The impact of the natural urbanisation process on building violations, socioeconomic factors, flaws in the building rules and regulations, as well as improper urban management policies, can generally be categorised into four categories (Sarkheyli et al., 2012). In other words, politics, economics, culture, and nature all have an impact on the process of constructing and repairing the city. In general, politics (management) plays a significant role in building and reproducing space in developing countries (Kamanroudi Kojouri, 2006a).
One of the key tools supporting urban management is sustainable revenues. Public finance is typically used to bring up this issue (urban finance). The term "public finance" (sometimes known as "urban finance") is frequently used to refer to methods of financial earning, expenditure, and management of financial resources. Another prerequisite for sustainable urban development is the existence of sustainable sources of revenue. In addition, how much and in what ways the city's natural resources are used affects sustainable development in the urban economy. protecting urban green space, water, and other resources, as well as the urban environment. Therefore, it is important to produce urban public goods and provide revenue in a way that does not degrade the environment's quality or the residents' quality of life. In other words, when urban management includes at least two crucial elements of sustainability and upholds the quality of the environment and urban area, its income is sustainable (Sharzei and Majed, 2013).
The four pillars of public finance are "decentralised finance," "local tax economy," "economy of municipal services," and "central government helping the municipality economy." Decentralized finance refers to decentralisation and giving local governments the financial authority of the federal government with the goal of providing the ideal number of public goods required in a particular geographic area. The local tax economy emphasises that people should pay for the creation and provision of local government services if they are to benefit from them. Regarding the economics of municipal services, this institution consistently offers a range of services to the people and collects the required fees from them. Assisting the municipality with government funding is one more approach to cover the cost of urban services (Qurbani and Azimi, 2013).
The first and second generations of this issue have been used to present the overall viewpoint on decentralised finance. First-generation decentralised finance advocates hold that the public sector should step in and try to promote societal welfare whenever the market fails since there are public goods involved. According to these viewpoints, decentralised levels of government (especially local governments) ought to rely more on taxes that are connected to the advantages of local public goods, including real estate taxes and paying for municipal services. In addition to other economic areas, the growing viewpoints of the second generation of decentralised finance also include those of politics and social sciences. On the other side, the central government takes on the role of an employer rather than giving the local government a budget, which restricts their ability to provide services through the budget in a flexible manner. This means that in addition to deciding the local budgetary restrictions, the federal government also controls how those funds are allocated among other costs. As a result, one of the key distinctions between the perspectives of the first and second generations is the central government's fiscal constraints (Andalib and Sobetghadam, 2009).
According to decentralised finance models, the only way to reduce monopoly rent in society is through downsizing. This is the rationale behind why cutting the government budget is regarded as the most crucial piece of policy for all-around government downsizing. In many economic domains, these approaches have actually been unsuccessfully implemented under technocratic and non-participative development patterns(Kamran et al., 2020). Urban management is one of these examples. City administrators essentially put monopoly rent permits to urban areas and profit from this rent on the agenda when faced with structural limits and hurdles to setting charges and taxes. Urban management is one of the areas where, according to neoclassical economists' beliefs, shrinking the size of the government does not result in a decrease in monopoly rent and an increase in economic efficiency. New theories of development stress how reducing government (using a non-participative development model) increases monopoly rent and economic inefficiencies. This non-participatory development model manifests in areas where there is a lack of social and class awareness, a lack of strength in the organisation of social strata, and a lack of robust civic institutions(Yazdani, 2001).
In 2017, Sundaresan conducted research on the relation between building code violations and urban planning in Bangalore, India. He came to the conclusion that a network of private interests, political interference, and governance failures caused planning to violate building codes and harm the public interest. In 1998, Ahar et al. looked at policies and the poor housing situation in Mumbai, India, and concluded that migration and rapid population increase were significant reasons. The rapid expansion of the low-wage informal sector and high-cost enterprises were promoted by previous urban development strategies. Additionally, subsidised transportation systems made it possible for urban dwellers to live and work. Additionally, a poor and ineffective urban planning system, a lack of public investment, and restrictions in the real estate and rental markets all contributed to the informal housing problem that plagued the poor in this city. In 2009, Tseng et al. looked into Taiwanese city of Tainan's building code infractions. On the one hand, it was determined that people's ignorance of the significance of building standards in sustaining the urban environment was the primary cause of these infractions. On the one hand, there wasn't enough room, which was another issue. According to Ioannidis et al. (2009), who investigated informal structures in Greece's Eastern Attica region, unplanned development and the emergence of informal structures are the result of a confluence of social, economic, legal, and administrative variables.
In 2009, Alnsour and Meaton investigated the factors affecting non-compliance with residential norms in the Jordanian city of Old Salt. Three socioeconomic categories (family size, household income, public awareness, and assets), administrative measures (administrative culture, oversight, and implementation), and the ambiguity of residential rules were used to categorise these aspects. The rise in housing demand was accompanied by difficulties like the number of large households, low income levels, poor public awareness of planning and building laws, and a shortage of housing financial facilities. This type of development violated planning rules because of the rise in housing demand brought on by the impact of these economic and social conditions. Many scholars, including Tipple (2000), Fekade (2000), and Erbas and Nothaft (2005), have validated this effect, particularly with regards to reducing the cost and duration of building. Local organisations and the government are primarily responsible for using residential standards in this type of building. As a result, monitoring and regulating the application of planning criteria can be done very effectively through corporate culture and urban management techniques. Municipal culture, according to Post (1996), is crucial for managing and regulating urban development and ensuring adherence to these standards. Arimah and Adeagbo (2000) assert that it is essential to adapt or dualize three variables, such as planning, implementing, and supervising, particularly when there are administrative and personal interests involved.
After conducting study in Mexico City, Ramos (2019) came to the conclusion that profitable interactions in the framework of the economy were to blame for the city's recent spatial development. Real estate and urban land policies were the foundation for this problem since ineffective urban management and planning might serve as a springboard and exacerbate its effects. Zhai et al (2018) research examined rent-to-price ratios, house rents, and property prices in 30 Chinese cities. The findings of that research indicated that the ratio of rent and the price of land and housing is a key indicator in identifying the real estate market condition. In that study, the dynamics of this ratio and the variables influencing home prices from 2008 to 2013 during a five-year period were examined. There appeared to be a strong correlation between rent and home prices. By distinguishing the centre, middle, and new contexts, Manganelli and Murgante examined the dynamics of urban land rent in sizable Italian cities in 2017. The findings showed that the urban land rent is a result of a significant difference between the market price and the cost of producing land, which causes urban sprawl. Additionally, according to research by Bob and Rao (2012), unauthorised construction results from poor urban management that disobeys the laws and guidelines governing urban development control. According to Alnsour and Meaton's research, one of the key causes of building violations is the ambiguity of construction regulations and standards. As a result, management strategies including administrative culture, methods for construction monitoring, and how to put building regulations into practise were suggested. In accordance with residential building requirements, these three actions were considered to be significant attitudes.
Romano et al studies (2021) of illegal building and Italy's national land policy in the year 2021 led them to the conclusion that, despite the fact that these activities fall under a variety of categories, they do not ultimately have any notable outcomes. The inadequacy of the administrative, regulatory, and technical agencies to address this particular infringement is highlighted by this. The impact of building violation costs on final and rental pricing in the city of Chicago was researched by Bartram in 2019. Bartram held the opinion that while the cost of correcting building problems raises rent, it does not significantly affect a home's final selling price. In 2019, Alishaqee and Albazzaz looked at how the quality of life in Baghdad's Atifiya neighborhood was affected by building code violations and the split of unofficial residential land. They came to the conclusion that this activity significantly affected the quality of life. Additionally, the public service network became unsuitable and reduced open and public areas, placing enormous strain on urban infrastructure. Building infractions in the Taiwanese city of Tainan were investigated by Tseng et al. in 2009. It was discovered that failure to comply with legal permissions and technical regulations were the most common breaches. Because of this, the majority of the violators were prepared to pay the fine. A sort of rent and examples from urban land were given by Raisdana in his 2003 study on urban land rent in Iran. These rents were referred to as "paving rent" or "Induction rent of municipalities". In his opinion, towns and governmental entities produce this kind of rent by imposing limitations, offences, and taxes, or by making concessions that give rise to absolute rent suspicion, exclusive rent, or differential rent. In this method, social classes that rely on money might get approval to enhance density by erecting multi-story structures in exchange for paying the required sum of money. Their land will be able to produce more goods in this way (more residential units).
Based on this, reducing government with a technocratic, non-participative development paradigm is one of the main causes of building breaches in cities. In this instance, public and private sector actors worked together to commodify urban area and to generate unstable earnings through monopoly rent, stock market, and building violations. Numerous effects and instabilities in the physical-spatial, socioeconomic, natural-ecological, and political-management dimensions result from these circumstances (Fig. 1).