Collaborative public governance has been profoundly over-romanticised recently. The protagonists often show optimism in joint actions achieving better performance while downplaying myriad dysfunctions these collaborations posit in public administration (Sowa, 2008; Kagan et al., 1993). First, collaborative governance efforts come in loosely organised and embedded forms of joint action systems in public administration (Lopes and Farias, 2022; Percy-Smith, 2006; Stoker, 2006; Agranoff, 1991; Gerton and Mitchell, 2019). This means they may easily succumb to internal and inter-agency politics and, as such, remains too complex to realise, especially in contexts where public administration is only developing like those in Africa. Also, joint actions require more intentional public leadership to realise and sustain an issue that is problematic in public administration and may be short-lived if realised. This being the case, despite many success stories realising joint organisational actions characteristically bear tensions and conflicts in public management (Christiansen et al. 2007; Hudson et al. 1999).
Another thing, multi-agency network policy processes may acquire other complex public governance modes and approaches, which could require public managers to have additional skill sets and resources that may not be at their disposal. This is especially so in African contexts where public administration typically works under conditions of resource scarcity that cannot fully support public innovations inherent in inter-agency collaborations (Bernardi and de Chiara, 2011; Chelagat et al., 2019). The implication of this is that such challenges become more inevitable as collaborations increase in scope in trying to deal with difficulties in creating sustainable systems, responding to the demand for innovation, and the ambiguity of goals common in public administration (Agranoff 1991; Gerton and Mitchell 2019; Capano et al. 2022).
This paper argues that these challenges or subsequent dysfunctionalities, such as unclear collaboration mechanisms and norms, weaknesses of coordination processes, information-sharing deficits and lack of cooperation in auditing and investigations, are characteristic of social processes gaps that underpin inter-agency collaborations. Despite elaborate studies on these collaborative governance issues, this research agenda is still lagging in Africa. Much of what we know about joint action challenges refers to the European and North American experiences, as similar institutional arrangements currently proliferating in developing country contexts in Africa are still vastly under-reported. This paper illuminates this void using trust variables as explanatory variables.
Recently, studies on collaborative governance have identified the significant role of trust variables in determining the success or failure of joint actions (Stoker, 2006; Getha-Taylor et al., 2019; Christensen and Lægreid, 2019; Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014; Ran and Qi, 2019; Onyango 2019). In public administration, the public value and governance theories vividly discuss trust composites in discerning how multi-agency collaborations function. They mainly show that trust is needed for the personnel to be more motivated by engaging in networks, partnerships, mutual respect, and learning relationships (e.g. Song et al., 2019; Temby et al., 2017). The argument is that collaborative arrangements functionally reside in informal processes that complement or glue together loosely matched legal repertoires for inter-agency interaction to foster coordination, information-sharing, planning, implementation, and collaboration (Bardach, 2001; Percy-Smith, 2006; Onyango, 2020; Ansell et al., 2022). This paper draws on secondary data to dissect these issues in the context of anti-corruption policy implementation in Kenya. It begins by devising a multi-agency approach anchored on organisational trust attributes to understand these collaborative dimensions.
The proceeding discussion is organised as follows. The first section reviews and identifies the trust composites of the multi-agency relations and looks into how the two links unpack policy programs' implementation processes. This section further packages the underlying attitudes and organisational composites of inter-agency relations. The next section builds on this to develop a framework of inter-agency trust before focusing on the context of the multi-agency approach in Kenya. After this is the presentation of the study's methodology, data presentation and discussion, and conclusion sections.
The Kenyan case is relevant because it provides an interesting African experience and unique insights into collaborative governance outside the European and North American experiences. Since the 2010s, the Kenyan policy landscape, like most African countries, has witnessed a growth in governance approaches like multi-agency relations in public policy and public service delivery (e.g., Otenyo 2021; Obosi, 2022; Onyango, 2022). This way, a focus on Kenya contributes to the growing research on challenges characterising the fragility and complexity of inter-agency relations in public governance in African public service.
Understanding Multi-agency Collaborations And How Trust Comes In: A Review
Finding a functional model that effectively couples legal and non-legal or informal operations are often a challenge in public administration (Bernardi and de Chiara, 2011; Chelagat et al., 2019; Christensen and Lægreid, 2019). For one, public organisations are more concerned about the loss of power that comes with organising tasks across institutional boundaries (Molenveld et al., 2020; Onyango, 2019a). There are also constraints like overlapping organisational mandates, political inclinations, capacity issues, the lack of joint budgeting, assessing collaborative capacity and trust-building from principled conduct, etc. (Hudson et al., 1999; Percy-Smith, 2006; Onyango and Ondiek, 2021; Milward and Provin, 2006). This way, collaborative governance advocates are keen on building mutual trust to overcome institutional constraints of inter-agency collaborations (Stoker, 2006). Mutual trust between partners would reduce the above collaborative constraints to increase performance. As a public governance approach, a multi-agency network is defined as "any joint activity by two or more agencies working together that is intended to increase public value by working together rather than separately" (Bardach, 1998, p.8).
Joint action is based on the idea that "complex policies are more effectively put into practice if agencies cooperate a lot, whereas less difficult tasks are handled just as well without inter-organisational cooperation" (Lundin, 2007, p.629). A study on designs for implementing HIV/AIDS in Kenya found that policy actors adopted a multi-agency approach because "the fragmentation of externalities has been producing less bureaucratic quality and capabilities, deriving from a significant lack of coordination and generating a proliferation of projects and creation of parallel systems of monitoring and evaluation" (Bernardi and de Chiara, 2011, p.35, also see Chelegat et al. 2019 on collaborative approaches to implementation of health policy programs in Kenya).
This means that much as multi-agency networks also need well-designed rational systems to be effective, they are primarily based on public managers' boundary-spanning skills. A study produced by the World Bank on a multi-agency approach to implementing anti-corruption policies in Kenya stated that key administrative challenges lay with the prevailing administrative skillsets and culture. It mentions that "traditionally, the obstacles to coordination between government agencies [in Kenya] stem from fundamental cultural differences and motivations of different agencies" (World Bank, n.d., p.268). These findings align with studies elsewhere (e.g., Song et al., 2019; Percy-Smith, 2006), showing that multi-agency networks rely profoundly on partnering organisations' cultural and environmental systems or contexts.
These dimensions point to potential linkages between performance problems in multi-agency relations and trust variables (O'Toole, 1997). The public sector's pyramidal or hierarchical organisational forms and implementation guidelines take on top-down synergies. These are more likely to come with inward-looking strategies that may constrain trust-building strategies between institutional actors (Onyango, 2019). Hierarchies reduce the human face and relations needed for effectively realising administrative or implementation processes. Often, however, managing collaborative networks take on horizontal management principles that, among others, chiefly factor in and fronts elements of trust, mainly mutual respect, equality, and confidence between partners (Milward and Provin, 2006). Since the multi-agency approach is conceptually ambiguous, it is often modelled under different categories or typologies, as summarised in Table 1 below. These typologies include hierarchical, working mode, and engagement levels (Fox and Butler, 2004).
Table 1
Some typologies of the Multi-Agency Approach
Typology
|
Activities
|
Purpose
|
Hierarchical
|
Information Sharing
|
Knowledge of the partner's role and capacity to do it; mutual learning, access to information; and openness in decision-making
|
Planning action
Implementing projects/plans
|
Identification of needs and activities; processes for such activities
Joint or separate planning, monitoring, reviewing, etc.
|
Coordination and Cooperation
|
Nurturing co-operative culture; admittance of new partners
|
Mode of Working
|
Autonomous working
|
Separate nature of programs; partners involved in training, advising, etc.
|
Coordinated working
|
Work separately but within commonly set goals and assessments.
|
Integrated working
|
Synsethization and coordination of work; ownership of the programs by the partners (institutionalisation); teamwork; holistic roles, etc.
|
Levels of Engagement
|
Cooperation
|
More formal relationships; goals are more on individuals than collective; future links.
|
Coordination
|
Joint agreement to work on collective goals; permission to influence each other.
|
Integration
|
High commitment to a shared goal; formation of a new engagement structure.
|
Source: Author's summary from Fox and Butler (2004)
To Fox and Butler (2004), under the level of engagement, partners can be further involved in mainly three functions: a) strategic function, which focuses on the priorities that influence the strategic plans of the individual partner. This is explicit in Kenya's Anti-Corruption strategic plan (2018–2023) drafted by Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) in collaboration with other stakeholders, mainly Transparency International (TI-Kenya) and other government agencies, like the Commission for Administrative Justice (CAJ) (e.g. World Bank n.d.), as Kenya's health policy programmes (Chelagat et al. 2019). b) Commissioning deals with the commissioning priorities of individual partners, including performance management of the policy programs. An example is Kenya's implementation of the current 18th -cycle performance contracting regarding anti-corruption strategies and policies in the public sector. c) Policy program concerned with transforming the individual partner from a virtual to a physical organisation that anyone can engage with.
We can also link these typologies' components to Mary Parker Follet's famous coordination principles in the context of a multi-agency network. These principles include the early stages principle that enables effective mapping of challenges such as limited resources, bounded rationality on decision-making, and efficient planning function mechanisms. The continuity principle may enhance certainty, learning, and seamlessness in public organisations' decision-making and implementation. Despite being more descriptive of internal relationships between the supervisors and subordinates, direct contact as the third principle may strengthen inter-agency relationships. This means it can enhance coordination through effective communication and reduced pathologies. It has become commonplace that pathologies like red tape and routines often stem from the hierarchy and hinder building mutual respect and trust in a multi-agency network (Bardach, 1998). The fourth principle of reciprocal relations is a central dimension of this study because it can lead to mutual trust through openness and transparency within and between agencies in a multi-agency network (Milward and Provin, 2006).
In short, the multi-agency approach seeks to de-bureaucratise public policy and service-delivery processes to, among others, acquire additional resources and skills which come with cooperating with like-minded organisations. Co-operations need reciprocal relationships, matching values and norms, shared missions and vision, teamwork, communication flow, ethical management tools, and a positive attitude towards each other (Pucetaite et al., 2010). Additionally, it calls for confidence, transparency, openness, compliance, and information-sharing among partners. In other words, mutual trust between partnering agencies involved in implementing or delivering a particular policy program is critical and central for co-creating sustainable implementation strategies (Ansell et al., 2022).
Most importantly, mutual trust takes critical cues from contextual variables or local dynamics. In public administration, these will include a complex mix of socio-cultural, economic, and political norms and structures that often explain trust deficits in transitional economies (Onyango, 2019a). The African public service, for example, is still relatively dealing with conditions that prevailed during the formative years of American public administration (see Onyango 2021; 2022). According to Dwight Waldo, these dysfunctions include disorganisation, amateurism, haphazardness, and dishonesty (Waldo, 1952). Therefore, contends Pucetaite et al. (2010), trust deficits in public institutions in the global south stem from
[…] certain social-historical processes that [condition] lower self-regulation, authoritarian and patriarchal organisational structures and lack of partnership-based interrelations between the manager and employees, a rather flexible attitude to the norms and standards, negligent behaviour at work, etc. (p. 198).
This makes it challenging to apply most Weberian models for trust-building in developing countries contexts. An issue that has been covered extensively in African Public Administration research. This study used a three-dimensional approach to framing trust-informed linkages in multi-agency relations in anti-corruption policy programs in Kenya.
A three-dimensional organisational approach to inter-agency trust
Mutual trust is conceptually ambivalent and difficult to measure. It has two components, namely, the cognition and affective components. The first "refers to an evaluative belief and usually a certain extent of experience and knowledge about the other actor. Cognition-based trust is founded on evaluative predictions and calculations, such as the probability of the reciprocal behaviour of the other party" (Pucetaite et al., 2010,199). Rational appraisals contingent on performance, compliance, ethical behaviours, etc., are based on cognition-based trust. Lewis and Wiegert (1985) argue that under cognition-based trust, "we choose whom we will trust in which respects and under what circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be 'good reasons,' constituting evidence of trustworthiness" (p. 970). The trustees' choice to trust or distrust is based on adequate knowledge or ignorance (McAllister, 1995). Other subsets of inter-organisational trust are performance-based, integrity, and transparency-based trust (Schoorman et al., 2007).
Conversely, affective-based trust is a sentimental and emotional bond between individuals to trust. Individuals invest emotionally in trusting relationships, genuine expressions, and care and concern for their partners' welfare. Also, there is a belief in the intrinsic virtue of such relationships and the reciprocity of such sentiments (McAllister, 1995, p.26). This facet of trust takes stock of a relationship's history over a long period and may be needed to sustain long-term organisational development. This means organisational environments should feature value-congruence between trustees, the fulfilment of expected outputs, sustained performance, and internal institutional culture (Pucetaite et al., 2010).
Most importantly, contends Pucetaite et al. (2010), affect-based trust "is proactive: it involves a mutual expectation of fair and honest behaviour. It is also characterised by congruence between the parties' values and interests" (p.199). Therefore, it may stimulate other subsets, mainly trust-based, predictability-based, and credibility-based (Schmidt and Schreiber, 2019). Affect-based trust can also enhance strong and semi-strong trust forms (Barney and Hansen, 1994). While referencing Barney and Hansen (1994, Schmidt and Schreiber (2019) summarise the distinction between the two forms of trust in the following manner;
Semi-strong trust occurs when parties to an exchange are protected through various social and economic costs imposed by governance devices, while strong trust emerges despite governance mechanisms. Strong trust… depends on the values, principles and standards of behaviour internalised by parties. One could also argue whether it may be included in the definition of social governance. That is, moral and ethical behaviour, taken from an anthropological perspective, are evolutionary forms of exclusion of individual actors from the group (Schmidt and Schreiber, 2019, p.74).
This paper's approach builds on cognition and affect-based trust and the subsets they may produce to describe the complex contexts of inter-agency collaboration in public administration. These factors are (a) the structural features of public organisations or the rational-bureaucratic perspective, (b) the informal variables of public organisations or the cultural perspective, and (c) the broader ecological variables of public organisations or the environmental perspective of inter-institutional trust. This three-dimensional perspective takes cues from rational, natural, and open systems perspectives (e.g., Scott and Davis [2007] 2015), as illustrated in Figure (1) below.
The normative perspective
The rational-bureaucratic systems order cognition-based trust between partner members. They stipulate the normative foundations of the bureaucracy that defines formal relationships, designs of organisations, and the degree of compliance with different roles and authorities in implementing policy programs. They further provide legal legitimacy for effective boundary-spanning strategies, which unpacks legal complexities that may limit the leeway of action and technicalities hindering policy collaborations. The subsequent legalistic flexibilities and organisational culture are antecedents for internal and external trust-building efforts, which can alternatively enhance institutional capacity and personnel commitments. And help determine the organisational purpose, clientele, and existing or possible collaboration strategies. Additionally, these rational systems involve organisational leaders' initiatives or how they use them as instruments to influence organisational values, vision, policy designs and problem structure norms.
In his study to map what he considers African management philosophy in Kenya and Tanzania, Mapunda (2012) shows that Kenyans and Tanzanian "employees expect the manager or leader to make authoritative decisions, to be decisive. In their minds, that is what he is employed to do. Consultation would be perceived as a sign of weakness – a lack of knowledge and confidence on the part of the manager or leader. Teamwork and empowerment are associated with 'Western' management styles" (p.14). While this may be applicable, it also suffices to state that organisational leaders' actions take on different issues. This includes their personal characteristics, historical relations between employees and the situation at hand. For instance, when it comes to collaborations, there are higher possibilities of consultations between organisational leaders and senior members or employees. Another factor is the specific organisational culture and its mandate. Altogether these factors may determine how organisational leaders utilise their legal mandates in collaborative initiatives.
From a rational-bureaucratic systems perspective, public managers considerably score high on rationality (Christensen et al., 2007) and engage in structural-instrumental legitimation of policy initiatives to improve internal and external environments for boundary-spanning activities. Jurisdictive responsibilities and functions bind institutional policy relationships for trust-building strategies. These functional roles may further enhance what Benne and Sheats (1948) refer to as task roles. Task roles relate to the information and data-seeking efforts, initiating and clarifying ideas, proposals, plans, coordination of groups, and groups' orientation towards achieving organisational goals and establishing outside contacts for policy collaboration and networks for integration processes.
Integration processes, in this case, are particularly critical in measuring the effectiveness of policy programs. This means the logic of action in rational-bureaucratic functions is that of consequences. Public managers weigh their actions on instrumental actions or bureaucratic scorecards and corresponding policy outcomes (March and Olsen, 2009; Christensen et al., 2007). Thus, building inter-agency trust strategies depends on existing instrumental capacities, the nature of public leadership, unambiguous objectives, and resources attached to policy programs, as I will show further in the data analysis and discussion sections below.
A Cultural Perspective
Frequently, cultural systems form the main operational repertoires of organisations (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 2008). As cultural systems, informal norms, values, and processes animate the interfaces between formal and informal administration properties. Overall, cultural systems connote composites of organisational culture, which closely match rational-bureaucratic components. For example, bureaucratic personalities of openness to learning from experiences and agreement, among others that align with the organisation's performance orientation, promote team-building attitudes, value integrity, innovations, etc. Studies have shown that cultural systems sustain and support collaborative networks (e.g., Bouckaert, 2012; Onyango, 2019). Especially by enhancing organisational communication and commitment, essential in retaining critical actors within an inter-agency collaboration. In this respect, organisational culture is considered a strategy that can be harnessed and manipulated to improve organisational commitment and productivity. Consequently, managers have often been advised to nurture and utilise culture to sustain performance and collaborative public management strategies.
The cultural perspective underscores the affect-based trust composites. It emphasises "internal aspects of institutionalised organisations, historical legacies, and established traditions but also looks at external institutionalised environments and prevailing beliefs regarding what constitutes relevant problems and good solutions" (Christensen et al., 2007, p. 3). Therefore, unlike the bureaucratic systems perspective, the logic of action from the cultural system perspective is that of appropriateness – where appropriate behaviours do not call for rational deliberations. Instead, the focus is on what is most likely to be applicable, tried in the past, or drawn from previous experiences and lessons that have worked elsewhere (Christensen et al., 2007, p. 3).
The logic of appropriate, in this case, may also entail behaviours primarily drawn on dominant norms and values taken for granted and have been perpetually practised or rationalised by administrators. Cultural imperatives also mean that integrity and efforts to enforce them in bureaucratic contexts have more to do with administrative personalities and relations than rules. This may partly explain how public agencies enter into partnerships and why some of these partnerships may collapse or remain stable and sustainable, as will be explained further in this paper.
The Environmental Perspective
The environmental perspective integrates both the internal and external surroundings of an institution. Organisational environments, such as working conditions in the institution and management styles within and between government institutions, may result in some degree of trust or distrust between collaborating agencies and between these agencies and the citizens (Bouckaert, 2012). As such, contingencies, mainly political trust, public trust, and institutional trust towards the government or agencies concerned with realising a particular policy program, shape a typology for multi-agency relations and are critical in building inter-agency trust.
Moreover, employees' internal environments are highly influenced by the prevailing management patterns and institutional trust levels, including collective mindsets (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004; Ohemeng et al., 2019). This way, public leaders are tasked with changing mindsets from defensive to productive reasonings and creating new ways of managing the personnel to become innovative. This involves encouraging teamwork, effective conflict resolution mechanisms, and a climate of trust. The climate of trust "encourages risk-taking behaviours, such as cooperation, knowledge sharing and helping colleagues in need, because employees are confident their generosity will be reciprocated" (Ohemeng Darko and Amoako-Asiedu, 2019, p.3). This will produce different teamwork strategies and outward-looking performance definitions through collaborations and knowledge-sharing.
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) contend that team strategies in an organisation towards their environment can be categorised into informing, parading, and probing teams. "Informing teams remain relatively isolated from their environment; parading teams have high levels of passive observation of the environment, and probing teams actively engage outsiders. Probing teams revise their knowledge of the environment through external contact, seek outside feedback on their ideas, and promote their teams' achievements within their organisation" (p. 5). They further identified four typologies of boundary-spanning activities – ambassador, task coordinator, scout, and guard. The ambassador activity relies on the boundary spanner to access the organisation's power structures. The task coordinator activity "identifies how the personnel provides accessibility to the workflow structures to manage horizontal dependence. Scout activity concerns the acquisition of pertinent ideas and information. The guard activity aims to protect information from external parties (Curnin 2016,2). These are determined mainly by an individual organisation's leadership style, knowledge transfer, training, as well as internal ethical climate and managerial strategies.
In a study looking into the impact of leadership training programs on knowledge transfer to improve Health Care systems in county governments in Kenya, it was established that successful experiences were because of the "training design, work environment climate, trainee characteristics, team-based coaching and leveraging on occurring opportunities" (Chelagat et al. 2019,1). Conversely, failed programs were because of the need for more effective communication, longitudinal coaching and work-team recruitment (Chelagat et al., 2019).
Creating trustful relationships is stimulated when bureaucratic, cultural, and environmental rationalities are closely matched. In this way, trust in collaborative governance can be understood within an interface between organisational culture, structure, and external environments of public organisations, as demonstrated in the proceeding discussion.
The Context
As public innovation policy tools, multi-agency approaches are designed to strengthen horizontal institutional relationships or policy networks, which should help resolve some vertical implementation gaps. By their nature worldwide, multi-agency policy networks in Kenya have taken some of the following dimensions; (a) collaborations with International Organizations (or donor agencies); (b) collaborations with locally-based non-governmental organisations and civil society groups; (c) collaborations between regional governments or inter-governmental partnerships (i.e., Economic blocs); (d) collaborations between government institutions and community associations/groups like in the context of communal resource-mobilisation, e.g., through youth or women groups, and (e) collaborations between government institutions themselves.
However, these distinctions are not clear and sometimes need to be refined. They may overlap or include other streams, such as layers of inter-agency relations and membership from non-governmental organisations. In Kenya, this is very common. The last stream is increasingly becoming the implementation model for policy programs, especially in the national bureaucracy and between county governments and national institutions (e.g., Otenyo 2021). These arrangements aim to enhance the effectiveness of policy implementation. For example, the National Council of Administration of Justice (NCAJ), formed in 2011, is high-level policymaking, performance, and oversight coordinating mechanism. Its membership comprises State and non-State justice sector actors. It is formally required to hold at least four Council meetings per year.
The Chief Justice heads it by statute that institutionalises its policies within different institutional contexts, such as the Law Society of Kenya, Kenya Prisons, Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the Directorate of Criminal Investigation, and Inspector of Police, among other members of mutual interest. Members have lauded NCAJ for ensuring enhanced policy development and effective collective action on policy implementation and evaluation. For example, with the outbreak of COVID-19, it recently convened three times to draft guidelines that would cushion the spread of COVID-19, mainly in Prisons and other areas.
The role of donor agencies in initiating or sustaining these networks as funders have also been extensively documented in Kenya. Following massive food shortages and malnutrition in the 1980s, donor agencies such as the European Union (EU) and USAID worked with the government to resolve Kenya's disastrous food security (Otenyo, 2021). Again, within the Kenyan National Plan of Action (2013-17) framework, the Better Migration Management (BMM) Programme, a cross-national collaborative framework, has been legitimated.
BMM is funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). BMM has been critical in training and providing information for the Ministry of Immigration, Kenya Police Service and Department of Children, and other stakeholders in combating human trafficking. This is mainly through Isiolo County for Eritreans and Ethiopians en route to South Africa because of human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants between the two countries.
Other multi-stakeholder arrangements include the Uwiano Platform for Peace, whose membership comprises UNDP, UNWomen, Kenya's National Security Council (NSC), the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), IEBC and PeaceNet, has a presence in all the 47 counties in Kenya. Besides being critical in training government and non-governmental personnel, this platform has enhanced coordination among its partners at national and sub-national levels. In the context of anti-corruption policy programs, administrative executives at all government levels are engaged in different multi-agency arrangements. These are created through statutes (rational-legal systems) or personal initiatives (informal boundary-spanning activities) to enhance the effectiveness of corresponding statutes. This has been motivated to; address the complex problem of public policies and create an environment for the comprehensive implementation of cross-cutting policy programs.
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) is the lead agency that coordinates anti-corruption policy strategies in government institutions, commissions, and authorities. This has involved devising and engaging in different typologies or forms of multi-agency networks. Before the sessional paper No.2 of 2018, which rolled out the National Ethics and Anti-Corruption Policy (NEACP), anti-corruption programs in Kenya were hosted in many legal frameworks, ethical guidelines, and other legislation to foster public accountability or strengthen public administration integrity systems. These include Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003; the Bribery Act, 2016; Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003 (POEA); the Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012 (LIA); the Public Finance Management Act, 2012, among others. NEACP's development and implementation take a collaborative governance approach effort by key government agencies like the Witness Protection Agency, Commission for Administrative Justice (CAJ), etc. Cross-institutional synergies are highly recommended to realise the effective implementation of the policy (Republic of Kenya 2018).
Based on the recognition that enforcement of this anti-corruption legislation and programs is cross-cutting and requires a multi-sector approach to be effective (an integrated policy), the National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee (NACCSC) and EACC have engaged in broad-based stakeholder consultations and networks. Partnerships and collaboration in anti-corruption efforts involve commissions, ministries, donor organisations, and other stakeholders. In particular, EACC has primarily partnered with agencies whose core business matches its own but is slightly different because of corruption's complex nature as a policy problem. These include the Ombudsman's office (Commission for Administrative Justice - CAJ) and the police.
Among other networks, through the Kenya Leadership and Integrity Forum (KLIF), EACC, CAJ, government ministries and their departments, and the Judiciary cooperate to enhance internal or vertical and external or horizontal coordination. This is on specific investigations and penalties that may emerge during the implementation of the Public Service Integrity Program (PSIP) strategies that were applied before the NEACP. As a component of the Civil Service Reform Programmes (CSRP) reforms, anti-corruption policy programs were to be integrated into political-administrative structures through the PSIP framework. The PSIP was rationalised by matching public sector reforms with needed behavioural changes for a responsive, responsible, and accountable public administration. Therefore, training on integrity matters is key to changing the culture and environments of administration. Consequently, PSIP requirements, mainly Performance Contracting (PC), were to be integrated into all government agencies' administrative systems.
The indicators for organisational performance are established within the PC to include the following strategies for integrating anti-corruption policy programs in the public sector: (i) developing anti-corruption policies. This should include a statement on managerial responsibility and the subordinate staff's responsibility to address corruption in the institutions. Besides, there should be a summary that points out potential corrupt practices and requirements like (i) Developing institutional anti-corruption policies also creates corrupt prevention committees (CPCs) in partnering institutions. (ii) Realisation of corruption prevention committees or CPCs. This was to coordinate PSIP in the concerned agency and sensitisation through corruption campaigns within institutional jurisdictions. There should also be a review, monitoring, and evaluate the impact of PSIP, including preparing and submitting periodical reports on the internal status of corruption. (iii) Public entities should develop a corruption prevention plan (CPP). This includes developing risk management strategies, identifying critical functions and responses to risk areas, etc. (iv) Institutions should develop specific codes of conduct according to the national ethical guidelines. (v) There should be frequent integrity training, including the appointments and training of the Integrity Assurance Officers (IAOs). The IAOs should provide technical support to the management on Policy integration besides conducting sensitisation workshops in collaboration with EACC.
Multi-agency Networks for Anti-Corruption Policy Strategies in Kenya
Several multi-agency networks are meant to help integrate anti-corruption policy programs in Kenya. The public sector's primary partnership networks are KLIF and the Integrated Public Complaints Referral Mechanism (IPCRM)i. EACC defines KLIF as "a national integrity system set up to coordinate a unified sector-based strategy for preventing and combating corruption by forging alliances and partnerships with sectors across the Kenyan society" (EACC 2015, 37). KLIF has 14 members across the public and private sectors. These include follows; Legislature, Judiciary, Executive, EACC, Enforcement Agencies, Watchdog Agencies, Education, County Governments, Civil Society, Private Sector, Media, Professional Bodies, Labor, Religious Sector, and Constitutional Commissions (refer to EACC website).
Under the KLIF umbrella, the EACC coordinated and rolled out a five-year multi-sector integrity strategy dubbed the Kenya Integrity Plan (KIP). Through KIP, a roadmap was formulated "for all the KLIF sectors to implement a unified strategy to combat Kenya's corruption. All the sectors and the respective institutions implementing the KIP align their anti-corruption interventions to the KIP and develop annual action plans and progress implementation reports"ii.
These reports provide an opportunity to assess performance and measure the impact of stakeholders' anti-corruption activities. Furthermore, the IPCRM was formed in 2013 as multi-agency information management of corruption reports among six partners. Membership includes the EACC, the CAJ, Transparency International (TI-Kenya) as the only non-governmental organisation partner, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) describes IPCRM as an initiative of five agencies. IPCRM aims to strengthen partnerships between the state oversight institutions in handling, managing, and disposing of the received complaints/reports. It should also give feedback to the members of the public who lodged complaints (NCIC, 2015, p. 35).
More reports on human rights, corruption, and hate speech, among others, have been reported by member organisations. For example, the IPCRM initiative "led to efficient and effective access of services at devolved levels by establishing one-stop complaints and referral centres that has enhanced access, especially in rural/remote areas, to public complaints procedures established to address hate speech and ethnic discrimination" (NCIC, 2015, p.36). The IPCRM ensures coordination, information-sharing, and building an inclusive approach to tackling corruption amongst its stakeholders. Thus, the integration of PSIP is partially conducted within a principal-agent framework and polycentric systems in the public sector. For example, in the subnational public administration, the County Public Service Boards and Accounting Officers/Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are in charge of integrating the PSIP in collaboration with EACC and other commissions.
i By 2017, IPCRM has since become inactive.
ii EACC website (https://eacc.go.ke/default/klif/)