

# Environmental costs of political instability in Pakistan: policy options for clean energy consumption and environment

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## Research Article

**Keywords:** Political instability, Clean energy consumption, CO2 emissions, Pakistan

**Posted Date:** October 27th, 2021

**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-843124/v1>

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**Version of Record:** A version of this preprint was published at Environmental Science and Pollution Research on November 27th, 2021. See the published version at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-17646-5>.

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16  
17  
18 **Abstract**

19 Using time-series data of Pakistan from 1990 to 2019, this study explores the asymmetric effects of political  
20 instability on clean energy consumption and CO2 emissions. The results from the traditional ARDL model show that  
21 political stability lessens environmental damage by reducing CO2 emissions in the long run. However, when we  
22 used the nonlinear ARDL approach we found that political instability reduces the consumption of clean energy but  
23 also leads to damage environmental quality in long run in Pakistan. While political stability increases the  
24 consumption of clean energy but also helps to improve environmental quality in the short run in Pakistan. Thus,  
25 macroeconomic policies to promote expansion in clean energy consumption will directly stimulate green economic  
26 growth and environmental quality.

27  
28 **Keywords:** Political instability. Clean energy consumption. CO2 emissions. Pakistan.

29  
30  
31 **Introduction**

32 The persistent deteriorating environmental quality is one of the main global concerns facing the  
33 contemporary world and one of most researched problem in contemporary scholarly research. The persistent rise in  
34 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is generally considered the main factor behind environmental pollution and  
35 climate change (Uzar 2020; Ullah et al 2020). The pressing environmental concerns have motivated many  
36 governments to opt political choices to over come emissions. The emissions come from both developed and  
37 developing, and emerging countries. The task ahead is not easy and requires strong political decisions.

38           Apparently, economic expansion and environmental performance are confronting a trade-off that is  
39 environmental loss is inevitable consequence of trailing rapid growth rates. However, if primary sources of energy  
40 such as fossil fuels and coal are switched with clean energy sources, then environmental degradation can be  
41 decoupled from growth (Majeed and Luni, 2019). Currently, environmental economists, energy experts, political  
42 scientist, domestic governments and international institutes are increasingly considering the importance of the clean  
43 sources of energy in the production process. Particularly, carbon emissions are mitigated after the Kyoto Protocol  
44 was signed in 1997 and executed in 2005. Correspondingly, United Nations (UN) has declared “clean energy” as the  
45 17<sup>th</sup> sustainable development goal to manage environmental problems.

46           Political stability and better environmental governance are necessary for the sustainable exploitation of  
47 natural resources and environmental preservation (Samimi et al., 2012). Better institutions play a conducive role in  
48 natural resource use and environmental sustainability (Abdala, 2008). In the presence of high political instability,  
49 environmental rules and regulations become less stringent and therefore, environmental pollution deteriorates the  
50 environmental quality. Al-Mulali and Ozturk (2015) examined the factors that caused environmental degradation in  
51 14 MENA and showed that political stability is an important factor to improve the environmental quality of the  
52 region. In addition, energy consumption, urbanization, trade and industrial deteriorate the environmental quality.

53           The earlier studies have overlooked the political economy dynamics in exploring its effects on energy and  
54 carbon emissions though many studies have focused on the direct impact of democracy on the environmental  
55 degradation (Adams et al., 2016; Deacon, 2002; Torras and Boyce, 1998). For example, Raleigh and Urdal (2007)  
56 assert that political dynamics, particularly political regimes matter in shaping environmental outcomes. The earlier  
57 studies on the determinants of energy consumption and environmental pollution provide dissimilar results depending  
58 upon development stages (Adams and Klobodu 2017).

59           Adams and Klobodu (2017) extends the literature by focusing on a more comparable group of 38 African  
60 economies to explain political environmental and environmental degradation nexus over the period 1970-2011. They  
61 represent political economy by democracy and bureaucracy quality. Findings of their study suggest that both  
62 measures help to mitigate emissions in the selected African countries. Their study concluded that political  
63 institutions also play an important role in managing environmental quality including mitigation of carbon emissions.

64           One main argument in the literature suggests that stronger institutions help in better regulation of  
65 greenhouse gas emissions. Environmental regulation is inhibited in the presence of high corruption, red tape,  
66 bureaucratic inertia and financial mismanagement. Institutional quality removes/lowers these anti-environmental  
67 regulation factors and pave the way for the better management of the environmental quality (Panayoutou (1997).  
68 Goel and Herrala (2013) explored the direct impacts of corruption and shadow economy on carbon emissions for a  
69 panel data of 100 economies with a focus on MENA economies. They found mixed results. In general, they showed  
70 that higher levels of corruption and shadow economy are linked with lower levels of emissions. However, the  
71 opposite findings are revealed in the MENA region.

72           Since the beginning of 1990s, many environmentalists, energy experts and political scientists are  
73 increasingly focusing on the political aspects of environmental issues. The empirical literature also highlighted the  
74 importance of political institutions in improving environmental quality. For example, Congleton (1992) proves that

75 democratic regimes strongly favor environmental reforms. The consecutive stream of studies largely confirmed this  
76 conclusion, with some exceptions (Midlarsky, 1998; Barrett and Graddy, 2000). This research belongs to the  
77 emerging body of the literature that emphasizes political indicators in influencing energy and environmental  
78 concerns.

79         The empirical literature on political economy and environmental performance has been questioned for two  
80 main deficiencies. First, political stability is not adequately measured. Second, the empirical studies provided  
81 estimates based on outdated estimation approaches that cast doubt on the reliability of the results. The theoretical  
82 underpinnings of political stability and environmental performance can be traced back to the pioneering study of  
83 Grossman and Krueger (1995) which predicted an inverted U-shaped association between per capita GDP and  
84 environmental pollution. This relationship is widely known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), and its  
85 validity is heatedly debated, however, to date the literature is not yet conclusive (Majeed and Mazhar, 2020). One  
86 likely reason could be that many studies assume the association between growth and emissions as an automated  
87 procedure. However, it is not true as Grossman and Krueger (1995) assert that the EKC will not prevail on its own,  
88 but it largely depends upon public policy rejoinders, which are grounded in public support for environmental  
89 regulation. Consequently, a new debate has emerged, which focuses on political background and stability in shaping  
90 the environmental performance.

91         Grossman and Krueger's claim has merits because it is high demand for clean environment that creates its  
92 own supply. However, political scientists have long noted that environmental regulations and reforms mainly rely on  
93 collective actions and smooth functioning markets. Issues associated with market failure and collection action  
94 largely hinder the path for environmental policy implementation and effectiveness. Another challenge is that the  
95 information associated to causes and effects of the problems themselves remain asymmetric. In addition, one more  
96 reason is that a socially cohesive and efficient response demands the selection of a government policy based on  
97 certain collective action mechanisms. Hence, analyzing the asymmetric impacts of political performance on  
98 environmental performance remains a crucial empirical research query and this study steps in to fill this gap.

99         It is widely held belief that political stable regimes favor environmental quality as the expression and  
100 mobilization of new demands supported in such a scenario. In addition, policy learning is improved in the presence  
101 of free flow of information under democratic regimes (Barret and Graddy, 2000; Midlarsky, 1998). Moreover,  
102 demand for public goods in democratic regimes is better entertained than autocratic regimes (Congleton, 1992;  
103 Deacon, 2002). In a democratic regime, the controlling group is the whole population, and the median voter  
104 concentrates on balancing out marginal costs and gains of policy action. Environmental issues stem from increased  
105 pressure on natural resources by human numbers and affluence, and political stability in terms of democracy  
106 constitutes an effective social feedback mechanism. Contrary to this, natural resources are misused in autocratic  
107 regimes as elites disproportionately control and exploit the natural resources, thereby compromising  
108 environmental quality (Deacon, 2002). Hence political stability in terms of democracy is considered good for the  
109 environmental quality.

110         By contrast, the empirical literature also claims that such optimism may be misleading. Though democratic  
111 governments make more promises to manage the environmental quality, usually they do not keep their promises.

112 Furthermore, some of the top world democracies are also viewed as laggard in environmental conservation (Battig  
113 and Bernauer, 2009; Bohmelt, Boker, and Ward, 2016; Burnell, 2012). Environmental scholars have explained this  
114 puzzle considering other factors. Battig and Bernauer (2009) claim that a likely factor could be individuals ‘freedom  
115 in democracies, especially in the transport sector. Some view dimensions of democracy regime, like its degree of  
116 inclusiveness (Bohmelt, Boker, and Ward, 2016), form of the electoral system (Bohmelt, Boker, and Ward, 2016),  
117 rather than democracy per se, which are helpful for environmental performance.

118 One strand of the literature on political institutions and environmental regulation nexus emphasizes direct  
119 as well as indirect effects of political institutions through other factors such as urbanization and trade (Goel and  
120 Herrala 2013; Adams et al 2016; Ibrahim and Law 2016). For example, Adams et al. (2016) provided evidence for  
121 Ghana that democracy lowers carbon emissions directly and indirectly through mitigating the emission impact of  
122 urbanization. In a similar vein, Ibrahim and Law (2016), provided the evidence for 44 SSA region where democracy  
123 mitigates emissions directly as well as indirectly through its interactive effect with the trade.

124 Another strand of the literature offers conditional effects of political factors in improving environmental  
125 quality. For example, Wawrzyniak and Doryń (2020) evaluates growth-emission nexus depending upon the  
126 institutional quality for 93 emerging and developing economies from 1995 to 2014. They employed government  
127 effectiveness and corruption as measures of institutional quality and used GMM estimation procedure. The results  
128 suggest that government effectiveness moderates the growth-emissions nexus by lowering emissions. However, their  
129 finding did not confirm the moderating role of corruption.

130 The discussion based aforementioned studies offer diverse effects of political economy on environmental  
131 quality. That is, political indicators can have diverse effects depending upon the type of indicator, electoral system,  
132 form of the democracy, geographical bases, and development stage of the economies. Therefore, more refined  
133 empirical evidence is required to untangle the complex relationships of political stability on clean energy and  
134 environmental quality.

135 This research contributes to the literature in a number of unique ways: First, to the best of authors’  
136 knowledge, this research is first of its kind that incorporates the role of political instability in clean energy and  
137 pollution models. Second, it considers diverse dimensions of political instability unlike previous studies which  
138 consider a single aspect of political instability. Third, this study employs an index of political instability. Fourth, we  
139 also consider the issue of cross-sectional dependency among selected sampled countries by employing second-  
140 generation panel time series analysis. Fifth, this research also explores hidden asymmetric associations between  
141 political instability, clean energy and environmental pollution by exploiting non-linear autoregressive distributive  
142 lags (NARDL) approach. The findings of this research will provide suitable policy choices to manage energy and  
143 environmental concerns of the Pakistan economies and subsequently for other economies with similar profiles.

144 The remaining study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of the methodology and the  
145 modelling approach. Section 3 illustrates empirical findings and their interpretation. Finally, Section 4 concludes  
146 and offers suitable policy implications.

147  
148

149 **Model and methods**

150 Based on the previous studies (Al-Mulali & Ozturk 2015 and Sofuoğlu & Ay 2020), we examine the asymmetric  
 151 effects of political instability on clean energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Therefore, we adopt the following  
 152 clean energy consumption and CO2 emissions model specification:

153  
 154 
$$CE_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PS_t + \alpha_2 EG_t + \alpha_3 FD_t + \mu_t \text{ ----- (1)}$$

155 
$$CO_{2,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PS_t + \alpha_2 EG_t + \alpha_3 FD_t + \mu_t \text{ ----- (2)}$$

156  
 157 As can be seen, in equations (1) and (2) we have considered political stability (PS) as a key factor of clean energy  
 158 consumption and environmental quality. Based on the empirical literature, we expect an estimate of  $\alpha_1$  to be positive  
 159 in equation (1), while estimates of  $\alpha_1$  to be negative in equation (2). We used economic growth (EG) and financial  
 160 development (FD) as control variables. The next stage is to change equation (1) to an error-correction modelling  
 161 framework so that we can also add the short-run impacts of exogenous variables. Therefore, a new format of the  
 162 equation is as:

163  
 164 
$$\Delta CE_t = \pi + \sum_{p=1}^{n1} \pi_{1p} \Delta CE_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n2} \pi_{2p} \Delta PS_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n3} \pi_{3p} \Delta EG_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n4} \pi_{4p} \Delta FD_{t-p} + \beta_1 CE_{t-1} +$$
  
 165 
$$\beta_2 PS_{t-1} + \beta_3 EG_{t-1} + \beta_4 FD_{t-1} + \mu_t \text{ ----- (3)}$$

166  
 167 
$$\Delta CO_{2,t} = \pi + \sum_{p=1}^{n1} \pi_{1p} \Delta CO_{2,t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n2} \pi_{2p} \Delta PS_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n3} \pi_{3p} \Delta EG_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n4} \pi_{4p} \Delta FD_{t-p} + \beta_1 CO_{2,t-1} +$$
  
 168 
$$\beta_2 PS_{t-1} + \beta_3 EG_{t-1} + \beta_4 FD_{t-1} + \mu_t \text{ ----- (4)}$$

169  
 170 Equation (2) is assessed by the OLS, short-run impacts are noted in the estimates of “delta” variables and long-run  
 171 effects are noted by the estimates of  $\beta_2 - \beta_4$  normalized on  $\beta_1$ . The linear ARDL specification is first time  
 172 introduced by Pesaran et al. (2001) and becomes the workhorse of time series modelling. For the validity of long-run  
 173 coefficient estimates to be important, Pesaran et al. (2001) suggest F test and ECM or t-test. Since macroeconomic  
 174 variables could be a combination of I(0) and I(1), both tests have new critical values in estimation. We extended the  
 175 empirical literature so that we can explore the asymmetry analysis. The modification in linear modelling, first time  
 176 introduced by Shin et al. (2014). The concept of the partial sum is used to decompose ( $\Delta PS$ ) into two new time-  
 177 series as follows:

178 
$$PS^+_t = \sum_{n=1}^t \Delta PS^+_t = \sum_{n=1}^t \max(\Delta PS^+_t, 0) \quad (5a)$$

179 
$$PS^-_t = \sum_{n=1}^t \Delta PS^-_t = \sum_{n=1}^t \min(\Delta PS^-_t, 0) \quad (5b)$$

180 Where  $PS^+_t$  reveals the partial sum of positive shock, infers political stability and  $PS^-_t$  reflects the partial sum of  
 181 negative shock, infers political instability. Two new time series are used to replace  $PS_t$  in equation (3 and 4) to  
 182 arrive at:

183  $\Delta CE_t = \pi + \sum_{p=1}^{n_1} \pi_{1p} \Delta CE_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n_2} \pi_{2p} \Delta PS^+_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n_3} \pi_{3p} \Delta PS^-_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n_4} \pi_{4p} \Delta EG_{t-p} +$   
184  $\sum_{p=0}^{n_5} \pi_{5p} \Delta FD_{t-p} + \beta_1 CE_{t-1} + \beta_2 PS^+_{t-1} + \beta_3 PS^-_{t-1} + \beta_4 EG_{t-1} + \beta_5 FD_{t-1} + \mu_t$  ----- (6)

185  $\Delta CO_{2,t} = \pi + \sum_{p=1}^{n_1} \pi_{1p} \Delta CO_{2,t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n_2} \pi_{2p} \Delta PS^+_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n_3} \pi_{3p} \Delta PS^-_{t-p} + \sum_{p=0}^{n_4} \pi_{4p} \Delta EG_{t-p} +$   
186  $\sum_{p=0}^{n_5} \pi_{5p} \Delta FD_{t-p} + \beta_1 CO_{2,t-1} + \beta_2 PS^+_{t-1} + \beta_3 PS^-_{t-1} + \beta_4 EG_{t-1} + \beta_5 FD_{t-1} + \mu_t$  ----- (7)

187 Equation (6 and 7) is generally referred and known as a nonlinear or asymmetric ARDL model, whereas Eq. (3 and  
188 4) is mentioned as the linear or symmetric ARDL model. Shin et al. (2014) also used the same estimation method  
189 and similar diagnostic tests. The conventional ARDL diagnostic tests are also applied in the asymmetric model. For  
190 nonlinear ARDL, we also test a few additional asymmetry hypotheses. First, if two partial sum indicators have  
191 different lag orders in the short term which is a signal of short-term asymmetry. Second, at similar lags in two partial  
192 sum series any given lag order  $p$ , if coefficient estimates are different which confirm the short-run asymmetry  
193 through the Wald test. Finally, the response of the CO2 emissions to political stability changes will be nonlinear in  
194 the long run if the Wald test nullified the hypothesis of  $-\beta_2/\beta_1 = -\beta_3/\beta_1$ .

195 We have two dependent variables in this study, i.e clean energy use and CO2 emissions as proxies to assess the  
196 impact of political stability on clean energy and environmental quality. Whereas our independent variable is political  
197 stability, but financial development and economic growth are used as control variables. We obtained all datasets  
198 from World Bank, except political stability. The variable description is given in Table 1.

199

200 **Table 1: Definitions and descriptive statistics**

Variable	Symbol	Definition	Sources
Clean energy	CE	Alternative and nuclear energy (% total energy use)	World Bank
Carbon dioxide emissions	CO2	Carbon dioxide emissions (kilotons)	World Bank
Political stability	PS	The political stability index ranges from 0 to 100	ICRG
Economic growth	EG	GDP growth (annual %)	World Bank
Financial development	FD	Domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP).	World Bank

201

202

203 **Empirical findings and discussion**

204 The prime objective of the present study is to assess the asymmetric impacts of political stability on clean  
205 energy and CO2 emissions in the case of Pakistan. To specify the appropriate model, the first step is to check the  
206 stationarity of the data by using Phillips-Perron (PP) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test statistics. In  
207 Table 2, ADF tests statistics values reveal that CE, CO2 emissions, PS are non-stationary at I (0) and thus they  
208 become stationary at I(1), i.e first difference. However, the rest of the two variables namely, EG and FD are  
209 stationary at I (0). After checking the stationarity of the included variables we can infer that we can apply the  
210 NARDL approach for the empirical estimation. Meanwhile, if we carefully observe the PP statistics values, then we  
211 can find out that CE, PS, and FS are non-stationary at I(0) but they are stationary at I(1). The rest of the two  
212 variables are stationary at I (0).

213

214 **Table 2: Unit root tests**

Variables	ADF test statistic			PP test statistic		
	Level	1st difference	Decision	Level	1st difference	Decision
CE	1.413	3.538**	I(1)	2.511	7.476 **	I(1)
CO <sub>2</sub>	-0.144	-1.791*	I(1)	-4.173***		I(0)
PS	-1.531	-5.101***	I(1)	-2.219	-5.372***	I(1)
EG	-3.387***		I(0)	-3.318**		I(0)
FD	-2.630***		I(0)	-1.983	-5.904***	I(1)

215

216 Table 3 depicts the empirical estimated results of ARDL and NARDL models to quantify the asymmetric  
217 and non-asymmetric impacts of political stability on clean air and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Pakistan. First, we will discuss  
218 the estimated results of the ARDL model and then we will explain the NARDL model for clean air and also for CO<sub>2</sub>  
219 emissions. In the first column of Table 3, we have reported the empirical coefficients of the ARDL model for the  
220 clean energy model. We observe that the coefficient of political stability is positive and significant at 5 percent. It  
221 implies that a 1 percent increase in political stability will increase the use of cleaner energy by 2.987 percent in the  
222 case of Pakistan. We can infer that political stability is positively influencing the use of cleaner energy. On the other  
223 hand, the one-year lag value of political stability is also positively associated with the use of cleaner energy in the  
224 case of Pakistan. It is indicated from Table 3 that in the short run one 1 percent increase in the one-year lag value of  
225 political stability is causing a 2.130 percent increase in the use of clean energy. However, we could not find a  
226 significant difference between the current and lag value of political instability on the use of clean energy.

227 Next, we have concluded from the empirical results that economic growth is positively associated with the  
228 use of clean energy in Pakistan in the short run. In the same context, a 1 percent increase in economic growth leads  
229 to a 0.101 percent increase in the use of clean energy and it is significant at 5 percent. Meanwhile, the one-period lag  
230 of economic growth is also positively and significantly associated with the use of clean energy in Pakistan. It  
231 elaborates that with an increase in GDP, the economy invests in cleaner and environmentally friendly technologies.  
232 Our results in line with previous studies such as Ahmed and Long (2013), Javid and Sharif (2016), and Khan and  
233 Ullah (2019). Similarly, we have found that financial development is negatively associated with the use of clean  
234 energy in Pakistan. According to the empirical estimates for the short run, we can observe that a 1 percent increase  
235 in financial development is leading to a 1.290 percent decrease in the use of cleaner energy in Pakistan. Our results  
236 are consistent with the previous literature on the impact of financial development on environmental quality, for  
237 example, Zhang (2011); Ozturk and Acaravci (2013); Dogan and Turkekul (2016); Lahiani (2020) and Shoaib et al.  
238 (2020). These studies are of the view that financial development is causing a deterioration in overall environmental  
239 quality. Overall, we can justify the negative impacts of financial development through three effects namely,  
240 capitalization effect, technology effects, and income effect.

241 Next, we will explain the long-run coefficients of the clean energy model. We observe that in the long run,  
242 political stability is negatively associated with the use of clean energy however it is insignificant. In a similar study,  
243 Carlson and Lundström (2003) also found the insignificant impact of political stability on environmental quality.  
244 Similarly, Sarkodie and Adams (2018) also explained the insignificant association between political stability and

245 environmental degradation in South Africa. Furthermore, economic growth is positively associated with the use of  
246 cleaner energy, even though it is not significant. In the same context, Sharma (2011) also found a positive and  
247 insignificant impact of GDP on environmental quality for the sample of 69 countries. Financial development is also  
248 negatively associated with the use of cleaner energy but it is also insignificant. Few other studies in literature such as  
249 Dogan and Turkekul (2015) and Abid (2016) also found an insignificant association between these two variables of  
250 interest.

251 Now we will discuss the empirical results of the ARDL model for the CO2 model. We found a few very  
252 interesting insights in this regard. First, we will explain the short-run empirical estimates of the ARDL model. We  
253 can infer that in the short run the political stability is negatively associated with CO2 emissions but it is  
254 insignificant. Meanwhile, we have included a one-period lag value of political stability, which is positively  
255 influencing the use of CO2 emissions but it is insignificant. Our results are consistent with the previous literature,  
256 where different researchers found an insignificant relationship between political instability and CO2 emissions, for  
257 example, Carlsson and Lundström (2003) and Sarkodie and Adams (2018). Meanwhile, in the short run, economic  
258 growth is positively and significantly associated with the level of CO2 emissions. It implies that a 1 percent increase  
259 in economic growth will lead to the 0.006 percent increase in CO2 emissions and it is significant at 5 percent. We  
260 found immense literature on the positive and significant impact of GDP on CO2 emissions (Sharma, 2011;  
261 Kasperowicz,2015; Ullah et al,2020). Furthermore, the one-period lag of economic growth is negatively and  
262 significantly associated with the level of CO2 emissions in Pakistan.

263 In the previous literature on the impact of financial development on CO2 emissions, we observe that  
264 financial development can also spur manufacturing activities, therefore, consider to be the most important source to  
265 upsurge the CO2 emissions. In the present study, we can conclude from the short-run empirical analysis that  
266 financial development is positively associated with the level of emission in the short run and it is significant at 5 %.  
267 Meanwhile, a one-year lag value of financial development is negatively influencing the CO2 emissions and it is  
268 significant at 10 percent.

269 In the long run, we observe that political stability is negatively and significantly associated with CO2  
270 emissions i.e 1 percent increase in political stability, in the long run, causes an increase in CO2 emission by 1.267  
271 percent and it is significant at 10 percent. According to the previous literature political stability is one of the most  
272 prominent factors to improve environmental quality by increase clean energy consumption. In presence of political  
273 stability, the government can impose strict environmental regulations which in turn help to improve the  
274 environmental quality in the economy. Our results are consistent with previous literature, for example, Gani (2012);  
275 Lau et al. (2014), and Bhattacharya et al. (2017). Abid (2016) explained that political stability is positively  
276 influencing the environmental quality in the case of selected Sub-Saharan African countries. Al-Mulali and Ozturk,  
277 (2015) examined the impact of political stability on environmental quality in the case of the MENA region and  
278 concluded that political stability is helping to improve the environmental quality in these economies. Similarly,  
279 economic growth is also positively surging the level of CO2 emissions but it is not significant in our ARDL model.  
280 On the other hand, our financial development is positively and significantly causing an increase in CO2 emissions  
281 and the coefficient is significant at 5 percent. We found immense literature which is supporting the positive

282 association between financial development and CO2 emissions. For example, Komal and Abbas (2015) assessed that  
 283 financial development is positively associated with CO2 emissions in the case of Pakistan. Besides, Khan et al.  
 284 (2020) revealed that financial development is upsurging the level of CO2 emissions. Shahzad et al. (2017) applied  
 285 the ARDL test found a long-run and positive association between financial development and CO2 emissions in the  
 286 case of the Pakistani economy. Abbasi and Riaz, (2016) also supported the positive impact of the financial  
 287 development on CO2 emission.

288 We have explained the results of diagnostic tests in Table 3. First of all, F tests' values are confirming the  
 289 presence of co-integration for the clean energy model as well as the CO2 emission model. Furthermore, to know  
 290 about the existence of serial correlation in our estimated models we have applied a Lagrange multiplier test. Its  
 291 coefficient is insignificant in both of the models. Therefore we can conclude that there is no serial correlation in  
 292 these estimated models. At the same time by looking at the values of the RESET test we can conclude that there are  
 293 no model specification errors in our estimated models. In the end, we are concerned with the stability of the  
 294 parameters in both of the estimated models. Thus we have applied two tests, i.e. CUSUM test and the CUSUMSQ  
 295 test. Here “S” implies stability whereas “US” implies instability. However, we can see in Table 3 that both of our  
 296 models are indicating the stability of the parameters.

297

298 **Table 3: ARDL and NARDL of Clean energy consumption and CO2**

	Clean energy model				CO2 model			
	ARDL		NARDL		ARDL		NARDL	
	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Coefficient	t-Statistic
<b>Short-run</b>								
D(PS)	2.987**	3.794			-0.045	-0.761		
D(PS(-1))	2.130**	1.972			0.079	1.381		
D(PS(-2))	-0.845	-0.863						
D(PS(-3))	-1.352	-1.591						
D(PS_POS)			1.201*	1.736			-0.197*	-1.731
D(PS_POS(-1))			2.768**	2.318			0.189	1.315
D(PS_POS(-2))			-2.479**	-3.038			-0.008	-0.066
D(PS_NEG)			1.594*	1.902			0.027	0.173
D(PS_NEG(-1))			-1.449	-0.887			-0.138	-0.870
D(PS_NEG(-2))			4.181**	2.976				
D(EG)	0.101**	3.146	0.158**	4.470	0.006**	2.005	0.011**	2.628
D(EG(-1))	0.092**	2.248			-0.011**	-3.462	-0.021**	-4.822
D(FD)	-1.290	-1.566	-1.990**	-3.420	0.255**	3.859	0.287**	3.154
D(FD(-1))			-1.436*	-1.776	-0.130*	-1.814	-0.165*	-1.728
D(FD(-2))			-1.049	-1.450			0.110	1.211
<b>Long-run</b>								
PS	-18.58	-0.437			-1.267*	-1.869		
PS_POS			-0.247	-0.438			-0.381	-0.198
PS_NEG			-0.778*	-1.771			1.202*	1.722
EG	0.442	0.502	0.200**	4.635	0.118	0.883	0.242	0.744

FD	-11.04	-0.480	0.267	0.634	5.671**	2.004	4.809*	1.669
C	107.32	0.462	1.382	0.858	0.304	0.047	-3.740	-0.174
<b>Diagnostic stat</b>								
F-test	3.977*		1.971		10.07**		10.22**	
ECM(-1)	-0.072	0.395	-0.787**	-5.411	-0.346**	2.373	-0.681*	1.678
LM	0.975		1.146		1.184		1.748	
R-set	1.167		0.182		1.418		0.085	
CUSUM	S		S		S		S	
CUSUMsq	S		S		S		US	
Wald-SR			3.982**				1.987	
Wald-LR			2.123				4.987**	

299 **Note:** Significance levels: \*\*, 5%; and \*, 10%.

300

301 Now we will explain the asymmetric effects of political instability on clean energy use and CO2 emissions  
302 in the case of Pakistan. First, we will explain the short-run coefficients of the clean energy use model. As column 2  
303 of Table 3 reveals that in the short run, a positive shock in political stability is positively associated with the use of  
304 clean energy and it is significant at 10 percent. Moreover, a negative shock in political stability is also positively and  
305 significantly associated with clean energy use in Pakistan. The empirical results are supporting the asymmetries in  
306 the relationship between political stability and the use of clean energy in the case of Pakistan. In the same regard,  
307 Purcel (2019) explained the relationship between political stability and environmental degradation in the case of  
308 lower and middle-income countries and concluded an inverted U shape relationship. Meanwhile, a positive shock in  
309 the one-year lag value of political stability is also positively associated with the use of clean energy and it is  
310 significant at 5 percent. We can infer from our empirical analysis that economic growth is positively influencing the  
311 use of clean energy in the case of Pakistan. The empirical results are supported by previous literature, Nasir and  
312 Rehman (2011); Ahmed and Long (2013); Javid & Sharif (2016) and Khan & Ullah (2019). We can infer from our  
313 empirical estimation that financial development exerting a negative influence on the use of clean energy. We found  
314 immense evidence from the existing literature in this regard. For instance; Haseeb et al. (2018), Pata (2018),  
315 Gokmenoglu and Sadeghieh (2019).

316 In the long run, a positive shock in political stability is negatively influencing the use of clean energy;  
317 however, it is not significant. Similarly, a negative shock in political stability is negatively and significantly  
318 associated with the use of clean energy. Also, Rizk and Slimane (2018) indicated that political stability can lower  
319 CO2 emissions. In the case of economic growth we have observed that in the long run, economic growth is exerting  
320 a positive influence on the use of clean energy. Ahmed and Long (2013) and Javid and Sharif (2016) also found the  
321 same evidence in case of Pakistan. In the long run the financial development is negatively and insignificantly  
322 associated with the use of clean energy. On the same lines, Ding et al. (2018) also found an insignificant association  
323 between financial development and CO2 emissions for China and 219 trading partners for the time period 2004 to  
324 2014.

325 Next, we will discuss the asymmetric impacts of political stability on CO2 emissions in the case of  
326 Pakistan. The empirical results of the short-run estimates of the NARDL model reveal that a positive shock in  
327 political stability is negatively associated with CO2 emissions and also a negative shock in political stability is


328 positively associated with the level of CO2 emissions. Therefore in the case of Pakistan, we can infer the presence of  
329 asymmetries between political stability and CO2 emissions. Similarly in the short run, financial development is a  
330 prominent source of CO2 emissions in our empirical analysis. As indicated by our empirical analysis a positive  
331 shock in financial development is causing an increase in CO2 emissions.

332 In the long run, a positive shock in political stability is exerting a negative influence on CO2 emissions and  
333 a negative shock in political stability is causing an upsurge in CO2 emissions. We found strong evidence of  
334 asymmetries in the said relationship in the case of Pakistan. According to our empirical analysis economic growth is  
335 positively associated with CO2 emissions in the long run. There is immense literature available in the same context,  
336 for instance, Tamazian et al. (2009); Shahbaz et al. (2013) and Dogan and Seker (2016). Financial development is  
337 proved to be an important determinant of an increase in CO2 emissions. Our results are consistent with Ozturk and  
338 Acaravci (2013) and Farhani and Ozturk, (2015). These studies are of the view that financial development is actually  
339 giving a way to enter heavy industries into the economy and therefore up surging the CO2 emissions.

340 In the end, we will discuss the results of diagnostic tests, in the case of NARDL models for clean energy  
341 use and CO2 emissions. The F test values validate the joint significance of long run estimates for both models i.e  
342 clean energy and CO2 emissions. Besides, the critical values of the F test also confirm the existence of cointegration  
343 in both models. To check the serial correlation, we have applied the LM test and by looking at the estimated  
344 coefficients of LM tests we could not find any evidence of serial correlation. Besides, to check the correct model  
345 specification, and also stability of the parameters we have applied three tests, RESET CUSUM, and CUSUMsq  
346 tests. These tests validate the correct model specification as well as parameters stability. According to the estimated  
347 values of the goodness of fit measures tests, we can infer that models are well fitted. We applied the Wald test to  
348 confirm the asymmetries in the model. We can infer from the estimated coefficients of Wald tests that both the short  
349 as well as long-run asymmetries are existing in our estimated models. The dynamic multiplier of the impact of  
350 political stability on clean energy use and CO2 emissions are depicted in Figures (1) and (2).

351


352 **Figure 1: Asymmetric dynamic multipliers effects of political stability on clean energy consumption**



353

354

355 **Figure 2: Asymmetric dynamic multipliers effects of political stability on the CO2 model**



356

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358

359 **Conclusion and implications**

360 The key purpose of this paper is to investigate the asymmetric impact of political instability on clean  
361 energy consumption and CO2 emissions in Pakistan. To achieve this objective, the time-series data NARDL  
362 approach is employed for the period 1990–2019. The findings of the study have revealed that political stability and  
363 instability have a positive and significant impact on clean energy consumption in short run. However, the short-run  
364 effects of political stability lower CO2 emissions in Pakistan; this finding is in accordance with the theory. However,  
365 CO2 emissions in Pakistan is not affected by the political instability in short-run. Moreover, in long-run, political  
366 stability did not show any significant and robust effects on clean energy consumption and CO2 emissions.  
367 Conversely, in long-run, political instability has only revealed negative and significant effects on clean energy  
368 consumption but it has a positive impact on CO2 emissions in Pakistan. The asymmetric results show that policy  
369 instability has a more dramatic and robust impact on clean energy consumption and CO2 emissions than political  
370 stability. This finding is consistent with Al-Mulali & Ozturk (2015), who argues that political instability leads to  
371 lower public-private clean energy investments and, hence, lower clean energy consumption and more carbon  
372 emissions.

373 Based on empirics, some specific implications can be made for the deployment of clean energy and  
374 environment. The institution should reduce the conflicts and political instability in Pakistan is essential for social,  
375 economic, and political performance. The conflicts and political instability weaken the clean energy consumption  
376 and production performance, but it also declines the environmental regulations. Thus Pakistan needs to develop a  
377 strong political and institutional framework for environmental quality. Pakistan needs to take measures to improve  
378 governance and redesign the stable economic policies of energy and environment. Future studies can also focus on  
379 the impacts of numerous socioeconomic factors such as health, education, social security and instability, economic  
380 instability on clean energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Further empirical inquiry is required to seek better  
381 measures and channels through which political instability affects clean energy consumption and CO2 emissions.  
382 Future research should use a different measure of political instability in analysis for robust analysis.

383

384 **Ethical Approval:** Not applicable

385 **Consent to Participate:** I am free to contact any of the people involved in the research to seek further clarification  
386 and information

387 **Consent to Publish:** Not applicable

388 **Authors Contributions:** This idea was given by Muhammad Tayyab Sohail. Parvez Ahmed Shaikh, Muhammad  
389 Tayyab Sohail, and Muhammad Tariq Majeed analyzed the data and wrote the complete paper. While  
390 Zubaria Andlib read and approved the final version.

391 **Funding:** Not applicable.

392 **Competing interests:** The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

393 **Availability of data and materials:** The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from  
394 the corresponding author on reasonable request.

395

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