

Could the Environmental Regulation Promote Green Innovation? Evidence From China

Weiyong Zou (✉ weiyongzou@shu.edu.cn)

Shanghai University <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1939-9539>

Yunjun Xiong

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Research Article

Keywords: Environmental regulation, Green innovation, Porter hypothesis, Restriction theory

Posted Date: August 17th, 2021

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-749332/v1>

License:   This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[Read Full License](#)

35 Innovation compensation; Compliance costs

36 **1. Introduction**

37 Since China's reform and opening up, relying on demographic dividend and institutional dividend,
38 China has rapidly promoted the process of industrialization, laying the foundation for the
39 development of "world factory". But the rapid economic growth is at the cost of environmental
40 pollution. As a result, China has quickly become the world's largest energy consumer and
41 greenhouse gas emitter. According to the 2018 global environmental performance index jointly
42 compiled by Yale University and other authoritative institutions in the United States, China's air
43 quality ranks fourth from the bottom among 180 countries and regions, only surpassing India,
44 Bangladesh and Nepal. Among them, the concentrations of PM2.5 and PM10 are far behind the
45 international average annual standard. Climate problems such as "black confusion" and "haze on
46 ten sides" aggravate health inequality, but also bring significant economic losses and reduce social
47 welfare. According to the 2020 "Lancet Countdown China Report", the number of high
48 temperature heat wave related deaths in China has risen by four times since 1990. The economic
49 losses caused by high temperature related deaths in 2019 reached 13.6 billion US dollars, which is
50 equivalent to the economic income of more than 1.3 million people in the same year. Focusing on
51 the protection of ecological environment and promoting the sustainable development of economy
52 and society is the proper meaning.

53

54 In order to curb the continuous deterioration of the ecological environment, the government
55 continues to increase the intensity of environmental regulation, and strive to transform the
56 denotative growth into the connotative growth of economic development mode. Strict
57 environmental regulation is conducive to improving the ecological environment, but supervision
58 will cause distortion of local government incentives. Driven by the "Official Promotion"
59 assessment mechanism with economic growth as the core, local governments reduce
60 environmental standards in order to attract the inflow of capital and production factors. By
61 reducing environmental standards, producers can save "compliance costs", leading to "bottom-up
62 competition" (Ahlers & Shen, 2018). Under the guidance of the concept of scientific development,
63 local governments include environmental quality indicators in their performance appraisal. As an
64 important link between government environmental regulation and sustainable development of
65 green economy, green innovation has become an important consideration of high-quality
66 economic development (Zhang & Zhu, 2019). Different from traditional innovation, green
67 innovation is an important development strategy of producers, which is related to the improvement
68 of their ability and competitive position (Przychodzen, 2020). Green innovation takes into account
69 both economic and environmental effects, and achieves the expected environmental and economic

70 benefits by increasing green human capital for R&D of green products and new technologies (Li
71 & Zeng, 2020).

72

73 In fact, there are still many controversies about whether environmental regulation can promote
74 green innovation, and there is a lack of clear conclusions in academic circles. There are two main
75 issues in the debate: the "Restriction Theory" and the "Porter Hypothesis". The "Restriction
76 Theory" represented by neoclassical school believes that strict environmental regulation will
77 reduce the competitiveness of producers. Because environmental regulation has greatly increased
78 the operating costs of producers, hindered the desire of producers to actively participate in green
79 innovation research and development activities, and reduced the production of green innovation
80 products. This view is also known as "Compliance Cost Theory". Supporters of the compliance
81 cost theory look for theoretical and empirical evidence around the constraint theory (Pierce, 2021;
82 Pan et al, 2021). However, Porter hypothesis creatively proposes that the design of appropriate
83 environmental regulation standards can promote producer innovation. Strict but reasonable
84 environmental regulatory policies, such as Pigovian taxes and pollution permits, can encourage
85 producers to internalize external uneconomic behavior, encourage producers to actively participate
86 in green innovation research and development activities, increase green product output, and
87 generate "innovation compensation" effect to offset the impact of compliance costs (Porter and
88 Vander, 1995). Later, many scholars conducted a series of explorations around Porter's hypothesis
89 and believed that the greater the intensity of environmental regulation, the more conducive to
90 driving the development of regional green innovation levels, and there is a positive linear
91 correlation (Rubashkina, 2015; Santis, 2017; Tang et al, 2019; Deng et al, 2020). So, does
92 environmental regulation have a significant positive or negative impact on green innovation? Few
93 scholars have been involved in effective heterogeneity research. Does the implementation of
94 environmental policies need to be tailored to local conditions? Many scholars only pay attention to
95 the relationship between the two, and the discussion of the important internal mechanism has not
96 attracted the attention of the academic circles. What is the impact mechanism of environmental
97 regulation and green innovation? To clarify the above problems, we can clarify the significant
98 effects and channels between the two, and provide policy enlightenment for China to implement
99 environmental regulation to promote green innovation.

100

101 The existing literature lays a theoretical foundation and logical starting point for this study. Based
102 on this, the marginal contribution of this paper is as follows: first, the research perspective. Due to
103 the problem of data availability at the level of prefecture level cities in China, there are few
104 literatures on this topic at the level of cities. City is the concentrated embodiment of modern

105 economic and social civilization. By obtaining urban micro data, we can ensure that the research
106 results are more reliable and reasonable, and open up a new research perspective. Second, research
107 experience. In this paper, quantitative research is used to provide more abundant empirical
108 information, and dynamic situation is used to investigate the long-term application effect of
109 conclusions. Due to the heterogeneity of the implementation intensity of environmental regulation
110 and the degree of green innovation in different cities, the implementation standards of
111 environmental regulation policies may not meet the requirements of each city. Therefore, this
112 paper strengthens the analysis and discussion of the heterogeneity. In addition, this paper uses
113 SYS-GMM model to solve the endogeneity problem in the existing literature, and reduces the
114 estimation error caused by endogeneity by selecting appropriate instrumental variables. We choose
115 the spatial Dubin model to investigate the spatial effects of environmental regulation and green
116 innovation. Third, research mechanism. What are the specific channels to influence environmental
117 regulation and promote green innovation? There is a lack of discussion on the internal mechanism
118 of this topic in the existing literature. This paper will further introduce the mediating and
119 moderating mechanisms to examine the influence channels of research topics. This study helps to
120 clarify the direction of environmental regulation on green innovation. Through strengthening the
121 analysis of heterogeneity and endogeneity, and clarifying the internal mechanism, it can guide the
122 application of environmental regulation policy tools in green innovation in China.

123

124 The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: the second part puts forward the theoretical
125 hypothesis of environmental regulation and green innovation. The third part describes the use of
126 empirical analysis methods, including standard empirical model, estimation method, index
127 measurement and data sources. The fourth part introduces the estimation results and empirically
128 analyzes the relationship between environmental regulation and green innovation, including
129 heterogeneity analysis and endogenous test. The fifth part discusses the internal mechanism of
130 their relationship, including the mediating effect and regulatory effect. The sixth part is the
131 summary of this study, and puts forward a series of policy recommendations.

132

133 **2. Literature review and theoretical hypothesis**

134 The impact of environmental regulation on green innovation is mainly based on the
135 comprehensive effect of "Compliance Cost Effect" and "Innovation Compensation Effect".
136 Environmental regulation will produce greater innovation compensation effect to offset the
137 adverse factors brought by the cost of compliance. It mainly comes from the following three
138 reasons: (1) Cost saving. For producers, the cost of not complying with environmental regulations
139 is high. In order to avoid the increase of production cost caused by higher environmental

140 regulation, producers tend to make appropriate changes to reduce the compliance cost. Producers
141 should carry out green process improvement and technology research and development to reduce
142 production costs and improve production efficiency (Meng et al, 2020). (2) Promote competition.
143 Producers are faced with three kinds of external environmental pressures: the pressure of
144 environmental regulations, the pressure of customers and suppliers' stakeholders, and the pressure
145 of imitation competition to maintain their market share (Cai & Li, 2018). Environmental
146 regulation promotes producers to accept new ideas, stimulate their creative thinking, improve
147 product quality and environmental performance, and gain market competitive advantage (Li et al,
148 2019). (3) Social responsibility. Producers do not always pursue profit maximization, and meeting
149 social needs and goals is also an important factor for them to consider. In order to maintain the
150 legitimate needs of consumers and the government, producers are more willing to carry out
151 transformation, which can help producers gain a sense of social responsibility and achieve
152 additional profits by establishing a green image (Du et al, 2020).

153

154 H1: Environmental regulation can improve the level of green innovation.

155

156 In the face of more stringent environmental regulations, producers' pursuit of compliance depends
157 on their ability to understand, absorb and commercialize external knowledge (Leblebici et al,
158 1991). Therefore, having a high level of green innovation will increase organizational flexibility
159 and make it possible to adapt to the higher pressure of environmental regulation. On the one hand,
160 with the improvement of individual or regional green innovation level, the public awareness of
161 environmental protection is constantly enhanced, and the government supervision is
162 correspondingly increased. Regions with higher level of green innovation have higher level of
163 green absorptive capacity and will have the opportunity to get more preferential tax treatment
164 from the government. High intensity of environmental regulation will encourage regions to
165 increase green innovation investment, and promote producers, especially those with high pollution
166 and high emission, to obtain competitive advantage in green transformation (Delmas, 2011; Liao
167 & Shi, 2018). On the other hand, regions with low green absorptive capacity can not bear the
168 pressure of environmental regulation. Although the public's awareness of environmental
169 protection has been strengthened and the government's supervision has increased, it is difficult to
170 meet the compliance requirements because of the lack of affordability, which leads to the
171 producers' unwillingness to increase green innovation investment (Shen et al, 2019). To sum up,
172 higher level green innovation regions can better identify, evaluate and utilize new market
173 opportunities, and transform high-intensity environmental regulation pressure into the driving
174 force to improve their green innovation level (Zhang et al, 2019).

175

176 H2: Strong green innovation area is suitable for improving the intensity of environmental
177 regulation, while weak green innovation area is not suitable for making high-intensity regulation.

178

179 Under the pressure of environmental laws and policies, producers must take active measures to
180 deal with environmental challenges (Chan, 2005). When producers implement green innovation
181 strategy, managers integrate producer resources through green performance management and
182 compensation practice, cultivate internal staff and introduce innovative talents, so that they can
183 make greater efforts to produce new ideas, methods and actions, and effectively enhance human
184 capital (Ma et al, 2019). According to Romer's human capital theory, human capital is of great
185 significance to productivity growth (Romer, 1990). Human capital is the basic element of
186 knowledge economy and the core strategic resource of sustainable competitive advantage (Song &
187 Yu, 2018). Regions with high human capital have stronger technology attraction and diffusion
188 ability, which is conducive to the promotion and application of new technologies, and tend to
189 accept the concept of environmental protection and comply with environmental regulations, which
190 is conducive to reducing environmental pollution (Bano, 2018). Human capital should increase the
191 use of green technology, effectively avoid the "Resource Curse" and transform it into "Resource
192 Gospel" by giving full play to skilled equipment operation and technology application ability, so
193 as to realize the knowledge driven sustainable economic development mode (Singh, 2020).
194 Human capital through green training and education can help producers improve the level of green
195 supply chain management, sustainable human resource management and practice, reduce costs
196 and gain good social reputation (Albort-Morant et al, 2018).

197

198 H3: Environmental regulation can further improve the level of green innovation by promoting the
199 improvement of human capital.

200

201 More and more attention has been paid to market-oriented green innovation in China. The market
202 mechanism can stimulate the enthusiasm of producers, and the market price can reasonably reflect
203 the scarcity of resources and the supply and demand of products, both of which provide reasonable
204 guidance for production allocation (Filipovic, 2019). Effective market is conducive to cross
205 regional competition and cooperation. Cities with a higher degree of marketization have less
206 redundant construction, and form economies of scale through mergers, acquisitions and opening
207 up new markets to provide green innovation efficiency (Chen et al, 2021). Producers can improve
208 their business performance through green innovation. Producers in the same industry "Strive For
209 Survival By Innovation", forcing producers to leave the comfort zone and provide new capabilities

210 and products, resulting in "Escape From Competition Effect" (Albort et al, 2018). Market based
211 tools, such as sewage charges, environmental subsidies, emissions trading and other market means,
212 internalize the externality of pollution, reduce the marginal cost of pollution control, and obtain
213 more compensation for emission reduction (Liao, 2018). In addition, under the imperfect market
214 mechanism, due to unclear property rights, regions with more abundant natural resources are more
215 likely to face rent-seeking, corruption and opportunism, which will hinder the development of
216 green innovation and R&D activities (Pan et al, 2019).

217

218 H4: The regions with high degree of market development can strengthen the promotion of
219 environmental regulation on green innovation.

220

221 Green innovation has the characteristics of "Double Externalities" of knowledge spillover and
222 positive environmental externalities. Producers need to pay but can not get all the returns, and lack
223 the motivation to provide R&D funds. Green innovation is an active investment mode with long
224 investment cycle and large resource investment. Because of the market demand, the change of key
225 technical personnel, the shortage of capital supply and other reasons, the producers bear a greater
226 risk of green innovation. Imperfect market pricing system is prone to "Free Riding" behavior. The
227 regulatory role of the market alone is not enough to promote the level of green innovation to
228 achieve social optimum (Wang et al, 2018; Li, 2019). Financial R&D investment plays a vital role
229 in green innovation activities. Endogenous growth theory shows that the intensity of financial
230 R&D investment has a positive impact on the production sector, and efficient public R&D system
231 can make better use of private R&D funds (Conte, 2013). Financial R&D investment can send a
232 "Signal" to the market, guide producers and society to participate in green R&D, cultivate green
233 innovative talents, alleviate the problem of lack of funds for relevant producers, and reduce the
234 cost and risk of green R&D (Yi, 2020).

235

236 H5: Regions with more financial R&D investment can strengthen the role of environmental
237 regulation in promoting green innovation.

238

239 **3. Research design**

240 **3.1.Source of sample data**

241 In view of the lack of data in some cities such as Turpan and Linzhi, the sample is removed, and a
242 total of 5700 samples of 285 cities in China from 2000 to 2019 are selected.Among them, the
243 number of urban green patents comes from the retrieval of the State Intellectual Property Office
244 and the matching of the classification standards of the world intellectual property organization.

245 The data of environmental regulation comes from the work report of the city government, and is
246 mined by Python technology. The instrumental variable air circulation coefficient is based on era
247 interim meteorological data published by European Center for weather forecasting (ECMWF), and
248 is extracted by overlaying grid data with urban base map through ArcGIS. The other indicators are
249 from the statistical yearbook of Chinese cities and the statistical yearbook of local cities. In order
250 to reduce the heteroscedasticity of data, we use logarithm to deal with the data. We use 1%
251 winsorize to deal with the main continuous variables.

252

253 **3.2. Model construction**

254 Considering the impact of environmental regulation on green innovation, this paper takes the level
255 of green innovation as the explained variable and environmental regulation as the explanatory
256 variable. In addition, there may be inertia in the level of green innovation, that is, the previous
257 intensive level has an impact on the current intensive level. A dynamic model is constructed as
258 follows.

$$259 \quad \ln GI_{it} = \alpha_0 \ln GI_{it-1} + \alpha_1 \ln ER_{it} + \alpha_i \ln X_{it} + u_i + v_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

260 Among them, $\ln GI_{it}$ is the green innovation level of i city in t year; $\ln ER_{it}$ is the
261 environmental regulation intensity of i city in t year; $\ln X_{it}$ is the control variable, α is the
262 regression coefficient, μ_i and v_t are individual and time fixed effects, and ε_{it} is the residual term.

263

264 **3.3. Index selection**

265 (1) The explained variable is green innovation ($\ln GI$). Green technology refers to following the
266 law of ecological economy, adopting "Pollution-Free" and "Less Pollution-Free" technologies to
267 save resources and energy and reduce ecological environmental pollution. In 2010, the World
268 Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) launched the "International Patent Classification Green
269 List²" to facilitate retrieval of environmentally friendly technologies. According to the United
270 Nations Framework Convention on climate change, green patents are classified into seven
271 categories: energy conservation, alternative energy production, transportation, waste management,
272 administrative supervision and design, nuclear power, agriculture and forestry. According to the
273 above division basis and the IPC information of the patent classification number of the State
274 Intellectual Property Office, the matching identification and accounting can be divided into the
275 core measurement indicators of green innovation activities in various cities.


276

277 (2) Core explanatory variable: Environmental regulation ($\ln REG$). In order to further discuss the
278 impact of government environmental governance on green innovation, we need to construct

² <http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/est>.

279 appropriate environmental regulation variables to achieve the purpose of this paper. At present, the
 280 academia mainly measures the government's environmental regulation by means of pollution
 281 control investment cost, pollutant emission intensity, pollution tax rate and the number of
 282 environmental protection personnel. But these methods often produce many problems, such as
 283 only reflecting one aspect of the government governance environment. That is difficult to measure
 284 the overall picture of government governance policy. Therefore, similar to Chen et al. (2018), the
 285 frequency of environment related words in the government work reports of cities is selected as the
 286 proxy variable of environmental regulation. In this paper, python software is used to manually sort
 287 out the words related to the environment in the government work report. The frequency of search
 288 words are: ecology, environmental protection, environmental protection, emission reduction,
 289 pollution, air, green, carbon dioxide, pollution, energy consumption, low carbon, chemical oxygen
 290 demand, sulfur dioxide, PM2.5, PM10 and so on. The reasons for the better applicability of the
 291 index are: First, it can well reflect the overall picture of the government's environmental
 292 governance policies. Second, it can avoid reverse causality and meet the exogenous requirements
 293 of environmental regulation. Third, It can alleviate the unscientific and unreasonable measurement
 294 of environmental regulation caused by the lack of more data at the urban level.
 295

296 Fig.1 shows the time series characteristics of the measurement results of environmental regulation
 297 and green innovation indicators from 2000 to 2019. The number of environmental words increased
 298 from 287 in 2000 to 10464 in 2019, with an average annual growth rate of 25.12%. The number of
 299 green innovation patents increased from 8058 in 2000 to 454224 in 2019, with an average annual
 300 growth rate of 24.21%. Environmental regulation and green innovation have a similar growth
 301 trend and a positive correlation. This means that the concept of sustainable development is deeply
 302 rooted in the hearts of the people, the government continues to improve the environmental laws
 303 and policies system, and green innovative technology has made a breakthrough.



304

305

Fig.1 Time sequence characteristics of *ER* and *GI*

306


Fig.2 shows the spatial distribution of environmental regulation and green innovation (Taking 2019 as an example). We find that environmental regulation presents the spatial distribution characteristics of "Differentiation". This may be due to the wide coverage of China's land, unbalanced carrying conditions of regional resources and environment, regional development stage, industrial structure and environmental governance needs and other reasons, forming a "Classified Guidance" policy system.

312

313

The spatial distribution of green innovation has two main characteristics: First, the "Cluster Effect" is significant, forming the spatial pattern of "Four Cores, Three Clusters, Two Belts and Many Points". With Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen as the "Four cores", it radiates the "Urban Agglomerations" of Beijing Tianjin Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta. The eastern coastal economic belt and Yangtze River economic belt form a "Two Belt" distribution, and Wuhan, Xi'an, Chongqing and other cities form a multi-point "Growth Pole". Cities rely on their economic development, resource endowment, human capital, innovation factors and location policies to promote the development of urban green innovation level. Second, "Matthew Effect" is highlighted. The green innovation level of East China and South China is absolutely superior. In addition, regional industries complement each other and have strong comprehensive competitiveness, which further attract green innovation elements to accelerate agglomeration. Therefore, the difference of green innovation development will be further expanded.

325



326

Fig.2 Spatial distribution characteristics of *ER* and *GI*

327

328 (3) Mediators and moderators. This paper focuses on the mediating mechanism of environmental
 329 regulation on green innovation from the perspective of human capital. Human capital (*lnEdu*) is
 330 measured by the number of students per ten thousand. In addition, This paper examines the
 331 regulatory effect mechanism of environmental regulation on green innovation from the
 332 perspective of marketization level and Government R&D expenditure. This paper uses the
 333 proportion of private and individual employment in the total employment to measure the level of
 334 marketization (*lnMar*). Government R&D expenditure (*lnPte*) is measured by per capita financial
 335 science and technology expenditure.

336

337 (4) Instrumental variables. To identify the causal relationship between environmental regulation
 338 and green innovation, the biggest challenge is to solve the endogenous problem of environmental
 339 regulation. We use SYS-GMM to reduce the endogeneity of the model. The instrumental variables
 340 are the explained variable with a lag of one period (*L.lnGI*), the mean value of environmental
 341 regulation (*lnPREG*) and the coefficient of air circulation (*lnVC*). The selection basis of
 342 instrumental variables is shown in the endogeneity analysis section below.

343

344 (5) Control variables. ①Population density level (*lnCity*): it is measured by dividing the
 345 population by the administrative area. ②Infrastructure construction (*lnInstra*) is measured by
 346 highway mileage. ③Level of opening to the outside world (*lnFdi*): FDI is the amount of foreign
 347 capital actually used in the current year. According to the annual average exchange rate of RMB
 348 against the US dollar published in the annual report of the State Administration of foreign
 349 exchange, the actually utilized foreign capital is converted into the price of RMB, and then the
 350 proportion of FDI in GDP is calculated to measure the level of opening to the outside world.④The
 351 level of financial development (*lnFin*) is expressed by the proportion of loan balance of financial
 352 institutions in GDP.

353

354 **Table 1: Statistical Analysis of main variables**

Variable	Indicator meaning	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
<i>lnGI</i>	Green Innovation	5700	3.5715	1.9688	0.0000	9.9617
<i>lnREG</i>	Environmental regulation	5700	2.5761	1.3108	0.0000	4.7095
<i>lnCity</i>	Population density level	5700	5.7118	0.9252	1.5476	9.3557
<i>lnInstra</i>	Infrastructure construction	5700	8.9363	0.7888	6.6593	10.2954
<i>lnFdi</i>	Level of openness	5700	0.9199	0.6367	0.0178	2.6326
<i>lnFin</i>	Financial development level	5700	4.4401	0.5430	3.3565	6.0133
<i>lnEdu</i>	human capital	5700	4.2390	1.2814	1.8074	7.4612
<i>lnMar</i>	Marketization level	5700	4.2957	0.7195	0.9719	7.4466
<i>lnPte</i>	Financial R&D investment	5700	3.8492	1.2621	1.3906	7.4088
<i>lnVC</i>	Air circulation coefficient	5700	7.3525	0.3000	6.5472	8.2415

355 **Note:** Data values are transformed into logarithmic form.

356 **4. Econometric methodology**

357 **4.1. Benchmark regression**

358 The baseline regression results are reported in Table 2. (1) - (3) listed as static panel model. (4) -
 359 (6) list the dynamic panel model as the explained variable of lag phase I to test whether the model
 360 has long-term robustness. The fixed effects of city, time, city and time are introduced into the
 361 model. Select the model with good goodness of fit as the analysis benchmark, and the regression
 362 results show that: In the short term, environmental regulation can significantly promote green
 363 innovation ($\beta = 0.0170$, $P < 0.010$, Model 3). In the long run, the early green innovation has a
 364 dynamic impact effect, which promotes the current green innovation and has a significant and
 365 continuous positive impact ($\beta = 0.0160$, $P < 0.010$, Model 6). It shows that strict environmental
 366 regulation is conducive to promoting the development of green innovation technology (Peng et al,
 367 2021), and verifies hypothesis H1.

368

369 **Table 2: Benchmark regression**

Variable	<i>lnGI</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>L.lnGI</i>				0.735*** (0.00850)	0.888*** (0.00619)	0.499*** (0.0117)
<i>lnREG</i>	0.285*** (0.0120)	0.0212** (0.0104)	0.0170* (0.0102)	0.0907*** (0.00828)	0.0351*** (0.00866)	0.0160* (0.00882)
<i>lnCity</i>	2.190*** (0.127)	0.861*** (0.0474)	0.688*** (0.0911)	0.600*** (0.0865)	0.102*** (0.00889)	0.363*** (0.0808)
<i>lnInstra</i>	1.550*** (0.0324)	0.244*** (0.0323)	0.200*** (0.0350)	0.449*** (0.0254)	0.0588*** (0.0103)	0.0942*** (0.0321)
<i>lnFdi</i>	-0.332*** (0.0251)	-0.0516*** (0.0182)	-0.0806*** (0.0182)	-0.0711*** (0.0170)	0.0692*** (0.0119)	-0.0457*** (0.0161)
<i>lnFin</i>	1.103*** (0.0273)	0.309*** (0.0316)	0.235*** (0.0321)	0.266*** (0.0205)	0.131*** (0.0161)	0.137*** (0.0280)
Constant	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Urban fixed	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
Year fixed	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Observations	5,415	5,415	5,415	5,415	5,415	5,415
Number of id	285	285	285	285	285	285
R-squared	0.7200	0.8653	0.8660	0.8818	0.8806	0.9004

370 **Note:** In parentheses denote the standard error of the respective coefficients, ***/**/* indicates
 371 the significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively.

372

373 **4.2. Endogeneity test**

374 Because the level of R&D tendency and expenditure of producers will also affect the

375 environmental regulation faced by producers, there is a two-way causal relationship. In order to
 376 solve the endogenous problem, this paper refers to Fisman & Svensson (2007) and Hering &
 377 Poncet (2014), and takes the average level of environmental regulation (*lnPREG*) and air
 378 circulation coefficient³ (*lnVC*) as the instrumental variables of environmental regulation. Taking
 379 the average value of environmental regulation in different cities as an instrumental variable is not
 380 directly affected by the behavior of a single producer, but the average level of a city is directly
 381 related to the explanatory variable, so it can be used as an instrumental variable of environmental
 382 regulation. According to the ArcGIS software, the grid data is superimposed on the map of
 383 Chinese cities, and the air circulation coefficient of the corresponding city and year is
 384 matched. The air circulation coefficient only depends on natural phenomena such as regional
 385 climate conditions. In addition to affecting the degree of environmental regulation, there is no
 386 other mechanism between air circulation coefficient and green innovation, which meets the
 387 requirements of "Correlation" and "Exogenous" hypothesis, so it can be used as a instrumental
 388 variables of environmental regulation.

389

390 Table 3 reports the regression results of system instrumental variables (SYS-GMM). The first
 391 column is the lag period, and the explained variables are used as instrumental variables. The
 392 second column is the average of environmental regulation with instrumental variables. The third
 393 column is adding instrumental variable air flow coefficient to further reduce the endogenous
 394 problem of the model. It can be found that the sequence correlation test rejects the original
 395 hypothesis that there is no first-order autocorrelation for each estimated residual sequence, but
 396 does not reject the original hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation. Combined with Sargen test
 397 and Hansen test, it can be seen that the construction of instrumental variables in SYS-GMM is
 398 reasonable. The results show that environmental regulation has a significant positive impact on
 399 green innovation ($\beta= 985$, $P < 0.005$, Model 1; $\beta= 891$, $P < 0.001$, Model 2; $\beta= 624$, $P < 0.005$,
 400 Model 3). It shows that after reducing the endogeneity of the model, improving the intensity of
 401 environmental regulation can still promote the level of green innovation, and the empirical results
 402 are relatively stable.

403

404 **Table 3 : Estimation of instrumental variables**

Variable	<i>lnGI</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>L.lnGI</i>	0.529*** (0.146)	0.573*** (0.107)	0.476** (0.219)

³ The air flow coefficient is equal to the wind speed times the height of the boundary layer. The era interim database of the European Center for medium range weather forecasts (ECMWF) provides the global 0.75 degree × The wind speed (SI10) and boundary layer height (BLH) data at 10 meters height on 0.75 ° grid (about 83 square kilometers).

<i>lnREG</i>	0.985** (0.414)	0.891*** (0.282)	0.624** (0.295)
<i>lnCity</i>	0.405*** (0.122)	0.364*** (0.088)	0.446** (0.178)
<i>lnInstra</i>	0.0714 (0.0674)	0.064 (0.063)	0.189*** (0.0690)
<i>lnFdi</i>	0.129** (0.0556)	0.119*** (0.044)	0.110* (0.0602)
<i>lnFin</i>	0.308*** (0.0878)	0.281*** (0.073)	0.465** (0.186)
Constant	YES	YES	YES
AR(1)	-7.45*** (0.000)	-9.54*** (0.000)	-9.63*** (0.000)
AR(2)	1.18 (0.238)	1.56 (0.120)	1.49 (0.137)
Sargen test	0.308	0.749	0.388
Hansen test	0.360	0.869	0.407
Observations	4,275	4,275	4,845
Number of id	285	285	285

405 **Note:** In parentheses denote the standard error of the respective coefficients, ***/**/* indicates
406 the significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively.

407

408 **4.3.Spatial effect test**

409 According to the first law of geography, there is correlation between things, and the correlation
410 between things closer is higher than that between things farther (Tobler, 1970). In order to enhance
411 the robustness of the model and whether there is spatial spillover, we use spatial model to measure
412 spatial dependence. The spatial Durbin model considers the correlation of independent variables
413 and the correlation between independent variables and dependent variables in adjacent areas. It is
414 a composite model of spatial autocorrelation model and spatial error model. Therefore, the spatial
415 Durbin model is selected to analyze the spatial relationship between environmental regulation and
416 green innovation. Without considering the spatial correlation, Hausman test rejected the original
417 hypothesis at 1% significance level, so the fixed effect model was chosen. Considering the
418 heterogeneity of the city, we choose the double fixed effect model of time and space. Finally, the
419 dynamic model is considered by lagging the explained variable for one period. According to
420 LeSage & Pace (2009), the regression coefficient of spatial Durbin model can not accurately
421 explain the influence of explained variables and spatial spillover, so the decomposition model of
422 dynamic spatial Durbin model is taken as the analysis focus.

423

424 Before spatial model analysis, we need to use Moran index to test the correlation of core
425 indicators. The results show that the overall Moran index of green innovation and environmental

426 regulation have passed the 1% confidence level test (Schedule 1), indicating that the overall
 427 spatial correlation degree of the two is high. The local Moran index is positively correlated (Fig. 1
 428 and Fig.2), which indicates that there is a local spatial correlation between them, and the spatial
 429 model can be used for further analysis. Table 4 reports the regression results of the dynamic spatial
 430 Durbin decomposition model, in which (1) is the direct effect model, (2) is the indirect effect
 431 model, and (3) is the total effect model. The results show that environmental regulation has a
 432 positive correlation with local green innovation level ($\beta= 0440$, $P < 0.005$, Model 1), and has a
 433 significant role in promoting the level of green innovation in adjacent areas ($\beta= 1670$, $P < 0.005$,
 434 Model 2). It shows that environmental regulation has spatial spillover effect. With the gradual
 435 progress of ecological civilization construction, the central and local governments have frequent
 436 strategic interaction in environmental protection. The formulation of environmental regulation
 437 strategy has gradually changed into "Top-To-Top Competition", which is conducive to the
 438 coordinated development of regional green innovation (Peng, 2020).

439
 440

Table 4: Spatial effect test

Variable	<i>lnGI</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>lnREG</i>	0.0440** (0.0178)	0.1670** (0.0772)	0.2110** (0.0886)
<i>lnCity</i>	0.4147** (0.1658)	1.8203*** (0.6780)	2.2350*** (0.7793)
<i>lnInstra</i>	0.1656*** (0.0632)	-0.0359 (0.2446)	0.1298 (0.2717)
<i>lnFdi</i>	-0.0492 (0.0337)	-0.0645 (0.1106)	-0.1137 (0.1198)
<i>lnFin</i>	0.2832*** (0.0602)	0.1802 (0.2398)	0.4634* (0.2685)
Urban fixed	YES	YES	YES
Year fixed	YES	YES	YES
Rho		0.1581*** (8.74)	
Hasen Test		342.56*** (0.00)	
AIC		12506.63	
BIC		12546.51	
N		5700	
R-squared		0.8973	

441 **Note:** In parentheses denote the standard error of the respective coefficients, ***/**/* indicates
 442 the significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively.

443

444 4.4.Heterogeneity analysis

445 Each city has the characteristics of unbalanced development, so it is necessary to investigate the

446 policy differences of environmental regulation on local green innovation development in different
 447 cities. In order to verify whether this difference exists, this paper takes the sample median of
 448 environmental regulation and green innovation as the boundary, and divides the research objects
 449 into strong regulation (*RQ*) and weak regulation cities (*RR*), strong green innovation (*GQ*) and
 450 weak green innovation cities (*GR*), strong regulation and strong green innovation cities *RQ&GQ*,
 451 weak regulation and weak green innovation cities (*RQ&GQ*). For the division of areas, refer to Fig.
 452 3 and Fig. 4.

453

454 Table 5 reports the heterogeneity analysis of the above different environmental regulations and
 455 green innovation characteristics. The results show that the zoning of environmental regulation can
 456 not reflect the direction of policy implementation ($\beta = -0.00319$, $P > 0.010$, Model 1; $\beta = 0.00319$, $P >$
 457 0.010 , Model 2). That is to say, strengthening or reducing the intensity of environmental
 458 regulation does not necessarily significantly promote the development of green innovation. The
 459 strong and weak zoning of green innovation is of guiding significance for policy implementation.
 460 In strong green innovation cities, we should increase the intensity of environmental regulation to
 461 promote the development of local green innovation ($\beta = 0.0367$, $P < 0.001$, Model 3). However, in
 462 weak green innovation cities, increasing the intensity of environmental regulation will
 463 significantly hinder the development of local green innovation ($\beta = -0.0367$, $P < 0.001$, Model 4).
 464 The overlapping zoning of regulation strength and green innovation strength also has the guiding
 465 significance of policy implementation. In cities with the same characteristics of strong regulation
 466 and strong green innovation (Such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shenzhen, etc.), strengthening regulation
 467 can promote the development of green innovation ($\beta = 0.0318$, $P < 0.001$, Model 5). In cities with
 468 the same characteristics of weak regulation and weak green innovation (Such as Zhangjiajie,
 469 Chaoyang, Lhasa, etc.), there is no clear policy guidance ($\beta = -0.0146$, $P > 0.010$, Model 6). In a
 470 word, the strong green innovation city is suitable to improve the intensity of environmental
 471 regulation, and the innovation compensation effect of Porter hypothesis is significant. Weak green
 472 innovation cities can not formulate policies with higher regulation intensity, and the crowding out
 473 effect of compliance cost is obvious, which verifies the hypothesis H2.

474

475 **Table 5 : Heterogeneity test**

Variable	<i>lnGI</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>L.lnGI</i>	0.735*** (0.0115)	0.735*** (0.0115)	0.731*** (0.0114)	0.731*** (0.0114)	0.733*** (0.0116)	0.734*** (0.0114)
<i>lnREG</i>	0.0924*** (0.0128)	0.0892*** (0.0107)	0.0774*** (0.0110)	0.114*** (0.0128)	0.0849*** (0.0105)	0.0948*** (0.0105)
<i>lnCity</i>	0.600***	0.600***	0.595***	0.595***	0.602***	0.596***

	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.202)
<i>lnInstra</i>	0.449***	0.449***	0.449***	0.449***	0.451***	0.449***
	(0.0312)	(0.0312)	(0.0311)	(0.0311)	(0.0312)	(0.0312)
<i>lnFdi</i>	-0.0713***	-0.0713***	-0.0699***	-0.0699***	-0.0698***	-0.0703***
	(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0160)
<i>lnFin</i>	0.266***	0.266***	0.267***	0.267***	0.267***	0.265***
	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0202)
<i>lnREG×RQ</i>	-0.00319					
	(0.0127)					
<i>lnREG×RR</i>		0.00319				
		(0.0127)				
<i>lnREG×GQ</i>			0.0367***			
			(0.0125)			
<i>lnREG×GR</i>				-0.0367***		
				(0.0125)		
<i>lnREG×RQ&GQ</i>					0.0318**	
					(0.0135)	
<i>lnREG×RR&GR</i>						-0.0146
						(0.0151)
Constant	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Urban fixed	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year fixed	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5,415	5,415	5,415	5,415	5,415	5,415
Number of id	285	285	285	285	285	285
R-squared	0.8818	0.8818	0.8820	0.8820	0.8819	0.8818

476 **Note:** In parentheses denote the standard error of the respective coefficients, ***/**/* indicates
477 the significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively.

478

479 5. Further analysis

480 5.1. Mediation and regulatory effect model

481 In order to further explore the relationship between environmental regulation and green innovation,
482 we still need to study its internal mechanism. This paper draws on the intermediary and regulatory
483 effect mechanism model constructed by Chan (2021) to identify the mechanism of environmental
484 regulation on green innovation. On the basis of (1), model (2) (3) is added to the test process of
485 mediating effect, and the test process of moderating effect is (4) - (5).

486

$$487 \ln Edu_{it} = \alpha_0 \ln Edu_{it-1} + \alpha_1 \ln ER_{it} + \alpha_i \ln X_{it} + u_i + v_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

$$488 \ln GI_{it} = \alpha_0 \ln GI_{it-1} + \alpha_1 \ln ER_{it} + \alpha_2 \ln Edu_{it} + \alpha_i \ln X_{it} + u_i + v_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

$$489 \ln GI_{it} = \alpha_0 \ln GI_{it-1} + \alpha_1 \ln ER_{it} + \alpha_2 \ln Edu_{it} + \alpha_3 \ln Adj_{it} + \alpha_i \ln X_{it} + u_i + v_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

$$490 \ln GI_{it} = \alpha_0 \ln GI_{it-1} + \alpha_1 \ln ER_{it} + \alpha_2 \ln Edu_{it} + \alpha_3 \ln Adj_{it} + \alpha_4 \ln ER_{it} \cdot \ln Adj_{it}$$

$$491 + \alpha_i \ln X_{it} + u_i + v_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (5)$$

492

493 In the above formula, $LnEdu_{it}$ is the intermediary variable, which represents the human capital
494 of region i in year t, $LnAdj_{it}$ is the regulatory variable, which represents the marketization level
495 ($LnMar_{it}$) and government research investment ($LnPte_{it}$) of region i in year t. The setting of
496 other variables is the same as that in formula (1).

497

498 5.2.Mediating effect test

499 In order to increase the persuasiveness of mediating effect test results, this paper makes Sobel test
500 and bootstrap test. The results show that the robust standard error of Sobel test is 0.0082, and the
501 test p value is less than 0.05, indicating that the mediating effect is tenable. Using bootstrap test,
502 the sampling number is set to 500, the robust standard error is 0.0131, the test p value is less than
503 0.05, the confidence interval is [0.3280,0.3793], and the confidence interval does not contain 0,
504 which indicates that the mediating effect of the model exists again.

505

506 Following the steps of mediating effect test (Table 6), the study finds that environmental
507 regulation has a significant positive impact on green innovation ($\beta= 0907$, $P < 0.001$, Model 1).
508 Every 1% increase in environmental regulation, 0.0238% increase in human capital and 0.182%
509 increase in green innovation ($\beta= 0238$, $P < 0.001$, Model 2; $\beta= 182$, $P < 0.001$, Model 3). The
510 mediating effect accounted for 4.7757%, which verified hypothesis H4. The formulation of
511 environmental regulation will significantly improve the level of human capital, and the
512 improvement of human capital has a significant positive impact on green innovation. It shows that
513 human capital plays an important role in this process. Under the condition of stricter
514 environmental regulation, producers tend to pay more attention to the cultivation of green
515 innovative talents and encourage talents with high green innovation potential. The improvement of
516 human capital brings new knowledge and new technology to green innovation activities, and is
517 conducive to improving the level of green innovation (Song et al, 2021).

518

519 **Table 6: Mediating effect test results**

Variable	<i>lnGI</i>	<i>lnEdu</i>	<i>lnGI</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>L.lnGI</i>	0.735*** (0.0115)		0.708*** (0.0118)
<i>lnREG</i>	0.0907*** (0.00989)	0.0238*** (0.00637)	0.0699*** (0.00980)
<i>lnCity</i>	0.600*** (0.202)	0.0116 (0.0610)	0.570*** (0.193)
<i>lnInstra</i>	0.449*** (0.0311)	0.0446** (0.0208)	0.391*** (0.0325)

<i>lnFdi</i>	-0.0711*** (0.0159)	0.00266 (0.00826)	-0.0775*** (0.0160)
<i>lnFin</i>	0.266*** (0.0200)	0.00308 (0.0109)	0.287*** (0.0206)
<i>L.lnEdu</i>		0.770*** (0.0274)	
<i>lnEdu</i>			0.182*** (0.0246)
Constant	YES	YES	YES
Urban fixed	YES	YES	YES
Year fixed	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5,415	5,415	5,415
Number of id	285	285	285
R-squared	0.882	0.831	0.884
Sobel test		0.2033*** (0.0082)	
_bs_2		0.3536*** (0.0131)	

520 **Note:** In parentheses denote the standard error of the respective coefficients, ***/**/* indicates
521 the significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively.

522

523 **5.3.Mediating moderating effect test**

524 Table 7 reports the regression results of the regulatory effects of marketization and financial R&D
525 investment. The results show that marketization has a positive impact on green innovation ($\beta=$
526 0687, $P < 0.001$, Model 1). By introducing the cross product of environmental regulation and
527 marketization ($lnREG \times lnMar$), the marketization of regulatory variables has a significant positive
528 effect on green innovation ($\beta= 0295$, $P < 0.001$, Model 2). It shows that when the degree of
529 marketization is high, the promotion of environmental regulation on green innovation is
530 strengthened. On the contrary, it weakens the role of environmental regulation in promoting green
531 innovation. In order to strengthen the role of the market, the guiding opinions on building a
532 market-oriented green technology innovation system issued by the national development and
533 Reform Commission and the Ministry of science and technology clearly states that enterprises
534 must participate in green innovation projects with clear market orientation, and the proportion of
535 green R&D projects supported by major national science and technology projects and national key
536 R&D plans led by enterprises shall not be less than 55%.

537

538 Many scholars believe that financial R&D investment crowds out private investment and ignores
539 the important role of public R&D expenditure. In the field of environmental governance and green
540 innovation, financial R&D expenditures crowd out producer investment, which is not conducive to

541 improving the level of green innovation (Chervier, 2019). But is that really the case? The results
542 show that financial R&D investment has a positive impact on green innovation ($\beta= 298$, $P < 0.001$,
543 Model 3). By introducing the cross factor of environmental regulation and financial R&D
544 investment ($\ln REG \times \ln Pte$), the impact of financial R&D investment on green innovation also has
545 a significant positive regulatory role ($\beta= 0267$, $P < 0.001$, Model 4). It shows that financial R&D
546 investment strengthens the promotion of environmental regulation on green innovation. On the
547 contrary, it weakens the promoting effect of environmental regulation on green innovation and
548 tests hypothesis H5. Financial R&D investment and effective guidance are important ways to
549 improve urban green innovation. In recent years, the Chinese government has provided a lot of
550 R&D subsidies for enterprises, such as purchasing advanced equipment and technology, training
551 R&D personnel for technological transformation. According to the statistics of the National Bureau
552 of statistics from 2016 to 2020, the national financial expenditure on science and technology is
553 4.12 trillion yuan, with an average annual growth of 10.37%. As a result, major innovative
554 achievements such as Tiangong travel, Mozi communication and C919 aircraft have emerged one
555 after another.

556
557

Table 7: Moderating effect test results

Variable	<i>lnGI</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>L.lnGI</i>	0.701*** (0.0123)	0.695*** (0.0127)	0.585*** (0.0168)	0.574*** (0.0173)
<i>lnEdu</i>	0.169*** (0.0246)	0.175*** (0.0251)	0.180*** (0.0237)	0.187*** (0.0254)
<i>lnREG</i>	0.0667*** (0.00995)	0.0727*** (0.0100)	0.0678*** (0.00984)	0.0806*** (0.0107)
<i>lnMar</i>	0.0687*** (0.0160)	0.0725*** (0.0161)		
<i>lnREG × lnMar</i>		0.0295*** (0.00947)		
<i>lnPte</i>			0.298*** (0.0199)	0.289*** (0.0197)
<i>lnREG × lnPte</i>				0.0267*** (0.00729)
<i>lnCity</i>	0.572*** (0.191)	0.572*** (0.190)	0.496*** (0.182)	0.500*** (0.186)
<i>lnInstra</i>	0.379*** (0.0319)	0.385*** (0.0322)	0.389*** (0.0348)	0.409*** (0.0358)
<i>lnFdi</i>	-0.0823*** (0.0165)	-0.0772*** (0.0162)	-0.0891*** (0.0181)	-0.0794*** (0.0178)
<i>lnFin</i>	0.288***	0.275***	0.245***	0.244***

	(0.0207)	(0.0204)	(0.0213)	(0.0214)
<i>Constant</i>	YES	YES	YES	YES
Urban fixed	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year fixed	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5,415	5,415	5,415	5,415
Number of id	285	285	285	285
R-squared	0.885	0.885	0.894	0.894

558 **Note:** In parentheses denote the standard error of the respective coefficients, ***/**/* indicates
559 the significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively.

560

561 **6. Conclusion and Policy Implications**

562 The core of green innovation is to promote resource conservation and governance, environmental
563 friendliness and governance. Environmental regulation has become an important means to
564 promote green innovation. This study has important theoretical value and practical significance for
565 clarifying the relationship between environmental regulation and green innovation, and promoting
566 pollution control and environmental protection from the perspective of green innovation.

567

568 Based on the panel data of 285 prefecture level cities in China from 2000 to 2019, this paper
569 theoretically and empirically analyzes the impact of China's urban environmental regulation on
570 green innovation. The results show that environmental regulation has a significant and sustained
571 positive impact on green innovation, which falsifies the "Restriction Theory". The strong and
572 weak zoning of environmental regulation fails to reflect the direction of policy implementation,
573 and the strong and weak zoning of green innovation has guiding significance for policy
574 implementation. Specifically, strong green innovation city is suitable to improve the intensity of
575 environmental regulation, and innovation compensation effect is significant. Weak green
576 innovation cities can not formulate policies with high regulation intensity, and the crowding out
577 effect of compliance cost is obvious.

578

579 Under the circumstance of stricter environmental regulations, producers pay more attention to the
580 promotion and accumulation of human capital, which provides strong intellectual support for
581 green innovation activities. The relationship between the marketization of regulatory variables and
582 government research investment on green innovation has a significant positive strengthening
583 regulatory role. It shows that the promotion of environmental regulation on green innovation is
584 strengthened when marketization and government investment in scientific research are high. On
585 the contrary, it weakens the role of environmental regulation in promoting green innovation.

586

587 We use SYS-GMM model, and select the explained variable of lag period, the mean value of

588 environmental regulation and air circulation coefficient as the instrumental variables. After
589 reducing the endogeneity of the model, improving the intensity of environmental regulation can
590 still promote the level of green innovation. Using the spatial Durbin decomposition model, we find
591 that environmental regulation has spatial spillover effect on green innovation. The formulation of
592 environmental regulation strategy has gradually changed into "Top To Top Competition", which is
593 conducive to the coordinated development of regional green innovation.

594

595 Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward the following policy
596 recommendations: First, environmental policy needs to be adapted to local conditions, step by
597 step. The implementation of environmental regulation policy needs to comprehensively consider
598 the local reality. According to the urban development model, resource endowment and location
599 characteristics, take reasonable and appropriate environmental regulation policies according to
600 local conditions. Optimize the compound environmental policy and encourage the public to
601 actively participate in ecological and environmental protection activities.

602

603 Second, cultivate green human capital and stimulate the vitality of green innovation. Strengthen
604 the top-level design of green human capital management, and pay attention to the balanced
605 development of green human capital segmentation. In the recruitment and selection process,
606 priority should be given to employees with environmental awareness, and training on
607 environmental management knowledge and skills should be strengthened. Relying on digital
608 technology to optimize the management system, improve the efficiency of green human capital
609 allocation mechanism.

610

611 Third, the combination of efficient market and promising government. We need to give full play
612 to the role of market mechanism, innovate the supply and demand mechanism of green technology,
613 and enhance the market value of green technology. The government should increase the R&D
614 investment support for green key technology, explore the transfer and benefit distribution
615 mechanism of funded achievements projects to inventors and small and medium-sized enterprises,
616 and strengthen the innovation guiding leverage of financial R&D investment.

617

618

619

620

621

622 **Acknowledgements**

623 This study was sponsored jointly by the National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences
624 Project (20BTJ011)

625

626 **Author Contribution**

627 **Weiyong Zou** - Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing-original dra, Data collection and Data
628 curation, Software, Formal analysis, Visualization; Validation; **Yunjun Xiong** - Data curation,
629 Resources, Funding acquisition, Supervision.

630

631 **Consent to participate**

632 Not applicable.

633

634 **Consent to publish**

635 Not applicable.

636

637 **Compliance with ethical standards**

638 We strictly abide by ethical standards.

639

640 **Data availability**

641 The datasets used during the current study are available from the corresponding author on
642 reasonable request.

643

644 **Declaration of Conflicting Interests**

645 The author(s) declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest related to the research,
646 authorship, and/or publication of this article.

647

648 **Ethical approval**

649 No animal or human parts were used in this study.

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657 **Reference**

658

659 Ahlers, A. L., & Shen, Y. (2018). Breathe easy? Local nuances of authoritarian environmentalism
660 in China's battle against air pollution. *The China Quarterly*, 234, 299-319.

661 Albort-Morant, G., Leal-Rodríguez, A. L., & De Marchi, V. (2018). Absorptive capacity and
662 relationship learning mechanisms as complementary drivers of green innovation
663 performance. *Journal of Knowledge Management*.

664 Bano, S., Zhao, Y., Ahmad, A., Wang, S., & Liu, Y. (2018). Identifying the impacts of human
665 capital on carbon emissions in Pakistan. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 183,
666 1082-1092.

667 Bohnstedt, A. (2014). *Are Public and Private R&D Investments Complements or Substitutes?* (No.
668 485). Ruhr Economic Papers.

669 Cai, W., & Li, G. (2018). The drivers of eco-innovation and its impact on performance: Evidence
670 from China. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 176, 110-118.

671 Chan, R. Y., He, H., Chan, H. K., & Wang, W. Y. (2012). Environmental orientation and corporate
672 performance: The mediation mechanism of green supply chain management and
673 moderating effect of competitive intensity. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 41(4),
674 621-630.

675 Chan, R. Y. (2005). Does the natural-resource-based view of the firm apply in an emerging
676 economy? A survey of foreign invested enterprises in China. *Journal of management
677 studies*, 42(3), 625-672.

678 Chen, X., Li, H., Qin, Q., & Peng, Y. (2021). Market-Oriented Reforms and China's Green
679 Economic Development: An Empirical Study Based on Stochastic Frontier
680 Analysis. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 57(4), 949-971.

681 Chen, Z., Kahn, M. E., Liu, Y., & Wang, Z. (2018). The consequences of spatially differentiated
682 water pollution regulation in China. *Journal of Environmental Economics and
683 Management*, 88, 468-485.

684 Chervier, C., Le Velly, G., & Ezzine-de-Blas, D. (2019). When the implementation of payments
685 for biodiversity conservation leads to motivation crowding-out: a case study from the
686 Cardamoms forests, Cambodia. *Ecological economics*, 156, 499-510.

687 Conte, A. (2013). Determinants of policy reforms in the fields of R & D, education and innovation:
688 EU-27 evidence during the Lisbon Decade. In *Governance, Regulation and Innovation*.
689 Edward Elgar Publishing.

690 Delmas, M., Hoffmann, V. H., & Kuss, M. (2011). Under the tip of the iceberg: Absorptive
691 capacity, environmental strategy, and competitive advantage. *Business & Society*, 50(1),
692 116-154.

693 Deng, Z., Kang, J., & Fan, H. (2020). Environmental Regulation and Development
694 Transformation in the Tropical and Subtropical Cities of China: A Big Data
695 Analysis. *Tropical Conservation Science*, 13, 1940082920961491.

696 Du, W., Wang, F., & Li, M. (2020). Effects of environmental regulation on capacity utilization:
697 Evidence from energy enterprises in China. *Ecological Indicators*, 113, 106217.

698 Fisman, R., & Svensson, J. (2007). Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm
699 level evidence. *Journal of development economics*, 83(1), 63-75.

700 Hering, L., & Poncet, S. (2014). Environmental policy and exports: Evidence from Chinese
701 cities. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 68(2), 296-318.

702 Leblebici, H., Salancik, G. R., Copay, A., & King, T. (1991). Institutional change and the
703 transformation of interorganizational fields: An organizational history of the US radio
704 broadcasting industry. *Administrative science quarterly*, 333-363.

705 Levinson, A. (2003). Environmental regulatory competition: A status report and some new
706 evidence. *National Tax Journal*, 56(1), 91-106.

707 Li, D., Tang, F., & Jiang, J. (2019). Does environmental management system foster corporate
708 green innovation? The moderating effect of environmental regulation. *Technology
709 Analysis & Strategic Management*, 31(10), 1242-1256.

710 Li, D., & Zeng, T. (2020). Are China's intensive pollution industries greening? An analysis based
711 on green innovation efficiency. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 259, 120901.

712 Li, G., Wang, X., Su, S., & Su, Y. (2019). How green technological innovation ability influences
713 enterprise competitiveness. *Technology in Society*, 59, 101136.

714 Li, H., Zhao, C., Tang, X., Cheng, J., Lu, G., Gu, Y., ... & Liu, Y. (2021). How Do Different Types
715 of Environmental Regulations Affect Green Innovation Efficiency?. *Journal of
716 Mathematics*, 2021.

717 Liao, Z. (2018). Environmental policy instruments, environmental innovation and the reputation
718 of enterprises. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 171, 1111-1117.

719 Liao, X. (2018). Public appeal, environmental regulation and green investment: Evidence from
720 China. *Energy Policy*, 119, 554-562.

721 Ma, S., Dai, J., & Wen, H. (2019). The influence of trade openness on the level of human capital
722 in China: on the basis of environmental regulation. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 225,
723 340-349.

724 Meng, F., Xu, Y., & Zhao, G. (2020). Environmental regulations, green innovation and intelligent
725 upgrading of manufacturing enterprises: evidence from China. *Scientific reports*, 10(1),
726 1-17.

727 Pan, Z., Liu, L., Bai, S., & Ma, Q. (2021). Can the social trust promote corporate green innovation?
728 Evidence from China. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 1-17.

729 Pan, X., Ai, B., Li, C., Pan, X., & Yan, Y. (2019). Dynamic relationship among environmental
730 regulation, technological innovation and energy efficiency based on large scale
731 provincial panel data in China. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 144,
732 428-435.

733 Peng, H., Shen, N., Ying, H., & Wang, Q. (2021). Can environmental regulation directly promote
734 green innovation behavior?—based on situation of industrial agglomeration. *Journal*
735 *of Cleaner Production*, 128044.

736 Pierce, G., Gmoser-Daskalakis, K., Jessup, K., Grant, S. B., Mehring, A., Winfrey, B., ... & Levin,
737 L. (2021). University stormwater management within urban environmental regulatory
738 regimes: barriers to progressivity or opportunities to innovate?. *Environmental*
739 *Management*, 67(1), 12-25.

740 Porter, M. E., & Van der Linde, C. (1995). Toward a new conception of the
741 environment-competitiveness relationship. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 9(4),
742 97-118.

743 Przychodzen, W., Leyva-de la Hiz, D. I., & Przychodzen, J. (2020). First-mover advantages in
744 green innovation—Opportunities and threats for financial performance: A longitudinal
745 analysis. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 27(1),
746 339-357.

747 Rexhäuser, S., & Rammer, C. (2014). Environmental innovations and firm profitability:
748 unmasking the Porter hypothesis. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 57(1),
749 145-167.

750 Peng, X. (2020). Strategic interaction of environmental regulation and green productivity growth
751 in China: Green innovation or pollution refuge?. *Science of The Total Environment*, 732,
752 139200.

753 Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. *Journal of political Economy*, 98(5, Part
754 2), S71-S102.

755 Rubashkina, Y., Galeotti, M., & Verdolini, E. (2015). Environmental regulation and
756 competitiveness: Empirical evidence on the Porter Hypothesis from European
757 manufacturing sectors. *Energy Policy*, 83, 288-300.

758 De Santis, R., & Lasinio, C. J. (2016). Environmental Policies, Innovation and Productivity in the
759 EU. *Global Economy Journal*, 16(4), 615-635.

- 760 Shen, D., Xia, M., Zhang, Q., Elahi, E., Zhou, Y., & Zhang, H. (2019). The impact of public
761 appeals on the performance of environmental governance in China: A perspective of
762 provincial panel data. *Journal of cleaner production*, 231, 290-296.
- 763 Singh, S. K., Del Giudice, M., Chierici, R., & Graziano, D. (2020). Green innovation and
764 environmental performance: The role of green transformational leadership and green
765 human resource management. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 150,
766 119762.
- 767 Song, W., & Yu, H. (2018). Green innovation strategy and green innovation: The roles of green
768 creativity and green organizational identity. *Corporate Social Responsibility and
769 Environmental Management*, 25(2), 135-150.
- 770 Song, W., Yu, H., & Xu, H. (2020). Effects of green human resource management and managerial
771 environmental concern on green innovation. *European Journal of Innovation
772 Management*.
- 773 Tang, J., Zhong, S., & Xiang, G. (2019). Environmental regulation, directed technical change, and
774 economic growth: theoretic model and evidence from China. *International Regional
775 Science Review*, 42(5-6), 519-549.
- 776 Tobler, W. R. (1970). A computer movie simulating urban growth in the Detroit region. *Economic
777 geography*, 46(sup1), 234-240.
- 778 Wang, R., Wijen, F., & Heugens, P. P. (2018). Government's green grip: Multifaceted state
779 influence on corporate environmental actions in China. *Strategic Management
780 Journal*, 39(2), 403-428.
- 781 Yang, Y., & Wang, Y. (2021). Research on the Impact of Environmental Regulations on the Green
782 Innovation Efficiency of Chinese Industrial Enterprises. *Polish Journal of
783 Environmental Studies*, 30(2).
- 784 Yi, M., Wang, Y., Yan, M., Fu, L., & Zhang, Y. (2020). Government R&D subsidies,
785 environmental regulations, and their effect on green innovation efficiency of
786 manufacturing industry: Evidence from the Yangtze River economic belt of
787 China. *International journal of environmental research and public health*, 17(4), 1330.
- 788 Zhang, J., Liang, G., Feng, T., Yuan, C., & Jiang, W. (2020). Green innovation to respond to
789 environmental regulation: How external knowledge adoption and green absorptive
790 capacity matter?. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 29(1), 39-53.
- 791 Zhang, Q., Wang, Z., Sheng, D., & Feng, Y. (2021). Deeping Pricing System Reform and
792 Managing Price Expectations. In *Chinese Finance Policy for a New Era* (pp. 173-197).
793 Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore.

794 Zhang, F., & Zhu, L. (2019). Enhancing corporate sustainable development: Stakeholder pressures,
795 organizational learning, and green innovation. *Business Strategy and the*
796 *Environment*, 28(6), 1012-1026.