In a framework allowing for both vertical and horizontal product differentiation, the seller persuades the consumer of unknown taste by sending verifiable product information. The standard unraveling argument does not extend well under horizontal differentiation mainly because it is indefinite how to rank seller types. By defining price-dependent sales-dominance relations over seller types, we provide a generalized unraveling argument that can be applied no matter how products are differentiated. We show that if a sales-dominant seller type exists at a price over some seller types, an outcome at which all and only these seller types pool at this price doss not emerge regardless of the prior. We argue that sales-dominance relation is complete at every price if and only if full disclosure is the unique outcome regardless of the prior. We find the condition under which a worst-case type is well-defined regardless of the prior for every observable deviation of the seller. Finally, we explore product information the consumer could receive when sales-dominance relations are incomplete.