In this article, we analyze the industrial organization of the Maritime Seismic Acquisition Market (MSAM). Firms in this market are process, science, and technology-intensive and provide critical geophysical information for oil companies operating in the upstream offshore segment. We aim to find the determinants of price and cost changes and their relationships with market structures, firms conduct, and performance (SCP), considering the effect of oil price volatility on MSAM demand. To achieve this objective, we use a theoretical framework of Industrial Organization (IO) to analyze the empirical data of MSAM at a global database between 2006 and 2019. Our work is structured to estimate SCP and the New Empirical IO (NEIO) parameters related to concentration, market power, and competition and verify the hypothesis about market power or collusion from empirical demand and cost models. We found that concentration levels and profits in MSAM firms decrease to any demand increase. These concentration and profit fluctuations occur because market-fringe firms generate competitive pressure on the industry's average costs, an essential factor explaining price increases during market heating periods. Although MSAM has a sizeable concentration level, its firms have low levels of market power and markups with a high degree of competition, which is typical of a Competitive Oligopoly.