High
- 598 • Very high
- 599 • Extreme

600 **Number of cars**

601 How many cars does your household own or lease?

- 602 • 0
- 603 • 1
- 604 • 2
- 605 • 3
- 606 • 4 or more

607 **EV ownership**

608 Do you currently own a plug-in electric vehicle?

609 • Yes

610 • No

611 **Future EV ownership**

612 Will the next car you purchase be an electric vehicle?

613 • Yes

614 • No

615 • Don't know

616 **Future solar panels**

617 Do you plan to install solar panels on your home in the next year?

618 • Yes

619 • No

620 • Don't know

621 • I already have solar panels on my home

622 **Future gas or diesel backup generator**

623 Do you plan to buy a gas or diesel backup generator in the next year?

624 • Yes

625 • No

626 • Don't know

627 • I have had a gas or diesel backup generator for more than one month

628 • I just bought a gas or diesel backup generator in the last month

629 **Future battery storage**

630 Do you plan to install a home battery storage system for electricity in the next year?

- 631 • Yes
- 632 • No
- 633 • Don't know
- 634 • I have already installed a household battery storage system

635 **Future move**

636 How likely are you to move to a different home in the next year?

- 637 • Very likely
- 638 • Somewhat likely
- 639 • Not very likely
- 640 • Not at all likely

641 **Future supply purchases**

642 Over the next 12 months, do you plan to purchase additional food and water supplies to prepare
643 for future power shutoffs?

- 644 • Yes
- 645 • No
- 646 • Don't know
- 647 • I have already purchased additional food and water supplies

648 **Future landscaping changes**

649 Over the next 12 months, do you plan to change your home's landscaping to reduce risk from
650 wildfires?

- 651 • Yes
- 652 • No

653 • Don't know

654 • I already have wildfire-resistant landscaping

655 **Future building changes**

656 Over the next 12 months, do you plan to upgrade your home's building materials to reduce risk
657 from wildfires?

658 • Yes

659 • No

660 • Don't know

661 • I have already upgraded my home's building materials

662 **Trust in utility**

663 How much do you trust [RESPONDENT'S UTILITY]

664 • Not at all

665 • Somewhat

666 • A moderate amount

667 • Completely

668 **Utility responsibility**

669 When you think about [RESPONDENT'S UTILITY], how much is [RESPONDENT'S UTIL-
670 ITY] responsible for causing the planned power shut-offs in California since the beginning of
671 October?

672 • Not at all

673 • Somewhat

674 • A moderate amount

675 • Completely

676 **Willingness to forgo electricity**

677 Would you be willing to live without electricity for [RANDOMIZED LEVEL] each year to reduce
678 the risks of wildfires in California?

- 679 • Yes
- 680 • No

681 **PGE ownership structure**

682 The utility company PGE is currently in bankruptcy. A number of different options are being
683 considered. Which ownership structure would you prefer. [RANDOMIZED ADDITION TO
684 VIGNETTE: Remember, whoever owns PGE is also responsible for any damages caused by
685 PGE's equipment in the future.]

- 686 • Keep PGE a privately-owned utility, letting a private group of investors restructure the
687 company
- 688 • Make PGE a publicly-owned utility, making the State of California buy and operate the
689 utility
- 690 • Break PGE into several smaller publicly-owned utilities, making cities and other local areas
691 buy and operate the utility
- 692 • Make PGE into an energy cooperative owned and managed by local consumers

693 **WTP for no shutoffs**

694 Would you be willing to pay a surcharge of [RANDOMIZED LEVELS] every month on your
695 electricity bill to avoid future planned power shutoffs?

- 696 • Yes
- 697 • No

698 **WTP for burying power lines**

699 A number of different policy ideas are being discussed to try to make the electricity system in
700 California more stable.

701 One idea is to bury power lines underground. This would likely cost \$3 million per mile.
702 Currently, California has over 175,000 miles of overhead power lines. This means that burying

703 all California power lines would cost over \$525 billion dollars, more than twice the state's total
704 annual budget for all government spending.

705 How much would you support burying power lines in California if it cost you [RANDOMIZED
706 LEVELS] more per month on your utility bill for the next 10 years?

- 707 • Strongly support
- 708 • Somewhat support
- 709 • Somewhat oppose
- 710 • Strongly oppose

711 **WTP for storage adoption**

712 A number of different policy ideas are being discussed to try to make the electricity system in
713 California more stable.

714 One idea is to invest heavily in solar panels and battery storage within homes.

715 A typical house would likely need to invest about \$40,000 to install this solar and battery
716 system. In addition to providing some backup power during possible shutoffs, these systems can
717 also save customers around \$90 per month on their utility bills.

718 Would you be willing to purchase and install a solar and battery system on your own home
719 if there was a government subsidy of [RANDOMIZED LEVELS] to support this effort?

- 720 • Yes, definitely
- 721 • Yes, maybe
- 722 • No
- 723 • I already have a solar and battery system on my home

724 **PGE liability**

725 Under California law, companies like PGE are liable for damages caused by wildfires that their
726 equipment causes. For example, PGE estimates it will face about \$10 billion in liabilities from
727 the 2018 Camp Fire, which destroyed the town of Paradise and killed 85 people in Northern
728 California. [RANDOMIZED CONTENT:How much do you agree that companies like PGE
729 should be financially responsible for wildfire damages linked to their equipment?; OR How much
730 do you agree that companies like PGE should be financially responsible for wildfire damages

731 linked to their equipment, even if this will mean that power bills will go up to cover these extra
732 costs?; OR, How much do you agree that companies like PGE should be financially responsible
733 for wildfire damages linked to their equipment, even if this will mean that state taxes will go up
734 to cover these extra costs?]

- 735 • Strongly agree
- 736 • Somewhat agree
- 737 • Strongly disagree
- 738 • Somewhat disagree

739 **Weather changes**

740 In your opinion, over the past several years, has the weather in your community been getting...

- 741 • Much worse
- 742 • Somewhat worse
- 743 • About the same
- 744 • Somewhat better
- 745 • Much better

746 **Extreme Weather experiences**

747 In the past year, have you personally experienced any of the following extreme weather events
748 or natural disasters listed below? (Check as many as are applicable)

- 749 • Severe storm
- 750 • Heat wave
- 751 • Flood
- 752 • Wildfire
- 753 • Other unusual weather
- 754 • None of the above

755 **Extreme Weather harm**

756 How much were you harmed by these extreme weather event(s) or natural disaster(s)? [SCALE:

757 Not at all; Only a little; A moderate amount; A great deal]

758 **Home evacuation**

759 Since the beginning of October, did you evacuate your home in response to nearby wildfires?

760 • Yes

761 • No

762 **Wildfire concern**

763 How worried are you about a wildfire damaging your home?

764 • Very worried

765 • Somewhat worried

766 • Not very worried

767 • Not at all worried

768 **Air quality**

769 Since the beginning of October, has smoke made the air quality in your community worse?

770 • No, not at all

771 • Yes, somewhat

772 • Yes, a moderate amount

773 • Yes, severely

774 **CES support**

775 Currently, California has a clean energy requirement of 60% by 2030. How much would you

776 support increasing this to 80% by 2030, even if it means the price of electricity will go up?

777 • Strongly support

778 • Somewhat support

779 • Somewhat oppose

780 • Strongly oppose

781 **2035 target support**

782 Currently, California aims to eliminate all its net carbon pollution by 2045. How much would
783 you support bringing this timeline forward to 2035, even if it means the price of electricity will
784 go up?

785 • Strongly support

786 • Somewhat support

787 • Somewhat oppose

788 • Strongly oppose

789 **Global warming happening**

790 Recently, you may have noticed that global warming has been getting some attention in the news.
791 Global warming refers to the idea that the world's average temperature has been increasing over
792 the past 150 years, may be increasing more in the future, and that the world's climate may
793 change as a result. What do you think: Do you think that global warming is happening?

794 • Yes

795 • No

796 • Don't know

797 **Global warming cause**

798 Assuming global warming is happening, do you think it is...

799 • Caused mostly by human activities

800 • Caused mostly by natural changes in the environment

801 • None of the above because global warming isn't happening

802 **Global warming worry**

803 How worried are you about global warming?

- 804 • Very worried
- 805 • Somewhat worried
- 806 • Not very worried
- 807 • Not at all worried

808 **Demographics**

809 QUESTIONS ON EDUCATION, GENDER, MARITAL STATUS, YEAR OF BIRTH, HOUSE-
810 HOLD INCOME, NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN HOUSEHOLD, NUMBER OF PEOPLE UNDER
811 18, EMPLOYMENT STATUS, LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME

812 **Ideology**

813 One way that people talk about politics in the United States is in terms of left, right, and center,
814 or liberal, conservative, and moderate. Where would you place yourself on that scale?

- 815 • Extremely liberal
- 816 • Liberal
- 817 • Slightly liberal
- 818 • Moderate; middle of the road
- 819 • Slightly conservative
- 820 • Conservative
- 821 • Extremely conservative

822 **Partisan ID**

823 Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a...

- 824 • Democrat
- 825 • Republican

826 • Independent

827 • Other party

828 [IF INDEPENDENT OR OTHER PARTY] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Repub-
829 lican Party or to the Democratic Party?

830 • Closer to the Republican Party

831 • Closer to the Democratic Party

832 • Neither

833 **Job approval**

834 Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 100, how much you approve of the job that the following elected
835 officials are doing? [SLIDER SCALE FROM 0 TO 100]

836 • Your local city or community government

837 • California Governor Gavin Newsom

838 • US President Donald Trump