4.1 Explaining the upward pattern of terrorist attacks in the Sahel (2001–2017)
A comparison of the frequency of terrorist attacks in the Sahel between the two terms of George W Bush (2001-2009) and Barack Obama (2009-2017) shows that the security architecture put in place by the United States and its partners in the region was ineffective. The available data from the GTD indicate that the number of terrorist attacks leapt more than thirteen fold. Data show an increase from 277 during the presidency of George Bush, to 3691 attacks during the tenure of President Obama. This surge resulted in a rise in the number of victims from 1018 to 22268. Since the French military intervention in 2013 in response to the spillover of rebels from Libya and the subsequent fall of Northern Mali into the hands of terrorist organizations and Tuareg rebels, Statistics show an unprecedented surge in terrorist attacks in the G-5 Sahel states and Nigeria (see Fig1).
Before 2012, the average number of attacks in Mali was four per year. Between 2012 and 2017, this number jumped to an average of 63 attacks per year (Fig. 2). This is despite the recapture of Northern Mali by the French operation codenamed Serval in 2014.
The role of American Africa Command was to provide intelligence and air support to its European allies via its drone airbase near Agadez Niger. In 2013, the American administration announced the deployment of 40 U.S. military personnel to Niger, raising the total number of American forces in the country to around 100. The officially stated mission of these troops was to “provide support for intelligence collection and … also facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the region” (Obama 2013). Over the next few years, the U.S. military presence in Niger increased from 100 to around 800 troops. In Niger, which hosts the US air base known as Nigerien Base 201, the number of terrorist attacks has increased since 2014 (Fig.3), from an average of four attacks per year from 2007 to 2014 to an average of 33 attacks per year in the post-2014 period. A similar trend could also be observed in Burkina Faso for the same period in Fig.4, in Chad (Fig.5), and in Nigeria (Fig.6).
A basic examination of the increase in terrorist attacks in the Sahel shows a rising trend after NATO’s intervention in Libya, which led to the overthrow and assassination of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011. According to a report prepared by a UN assessment team, the collapse of the Libyan government gave militant groups access to large weapons caches (United Nations 2012). The report indicates that large quantities of weapons and ammunition were smuggled from Libyan stockpiles to Sahel countries by former militants in Libya. This influx of weapons and fighters exacerbated an already precarious and delicate situation, particularly in northern Mali, where ethnic rifts and simmering political tensions combined with the socioeconomic situation provided fertile ground for terrorist organizations, such as AQIM and other local groups to thrive and seize territory. Fig.7 shows that most attacks in the G-5 Sahel and Nigeria took the form of armed assaults, bombings, and explosions, as well as hostage taking and attacks on facilities. Terrorist group violence remains largely concentrated in four theaters: Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and the Lake Chad Basin, with much lower intensity in Burkina Faso and Mauritania from 2001 to 2017. Suicide bombings are another characteristic tactic. Their number has increased especially in Nigeria, Mali, and Chad, where the most active terrorist groups are Buko Haram, the Fulani extremists, and AQIM and its offshoots.
Analysis of terrorist attacks by location shows the "hottest" cities in each Sahel state. In Mali, most attacks were concentrated in the cities of Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu, and Aguelhok, while the capital Bamako was the sixth hottest city. The capital city of Niamey in Niger also ranked as the sixth hottest city, while the cities of Boso, Diffa, and Agadez had the most attacks. In contrast to Bamako, the capitals of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad hosted the most attacks compared to other cities. The geographical focus of terrorist attacks appears to be less related to ungoverned spaces, although they may be a tempting playing field for extremists. Fig.8 shows that terrorist attacks have affected major cities in the Sahel, including capital cities, and is spreading from Mali to Burkina Faso, posing a growing threat to West African coastal states.
Many Sahelian specialists might concur that the Sahel is inaccurately problematized as an ungoverned region and might endorse the discernment that it is, in reality, a misgoverned space. In a webinar organized by the Congress sponsored Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, Camara (2022), a Sahel expert and a former Malian senior official and advisor, underlined the importance of instilling a sense of national belonging among the local population in northern Mali through simple symbolic actions, like the extension of national TV channels broadcasting to these spaces. Regarding state presence, Camara (2002) provides the example of local governors and elected officials who do not even appear in these remote areas and are unfamiliar to the local populace. In a similar vein, Lyammouri (2022) warned that the presence of the state and its security forces in previously captured spaces by radical groups should not be associated with abuses against the local population. Because they have negotiated for their livelihood with radical groups, locals are perceived by security forces as collaborators with these groups and hence became subject to human rights violations. Deterrence by constructive state presence measures, what Wilner (2011) termed as ‘behavioral defenses’, would achieve a defensive denial through an overwhelming security environment that reassures rather than compels the population into further displacement.
4.2 The correlation between State fragility and the surge of terrorist attacks
After reviewing the Fragile State Index (FSI) of each state in the G-5 Sahel and considering statistics from the GTD database on the increase in terrorist attacks, we conducted a correlation test for each country to determine a possible relationship between trends in state fragility and the increase in terrorist attacks. The test is conducted over a seven-year period from 2011–2017, as FSI data is not available prior to 2011. From the correlation tables, we can see two important parts of the results: Pearson's R (correlation coefficient) and the 2-tailed significance value. The generated results show that there is either a negative, weak or a moderate correlation between the fragility index of the Sahelian states (first variable) and the increase in terrorist attacks (second variable). This means that the increase or decrease in one variable is not associated with an increase or decrease in the other variable; thus, there is no linear correlation.
In the case of Mali, for example, Fig. 8 indicates a very weak negative correlation (-8%), implying that the more terrorist attacks in the country, the lower its fragility index and the effect is minor. The 2-tailed significance value in this case corresponds to 0.798, which is > 0.05 (The standard alpha value). This means that the correlation is insignificant, and the relation is limited to a small sample size (N of years = 11). From the simple scatter with fit line of fragile states index by number of attacks, the data points in all the graphs of G-5 Sahel states and Nigeria do not cluster tightly around the regression line, displaying a weak to moderate relationship. A similar insignificant correlation is obtained for the rest of the Sahel States (see appendix 1 for correlation results).
4.3. Discussion
From the individual trends of terrorist attacks (Figs. 2–6), the S-curves show an increase in terrorist attacks after 2012 and a decrease after 2015. This wave-like trend suggests a temporary success of military counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. Despite their legal and moral contentions, targeted killings could substantially degrade the coercive capability of radical groups through the elimination of their personnel and assets and influence individual motivation and group behavior (Wilner 2011). However, the resurgence and expansion of attacks demonstrate that what has been achieved through military operations has not been sustainable. A military-centric approach based on punishment might achieve temporary success, but sustained stabilization should rely on a fully integrated approach that includes other nonmilitary deterrents. The 9/11 Commission emphasized that significant progress against terrorism cannot be achieved exclusively with military force. (Kean et al. 2004). Punishment measures against terrorist groups might diminish their operational capabilities, but it could not eradicate the ideology that spawns new recruits. For Chellaney (2019), “Targeting terrorists and their networks brings only temporary success—but the long-term strategy needs to focus on discrediting the ideologies that attract attackers”.
Although terrorist groups in the Sahel are shaped by different domestic contexts (Raleigh and Dowd 2013), the character of the American GWOT through its totalizing narrative promotes the misleading tendency to assume that all these groups are monolithic with a transnational agenda that espouses the doctrine of global jihad against the unholy West. The majority of radical groups in the Sahel are not homogenous manifestations of a single Jihadist ideology as most of them have emerged from domestic grievances fueled by ethnic divide, political marginalization and deteriorated socio-economic status. Raleigh and Dowd (2013,p.13) assert that “the groups operating within the Sahel are, by and large, domestic groups operating within their own subnational contexts, and challenging local, regional and national governance over issues of corruption, marginalization, political exclusion and mismanagement”.
The U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel should therefore shift its goal from defeating terrorism to deterring it based on a distinction between transnational and domestic types of radical groups. Trager and Zagorcheva (2006) suggest that the United States could deter domestically based organizations from joining Al Qaeda's global network by threatening to intervene against what they value, namely their domestic objectives. In this context, "[T]errorists would be coerced into courses of action not just out of fear for their lives and property, but also out of fear for their cause" (Trager and Zagorcheva 2006, p.101). That being said, the United States FTO list should at least consider a new typology that distinguishes between radical groups that use terrorist signature tactics as an instrument to achieve domestic political goals and those groups which embrace transnational terrorism as an end in itself, what Garfinkle (2009) called apocalyptic terrorism. This new typology is critical in that it allows tailored policy tools to be prescribed for each type, rather than a one-size-fits-all strategy that paints all radical groups with the same brush and might achieve only temporary success. While a focus on punishment might be effective with the apocalyptic type of radical groups like AQIM, a greater emphasis on denial and delegitimization might be more effective with the instrumental type of ethnic-based radical groups like the Macina Liberation Front and Ansar Al-dine in Mali. The Fulanis and Tuaregs, respectively, dominate the two groups, and both ethnicities share political opposition to the ‘Bambara-dominated’ government in Bamako. Camara (2002) argues in favor of a dialogue with some of JNIM members as the majority of them are locals who oppose the central governments more than defending a solid line ideology. She recommends that central governments in Bamako and Ouagadougou should engage JNIM in selected predefined situations for the benefit of establishing lines of communication. Admitting the divergent views about negotiating with some terrorist groups, Camara (2022) stresses that the public opinion in Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso is increasingly convinced that war cannot be won by weapons and that dialogue is necessary.
In this regard, the Trans Saharan region needs less militarization, more diplomacy, and socio-economic resilience programs. The recently appointed US special envoy to the Sahel should play an active role in supporting the efforts of the Algerian and Mauritanian governments – partner countries in the TSCTP – to achieve national reconciliation between the different segments of the Malian people. A comprehensive and lasting peace could cut off the road for AQIM to trade on the ethnic divide and political marginalization of certain Malian ethnicities, particularly the Tuaregs in the north of the country. Stabilizing Mali is a key factor that would have a positive snowball effect on neighboring countries in the Sahel. Although the 2015 Algiers agreement suffers many obstacles for its implementation (Pellerin 2020), it could open the door for other groups to lay down their arms and join the peace process if the United States focuses its investments in the Sahel on State building, law enforcement, and economic opportunity development rather than training and equipping local armies. Deterrence by mitigation functions by moderating the social, political, and economic effects of terrorism. In the words of Wilner (2011, p.23), “Broad mitigating factors include a robust economy, an effective political system, and a resilient society able to withstand the shocks of terrorism”. Diplomacy and denial mitigations are just two of other non-military facets that could feed into the arteries of regional stability and affect the calculus of radical groups. Another important deterrent could be a well-engaged deradicalization process based on a robust counter narrative that targets the beliefs and rationales that guide the conduct of radical groups.
The TSCTP reliance on military information support teams (MIST) to provide counter-extremism services such as funding local films or donating books to schools is both state-centric and impractical given realities on the ground. Neglecting the important role of insiders such as tribal and religious leaders in this delicate mission of delegitimizing the radical narrative reveals another shortcoming of the TSCTP. One could argue that the United States would not be entitled to lead a sensible mission that targets the 'religious bona fede' of AQIM and its offshoots. This could lead to counterproductive results and even embolden radical groups, considering that the disproportionate U.S. response to the September 11 attacks painted a bleak picture of an America that targets Muslims and Islam. Although delegitimization is not the province of Western governments, as Long and Wilner (2014) note, Washington could play the role of a potential facilitator to support homegrown programs and initiatives led by local scholars and religious leaders in the Sahel. For instance, a group of scholars and sheikhs from five countries in the African Sahel announced the creation of the League of Ulema (Scholars), Preachers and Imams of the Sahel (LOPIS), with the participation of imams and preachers from Algeria, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The League's main mission is to change the behavior of active and would-be extremists. During their workshops in various Sahel countries, LOPIS members emphasized reviving the role of imams and scholars in addressing extremism in the Sahel by combating the spread of religious illiteracy and ignorance of the essence and truth of the Islamic religion, which calls for peace, dialogue, coexistence and reconciliation. For example, the 2021 Algiers workshop emphasized the need to combat extremist ideas by promoting "religious values of moderation" by focusing on the "curriculum of Islamic education in the region's countries." (Sidhoum 2021).