Following Kaplan and Schoar’s (2005) comprehensive study on overall private equity performance, there is increasing scientific interest on the performance of real estate private equity funds (Nadler 2018). However, the literature on the factors affecting CEREF performance and thus share value is scarce and mainly focused on global performance (Arnold, Ling, and Naranjo 2021, 2019; Aarts and Baum 2016; Krautz and Fuerst 2015; Alcock et al. 2013; Tomperi 2010; Anson and Hudson-Wilson 2003) and European performance (Morri, Perini, and Anconetani 2021; Delfim and Hoesli 2016; Kiehelä and Falkenbach 2015; Fuerst, Lim, and Matysiak 2014, 2013; Fuerst and Matysiak 2013; Brounen, Veld, and Raitio 2007). National studies exist only on the US market (Arnold, Ling, and Naranjo 2021; Farrelly and Stevenson 2019; Barker, Seah, and Shilling 2019; Arnold, Ling, and Naranjo 2017; Fisher and Hartzell 2016; Case 2015; Hahn, Geltner, and Gerardo-Lietz 2005; Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli 2005) and to a lower extent on the UK market (Farrelly and Matysiak 2012; Bond and Mitchell 2010; Baum and Farrelly 2009). To the best of our knowledge, the only studies analyzing CEREFs in the German market and their performance are Nadler (2018) and Delfim and Hoesli (2016). Nadler (2018) compares the ex-ante and ex-post performance disclosures of German CEREFs and finds substantial problems due to the overestimation bias of many fund managers. Delfim and Hoesli (2016) compare five European countries using NAVs from 2001 to 2014, inferring that the impacts of macroeconomic factors are country dependent and, as posited by Farrelly and Stevenson (2019) and Fuerst, Lim, and Matysiak (2014, 2013), depend on whether the fund is open-ended or closed-ended. Furthermore, they compare the reactions of non-listed funds, listed RESs, and direct real estate funds to several fund characteristics and conclude that fund characteristics such as investment style, vehicle structure, size, and leverage affect all three fund types; the latter two factors exhibit optimal levels at which their respective impacts reverse, while fund age only affects CEREFs.
Studies assessing the German market for OEREFs, the other part of private equity real estate funds, are scarce; however, there are more studies related to OEREFs than CEREFs. Gerlach and Maurer (2020) assess the secondary market activities of OEREFs and find high trading levels when the fund management company has suspended the issue or redemption of shares. Moreover, they find that shares trade at a discount when the fund management company suspends their redemption, whereas they trade at a premium when the fund management company suspends their issue. Finally, they find that there has been an increase in secondary market trading activities since German regulations introduced a minimum holding period of 24 months and mandatory notice period of 12 months for share redemptions. Schnejdar et al. (2020) assess the impact factors of the NAV spread on the secondary market for OEREFs, based on the difference between transaction prices on the secondary market and the indicated NAV. They find that leverage, liquidity ratio, extraordinary payouts, the share of institutional investors, and the policy uncertainty index affect the NAV spread. Stein (2014, 2013) provides an overview of the effects of the global financial crisis on the risk and return characteristics of OEREFs with regard to NAV and transaction prices in the secondary market. Kurzrock, Gläsner, and Wilke (2009) assess whether significant performance differences occur between retail and institutional funds and find that the asset allocation of funds mainly drive the mean relative returns and that institutional investors are better-off than retail investors.
Most studies that focus on real estate private equity fund performance compute the returns on NAVs provided by industry associations and other third-party data providers, such as INREV, Burgiss, Cambridge Associates, Investment Property Databank, NCREIF, and Preqin. This is particularly problematic given that the available information from industry associations and other third-party data providers is voluntarily provided by the respective fund managers, as the issuing companies are not obliged by the federal or state regulations to publish performance data or other fund information (Arnold, Ling, and Naranjo 2019). Additionally, in almost all cases, NAVs are computed for non-liquidized funds, thus increasing the potential reporting bias; this has caused much controversy regarding the reliability of performance data. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) find that private equity fund performance in previous research is overstated and largely driven by the inflated accounting valuation of ongoing investments. Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014) and Jenkinson, Sousa, and Stucke (2013), conversely, find that fund valuations are conservative, with exceptions during the period when follow-on funds are raised. Nadauld et al. (2019) assess a global sample of transaction prices in the secondary market for private equity investments and find that most transactions occur at a discount on the NAV. They strongly emphasize that substantial discretion is required when computing NAVs and point out that the extent to which NAVs fairly represent the present value of a fund’s future cash flows is unclear. However, our data are not based on hypothetical NAVs provided by fund managers but on realized transaction prices in the secondary market, where the supply and demand of the market meet and define the price of a CEREF share.
Another issue with the performance data of CEREFs with regard to industry associations and other third-party data providers is that the number of underlying funds is relatively small compared to the total number of available funds on the market. For example, INREV includes only 38 funds from 10 different issuing companies, and 19 funds stem from one issuing company for the German CEREFs market. However, our data are based on 412 CEREFs from 131 issuing companies, thus reflecting a large sample and market diversity.
Factors affecting the price or performance of real estate assets have been extensively discussed in the literature, but few studies have investigated private equity real estate funds, and even fewer have focused on CEREFs. Fuerst and Matysiak (2013), Fuerst, Lim, and Matysiak (2014, 2013) and Fairchild, MacKinnon, and Rodrigues (2011) find that for samples of private equity real estate funds, fund size and fund age respectively have positive and negative impacts on price, based on European or US samples. However, most of the literature is related to direct real estate or listed real estate companies. Kohlert (2010) shows that, in the UK direct real estate market, unemployment negatively affects asset performance. According to Schätz and Sebastian (2009), the German market displays the same relationship between direct real estate funds and OEREFs; additionally, they find that government bonds have a positive impact. Adams and Füss (2010) showed the positive impact of economic activity on a global data sample of direct real estate.
To the best of our knowledge, property-related factors, such as property size or age, have not yet been analyzed in the context of listed or private equity real estate markets. A major reason for this is the broad portfolio of various properties within one vehicle, making it difficult to summarize their status in concrete figures. While German CEREFs are, for the most part, single-property funds, for which property-related figures are relatively easy to specify, listed real estate assets or German OEREFs are multi-property vehicles. For example, German OEREFs must follow the principle of risk mixing through diversification such that no property has a share of more than 15% in the portfolio at the time of purchase. However, Esrig, Hudgins, and Cerreta (2011) show that large properties have historically outperformed smaller properties on an absolute and risk-adjusted basis while controlling for sectors: of office, multifamily, retail, and the top six metropolitan areas Boston, New York, Washington DC, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Additionally, they state that previous studies have generally failed to control for property type and, thus, the academic literature on the performance of large properties is inconclusive. However, this study controls for property types by generating subsamples. In general, for most properties we can assume that the older a property, the lower the transaction price, as the future costs of renovation work increase with time.
Transaction-related factors such as the number or volume of transactions in stock or secondary markets are often used as simple proxies for liquidity (Ametefe, Devaney, and Marcato 2016). However, no previous study has assessed CEREFs using this proxy, as most of them are based on NAVs and not on secondary market transactions. Because of the overall illiquid characteristic of the secondary market for CEREFs, we assume that higher liquidity in the market reflects higher demand, causing an increase in prices.